JUDGMENT : 1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 25th November 2017 passed below Exhibit 73 in Civil Suit No.841 of 2015 by the learned Additional Judge, City Civil Court No.09, Ahmedabad (hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial Court”) whereby the learned Judge has allowed the withdrawal of the suit while rejecting the objection raised by the applicant, who is power of attorney holder of one Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia, the applicant has preferred the present civil revision application. 2. Brief facts of the present case is that the plaintiff – Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia and respondent No.1 are real brothers and they have got property from their father by Will and one of the conditions is regarding pre-emption right. It was mentioned in the Will that if any of the son wants to sell his portion of the property, he has to sell to his brother i.e. other son and in case of any of the son refused to purchase the property, in that event, other son is entitled to sell his plot to any third party. It is contended by the plaintiff that his brother respondent No.1 tried to sell his portion of the property and, therefore, he has published notice in the local newspapers whereby the plaintiff has filed objection and informed the respondent that he is ready to purchase the property. It is contended that there was notice transactions between the parties and ultimately, the plaintiff’s power of attorney holder has instituted the aforesaid suit for declaration and permanent injunction against his real brother. 2.1 It emerges that during the pendency of the aforesaid suit, application at Exhibit 73 came to be filed by the original plaintiff which has been objected by the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff and after hearing both the sides, learned Judge was pleased to allow application at Exhibit 73 and the suit was permitted to be withdrawn and rejected the objection raised by the applicant. Now, the applicant has assailed the impugned order passed by the Trial Court on the ground that the same is erroneous and it is based on the pretext that the original plaintiff has sold his land and, therefore, there does not remain the right of pre-emption and on this ground, the suit itself is not maintainable and on that ground, the prayer for withdrawal of the suit was allowed. According to him, it was brought to the notice of the Trial Court that the mischief has been played by the defendants and the suit may not be allowed to be withdrawn. It is contended that the sale deed executed is by playing mischief and accordingly, the civil suit is filed for cancellation of the sale deed. By referring to H.R.P. No.374 of 2017, it is contended that the suit was filed for protecting the right of the original plaintiff as the same was effected by Rasinkumar Babarbhai Bhatia and that suit was not against the original plaintiff and, therefore, the fact of that suit ought not to have been relied upon by the Trial court. He has assailed the observations of the Trial Court regarding the fact that no cause of action survives in the present suit and permitted withdrawal of the suit. It is also averred that there are three power of attorney holders contending to be the power of attorney holder of the original plaintiff and this fact has not been considered by the Trial Court and passed the impugned order. According to him, in view of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter be referred to as “the CPC”), it was the duty of the learned Judge to insist upon the parties to reduce the terms into writing while making withdrawal application. It is contended that on perusal of the withdrawal application, it appears that no terms were produced on record upon which both the parties have arrived at amicable settlement. It is further contended that the Trial Court has failed to appreciate the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gurpreft Singh Vs. Chatur Bhuj Goft, reported in (1988) 1 SCC 270 . It is contended that the original plaintiff has brought to the notice of the Trial Court that some mischief has been played by the defendant and his signatures are obtained by the original defendant upon the documents are not of free will and hence, there is a dispute with regard to the signatures of the original plaintiff. It is further contended that the Trial Court has not considered the email sent by the original plaintiff to the Registrar of the City Civil Court as well as the learned Judge. It is further contended that the Trial Court has not considered the email sent by the original plaintiff to the Registrar of the City Civil Court as well as the learned Judge. It is contended that the Power of Attorney executed in favour of the applicant herein was never cancelled and the Power of Attorney executed in favour of some third person was not executed by him. On all these grounds, it is prayed by the applicant – Power of Attorney that the order passed below Exhibit 73 In Civil Suit No.841 of 2015 may be quashed and set aside and the same may be restored to its file. 3. Heard Mr. Mehul Shah, learned senior advocate with Mr. Dhruvik Patel, learned advocate for the applicant and Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala, learned senior advocate with Mr. Manav Mehta, learned advocate for the respondents at length. Perused the impugned order as well as record placed in the form of paper book and the decisions cited at the Bar. 4. Mr. Mehul Shah, learned senior advocate with Mr. Dhruvik Patel, learned advocate for the applicant has submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of revision application. While referring to all documents, he has submitted that both sons have equal share in the property and there was clause of pre-emption. He has submitted that in the suit, interim application was filed and it was allowed in favour of the original plaintiff. He has submitted that on the date of production of the withdrawal purshis at Exhibit 73, the original plaintiff was in the hospital and his signature was obtained fraudulently on the said purshis. He has submitted that the advocate, who was engaged by the power of attorney holder, has not put his signature on the purshis, but another advocate has identified the signature of the original plaintiff. He has referred to the medical papers and has submitted that the objection was raised by the power of attorney holder which is at page No.85 of the paper-book. While referring to the communication i.e. email sent by the original plaintiff to the concerned Trial Court, he has submitted that after reaching to USA, the original plaintiff has also specifically stated that he has not cancelled the power of attorney in favour of the present applicant and he has not signed the withdrawal purshis and he intends to proceed with the suit. While referring to the other power of attorney executed in favour of the brother of the original plaintiff, he has submitted that the power of attorney has no authority to deal with the matter. He has submitted that in the suit, the issues were framed and, thereafter, list of documentary evidence was also produced. While dealing with the application of defendant at Exhibit 88 at page No.103 of the paper-book, he has submitted that this is an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC for rejection of the plaint. He has submitted that the application came to be rejected by the Trial Court. He has further submitted that other power of attorney holder of the original plaintiff has also moved an application at Exhibit 89 (page No.107 of the paper-book) contending to take action against the present plaintiff as he has forwarded false email and has tried to create the evidence. 4.1 Mr. Mehul Shah, learned senior advocate has submitted that another suit was filed regarding other own property and that suit has no connection with the present one and the present suit is only based on the right of pre-emption. He has submitted that when the original plaintiff has sent email to the Court, it should have been considered by the Trial Court and the order on purshis below Exhibit 73 ought not to have been passed and withdrawal purshis ought to have been rejected and proper opportunity to lead the evidence ought to have been granted to the present applicant, who is power of attorney holder of the original plaintiff. He has submitted that the original plaintiff is ready to depose through video conference. While referring to the provisions contained in Order XXIII of the CPC, he has submitted that when the power of attorney holder of the original plaintiff has raised the objection then the evidence is required to be recorded and there is triable issue as to whether there was real intention on the part of the original plaintiff to withdraw the suit or not. He has also submitted that the suit was filed by the power of attorney holder and, therefore, the original plaintiff ought not to have been permitted to place the application for withdrawal of the suit and only the applicant herein, who is power of attorney, could have exercised such right. He has also submitted that the suit was filed by the power of attorney holder and, therefore, the original plaintiff ought not to have been permitted to place the application for withdrawal of the suit and only the applicant herein, who is power of attorney, could have exercised such right. He has submitted that the original defendant is afraid of facing trial. He has submitted that the Trial Court has committed serious error of facts and law in passing the impugned order and, therefore, it requires interference by this Court. 4.2 By relying upon the following decisions, Mr. Mehul Shah, learned senior advocate has urged to allow the present civil revision application and quash and set aside the impugned order and to restore the suit on its file and the Trial Court may be directed to complete the proceedings within time bound manner. (i) In the case of Yeshwant Govardhan Vs. Totaram Avasu and others, AIR 1958 Bombay 28; (ii) In the case of Dwarika Prasad Vs. Nirmala and others, (2010) 2 SCC 107 ; (iii) In the case of Mahalaxmi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others Vs. Ashabhai Atmaram Patel, (2013)4 SCC 404 ; 5. Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala, learned senior advocate with Mr. Manav Mehta, learned advocate for the respondents has vehemently submitted that the suit and the present civil revision application have been filed by the power of attorney holder of the plaintiff named Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia. He has submitted that the power of attorney has been cancelled by the public notice and, therefore, the present applicant is no more power of attorney holder of the original plaintiff. He has submitted that the original plaintiff has sold his part of share and, therefore, there is no question of right of pre-emption in existence and, therefore, the original plaintiff cannot insist for pre-emption. While referring to another suit filed for cancellation of the sale-deed, he has submitted that the present applicant himself has shown other person as power of attorney holder of Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia. He has submitted that when the original plaintiff himself has sold the property which came to his share under the Will there is no question of pre-emption. He has submitted that no right is subsisting in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, the suit itself is not maintainable at all. He has submitted that when the original plaintiff himself has sold the property which came to his share under the Will there is no question of pre-emption. He has submitted that no right is subsisting in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, the suit itself is not maintainable at all. He has submitted that there are other power of attorney holders of the original plaintiff and by virtue of other power of attorney, the sale deed has been executed in favour of one Vipul Patel. He has referred to the public notice of revocation of the power of attorney holder of the present applicant dated 10th August 2017. 5.1 Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala, learned senior advocate has submitted that the present applicant i.e. so-called power of attorney of Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia has filed the suit against Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia himself and in that suit, he has joined the other power of attorney holder of the original plaintiff – Arvindbhai. He has submitted that in that suit, the interim injunction has been denied by the Trial Court. While referring to the documentary evidence on record, he has submitted that on 29th August 2017, Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia came to India and he was in India till 11th September 2017. He has submitted that the withdrawal pushis of the original plaintiff has been filed on 4th September 2017 at Exhibit 73 wherein it is specifically stated that the dispute has been settled out of the Court and, therefore, the original plaintiff is not willing to proceed with the suit. According to him, when the original plaintiff himself has signed the purshis and submitted before the Trial Court, the power of attorney holder cannot challenge the same on the ground that the suit was filed by the power of attorney and not by the plaintiff himself. He has submitted that the stand of the power of attorney holder is that without informing him and without any written settlement deed, the original owner of the suit property, who wants to exercise his right of pre-emption, cannot move the purshis at Exhibit 73 reflects the conduct and intention of the power of attorney holder. He has submitted that the stand of the power of attorney holder is that without informing him and without any written settlement deed, the original owner of the suit property, who wants to exercise his right of pre-emption, cannot move the purshis at Exhibit 73 reflects the conduct and intention of the power of attorney holder. While referring to the letter dated 14th September 2017 at page No.121 of the paper book written by Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia addressed to the learned Judge, he has submitted that it cannot be considered as it is not produced as per the provisions of law and the same is sent directly to the learned Judge, which cannot be considered. While referring to the medical papers dated 30th August 2017 at page No.122 of the paper book, he has submitted that this shows that Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia was in India when the said withdrawal purshis was filed. While referring to the various documentary evidence on record, he has submitted that there is original signature of the plaintiff which can be compared and when compared, it is clearly found that the signature of the original plaintiff Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia is same. 5.2 Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala, learned senior advocate has submitted that when the power given to the present applicant was cancelled then in absence of any fresh power given to the present applicant, the present applicant cannot proceed with the matter. He has submitted that the power of attorney given to his own brother by original plaintiff Arvindbhai is not revoked till today. He has invited the attention of the Court that there are three power of attorney holders nominated by the original plaintiff. While referring to the various documents, he has submitted that in reality, so-called power of attorney holder Johnmark Ravikant Kant, applicant herein is personally pursuing the legal matter. He has submitted that Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia has not denied having settlement between the parties. He has submitted that for restoration of cancelled power of attorney holder in favour of the present applicant, in view of Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act, fresh power of attorney in writing is required. According to him, the communication dated 4th October 2017 at page No.97 of the paper-book does not satisfy the provisions of Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act. According to him, the communication dated 4th October 2017 at page No.97 of the paper-book does not satisfy the provisions of Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act. He has submitted that the present applicant, who is power of attorney holder of original plaintiff, has no valid power of attorney in his favour. He has submitted that the subsequent suit is filed by another not for cancellation of sale deed. 5.3 While referring to the impugned order passed by the Trial Court, Mr. Sanjanwala, learned senior advocate has submitted that the Trial Court has considered all the vital aspects of the matter and has properly exercised its jurisdictional discretion and this being a civil revision application, the power of this Court is very much limited. He has submitted that in this case, the settlement has not been challenged and provision of Section 14 of the Notary Act is not properly complied with on the document produced by the original plaintiff through e-mail. He has urged to dismiss the present civil revision application and to confirm the impugned order of the Trial Court. 6. In rejoinder, Mr. Mehul Shah, learned senior counsel for the applicant has submitted that the withdrawal purshis at Exhibit 73 was filed on 4th September 2017, the document list was produced at pages No.130 and 131 of the paper-book on 9th November 2017, by third power of attorney, which includes several documents. He has submitted that the impugned order was passed on 25th November 2017. While referring to the document list filed by respondent No.1 who is real brother of Arvindbhai, has filed objection at Exhibit 93. While referring to the Memorandum of Understanding dated 1st September 2017 at page No.150 of the paper-book, he has submitted that the signature of the original plaintiff is obtained when he was not having good health and he was taking medicine as per the medical papers dated 30th August 2017 at page No.122 of the paper book. While referring to the Memorandum of Understanding dated 1st September 2017 at page No.150 of the paper-book, he has submitted that the signature of the original plaintiff is obtained when he was not having good health and he was taking medicine as per the medical papers dated 30th August 2017 at page No.122 of the paper book. He has referred to the medical papers dated 30th August 2017 at page No.122 of the paper book and has submitted that while taking the benefit of ill-health of Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia, signatures have been taken on various papers and, therefore, the so-called signatures of the original plaintiff even if are of the same person i.e. plaintiff then also, considering the special facts and circumstances of the case, those documents ought not to be considered by the Court below and the communication sent by the original plaintiff from USA to the concerned Court and sending of documentary evidence thereof ought to have been considered by the Trial Court, while deciding the withdrawal purshis. He has submitted that the Trial Court has committed serious error of law and facts in allowing the withdrawal purshis. He has urged to allow the present civil revision application. 7. It is well settled principle by catena of decisions that the High Court, while considering the matter in exercise of its jurisdiction in civil revision application would not reverse the finding of fact as recorded by the Courts below. But it is not an absolute proposition. In a case where the finding is recorded without any legal evidence on the record, or on misreading of evidence or suffers from any legal infirmity, which materially prejudices the case of one of the parties or the finding is perverse, it would be open for the High Court to set aside such a finding and to take a different view. The exercise of the revisional power is broadly subject to the following conditions; (1) That the decision must be of a court subordinate to the High Court; (2) That there must be a case decided by a subordinate court; (3) No appeal must lie either to the High Court or to any lower appellate court against the decision; (4) In deciding the case, the subordinate court must appear to have – (a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law, or (c) acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The High Court in exercising the revisional powers is in its very nature is a truncated power. The width of the powers of the revisional court cannot be equated with the powers of the appellate court. In exercising the legality and the propriety of the order under challenge, what is required to be seen by the High Court is whether it is in violation of any statutory provision or a binding precedent or suffers from misreading of the evidence or omission to consider relevant clinching evidence or where the inference drawn from the facts proved is such that no reasonable person could arrive at or the like. It is only in such situations that interference by the High Court in revision in a finding of fact will be justified. Mere possibility of a different view is no ground to interfere in exercise of revisional power. 8. In the case of Yeshwant Govardhan (supra), the Bombay High Court has held and observed in para-6 as under:- “6. Now, a suit may be disposed of in various ways. A suit may be disposed of by allowing plaintiff's claim. A suit may be disposed of by the dismissal of a plaintiff's claim. A suit may, again, be disposed of by a compromise between the parties and by a consent decree being taken between them and lastly, a suit may be disposed of by withdrawal as indicated in O. XXIII. It seems to us, and it will be conceded, that when a suit is filed, the Court has control over the proceedings initiated by the suit. If such a view were not taken, it would lead to confusion in the proceedings. It seems to us, and it will be conceded, that when a suit is filed, the Court has control over the proceedings initiated by the suit. If such a view were not taken, it would lead to confusion in the proceedings. The Suit must be shown to be disposed of in a manner permitted by the law.” 9. In the case of Dwarika Prasad (supra), the Apex Court has dealt with the powers from the revisional court under Section 115 and Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC in para-21 and 24 to the effect that the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court as incorporated in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is intended to ensure that justice is done between the parties. It is observed that it is well settled that in a suit for partition of the joint properties every defendant is also in the capacity of the plaintiff and would be entitled to decree in his favour, if it is established that he has a share in the properties. 10. The provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC provides withdrawal and adjustment of suits, which reads as under:- R.1 Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim. - (1) At any time after the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim: Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or other person to whom the provisions contained in rules 1 to 14 of Order XXXII extend, neither the suit nor any part of the claim shall be abandoned without the leave of the Court. (2) An application for leave under the proviso to sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend and also, if the minor or such other person is represented by a pleader, by a certificate of the pleader to the effect that the abandonment proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor or such other person. (3) Where the Court is satisfied - (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim. (4) Where the plaintiff - (a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1), or (b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3), he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim. (5) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorise the Court to permit one of several plaintiffs to abandon a suit or part of a claim under sub-rule (1), or to withdraw, under sub-rule (3), any suit or part of a claim, without the consent of the other plaintiffs. 11. In view of the aforesaid provisions, if the plaintiff wants withdrawal of the suit under Order XXIII Rule 1 then it is right of the plaintiff to withdraw the suit without any liberty for institution of fresh suit. If the case falls under Order XXIII Rule 1, the plaintiff concerned can withdraw the suit. The plaintiff is dominant right to proceed and would normally permit to withdraw the suit unless and until the prayer for withdrawal falls within the exceptional circumstances. In view of the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 1, the leave of the Court is required in the case where the plaintiff is minor or disable or persons falling under Order XXXII Rule 1 to 14 and in that case, the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 2 is applicable. 12. Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act provides for presumption as to powers of attorney reads as under:- 85. Presumption as to powers of attorney. 12. Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act provides for presumption as to powers of attorney reads as under:- 85. Presumption as to powers of attorney. - The Court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power-of-attorney, and to have been executed before, and authenticated by, a Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, [Indian] Consul or Vice-Consul, or representative [***] of the [Central Government], was so executed and authenticated. [85A. Presumption as to electronic agreements. - The Court shall presume that every electronic record purporting to be an agreement containing the [electronic signature] of the parties was so concluded by affixing the [electronic signature] of the parties]. 85B. Presumption as to electronic records and a [electronic signature]. - (1) In any proceedings involving a secure electronic record, the Court shall presume unless contrary is proved, that the secure electronic record has not been altered since the specific point of time to which the secure status relates. (2) In any proceedings, involving secure [electronic signature], the Court shall presume unless the contrary is proved that- (a) the secure [electronic signature] is affixed by subscriber with the intention of signing or approving the electronic record; (b) except in the case of a secure electronic record or a secure [electronic signature], nothing in this section shall create any presumption, relating to authenticity and integrity of the electronic record or any [electronic signature]. 85C. Presumption as to [electronic signature certificates]. - The Court shall presume, unless contrary is proved, that the information listed in a [electronic signature certificate] is correct, except for information specified as subscriber information which has not been verified, if the certificate was accepted by the subscriber.] 13. The aforesaid provisions of the Indian Evidence Act empowers the Court to raise presumption regarding powers of attorney executed before and authenticated by a Notary Public, or any Court, Judge, Magistrate [Indian] Consul or Vice-Consul, or representative of the Central Government. In this case, one after other, there are three power of attorneys of the plaintiff. It also appears from the record that the power of attorney given to the present applicant has been cancelled by the original plaintiff. The plaintiff has not taken any action after revocation of the power of attorney of the present applicant Johnmark Ravikant Kant and has not tendered the necessary document before the Trial Court. It also appears from the record that the power of attorney given to the present applicant has been cancelled by the original plaintiff. The plaintiff has not taken any action after revocation of the power of attorney of the present applicant Johnmark Ravikant Kant and has not tendered the necessary document before the Trial Court. The original plaintiff has simply sent e-mail from USA to the concerned Judge, which is not in consonance with tendering of document in the suit itself. Further, in view of the fact that the present applicant has filed the suit against own master wherein he has joined another power of attorney holder of Arvindbhai duly suggests that the power of attorney has been cancelled by the original plaintiff – Arvindbhai. 14. In the case of Mahalaxmi Cooperative Housing Society Limited (supra), while dealing with Order XXIII, the Apex Court has held and observed in paras-39, 40, 41 and 42 as under:- 39. Rule 1 of Order 23 speaks of withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim. Rule 1 of Order 23 covers two types of cases (i) where the plaintiff withdraws a suit or part of a claim with the permission of the court to bring in fresh suit on the same subject-matter and (ii) where the plaintiff withdraws a suit without the permission of the Court. 40. Rule 3 of Order 23, on the other hand, speaks of compromise of suit. Rule 3 of Order 23 refers to distinct classes of compromise in suits. The first part refers to lawful agreement or compromise arrived at by the parties out of court, which is under 1976 Amendment of CPC required to be in writing and signed by the parties. The second part of Rule deals with the cases where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of whole or a part of the suit claim which is different from first part of Rule 3. The expression “agreement” or “compromise” refer to first part and not the second part of Rule 3. The second part gives emphasis to the expression “satisfaction”. In Pushpa Devi v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 , this Court has recognised that the distinction deals with the distinction between the first part and the second part: (SCC p.577, para 19). "19. What is the difference between the first part and second part of Rule 3? The second part gives emphasis to the expression “satisfaction”. In Pushpa Devi v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 , this Court has recognised that the distinction deals with the distinction between the first part and the second part: (SCC p.577, para 19). "19. What is the difference between the first part and second part of Rule 3? The first part refers to situations where an agreement or compromise is entered into in writing and signed by the parties. The said agreement or compromise is placed before the court. When the court is satisfied that the suit has been adjusted either wholly or in part by such agreement, or compromise in writing and signed by the parties and that it is lawful, a decree follows in terms of what is agreed between the parties. The agreement / compromise spells out the agreed terms by which the claim is admitted or adjusted by mutual concessions or promises, so that the parties thereto can be held to their promises in future and performance can be enforced by the execution of the decree to be passed in terms of it. On the other hand, the second part refers to cases where the defendant has satisfied the plaintiff about the claim. This may be by satisfying the plaintiff that his claim cannot be or need not be met or performed. It can also be by discharging or performing the required obligation. Where the defendant so 'satisfied' the plaintiff in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, nothing further remains to be done or enforced and there is no question of any 'enforcement' or 'execution' of the decree to be passed in terms of it." 41. Further, it is relevant to note the word “satisfaction” has been used in contradistinction to the word “adjustment” by agreement or compromise by the parties. The requirement of “in writing and signed by the parties” does not apply to the second part where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of whole or part of the subject-matter of the suit. 42. The proviso to Rule 3 as inserted by the Amendment Act, 1976 enjoins the court to decide the question where one party alleges that the matter is adjusted by an agreement or compromise but the other party denies the allegation. The court is, therefore, called upon to decide the lis one way or the other. 42. The proviso to Rule 3 as inserted by the Amendment Act, 1976 enjoins the court to decide the question where one party alleges that the matter is adjusted by an agreement or compromise but the other party denies the allegation. The court is, therefore, called upon to decide the lis one way or the other. The proviso expressly and specifically states that the court shall not grant such adjournment for deciding the question unless it thinks fit to grant such adjournment by recording reasons. 15. Considering the contentions of the parties, material placed on record, impugned order and the decisions cited at the Bar, it is an admitted fact that both brothers i.e. original plaintiff - Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia and defendant – Anant Babarbhai Bhatia have got property from their father by Will and there is recital regarding pre-emption right in favour of both the sons. It is also an admitted fact that prior to filing of the suit by the power of attorney holder of Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia, there was notice transactions regarding the sale of the property of Anant Babarbhai Bhatia. It also reveals from the paper-book that the defendant No.1 has informed the plaintiff and invited him to purchase the property at market price. Whereas, it is contended by the original plaintiff that he is ready to purchase the property not at market price but at valuation report which he has obtained. It appears from the record that the present applicant, power of attorney of the original plaintiff, was given a special power of attorney only to deal with the property and not for any other purpose. It also appears from the record that during the pendency of the suit, the withdrawal purshis came to be filed by the original plaintiff on 4th September 2017 wherein it is specifically stated that the amicable settlement has been arrived at between the parties and, therefore, the plaintiff waives his dispute regarding the property and he does not want to proceed with the matter and withdraw the suit unconditionally. This very purshis has been challenged by the power of attorney holder of the original plaintiff stating that he was not informed by the original plaintiff and the original plaintiff has no right to withdraw the suit and only he has right as the power of attorney holder of the original plaintiff. 16. This very purshis has been challenged by the power of attorney holder of the original plaintiff stating that he was not informed by the original plaintiff and the original plaintiff has no right to withdraw the suit and only he has right as the power of attorney holder of the original plaintiff. 16. It appears that essentially, the power of attorney holder of the original plaintiff is pursuing the matter and not original plaintiff. Of course, it appears from the record that after reaching USA, the so-called email transaction has been sent in the name of Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia addressed to the concerned Judge. This fact cannot be treated as legal one as, if any, party to the legal proceedings has to provide the document in the matter then it has to be tendered in the Court itself and no person can directly send the same to the concerned Judge. The practice adopted by the original plaintiff Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia cannot be endorsed. Had there been real objection of such withdrawal purshis then he himself should have personally appear before the Court below and told the Court that he has objection for withdrawal of suit and do not intend to withdraw the suit. It also appears from the paper book that almost in all the papers which includes MOU as well as documents giving power to the present applicant and the power of attorney given to his brother, the signature of the original plaintiff are same. 17. It is pertinent to note that the present power of attorney holder Johnmark Ravikant Kant has also filed the suit against the original plaintiff - Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia, who is owner of the property and has given the power of attorney for the same property. This shows that the brother of the original plaintiff is not pursuing the legal battle, but under the guise of the power of attorney holder of the original plaintiff, Johnmark Ravikant Kant is pursuing the legal proceedings. It is also come on record that by virtue of public notice issued in the daily newspapers, the power given to Johnmark has been cancelled and, thereafter, there is no revival of the power of attorney by the original plaintiff in favour of the applicant. It is also come on record that by virtue of public notice issued in the daily newspapers, the power given to Johnmark has been cancelled and, thereafter, there is no revival of the power of attorney by the original plaintiff in favour of the applicant. It is also pertinent to note that the document list at Exhibit 91 at page No.130 of the paper book has been filed on behalf of the original plaintiff by another power of attorney holder, who is said to be brother of Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia. Along with that power of attorney, which is given to the brother, has been produced wherein the signature of the original plaintiff is there on page No.139 of the paper book. It also reveals from the materials on record that the another power of attorney is also given in the name of Vinay Harbanshkumar Arora at page No.143 of the paper book which also bears the identical signature of the plaintiff on page No.143. It also reveals from the paper book at page No.143 that the power of attorney given to Vinay Harbanshkumar Arora has been cancelled by Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia vide on 7th November 2017 which is at page No.149 of the paper book which bears the same signature. Not only that it appears from the aforesaid documents in paper book, but also appears from the MOU dated 1st September 2017 between the brothers, that on each page, the signature of Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia is there and his photograph is also appended and the same has been notarized. It also reveals from the affidavit filed by Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia which is at page No.165 of the paper book suggests that he has come in India and produced the withdrawal purshis before the concerned Court and he did not intend to continue with the aforesaid suit and want to withdraw the same and he has averred that he has sold his own property and on this document also, there is signature of the plaintiff Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia, which can be compared with other document, which is signed by the Notary of New Jersey. 18. It appears from the record that Jonhmark Ravikant Kant is alleged to be power of attorney holder of Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia has instituted H.R.P. Suit No.374 of 2017 against Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia through power of attorney Rashinkumar Babarbhai Bhatia. 18. It appears from the record that Jonhmark Ravikant Kant is alleged to be power of attorney holder of Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia has instituted H.R.P. Suit No.374 of 2017 against Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia through power of attorney Rashinkumar Babarbhai Bhatia. This very fact suggests that earlier power of attorney Jonhmark Ravikant Kant himself has filed the suit against this applicant who has given right to protect the property. All these circumstances suggests that the real fighter is not Arvindbhai Babarbhai Bhatia, but it is Jonhmark Ravikant Kant. 19. It is pertinent to note that the stand taken by Jonhmark Ravikant Kant that without his consent, the original plaintiff cannot withdraw the suit is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The wish of the owner is to be respected and not that of the power of attorney holder. It appears from the record that withdrawal purshis has been objected by the power of attorney holder. The status of the power of attorney holder can be termed as agent and he cannot become the principal by virtue of such power of attorney given by the owner of the property. Filing of objection by the power of attorney holder against his own master is nothing but an attempt to grab the property of the owner. The conduct of the power of attorney holder is doubtful. When the original owner has sent the purshis for withdrawal which is supported by the other documents, this power of attorney holder cannot object to it, but he has to accept the same as it is as his master’s wish. Unfortunately, in this case, the so-called power of attorney holder Jonhmark Ravikant Kant is pursuing the matter for the reasons best known to him. 20. On perusal of the impugned order of the Trial Court, it clearly transpires that the Trial Court has properly considered each and every aspects of the matter and has not committed any error in allowing the withdrawal purshis at Exhibit 73 and in rejecting the objection of the power of attorney Johnmark Ravikant Kant. As such, the impugned order is sustainable in the eyes of law and does not warrant any interference by this Court. 21. In view of the above, the present civil revision application is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed. No order as to costs. Interim relief, if any, is vacated forthwith. As such, the impugned order is sustainable in the eyes of law and does not warrant any interference by this Court. 21. In view of the above, the present civil revision application is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed. No order as to costs. Interim relief, if any, is vacated forthwith. FURTHER ORDER At this stage, Mr. Mehul Shah, learned senior advocate for the applicant requests for extension of interim relief, which is objected by learned advocate for the respondents. Considering the fact that there was interim relief granted in favour of the applicant, let the interim relief be continued for six weeks.