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2019 DIGILAW 1128 (ALL)

Suraj Mehata v. State Of U. P.

2019-04-30

MANJU RANI CHAUHAN

body2019
JUDGMENT : Manju Rani Chauhan, J. 1. Heard Mr. Rakesh Pandey, Advocate assisted by Mr. A.R. Siddiqui and Mr. Gaurav Tiwari, learned counsel for the applicants-Suraj Mehata and Arvind Singh, Sri Dhiraj Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the applicants-Suresh Mishra and Mr. Om Prakash Mishra, learned A.G.A. for the State. 2. Perused the material on record. 3. The above three bail applications have been filed by the applicants-Suraj Mehata, Suresh Mishra and Arvind Singh respectively with a prayer to enlarge them on bail in Case Crime No. 44 of 2019, under Sections 419, 420, 272 and 273 I.P.C. Police Station-Govind Nagar, District-Kanpur Nagar, during the pendency of the trial. 4. It transpires from the record that a first information report has been lodged by the Inspector Shri Mohd. Jainuddin Ansari of Special Task Force, Kanpur Nagar on 11th February, 2019 at 20:30 hrs against five persons, namely, Suraj Mehata (applicant herein), Sanjay Darwani, Suresh Mishra (applicant herein), Arvind Singh (applicant herein) and Abhishek Kapoor alleging therein that the Police has been informed that in the Sangam Food Factory situate at Govind Pur, with the help of adulterated chemical, indigenous liquid butter (deshi ghee) and sesame (teel) oil were being made, which was causing disfunction on the human body. On the said information, Personnel of Special Task Force came to the factory and saw that RPO chemical were being boiled and packaging was being done by labours with the help of machines. No scent was coming from the boiling chemical, whereas from the packing material, scent of indigenous liquid butter was coming. After mixing adulterated chemicals in the soybean oil, sesame oil was being made and packaging of the same was done. Since the matter related to food stuff, information was given to the team of F.S.D.A. Kanpur. On the said information, the officers/officials of F.S.D.A. were present including the Food Security Officer, Kanpur. After stopping the packaging work, a joint investigation was initiated. Suraj Mehata (applicant herein), who was partner of the said factory, was interrogated and he told that Sangam Food Product was a partnership firm and the main partner of the said firm was Sanjay Darwani and other details regarding registration of the said firm and licence of repacker and wholesaler were also disclosed. On seeing the Police, said Sanjay Darwani escaped. On seeing the Police, said Sanjay Darwani escaped. Since the notification/information was found to be correct, Suresh Mishra, Gate Keeper (applicant herein) and Arvind Singh (applicant herein), Supervisor of the said firm were taken into custody. When the accountant, namely, Abhishek Kapoor was searched, it was found that with the owner of the firm, he also escaped taking along with with him necessary documents. On the pointing out of one of the partners Suraj Mehata (appliant herein), Police Personnels as well as the officers/officials of Food and Security Department have seached the first floor of firm, where duplicate indegenous liquid butters, duplicate sesame oils, adulterated chemicals, soybean oil in various quantities as well as wrappers of various brands, printing machine (for printing batch, manufacturing date and printing), turner machine etc. were recovered. On the interrogation, Suraj Mehata told that one liter of chemical (which was found in four drums), when mixed in 220 liters of soyabean oil appeared like sesame oil. By understanding it as sesame oil, people used the same and bought it on the rate of sesame oil. 5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the applicants that once alleged adulteration is being made in food stuff, then the entire activity of applicants is covered by Special Act i.e. Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006 and the authorities can take action only under the aforesaid Special Act as it postulates an overriding effect over all other food related laws including the F.A. Act and accordingly, invocation of Sections 272 and 273 I.P.C. in matter relating to adulteration is unjustifiable and accordingly, this Court should come to the rescue and reprieve of the applicants. Learned counsels for the applicants has placed reliance upon the Division Bench Judgment of the Lucknow Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holdings (Pvt) Ltd. & Another Vs. Learned counsels for the applicants has placed reliance upon the Division Bench Judgment of the Lucknow Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holdings (Pvt) Ltd. & Another Vs. State of U.P. & Others {Writ petition No. 8254 (MB) of 2010, decided 8th on September, 2010) along with two other connected petitions, wherein it has been laid down that in view of the specific provisions of Food Safety & Standards Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the “FSS Act”), the offences relating to adulteration of food that are governed under the FSS Act after July 29, 2010 are to be treated as per the procedures to be followed for drawing and analysis of samples as have been provided for. The provisions of penalties and prosecution have also been provided therein. Therefore, before launching any prosecution against an alleged offence of food adulteration, it is necessary for the concerned authorities to follow the mandatory requirements as provided under Sections 41 and 42 of FSS Act and therefore, the Police have no authority or jurisdiction to investigate the matter under FSS Act. It has next been argued by the learned counsel for the applicants that despite time being granted under order of the Court dated 1st January, 2019 in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 13379 of 2019, no counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State. Non filing of counter affidavit will deprive the right to liberty of the applicants. It has next been argued that the period of detention of the applicants of more than two months as on date is excessive, whereas the punishment for the offences punishable under Sections 272 and 273 Cr.P.C. is only for six months along with fine. It has next been argued that the matter relates to food stuff, therefore, the first information report should be lodged by the Food Safety Department and not by the Special Task Force, therefore, in view of the provisions contained in Food Safety and Security Act, 2006, the present first information report is liable to be quashed. It has further been argued that the alleged recovered chemicals were sent for analysis before the Government Public Analysis Laboratory, Lucknow on 11th February, 2019. It has further been argued that the alleged recovered chemicals were sent for analysis before the Government Public Analysis Laboratory, Lucknow on 11th February, 2019. Out of ten samples, no adulterant was detected in six samples as per the report of the Laboratory, copy of which is on record as Annexure-S.A.-1 to the supplementary affidavit filed in Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 14478 of 2019. Two samples have been reported to be misbranded and substandard, whereas remaining two samples are reported to be adulterant as per the FSS Act but the same is not injuries to health. Against the said report, the applicants have an efficacious statutory alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 46 (4) of FSS Act, but because of arrest, they could not avail the said benefit by challenging the said report. It has further been argued that if the said report is found to be correct, then only in that circumstance, the maximum punishment for adulterant is only a penalty not exceeding two lacs. If it is adulterant and injurious to health then also punishment, which can be imposed, is only a penalty not exceeding Rs. Ten lacs as per sub-sections (i) & (ii) of Section 57 of FSS Act. 6. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the applicants that provisions of Sections 419 and 420 are not applicable to the applicants as they have licence of repackaging the edible oil and selling the same on wholesale rate. It has lastly been argued that the applicants have not committed any heinous crime and they are alleged to have committed petty offences. Therefore, they are liable to be enlarged on bail. The applicants have no criminal antecedents to their credit except the present one. As the present case is false, the applicants are liable to be enlarged on bail. It is lastly contended that there is no possibility of the applicants of fleeing away from the judicial process or tampering with the witnesses and in case, the applicants are enlarged on bail, the applicants shall not misuse the liberty of bail. The applicants, namely, Suraj Mehata, Suresh Mishra and Arvind Singh are in jail since 11th February, 2019, 11th February, 2019 and 12th February, 2019 respectively. 7. Per contra, Mr. Om Prakash Mishra, learned A.G.A. has opposed the present application for bail. The applicants, namely, Suraj Mehata, Suresh Mishra and Arvind Singh are in jail since 11th February, 2019, 11th February, 2019 and 12th February, 2019 respectively. 7. Per contra, Mr. Om Prakash Mishra, learned A.G.A. has opposed the present application for bail. He states that the first submission of the learned counsel for the applicants that when in the matter food adulteration, Special Act i.e. FSS Act has come into picture, provisions of Sections 272 and 273 I.P.C. are not applicable against applicants are liable to be rejected on the ground that there is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender under two different enactments, the bar is only to the punishment of the offender twice for the offence. In support of the same, Mr. Mishra has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of the State of Maharashtra & Anr. Versus Sayeed Hassan Sayeed Subhan & Ors. reported in AIR 2018 SC 5348 & MANU/SC/1021/2018. 8. Paragraph nos. 6 and 7 of the said judgment are reproduced herein below: “6. There is no dispute that Section 55 of the FSS Act provides for penalty to be imposed for non compliance of the requirements of the Act, Rules or Regulations or orders issued there under by the Food Safety Officer. But, we are afraid that we cannot agree with the conclusion of the High Court that non compliance of the provisions of the Act, Rules or Regulations or orders cannot be subject matter of a prosecution under IPC unless expressly or impliedly barred. The High Court is clearly wrong in holding that action can be initiated against defaulters only under Section 55 of FSS Act or proceedings under Section 68 for adjudication have to be taken. A further error was committed by the High Court in interpreting the scope of Section 188 of the IPC. Section 188 of the IPC does not only cover breach of law and order, the disobedience of which is punishable. Section 188 is attracted even in cases where the act complained of causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety as well. We do not agree with the High Court that the prohibitory order of the Commissioner, Food and Safety is not an order contemplated under Chapter X of the IPC. Section 188 is attracted even in cases where the act complained of causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety as well. We do not agree with the High Court that the prohibitory order of the Commissioner, Food and Safety is not an order contemplated under Chapter X of the IPC. We are also not in a position to accept the findings of the High Court that Section 55 of the FSS Act is the only provision which can be resorted to for non compliance of orders passed under the Act as it is a special enactment. 7. There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender under two different enactments, but the bar is only to the punishment of the offender twice for the offence. Where an act or an omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. 1. The same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under the IPC and at the same time, an offence under any other law. 2 The High Court ought to have taken note of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as follows: “Provisions as to offences punishable under two or more enactments – Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of 1 T.S. Baliah v. T.S.Rengachari – (1969) 3 SCR 65 2 State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan – (1988) 4 SCC 655 those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” 9. So far as the second submission raised by the learned counsel for the applicants that non-filing of counter affidavit will deprive the right to liberty of the applicants is concerned, Mr. So far as the second submission raised by the learned counsel for the applicants that non-filing of counter affidavit will deprive the right to liberty of the applicants is concerned, Mr. Mishra, the learned A.G.A. has argued that the same is also liable to be rejected on the ground that the complete instructions along with case diary qua the present case have already been received by him and from the same he has already placed the oral as well as documentary evidence to assist the Court in the present case. Therefore, there is no requirement of filing of counter affidavit to bring on record the aforesaid oral as well as documentary evidence, as the same are already before this Court. 10. Mr. Mishra, learned A.G.A. has next argued that the third submission raised by the learned counsel for the applicants that the period of detention of the applicants of more than two months as on date is excessive, whereas the punishment for the offences punishable under Sections 272 and 273 Cr.P.C. is only for six months along with fine, is also liable to be rejected on the ground that under the amended provisions of Sections 272 and 273 I.P.C. in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the punishment for the offences under Sections 272 and 273 I.P.C. is for life imprisonment along with fine. Learned counsel for the applicants have mislead the court in submitting that the punishment under the aforesaid Sections is for six months only. In support of the same, he has placed reliance upon the amended provisions of Sections 272 and 273 I.P.C., which read as follows: “272. Adulteration of food or drink intended for sale Whoever adulterates any article of food or drink, so as to make such article noxious as food or drink, intending to sell such article as food or drink, or knowing it to be likely that the same will be sold as food or drink, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. STATE AMENDMENTS State of Uttar Pradesh: In sections 272, 273, 274, 275 and 276 for the words "shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both" the following shall be substituted, namely:- "shall be punished with imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the court may, for adequate reason to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment tot- life." [Vide U.P. Act No. 47 of 1975].” 273. Sale of noxious food or drinks: This section makes sale of noxious food or drink an offence. It says that whoever either sells, or offers or exposes for sale, any article as food or drink which has either been rendered noxious or which has become noxious, or which is in such a state that makes it unfit for food or drink, either with the knowledge or having reason to believe that the same is noxious as food or drink, shall be punished with simple or rigorous imprisonment for a term extending up to six months, or with fine extending up to one thousand rupees, or with both. State of Uttar Pradesh: In sections 272, 273, 274, 275 and 276 for the words "shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both" the following shall be substituted, namely:- "shall be punished with imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the court may, for adequate reason to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment tot- life." [Vide U.P. Act No. 47 of 1975].” 11. In view of the aforesaid amended provisions, Mr. Mishra has stated that as learned counsel for the applicants has mislead the Court by submitting that the punishment under Sections 272 and 273 I.P.C., is for six months only, applicants are not entitled to any relief from this Court including their enlargement on bail. In support of the same, he has referred paragraph nos. Mishra has stated that as learned counsel for the applicants has mislead the Court by submitting that the punishment under Sections 272 and 273 I.P.C., is for six months only, applicants are not entitled to any relief from this Court including their enlargement on bail. In support of the same, he has referred paragraph nos. 21 to 30 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ramjas Foundation & Another Versus Union of India & Others reported in (2010) 14 SCC 38 , which reads as follows: “21. The principle that a person who does not come to the Court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every Court is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have bearing on adjudication of the issues arising in the case. 22. In Dalglish v. Jarvie 2 Mac. & G. 231, 238, Lord Langdale and Rolfe B. observed: "It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under the notice of the Court all facts material to the determination of his right to that injunction; and it is no excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the importance of any fact which he has omitted to bring forward. 23. In Castelli v. Cook (1849) 7 Hare, 89, 94 Wigram V.C. stated the rule in the following words: "A plaintiff applying ex parte comes under a contract with the Court that he will state the whole case fully and fairly to the Court. If he fails to do that, and the Court finds, when other party applies to dissolve the injunction, that any material fact has been suppressed or not property brought forward, the plaintiff is told the Court will not decide on the merits, and that, as he has broken faith with the Court, the injunction must go." 24. If he fails to do that, and the Court finds, when other party applies to dissolve the injunction, that any material fact has been suppressed or not property brought forward, the plaintiff is told the Court will not decide on the merits, and that, as he has broken faith with the Court, the injunction must go." 24. In Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus Brothers & Company 55 L.T. 802, 803, Kay J. held as under: "I have always maintained, and I think it most important to maintain most strictly, the rule that, in ex parte applications to this Court, the utmost good faith must be observed. If there is an important misstatement, speaking for myself, I have never hesitated, and never shall hesitate until the rule is altered, to discharge the order at once, so as to impress upon all persons who are suitors in this Court the importance of dealing in good faith in the Court when ex parte applications are made." 25. The same rule was restated by Scrutton L., J in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioner (1917) 1 K.B. 486. The facts of that case were that in April, 1916, the General Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the district of Kensington made an additional assessment upon the applicants for the year ending April 5, 1913, in respect of profits arising from foreign possessions. On May 16, 1916, the applicants obtained a rule nisi directed to the Commissioners calling upon them to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not be awarded to prohibit them from proceeding upon the assessment upon the ground that the applicants was not a subject of the King nor resident within the United Kingdom and had not been in the United Kingdom, except for temporary purposes, nor with any view or intent of establishing her residence therein, nor for a period equal to six months in any one year. In the affidavit on which the rule was obtained the applicants stated that she was a French subject and resident in France and was not and had not been a subject of the United Kingdom nor a resident in the United Kingdom; that during the year ending April 5, 1913, she was in the United Kingdom for temporary purposes on visits for sixty-eight days; that she spent about twenty of these days in London at her brother's house, 213, King's Road, Chelsea, generally in company with other guests of her brother; that she was also in the United Kingdom during the year ending April 5, 1914, for temporary purposes on visits, and spent part of the time at 213, King's Road aforesaid; and that since the month of November, 1914, she had not been in the United Kingdom. 26. From the affidavits filed on behalf of the Commissioners and of the surveyor of taxes, who showed cause against the rule nisi, and from the affidavit of the applicants in reply, it appeared that in February, 1909, a leasehold house, 213, King's Road, Chelsea, had been taken in the name of the applicant's brother. The purchase money for the lease of the house and the furniture amounted to 4000l., and this was paid by the appliants out of her own money. The accounts of household expenses were paid by the brother and subsequently adjusted between him and the applicants. The Divisional Court without dealing with the merits of the case discharged the rule on the ground that the applicants had suppressed or misrepresented the facts material to her application. The Divisional Court observed that the Court, for its own protection is entitled to say "we refuse this writ of prohibition without going into the merits of the case on the ground of the conduct of the applicants in bringing the case before us". 27. On appeal, Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R. and Warrington L.J. approved the view taken by the Divisional Court. Scrutton L.,J. who agreed that the appeal should be dismissed observed: "and it has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicants comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts - facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it - the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicants must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement." 28. The above noted rules have been applied by this Court in large number of cases for declining relief to a party whose conduct is blameworthy and who has not approached the Court with clean hands - Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC 1558 , Welcome Hotel v. State of A.P. (1983) 4 SCC 575, G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Government of Karnataka (1991) 3 SCC 261 , S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1 , A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P. (2007) 4 SCC 221 , Prestige Lights Limited v. SBI (2007) 8 SCC 449 , Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India (2008) 2 SCC 326 , K.D. Sharma v. SAIL (2008) 12 SCC 481, G. Jayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel (2009) 3 SCC 141 and Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. (2010) 2 SCC 114 . 29. In the last mentioned judgment, the Court lamented on the increase in the number of cases in which the parties have tried to misuse the process of Court by making false and/or misleading statements or by suppressing the relevant facts or by trying to mislead the Court in passing order in their favour and observed: "1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. "satya" (truth) and "ahimsa" (nonviolence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice delivery system which was in vogue in the pre- Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice delivery system which was in vogue in the pre- Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings. 2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final." (emphasis supplied) 30. In our view, the appellants are not entitled to any relief because despite strong indictment by this Court in Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, they deliberately refrained from mentioning details of the cases instituted by them in respect of the land situated at Sadhora Khurd and rejection of their claim for exemption under clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959 by the High Court and this Court.” 12. Mr. Mishra has further argued that the fourth submission of the learned counsel for the applicants that as per the report of the Laboratory, only two samples are found to be adulterant and for the same, they may be inflicted penalty of a fine of Rs. 2 lacs when the adulterant is found to be not injurious to health and a penalty of Rs. 10 lacs, when the same is found to be injurious health as per the provisions of FSS Act, is liable to be rejected on the ground that they have been prosecuted under the Indian Penal Code and not under the provisions of FSS Act and for the same, there is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender under two different enactments, which has already been explained by the Apex Court in the case of Ramjas Foundation (Supra). It is for the applicants to avail the remedy under FSS Act for quashing of the same. At this stage, the genuineness or otherwise of the report of the Laboratory qua the recovered chemicals from the firm of the applicants, cannot be looked into and learned counsel for the applicants cannot claims benefit for the same. Since the applicants before this Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C. seeking enlargement of their bail, this Court can examine only as to whether the offences alleged against the applicants are made out or not only. 13. Mr. Mishra, learned A.G.A. has further argued that the fifth submission of the learned counsel for the applicants that Sections 419 and 420 are not applicable in the case of applicants as the firm has licence for packaging the indigenous liquid butter and sell the same on wholesale rates is also liable to be rejected on the ground that the applicants were illegally manufacturing the indigenous liquid butter and sesame oil mixing adulterated chemicals they were also by pasted the wrappers of various branded companies for selling the same on higher rates, which goes to show that they have committed fraud to the public at large, therefore, Sections 419 and 420 are applicable against them. 14. Mr. Mishra has next argued that the last submission of the learned counsel for the applicants that the applicants have not committed heinous crime and for the petty offences, seeing the detention of the period of the applicants, they are liable to be enlarged on bail, is also liable to be rejected on the ground that learned counsel for the applicants has mislead the court as the offences committed by the applicants are punishable under Sections 272 and 273 and punishment under the said Sections is for life imprisonment along with fine. The persons like the appliantss, who sells the food stuff by mixing toxic chemicals etc. only to earn more money and for their personal benefit, are liable to be punished harshly, as such persons are dangerous for life and liberty of public at large. Adulterated food stuff, which are made from bones of animals, chemicals, pam oils, soaps cream etc. not only make the people sick but also becaome cause of death in few cases. only to earn more money and for their personal benefit, are liable to be punished harshly, as such persons are dangerous for life and liberty of public at large. Adulterated food stuff, which are made from bones of animals, chemicals, pam oils, soaps cream etc. not only make the people sick but also becaome cause of death in few cases. Due to the consumption of adulterated food, peopl can get various chronic diseases like Liver Disorder, Diarrhoea, Stomach Disorder, Lathyrism Cancer, Vomiting, Dysentery, Cancer, Joint Pain, Heart Diseases, Food Poisoning etc. The minerals, chemicals, and poor quality substances added to the food are responsible for these health conditions which the people might have to undergo in future. Some adulterated foods can even lead to abortion or a brain damage. Young children consuming adulterated food for long will have issues in conceiving. 15. Dealing with the complicity of applicants-accused and in light of the material on record, the learned A.G.A. vehemently submits that no case for bail is made out and the bail applications of the present applicants are liable to be rejected. It is lastly contended that the innocence of the applicants cannot be adjudged at this stage, therefore, they do not deserve any indulgence. 16. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicants, the learned A.G.A. for the State and upon perusal of the evidence brought on record as well as the complicity of the applicants but without commenting on the merits of the case, I do not find any good reason to exercise my discretion in favour of the accused applicants. Thus, all the three bail applications stand rejected. 17. However, the trial court is expected to gear up the trial of the aforesaid case and conclude the same as expeditious, as possible from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order, keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Alakh Alok Srivastava Vs. Union of India and Another reported in AIR 2018 (SC) 2004, if there is no legal impediment. in accordance with law, without granting any unnecessary adjournment to either of the parties, provided the applicants fully cooperate in conclusion of the trial, if there is no other legal impediment. 18. Office is directed to transmit a certified copy of this order to the court concerned within a fortnight. 19. in accordance with law, without granting any unnecessary adjournment to either of the parties, provided the applicants fully cooperate in conclusion of the trial, if there is no other legal impediment. 18. Office is directed to transmit a certified copy of this order to the court concerned within a fortnight. 19. It is clarified that any observations, if any, made by this Court are strictly confined to the disposal of the bail application and must not be construed to have any reflection on the ultimate merits of the case.