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2019 DIGILAW 1130 (GAU)

State of Nagaland v. Chubanungsang Imchen

2019-10-09

MANISH CHOUDHURY, SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO

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JUDGMENT : MANISH CHOUDHURY, J.:— Heard Ms. V. Suokhrie, learned State counsel for the appellants and Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel appearing for the sole respondent. 2. These two writ appeals are preferred against the common judgment and order dated 19.3.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 184(K)/2018 and WP(C) No. 185(K)/2018. By the said common judgment and order dated 19.3.2019, the learned Single Judge has set aside the orders, both dated 6.10.2017, passed by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, whereby, the petitioners therein, i.e., the respondents herein were placed under suspension with immediate effect in exercise of powers conferred under rule 6(1)(a) of the Nagaland Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967 (‘the Rules of 1967’). 3. The background facts, in brief, leading to the institution of the writ petitions are stated hereunder: (i) The respondent in WA No. 5/2019, i.e., the petitioner in WP(C) No. 184 (K)/2018, was serving as a Joint Director in the Department of School Education, Nagaland, Kohima. While the respondent was so serving, he was given additional charge to look after the project of Inclusive Education of Disabled Students at the Secondary Stage (IEDSS) as Project Director during 2011-15. (ii) The respondent in WA No. 6/2019, i.e., the petitioner in WP(C) No. 185(K)/2018, was serving as a Joint Education Officer (JEO), attached to RMSA, in the Department of School Education, Nagaland, Kohima. While the respondent was so serving, he was also given the additional charge to look after the project of IEDSS as Assistant Project Officer during 2011-2015. (iii) Alleging irregularities in implementation of the said IEDSS project, a written complaint dated 31.8.2014 came to be filed before the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Kohima against the School Education Department by a Dy. SP (Vigilance) of the said Department. Based on the said complaint, a Special Investigation Team was constituted and a regular case being Regular Case No. 1/2015 was registered, on 20.2.2015, under section 409/420/120B/477A, Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) read with section 13(1)(c)(cl) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘the P.C. Act’) against the departmental officers including the respondents herein. Pursuant to the registration of said vigilance case, investigation was initiated and a charge sheet was stated to have been submitted, about which would be referred to in the subsequent paragraphs. Pursuant to the registration of said vigilance case, investigation was initiated and a charge sheet was stated to have been submitted, about which would be referred to in the subsequent paragraphs. (iv) Thereafter, on 6.10.2017, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland passed the impugned orders placing the respondents in the present appeals under suspension, exercising powers under the provisions of rule 6(1)(a) of the Rules of 1967. The said order of suspension passed in respect of the respondent in W.A. No. 5/2019 is quoted here under:— “GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION ORDER Dated Kohima, the 6th October, 2017 NO. DSE/CSS/IEDSS/2-4/2015(Pt): Whereas a case against Dr. Chubanungsang, Joint Director School Education in respect of criminal offence is under investigation/inquiry/trial. Now, therefore, the Governor in exercise of the powers conferred under rule 6(1)(a) of the Nagaland Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,1967 of Nagaland is pleased to order the suspension of Dr. Chubanungsang, Joint Director, School Education with immediate effect. It is further ordered that during the period that this order shall remain in force, the headquarters of Dr. Chubanungsang, Joint Director, School Education shall be Kohima and the said Dr. Chubanungsang, Joint Director, School Education shall not leave the headquarters without obtaining the previous permission of the competent authority. During the period of suspension, Dr. Chubanungsang, Joint Director, School Education, Nagaland Kohima shall be entitled to a subsistence allowance at an amount of equal to the leave salary which he would have drawn under the leave rules applicable to him if he had been on leave or half average pay and in addition, dearness allowance, if admissible on the basis of such leave salary. Sd/- PANKAJ KUMAR, IAS Chief Secretary, Nagaland.” The order of suspension dated 6.10.2017 passed in respect of the respondent in WA No. 6/2019 was in similar terms. 4. The respondents contending that more than 11 months had elapsed since passing of the orders of suspension on 6.10.2017 without any review of the said suspension orders by the State respondents, preferred the writ petitions praying for setting aside of the impugned suspension orders dated 6.10.2017. 4. The respondents contending that more than 11 months had elapsed since passing of the orders of suspension on 6.10.2017 without any review of the said suspension orders by the State respondents, preferred the writ petitions praying for setting aside of the impugned suspension orders dated 6.10.2017. The learned Single Judge after considering the provisions of rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 [‘the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965’] and rule 6 of the Rules of 1967 to the fact situations in the cases, had observed in the impugned common judgment and order as under “17. It is an admitted fact that the CCS CCA Rules are applicable in toto to the employees working under the Government of Nagaland. Keeping the above fact in view, this court will have to see whether the authorities have to undertake a periodical review of the suspension order within every fresh period of 90 days, even after a disciplinary proceeding is initiated or a charge sheet is filed in a criminal proceeding. 18. The extract of para 21 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhury v. Union of India (supra) is reproduced below again, which is as follows:— “21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the memorandum of charges/charge sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension …………” 19. A reading of the above clearly shows that a suspension order does not survive beyond 3 (three) months if within this period, the Memorandum of Charges/Charge-sheet is not served upon the delinquent officer/employee unless there is a review of the suspension order and the suspension is extended. Further, even if a charge sheet is served upon the delinquent officer/employee, a reasoned order has to be passed for the extension of the suspension order. 20. Further, even if a charge sheet is served upon the delinquent officer/employee, a reasoned order has to be passed for the extension of the suspension order. 20. The observation made by the Division Bench of this court in Indian Institute of Technology v. Aloke Kumar Ghosal (supra), which is to the following effect: “……… If the interpretation sought to be given is accepted, it would lead to a situation where once the first review is carried out and the criminal proceeding continues, the authority would be denuded of its discretion to review continuation or otherwise of the period of suspension. It would mean that till the criminal trial continues, respondent No. 1 would have to suffer suspension. There cannot be any such absolute proposition of law to say that a Government servant facing criminal trial would have to continue under suspension till the criminal trial concludes.”…. 22. Though there is nothing stated in black and white in rule 10 of the CCS CCA Rules with regard to the time limit for review of suspension order to take place, after filing of a charge sheet in a criminal case or initiation of a departmental proceeding, the Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhury v. Union of India (supra) has categorically held that if the memorandum of charges/charge sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for extension of the suspension order. Though the aspect of having a review of the suspension period of a delinquent officer, after the authorities have passed a reasoned order subsequent to serving a charge sheet within each succeeding 90 days, is not explicitly laid down in the CCS CCA Rules and the judgments of the Apex Court and this court, the observation made by the Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhury v. Union of India (supra) and Indian Institute of Technology v. Aloke Kumar Ghosal (supra), implies that a periodical review of the suspension order should be undertaken by the authorities, within every subsequent 90 days, after the reasoned order is passed consequent to filing/serving of the charge sheet 23. In the present case, the State respondents have not produced any order, let alone a reasoned order, extending the suspension period of the petitioner after the charge sheet had been filed. The petitioners having been suspended on 6.10.2017, nearly one and half years have passed since then. In the present case, the State respondents have not produced any order, let alone a reasoned order, extending the suspension period of the petitioner after the charge sheet had been filed. The petitioners having been suspended on 6.10.2017, nearly one and half years have passed since then. As the State respondents have not passed any order after filing of the charge sheet, extending the petitioners suspension, the same not being in conformity with the law laid down by the Apex Court and the Division Bench judgment of this court in Indian Institute of Technology v. Aloke Kumar Ghosal (supra), the suspension orders of the petitioners cannot be allowed to continue as valid orders. They are hereby set aside. The State respondents shall immediately reinstate the petitioners back into service. However, the State respondents are free to transfer the petitioners to any department in any of its Offices within or outside the State, so as to sever any local or personal contact they have in respect with the case. The Government may also prohibit the petitioners from contacting any person, or handling records and documents, which may have an effect on the criminal proceedings that are pending against the petitioners. The question of whether the petitioners are entitled to consequential benefits or back wages would depend upon the criminal proceedings and any departmental proceeding that may be initiated against the petitioners.” 5. Ms. V. Suokhrie, learned State counsel for the appellants, has submitted that the learned Single Judge had erred in placing reliance in the decisions of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhury v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 291 , and the Division Bench of this court in Indian Institute of Technology v. Aloke Kumar Ghosal, 2017 (5) GLT 132. As the conditions of service of both the respondents are governed by the Rules of 1967, the principles laid down in those decisions cannot be imported to the fact situation leading to the suspension of the present two respondents. She further submits that the learned Single Judge had also erred in holding that the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 are applicable in toto to the employees working under the Government of Nagaland. It is further submitted by her that in the orders dated 6.10.2019, the provisions of rule 6(1)(a) of 1967 Rules had been inadvertently mentioned whereas the same should have been rule 6(1)(b) of 1967 Rules. 6. It is further submitted by her that in the orders dated 6.10.2019, the provisions of rule 6(1)(a) of 1967 Rules had been inadvertently mentioned whereas the same should have been rule 6(1)(b) of 1967 Rules. 6. Per contra, Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel for the respondents, has submitted that the prepositions of law enunciated in Ajay Kumar Choudhury (supra) and Indian Institute of Technology (supra) are squarely applicable to the cases in hand. In support of his submission, he has referred extensively to the observations made in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra). It is further submitted by him that in either of the two situations, whether it is under rule 6(1)(a) or rule 6(1)(b) of 1967 Rules, the period of suspension cannot be extended beyond 90 (ninety) days without passing a reasoned order by the review committee. In so far as the cases in hand are concerned, at the time of passing of the suspension orders dated 6.10.2017, no disciplinary proceedings were pending against the respondents. The orders also did not indicate that the orders of suspension were made in contemplation of drawal of disciplinary proceedings against the present respondents. Under such facts and circumstances, the orders of suspension were non est in law at the time of preferring the writ petitions which were filed in October 2018. As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants relating to rule 6(1)(b) of the 1967 Rules is concerned, he submits that even in a case of suspension emanating from criminal investigation/inquiry/trial, there must be review of the order of suspension for extending the period of suspension beyond the initial period of 90 (ninety) days which in the instant cases are missing. He has also placed reliance in decisions of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 8427-8428/2018 (State of Tamil Nadu v. Promod Kumar IPS and a Division Bench of this court in WP(C) No. 3218/2019 (Rakibuddin Ahmed v. State of Assam). 7. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. We have also perused the materials on record and the decisions rendered by the hon'ble Supreme Court and this court. 8. It has emerged from the records that pursuant to a preliminary enquiry conducted by the Dy. 7. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. We have also perused the materials on record and the decisions rendered by the hon'ble Supreme Court and this court. 8. It has emerged from the records that pursuant to a preliminary enquiry conducted by the Dy. SP of the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption on the basis of a written complaint received at the Vigilance Police Station on 31.8.2014, a regular case being Regular Case No. 1/2015, was registered in the Vigilance Police Station, Kohima on 20.2.2015 for alleged misappropriation of IEDSS fund and the prosecution sanction was granted in respect of 5 persons including both the respondents herein, on 6.10.2017 under section 19 of the PC Act, 1988. On the same day, i.e., on 6.10.2017, the orders placing the respondents under suspension with immediate effect were passed under rule 6(1)(a) of the 1967 Rules alleging, inter alia, that a case against the respondents in respect of the criminal offences, mentioned above, was under investigation/inquiry or trial. 9. Referring to Annexure 1 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the State respondents in WP(C) No. 184(K)/2018, Ms. V. Suokhrie, learned State counsel has submitted that charge sheet in Regular Case No. 1/2015 was submitted on 29/8/2017. Controverting the said submission, Mr. A. Zho, learned counsel for the respondent has placed on record a copy of the charge sheet along with the forwarding letter dated 20.12.2017 submitted by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption before the Special Court. A perusal of the said forwarding letter dated 20.12.2017 indicates that the charge sheet was submitted only on 20.12.2017 with a request to the trial court to take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein. Before proceeding further on the issue involved in these appeals, it is apt to reproduce rule 6 of the Rules of 1967 as under: “6. Suspension:— (1) The Appointing Authority or any Authority to which it is subordinate or any other Authority empowered by the Governor in that behalf may place a Government servant under suspension. Before proceeding further on the issue involved in these appeals, it is apt to reproduce rule 6 of the Rules of 1967 as under: “6. Suspension:— (1) The Appointing Authority or any Authority to which it is subordinate or any other Authority empowered by the Governor in that behalf may place a Government servant under suspension. A Standard form of suspension of order of suspension is specified in Schedule II: (a) Where a disciplinary proceedings against him is contemplated or is pending, or (b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence involving moral turpitude is under investigation, inquiry or trial: Provided that where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the Appointing Authority such Authority shall forthwith report to the Appointing Authority the circumstances in which the order was made. (2) A Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of Appointing Authority— (a) With effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours. (b) with effect from the date of his conviction if, in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consequent to such conviction.” 10. On perusal of the aforesaid sub-rule (1) of rule 6 of the 1967 Rules, it is clear that the said sub-rule contemplates suspension under two situations. Rule 6(1)(a) has conferred power on the Appointing Authority or any other authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the Governor in that behalf to place a Nagaland Government servant under suspension where a disciplinary proceeding is pending against him or a disciplinary proceeding is contemplated against him. Under the second situation, the aforesaid authorities have been empowered to place a Government servant under suspension where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence involving moral turpitude is under investigation, inquiry or trial. 11. Under the second situation, the aforesaid authorities have been empowered to place a Government servant under suspension where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence involving moral turpitude is under investigation, inquiry or trial. 11. In view of the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the decision in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) is not applicable in respect of a Government servant whose condition of service are regulated by the Rules of 1967 and the said decision pertains only to a Government servant coming under the purview of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, it is appropriate to reproduce the following observations and conclusion made by the hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 8,11 and 12 in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) hereunder “8. Learned senior counsel for the Appellant, however, has rightly relied on a series of judgments of this court, including O.P. Gupta v. Union of India, where this court has enunciated that the suspension of an employee is injurious to his interests and must not be continued for an unreasonably long period; that, therefore, an order of suspension should not be lightly passed. 11. Suspension, specially preceding the formulation of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature, and must perforce be of short duration. If it is for an indeterminate period or if its renewal is not based on sound reasoning contemporaneously available on the record, this would render it punitive in nature. Departmental/disciplinary proceedings invariably commence with delay, are plagued with procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the memorandum of charges, and eventually culminate after even longer delay. 12. Protracted periods of suspension, repeated renewal thereof, have regrettably become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be. The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations, the scorn of society and the derision of his Department, has to endure this excruciation even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanour, indiscretion or offence. His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or iniquity. Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement. His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or iniquity. Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement. Indubitably the sophist will nimbly counter that our Constitution does not explicitly guarantee either the right to a speedy trial even to the incarcerated, or assume the presumption of innocence to the accused. But we must remember that both these factors are legal ground norms, are inextricable tenets of common law jurisprudence, antedating even the Magna Carta of 1215, which assures that — “We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right.” In similar vein the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” 12. A reading of the aforesaid observations goes to show that the observations made therein are on the subject-matter of suspension in general and the same are not restricted to the provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 in particular. In fact, it is crystal clear from the above extracts including paragraph 21, from Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), that an order of suspension should not extend beyond 3 months if within that period of 3 months, the memorandum of charges/charge sheet is not served on the employee under suspension. Further, it is clear from the above judgment that if a memorandum of charges/charge sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for extension of the suspension. In laying down the said propositions, the hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the provisions of section 167, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘the Cr.PC’). Further, it is clear from the above judgment that if a memorandum of charges/charge sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for extension of the suspension. In laying down the said propositions, the hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the provisions of section 167, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘the Cr.PC’). Thus, it is made clear that an employee's initial period of suspension can be for a period of 3 months from the date of suspension and if within that period, the memorandum of charges/charge sheet is not served on the employee, the order of suspension looses its force and in case if within that period of 3 months, the memorandum of charges/charge sheet has been served and the competent authority is of the opinion that the period of suspension should be continued beyond the period of 3 months then also, a reasoned order must be passed for extension of the period of suspension. 13. In the cases at hand, if we go by the orders of suspension order dated 6.10.2017 literally then it has emerged that at the time of passing of the suspension orders, there were no disciplinary proceedings pending against the respondents. Though in the orders dated 6.10.2017, there was no mention to the fact that any disciplinary proceeding was contemplated against the present respondents, in the affidavits-in-opposition filed by the appellants in both the writ petitions in February 2019, it was mentioned that the authority was contemplating to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondents. However, there was no mention about any review of the orders of suspension order dated 6.10.2017. On a query made to the learned counsel for the appellants as to whether any disciplinary proceeding has been initiated as on date, against either of the respondents by serving the memorandum of charges, the learned State counsel for the appellants replied in the negative. In such view of the matter, if the order of suspension is considered to have been passed under rule 6(1)(a) of the 1967 Rules, then the order of suspension dated 6.10.2017 has no legal authority to stand. 14. In such view of the matter, if the order of suspension is considered to have been passed under rule 6(1)(a) of the 1967 Rules, then the order of suspension dated 6.10.2017 has no legal authority to stand. 14. In respect of the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned Single Judge was not correct to hold that the provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 were applicable in toto in respect of a Government employee serving under Government of Nagaland, we are of the considered view that the submission of the learned counsel to that extent is correct since the conditions of service of State Government employees under the Government of Nagaland like the respondents, are regulated by the provisions of the 1967 Rules. But when the matter is considered in the perspective of the contention of the appellants that in respect of an employee who was placed under suspension in terms of rules 6(1)(b) of the 1967 Rules, the proposition enunciated in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) is not applicable, the other part of the contention does not, in our considered opinion, appear to be correct. Because, it has been clearly mentioned in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) that even if a charge sheet is submitted then also a reasoned order must have to be passed by the competent authority for extension of the period of suspension. The said principle has been laid to adequately safeguard the right of the delinquent employee to speedy trial. The preservation of the interests of the Government in the prosecution of such an employee also has been taken into consideration while laying down the above-stated proposition and in the impugned judgment also, the aforesaid perspective was duly taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge. 15. The State Government definitely has the power, authority and jurisdiction to keep a Government servant under suspension pending dra wal of disciplinary proceeding or during the pendency of a disciplinary proceeding or during the pendency of a criminal investigation/inquiry/trial. 15. The State Government definitely has the power, authority and jurisdiction to keep a Government servant under suspension pending dra wal of disciplinary proceeding or during the pendency of a disciplinary proceeding or during the pendency of a criminal investigation/inquiry/trial. The object of placing a Government servant under suspension is to keep him away from an influential position wherefrom he can interfere with the conduct of the disciplinary proceeding, pending or contemplated, or criminal investigation/inquiry/trial so as to prevent him from hampering in the process of collection of evidence or from tempering with the evidence, in any manner, or where, having regard to the nature of charges/allegations against him, the competent authority is Of the opinion that it would be unsafe to continue to vest in him the powers of the post the Government servant is occupying. It is for the competent authority to consider all these aspects at the time of placing the Government servant under suspension and also during the period subsequent to suspension for keeping him under suspension. At the same time, on the other hand, the placement of a Government servant under suspension for a prolonged period unduly would change the colour of measure taken to place the public servant under suspension with the aforestated objectives, into a measure of punishment. It has been emphasised, therefore, time and again, that the matter of suspension as well as the period of suspension should also be considered from the perspectives of consequences and effects emanating therefrom. Having considered the principle laid down in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) regarding periodical review for the purpose of extension of the period of suspension, we are of the considered opinion that the proposition is also applicable in a case, like the cases in hand, where a public servant is placed under suspension when a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial and no review of the necessity of keeping him under suspension for any further period or otherwise has been made even after submission of a charge sheet in the criminal case. 16. In the case of Promod Kumar (supra), the matter under challenge was suspension of the respondent therein in view of his arrest in a criminal case under rule 3(2) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. 16. In the case of Promod Kumar (supra), the matter under challenge was suspension of the respondent therein in view of his arrest in a criminal case under rule 3(2) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. In paragraph 23 of the said judgment, the decision of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) has been referred to and the hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: “23. This court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 291 has frowned upon the practice of protracted suspension and held that suspension must necessarily be for a short duration. On the basis of the material on record, we are convinced that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the first respondent under suspension any longer and that his reinstatement would not be a threat to a fair trial. We reiterate the observation of the High Court that the appellant-State has the liberty to appoint the first respondent in a non-sensitive post.” 17. The respondents were placed under suspension on 6.10.2017, if it is assumed to be on the purported ground under rule 6(1)(b) of the 1967 Rules, when the appropriate authority decided to grant prosecution sanction in respect of 5 Nos. of Government of Nagaland employees including the respondents herein. As it transpires, the charge sheet under section 173, Cr.PC was submitted by the Investigating Agency before the learned court on 20.12.2017. In view of the submission of the charge sheet in Regular Case No. 1/2015, it prima facie appears that all the necessary materials have been collected by the Investigating Agency to prosecute the accused arraigned therein including the present respondents, to prosecute them under the appropriate offences. There is no whisper in the affidavits-in-opposition filed by the appellants herein as the respondents, in the writ petitions to the effect that there was any attempt on the part of the respondents to interfere in the process of collection of evidence or to temper with the evidence or to influence the witnesses in any manner. There is no indication in the charge sheet that any further investigation is necessary to unearth any further materials. 18. There is no indication in the charge sheet that any further investigation is necessary to unearth any further materials. 18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge is not unjustified in reaching the ultimate conclusion that the period of suspension of the respondents in absence of any reasoned order passed in review, cannot be prolonged and, therefore, is justified in setting aside the orders of suspension dated 6.10.2017 in respect of both the respondents. Consequently, we do not find any merit in the appeals and accordingly, the same are dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to cost.