JUDGMENT : VIRESHKUMAR B. MAYANI, J. 1. Being aggrieved by the final judgment and order dated 19.12.2011 passed by the Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No.4413 of 1992, the original Petitioner Nos. 4 and 5 have filed Letters Patent Appeal (Stamp) No.551 of 2012 (“LPA”) alongwith Civil Application (Stamp) No.6220 of 2012 for interim relief. As there is a delay of 144 days, a separate Civil Application No.6651 of 2012 (“Delay Condonation Application”) has been filed seeking condonation of delay of 144 days. During the pendency of the LPA, the Civil Application for interim relief and the Delay Condonation Application, on account of the demise of some of the parties, various Civil Applications came to be filed for the purpose of bringing on record the legal representatives of the said deceased party and/or for condonation of delay in filing such Civil Applications for bringing on record the legal representatives. Additionally one Civil Application No.908 of 2013 has been filed by Jankalyan Apartment Cooperative Housing Society Limited (“Jankalyan Society") seeking to be impleaded as Respondent in Delay Condonation Application and another Civil Application No.909 of 2013 has been filed by Jankalyan Society seeking impleadment in the LPA.Civil Applications for Legal Representatives: 2. Before dealing with the Delay Condonation Application seeking condonation of delay of 144 days in filing the LPA, this Court would first deal with the various Civil Applications filed for the purpose of bringing the legal representatives of the deceased party on record and/or seeking condonation of delay in filing such Civil Applications. The said Civil Applications are as follows: CA No. 10882 of 2012 being common Civil Application filed in CA No. 6651 of 2012, CA (Stamp) No.6620 of 2012 and LPA seeking condonation of delay for bringing legal representatives of deceased Respondents as prayed for vide paragraph 22 A and B thereof. As such, an Affidavit­in­Reply has been filed in the said CA No.10882 of 2012. However, this Court is inclined to condone the delay and therefore the said CA No.10882 of 2012 is allowed. CA No.2134 of 2014 has been filed in CA No.665l of 2012 and other Applications, seeking to bring on record the legal representatives of Respondent No.5­ Chandrakant Atmaram Patel. The respective learned advocates have no objection if the said CA No.2134 of 2014 is allowed without prejudice to the rights and contentions. CA No.2134 of 2014 has been filed in CA No.665l of 2012 and other Applications, seeking to bring on record the legal representatives of Respondent No.5­ Chandrakant Atmaram Patel. The respective learned advocates have no objection if the said CA No.2134 of 2014 is allowed without prejudice to the rights and contentions. Accordingly, the said CA No.2134 of 2014 is allowed. CA No.2154 of 2014 has been filed in CA No.10882 of 2012 and other Applications, seeking to bring on record the legal representatives of Respondent No.5­ Chandrakant Atmaram Patel. REDMI Kline respective learned advocates have no objection if the said CA No. 2154 of 2014 is allowed without prejudice to the rights and contentions. Accordingly, the said CA No.2154 of 2014 is allowed. CA No.1695 of 2016 has been tiled in CA No.12250 of 2015 seeking to bring on record the legal representatives of Applicant No.2/2­Bharatbhai Ammtbhai Patel. The respective learned advocates have no objection if the said CA No.1695 of 2016 is allowed without prejudice to the rights and contentions. Accordingly, the said CA No.1695 of 2016 is allowed. CA No.2289 of 2016 has been filed in CA No.12248 of 2015 and other Applications seeking to bring on record the legal representatives of Applicant No.2/2­ Bharatbhai Amrutbhai Patel. The respective learned advocates have no objection if the said CA No.2289 of 2016 is allowed without prejudice to the rights and contentions. Accordingly, the said CA No.2289 of 2016 is allowed. In view of the above, CA No. 10882 of 2012, CA No. 2134 of 2014, CA No. 2154 of 2014, CA No. 1695 of 2016 and CA No.2289 of 2016 are allowed. CA 6651 of 2012 for condonation of delay in filing LPA: 3. This Court shall now consider Civil Application No.6651 of 2012/Delay Condonation Application by which the Applicants have prayed for condonation of delay of 144 days in filing the LPA. 3.1 At this stage, it may be noted that the impugned final judgment and order dated 19.12.2011 (“impugned judgment”) passed by the Single Judge has been passed in 5 Special Civil Applications viz. (i) Special Civil Application No. 4413 of 1992, (ii) Special Civil Application No.10884 of 2009, (iii) Special Civil Application No. 11925 of 2009, (iv) Special Civil Application No.7087 of 2010 and (v) Special Civil Application No.7088 of 2010. (i) Special Civil Application No. 4413 of 1992, (ii) Special Civil Application No.10884 of 2009, (iii) Special Civil Application No. 11925 of 2009, (iv) Special Civil Application No.7087 of 2010 and (v) Special Civil Application No.7088 of 2010. Special Civil Application No.4413 of 1992 (“SCA 4413 of 1992”) challenged the order dated 03.06.1992 of the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (“Ceiling Act”) passed under section 20 thereof. The later 4 Special Civil Applications challenged orders passed by the Civil Court in exercise of powers under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”). 3.2 By the impugned judgment, the Single Judge disposed of SCA 4413 of 1992 with observations inter alia that the exemption permission is not revoked and that the party seeking any benefit thereunder qua title shall have to establish their title independently of that order i.e. the order dated 03.06.1992 passed under the Ceiling Act. 3.3 In so far as the remaining 4 Special Civil Applications are concerned, the Single Judge, by the impugned judgment allowed the same and remanded the matter back to the concerned Trial Court with certain directions. 3.4 Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment passed by the Single Judge in the said 4 Special Civil Applications, the present Respondent No.4 Mahalaxmi Cooperative Housing Society Limited (“Mahalaxmi Society”) filed before the Supreme Court, 4 Special Leave Petitions sometime in January 2012. In the said 4 Special Leave Petitions, the impugned judgment dated 19.12.2011 in so far as the same was passed in SCA 4413 of 1992 (under Ceiling Act), was undisputedly not challenged. Sufficienc of Cause for condonation of dela : 3.5 It is in the aforesaid background that this Court would like to examine the sufficiency of cause pleaded in Delay Condonation Application seeking condonation of delay of 144 days. 3.5.1. In paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Delay Condonation Application, the Applicants have essentially referred to/pleaded the facts of the matter and thereby tried to demonstrate that their case in the LPA is meritorious. 3.5.2. In paragraph 6 of the Delay Condonation Application, the Applicants have stated that the impugned judgment has been challenged by Respondent No.4­Mahalaxmi Society and others by filing 4 Special Leave Petitions and that the said 4 Special Leave Petitions were heard on 16.01.2012, 27.02.2012 and 12.04.2012. 3.5.2. In paragraph 6 of the Delay Condonation Application, the Applicants have stated that the impugned judgment has been challenged by Respondent No.4­Mahalaxmi Society and others by filing 4 Special Leave Petitions and that the said 4 Special Leave Petitions were heard on 16.01.2012, 27.02.2012 and 12.04.2012. It is thereafter stated by the Applicants in paragraph 7 that it was only during the hearing of the 4 Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court on 12.04.2012 that it transpired that the Respondent No.4­Mahalaxmi Society had not challenged the impugned judgment in so far as the same was passed in SCA 4413 of 1992 and that the Respondent No.4­Mahalaxmi Society had challenged the impugned judgment only in so far as the same was passed in the other 4 Special Civil Applications arising out of orders passed by the Trial Court. It is further stated by the Applicants that the record of the 4 Special Leave Petitions contained several volumes and that the Applicants were under the impression that the entire impugned judgment was challenged before the Supreme Court. It is further stated that it is at the hearing dated 12.04.2012 that it was made clear that the common impugned final judgment and order dated 19.12.2011 passed in SCA 4413 of 1992 is not challenged in the 4 Special Leave Petitions. Thereafter in paragraph 8 of the Delay Condonation Application, the Applicants have further stated that in view of the aforesaid, the Applicants decided to challenge the impugned judgment in so far as the same has been passed in SCA 4413 of 1992. It is at this stage that the Applicants consulted their lawyer and decided to challenge the impugned judgment in so far as the same is passed in SCA 4413 of 1992 by filing the present LPA. It is thereafter that the Applicants claim to have gathered all the necessary documents and details qua the proceedings under section 20 of the Ceiling Act and some time was spent in arranging for the funds for preparing the present LPA. In paragraph 9 of the Delay Condonation Application, the Applicants have stated that they applied for the certified copy on 02.01.2012 (i.e. within 2 weeks of the impugned judgment) and received the certified copy on 21.01.2012. In paragraph 9 of the Delay Condonation Application, the Applicants have stated that they applied for the certified copy on 02.01.2012 (i.e. within 2 weeks of the impugned judgment) and received the certified copy on 21.01.2012. Thereafter the Applicants have practically repeated the facts stated in paragraphs 6 to 8 and submitted that the said facts would constitute “sufficient grounds” in the eye of law to condone the delay in preparing the LPA. The Applicants have also pleaded in paragraph 10 that there is no lethargy, inaction or­inadvertence on part of the Applicants and that in the interest of justice delay be condoned. Lastly, in paragraph 11, the Applicants have stated that they have strong prima facie case on merit and the balance of convenience is in favour of the Applicants and hence the delay be condoned. Reply of the Contesting Respondents: 3.5.3. A detailed Affidavit­in­Reply dated 04.09.2012 (“Reply dated 04.09.2012”) alongwith various documents has been filed by Respondent No.2­Bai Saraswati. In the said Reply dated 04.09.2012, the Respondent No.2­ Bai Saraswati has contested the Delay Condonation Application both on the ground that the cause shown is not sufficient and also on merit. It has been stated that the entire premise for seeking condonation of delay on the ground that the Applicants came to know only on 12.04.2012 at the hearing of the 4 Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court that the impugned judgment in so far as the same is passed in SCA 4413 of 1992 is not challenged, is ex­facie false, incorrect and a blatant lie on the part of the Applicants. Reference is made to paragraph ‘J’ of the Reply dated 04.09.2012 and more particularly the order dated 16.01.2012 of the Supreme Court. A copy of the said order dated 16.01.2012 is at page 160 of the Delay Condonation Application wherein it clearly states as follows: “Ham the judgment and order dated 19.12.2011 In SCA No.10884/2009, SCA No. 7087/2010, SCA No.11925/2009. SCA No.7088/2010 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad." It is thereafter stated in the said Reply dated 04.09.2012 that the present Applicants have also filed their Affidavit­in­Reply 20.02.2012 in the 4 Special Leave Petitions. A copy of the said Reply dated 20.02.2012 is at pages 162­175 of the present Delay Condonation Application. SCA No.7088/2010 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad." It is thereafter stated in the said Reply dated 04.09.2012 that the present Applicants have also filed their Affidavit­in­Reply 20.02.2012 in the 4 Special Leave Petitions. A copy of the said Reply dated 20.02.2012 is at pages 162­175 of the present Delay Condonation Application. It may be noted that even in the said Reply dated 20.02.2012 of the Applicants, the Applicants have stated as follows in the cause title thereof: “Arising from the impugned common final judgment and order dated 19.12.2011 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No.10884/2009, Special Civil Application No. 7087/2010, Special Civil Application No.11925/2009, Special Civil Application No. 7088/2010." Thereafter in the Reply dated 04.09.2012, the contesting Respondents have referred to the order dated 27.02.2012 of the Supreme Court passed in the 4 Special Leave Petitions. A copy of the said order dated 27.02.2012 is at page 176 of the present Delay Condonation Application and it states as follows: “From the judgment and order dated 19.12.2011 in SCA No.10884/2009, SCA No. 7087/2010, SCA No.11925/2009, SCA No. 7088/2010 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad.” Paragraph ‘L’ of the Reply dated 04.09.2012 has referred to the hearing dated 12.04.2012 of the 4 Special Leave Petitions and the order dated 12.04.2012 by Which the present Respondent No.4­Mahalaxmi Society was permitted to carry out construction on the lands, etc. A copy of the said order dated 12.04.2012 is at pages 177­179 of the present Delay Condonation Application and it states as follows: “From the judgment and order dated 19.12.2011 In SCA No.10884 of 2009. SCA No.7087/2010, SCA No.11925/2009, SCA No.7088/2010 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad." In the Reply dated 04.09.2002, it is further stated that the present Applicants have falsely stated and claimed in the Delay Condonation Application that the Applicants learnt only on 12.04.2012 that the 4 Special Leave Petitions did not challenge the impugned judgment in so far as the same was passed in SCA 4413 of 1992 and therefore, the Applicants seek to challenge the same now. In paragraph ‘N’ of the Reply dated 04.09.2012, it has been further stated that apart from the above, no other cause, much less sufficient cause is pleaded by the Applicants. In paragraph ‘N’ of the Reply dated 04.09.2012, it has been further stated that apart from the above, no other cause, much less sufficient cause is pleaded by the Applicants. Thereafter while dealing with the present Delay Application parawise, it has been denied that the record of the Special Leave Petitions run into thousands of pages, it has been stated that only the Respondent No.4­ Mahalaxmi Society had filed the (4) Special Leave Petitions, it has been denied that it was during the hearing dated 12.04.2012 that the concerned Respondents i.e. Mahalaxmi Society made it clear that Mahalaxmi Society has not challenged the impugned judgment in so far as the same is passed in SCA 4413 of 1992. In paragraph 8, it has been stated that in so far as the purported consultation with the lawyer is concerned, it may not be out of place to state that the advocate of the present Applicants who appeared before the Single Judge was present and appeared for the Applicants before the Supreme Court on 27.02.2012 and 12.04.2012. It has also been stated that it was difficult to believe that the Applicants had the documents as well as the funds to appear before the Supreme Conn. engage advocates, tile reply whereas they were required to collect documents and funds for filing the present LPA. In so far as obtaining 0f certified copy is concerned, it has been stated that the Applicants had applied for the certified copy of the impugned judgment only in so far as the same is passed in CA 4608 of 2010 and not in SCA 4413 of 1992, that the said certified copy was notified on 04.01.2012 but the Applicants chose to take delivery only on 21.01.2012. It has been further stated that from a bare perusal of page 16 of the Delay Condonation Application, it is apparent that the same was prepared in April 2012 but filed on 11.05.2012, and that the Delay Condonation Application remained in office objection from 11.05.2012 upto 10.07.2012. In view of the said Reply dated 04.09.2012, it has been submitted that the Applicants have failed to show any cause, much less sufficient cause to condone the delay of 144 days in filing the LPA. In view of the said Reply dated 04.09.2012, it has been submitted that the Applicants have failed to show any cause, much less sufficient cause to condone the delay of 144 days in filing the LPA. It has been submitted that the Applicants have in fact not come with clean hands, have not stated true and correct facts and have tried to mislead the Hon’ble Court on the aspect of sufficiency of cause for the purpose of condonation of delay. 3.5.4. The Respondent No.4­Mahalaxmi Society has also filed an Affidavit­in-Reply dated 18.09.2012 in the present Delay Condonation Application and in substance has adopted the Reply dated 04.09.2012 of the Respondent No.2­Bai Saraswati. 3.5.5. Almost five years later, the present Applicants have filed an Affidavit­in Rejoinder dated 08.07.2017 (pages 183­207 and Annexures from pages 208 to 382) to the Reply dated 04.09.2012. On perusal of the said Rejoinder dated 08.07.2017, this Court notices that there is no parawise Rejoinder to the Reply dated 04.09.2012, and more importantly the assertions and submissions made in the Reply dated 04.09.2012 on the aspect of sufficiency of cause for condonation of delay has neither been dealt with nor denied by the present Applicants. On the contrary in the Rejoinder dated 08.07.2017, the present Applicants have tried to assert their case on merits rather than focusing on the sufficiency of cause to condone the delay. 3.5.6. The Applicants have thereafter recently, i.e. more than 7 and 1/2 years after filing the Delay Condonation Application, filed a further Affidavit dated 20.11.2019 (pages 383­389, with Annexures at pages 390­498). Even in the said further Affidavit dated 20.11.2019, there is no attempt made by the present Applicants to deal with the Reply dated 04.09.2012 on the aspect of sufficiency of cause but the attempt is only made by the Applicants to suggest that the Applicants have a strong case on merits of the matter and to assert that they have right, title, etc, over the land in question. It may be noted that by this time, i.e. when the Applicant. filed the Further Affidavit dated 20.11.2019, the 4 Special Leave Petitions were allowed by the Supreme Court and it was held that the Appellants had no right, title or interest in the land and the orders of the Trial Court accepting the compromise, were confirmed. It may be noted that by this time, i.e. when the Applicant. filed the Further Affidavit dated 20.11.2019, the 4 Special Leave Petitions were allowed by the Supreme Court and it was held that the Appellants had no right, title or interest in the land and the orders of the Trial Court accepting the compromise, were confirmed. However, the Applicants chose not to disclose the said fact in their Further Affidavit dated 20.11.2019. Reasons: 3.5.7. In the background of the aforesaid pleadings, this Court is now called upon to examine whether the Applicants have shown sufficient cause for this Court to exercise its discretionary powers to condone the delay of 144 days in filing the present LPA. This Court is of the opinion that on a plain reading of the memo of Delay Condonation Application, it is evident that the entire premise for seeking condonation of delay on the ground that the Applicants came to know only 12.04.2012 at the hearing of the (4) Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court that the impugned judgment in so far as the same is passed in SCA 4413 of 1992 is not challenged before the Supreme Court, is completely false, incorrect and contrary to the record. This has been clearly demonstrated by the Respondent No.2­Bai Saraswati in her Reply dated 04.09.2012. In this behalf, specific reference is made to paragraphs J, K, L, N of the Reply dated 04.09.2012 of the Respondent No.2­Bai Saraswati as also to the orders dated 16.01.2012, 27.02.2012 and 12.04.2012 of the Supreme Court as also the Reply dated 20.02.2012 of the present Applicants filed before the Supreme Court in the 4 Special Leave Petitions. The said three orders of the Supreme Court and the Reply dated 20.02.2012 of the present Applicants in the 4 Special Leave Petitions clearly indicate that what was before the Supreme Court were 4 Special Leave Petitions arising out of 4 Special Civil Applications, which were arising out of the orders of the Trial Court / Civil Court. SCA 4413 of 1992 was not before the Supreme Court. This Court finds that there is a clear attempt by the present Applicants to mislead this Court. Assuming that the Applicants did not read the orders dated 16.01.2012. SCA 4413 of 1992 was not before the Supreme Court. This Court finds that there is a clear attempt by the present Applicants to mislead this Court. Assuming that the Applicants did not read the orders dated 16.01.2012. 27.02.2012 and 12.04.2012 0f the Supreme Court, however, the Reply dated 20.02.2012 of the Applicants in the 4 Special Leave Petitions clearly suggests that the Applicants had full knowledge that there was no challenge to the impugned judgment in so far as SCA 4413 of 1992 is concerned. This Court therefore finds that the Applicants have knowingly made false statements about knowledge/what transpired at the hearing dated 12.04.2012 before the Supreme Court. The case of the Applicants that they learnt only 12.04.2012 that the common impugned judgment passed in so far as the same is passed in SCA 4413 of 1992, is not the subject matter of challenge in the 4 Special Leave Petitions, is therefore completely unbelievable, blatantly false and an attempt to mislead this Court. The Applicants do not stop here. However, the Applicants have thereafter pleaded in paragraph 8 of the present Delay Condonation Application that (after knowledge as aforesaid on 12.04.2012) they consulted their lawyer for the purpose of preparing the present LPA, that they gathered all necessary documents and details qua the proceedings under the Ceiling Act and time was spent also in arranging for funds for preparing the LPA. Such averments and case of the Applicants do not inspire any confidence. It has been specifically pleaded in paragraph 8 of the Reply dated 04.09.2012 of the Respondent No.2­Bai Saraswati that the advocate of the present Applicants who appeared before the Single Judge was present and also appeared for the Applicants before the Supreme Court on 27.02.2012 and 12.04.2012. Thus, this Court also cannot accept the theory of consulting the lawyers. In so far as time spent on gathering funds is concerned, it is indeed strange that the Applicants had funds to travel to Delhi, engage advocates, draft pleadings, tile interlocutory applications, etc. whereas for the purpose of tiling the present (intra­ court) LPA, the Applicants were required to spend time for gathering documents and collecting funds. The said masons ate therefore ex­facie unacceptable. Such purported reasons also do not inspire confidence for the purpose of exercise of discretionary powers of this Court. Conclusions on Dela Condonation Application: 4. whereas for the purpose of tiling the present (intra­ court) LPA, the Applicants were required to spend time for gathering documents and collecting funds. The said masons ate therefore ex­facie unacceptable. Such purported reasons also do not inspire confidence for the purpose of exercise of discretionary powers of this Court. Conclusions on Dela Condonation Application: 4. In view of the aforesaid, this Court has no hesitation to observe that the Applicants have miserably failed to show any cause, much less sufficient cause to condone the delay of 144 days in filing the LPA. The reasons advanced by the Applicants in support of the Delay Condonation Application are not only not sufficient but are in fact full of falsehood. This Court is conscious of the fact that the delay is not to be explained by the litigant on literal sense on day­to­day basis. However, when there is no justification for delay, the substantial law of limitation cannot be marred advancing the cause of liberal approach. The quantum of delay has no direct nexus in law with sufficiency of the cause. The extent of delay should not determine whether the cause is sufficient or not. The section under the Limitation Act or the provisions do not say that the discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. This Court believes that length of the delay is not the issue but acceptability of the explanation is the criterion. The criterion for condoning the delay is sufficiency of reasons and not the length of the delay. The shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account while exercising the discretion. It may not be out of place to state at this stage that as against the period of limitation of 30 days for tiling LPA, the present LPA has been filed with a delay of 144 days i.e. almost five times the prescribed period and that too for a intra­court appeal. Lastly, this Court would like to observe that “ends of justice” does not mean a favour to the Applicants even if the Applicants are not entitled to the same either under law, equity or justice. Ends of justice means viewing the facts and circumstances and the provision of law and granting a just relief or passing an appropriate order. Lastly, this Court would like to observe that “ends of justice” does not mean a favour to the Applicants even if the Applicants are not entitled to the same either under law, equity or justice. Ends of justice means viewing the facts and circumstances and the provision of law and granting a just relief or passing an appropriate order. For the aforesaid reasons alone, the Civil Application No.6651 of 2012 for condonation of delay stands dismissed and consequently the Registry is directed not to register LPA (Stamp) No.551 of 2012 and dismiss the same. Consequently, Civil Application Nos. 908 of 2013 and 909 of 2013 filed by Jankalyan Society are also dismissed as the delay in filing the LPA itself is not condoned and hence the question of their impleadment does not arise. 5. Merits: Ordinarily this Court would have stopped at this point. However, the Applicants have also pleaded/made averments in the Delay Condonation Application with regard to the merits of the matter, and continued with the said effort in their Affidavit­in­Rejoinder as well as Further Affidavit dated 20.11.2019. Even at the time Of hearing, the Applicants in fact have substantially submitted on the merits of the matter. This Court would therefore briefly deal with the aspect of merits of the matters. 5.2 The contesting Respondents brought to the notice of the Court that as such the Applicants have no right, title or interest of any kind whatsoever in the lands in question. The contesting Respondents brought to the notice of this Court a very significant development which has taken place during the pendency of the present Delay Condonation Application and the LPA. It has been stated that the 4 Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court have been allowed by the Supreme Court by judgment and order dated 01.03.2013 reported in (2013) 4 SCC 404 in the case of Mahalaxmi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others Vs. Ashabhai Atmaram Patel (dead) through LRs and others. Having perused the said judgment, this Court notices that the advocates representing the present Applicants were also representing the Applicants before the Supreme Court. This Court further notices that even Jankalyan Society was before the Supreme Court and thereby was fully conscious of the Supreme Court judgment (supra). Despite the same, even the said Jankalyan Society attempted to make submissions before this Court to press their respective two Civil Applications. This Court further notices that even Jankalyan Society was before the Supreme Court and thereby was fully conscious of the Supreme Court judgment (supra). Despite the same, even the said Jankalyan Society attempted to make submissions before this Court to press their respective two Civil Applications. On a plain reading of the said judgment and more particularly paragraphs 24, 25 to 37 and 47, it is abundantly clear that the present Applicants have no right, title and interest of any kind whatsoever in the lands in question. This Court also inquired from the Applicants if despite the Supreme Court judgment (supra), the Applicants still claim any right, title in the lands. The answer, shockingly was “Yes”, on the premise that some material was not placed before the Supreme Court. At this juncture, the learned advocate for the contesting Respondents pointed out that the Applicants had in fact also filed Review Petition Nos. 3170­3173 of 2013 in Civil Appeal Nos.2050­2053 of 2013 and that the Supreme Court has by order dated 24.02.2015 dismissed the same. Though elaborate submissions were sought to be made by the Applicants at the time of hearing on the merits of the matter, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court (supra), followed with the dismissal of Review Applications, this Court does not deem it necessary to deal with the said submissions (made on the merits) except to observe that the attempt on part of the Applicants and Jankalyan Society to submit that they have right, title and interest in the lands was clearly in the face of the Supreme Court judgment and the order passed on Review Petitions and ought not to have been done. Re: SCA 4413 of 1992: 5.3. This Court would briefly like to make some observations on SCA No.4413 of 1992. In SCA No.4413 of 1992, the subject matter of challenge was order dated 03.06.1992 passed by the Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act. It may be noted that during the pendency of SCA No.4413 of 1992, the Ceiling Act came to be repealed. In this context, paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the impugned judgment are required to be noted. Thereafter, after considering the totality of the facts, the Single Judge in paragraph 15 (at page Z/138) has observed as follows: “.... In this context, paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the impugned judgment are required to be noted. Thereafter, after considering the totality of the facts, the Single Judge in paragraph 15 (at page Z/138) has observed as follows: “.... Thus, in fact, it appears born the aforesaid discussion that the real objection was not the objection to grant of permission under section 20 of exempting the land but it was qua locus of person seeking exemption as the resultant effect of various applications was ultimately exemption to the land in question from the provisions of ULC Act as envisaged under section 20 of the Act. A question arises as to whether now at this stage if the said permission is revoked on the ground of it being containing extraneous conditions, would it serve any purpose, the answer is emphatic “NO”. The Court at this stage would also like to observe that in the light of Repeal Act, the revocation of the permission qua the land in question would be merely an academic exercise... 16. ...... The Court once again is also of the view that the entire exercise now would be merely an academic exercise so far as the exemption to the land in question and therefore, that permission qua the land in question need not to be quashed and set aside as in light of the Repeal ULC Act, it would lead nowhere ” 6. To conclude, this Court finds that the Applicants have miserably failed to show any cause, much less sufficient cause, to condone the delay of 144 days in filing the LPA. The Civil Application No.6651 of 2012 is therefore dismissed. Consequently, the Registry is directed not to register the LPA Stamp No.551 of 2012. Civil Application Nos. 908 and 909 of 2013 consequently stand rejected.