ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. N.K. Majmudar, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr. H.S. Munshaw, learned advocate for the respondent. 2. The prayers sought in this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution read as under: (i) Set aside the action of respondent of continuing the suspension of the petitioner beyond period of 90 days from the date of order of suspension dated 26.7.2016. (ii) Review the order of suspension passed against the petitioner in view of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 and be pleased to direct the respondent to review the order of suspension on basis various notification and GR. (iii) Revoke the order of suspension as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in judgment/order passed in SLP (Civil) No. 12112-12113 of 2017 and judgment/order in SCA No. 35/2017 passed by this Court and reinstate the petitioner with consequential benefits. (iv) Make the payment of difference of suspension allowance by enhancing the same from 50% to 75% from the date on which the petitioner has been placed under suspension for a period of 6 months and the difference of additional 20% may be directed to be paid with 12% interest to the petitioner. 3. The petitioner was an employee under respondent Gujarat Rajya Gram Vikas Nigam Ltd. serving as Project Assistant. On 12.02.2016, First Information Report came to be registered against petitioner for the alleged offence under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner had to obtain anticipatory bail and subsequently came to be transferred from Navsari to Ahmedabad. On 26.07.2016 the petitioner came to be suspended from service and his head quarter was changed to Gandhinagar. 3.1 It appears that the petitioner preferred Special Civil Application No. 14002 of 2016 questioning order of suspension which was not entertained by this Court as per order dated 30.11.2016. It is the case of the petitioner that since as the time has elapsed since he came to be suspended, a representation was given to the authority on 09.01.2019 for cancellation of suspension order. 3.2 The petitioner relied on resolution dated 20.09.2004 which provided for undertaking review of the suspension. Subsequently also the petitioner made the representation dated 21.08.2018. In additional to the above notification the petitioner has relied on other Resolution dated 23.03.2005 also to submit that the suspension could not have been continued for such long period and was liable to be revoked. 4. Subsequently also the petitioner made the representation dated 21.08.2018. In additional to the above notification the petitioner has relied on other Resolution dated 23.03.2005 also to submit that the suspension could not have been continued for such long period and was liable to be revoked. 4. The respondent Corporation filed affidavit-in-reply in which suspension was sought to be justified by mentioning facts about the finding of the First Information Report. It was contended that the petition was earlier filed and it was rejected. It was stated that charge-sheet dated 20.05.2019 in relation to the assets disproportion to the income of the petitioner has been received. It was emphasized that suspension of the petitioner was subsequent to report of the Anti Corruption Bureau and filing of FIR. 5. Long drawn prolongation of suspension has been subject matter of judicial condemnation by the court. In Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 2389 , the Apex Court disproved the long continuity of suspension against the government servant when such suspension stands without justification. 5.1 The Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Chaudhari (supra) stated: “Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, however, has rightly relied on a series of Judgments of this Court, including O.P. Gupta vs. Union of India, 1987 (4) SCC 328 , where this Court has enunciated that the suspension of an employee is injurious to his interests and must not be continued for an unreasonably long period; that, therefore, an order of suspension should not be lightly passed. Our attention has also been drawn to K. Sukhendar Reddy vs. State of A.P. 1999 (6) SCC 257 , which is topical in that it castigates selective suspension perpetuated indefinitely in circumstances where other involved persons had not been subjected to any scrutiny. Reliance on this decision is in the backdrop of the admitted facts that all the persons who have been privy to the making of the Office-notes have not been proceeded against departmentally. So far as the question of prejudicial treatment accorded to an employee is concerned, this Court in State of A.P. vs. N. Radhakishan, 1998 (4) SCC 154 , has observed that it would be fair to make this assumption of prejudice if there is an unexplained delay in the conclusion of proceedings. So far as the question of prejudicial treatment accorded to an employee is concerned, this Court in State of A.P. vs. N. Radhakishan, 1998 (4) SCC 154 , has observed that it would be fair to make this assumption of prejudice if there is an unexplained delay in the conclusion of proceedings. However, the decision of this Court in Union of India vs. Dipak Mali, 2010 (2) SCC 222 does not come to the succour of the Appellant since our inspection of the records produced in original have established that firstly, the decision to continue the suspension was carried out within the then prevailing period and secondly, that it was duly supported by elaborate reasoning.” 5.2 It was emphasized that suspension being transitory in nature ought to have been for short period: “Suspension, specially preceding the formulation of charges, is essentially transitory or temporary in nature, and must perforce be of short duration. If it is for an indeterminate period or if its renewal is not based on sound reasoning contemporaneously available on the record, this would render it punitive in nature. Departmental/disciplinary proceedings invariably commence with delay, are plagued with procrastination prior and post the drawing up of the Memorandum of Charges and eventually culminate after even longer delay.” 5.3 It was emphasized that the protracted period of suspension should be exception rather than on norms: “Protracted periods of suspension, repeated renewal thereof, have regrettably become the norm and not the exception that they ought to be. The suspended person suffering the ignominy of insinuations, the scorn of society and the derision of his Department, has to endure this excruciation even before he is formally charged with some misdemeanour, indiscretion or offence. His torment is his knowledge that if and when charged, it will inexorably take an inordinate time for the inquisition or inquiry to come to its culmination, that is to determine his innocence or iniquity. Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement. Indubitably the sophist will nimbly counter that our Constitution does not explicitly guarantee either the right to a speedy trial even to the incarcerated, or assume the presumption of innocence to the accused. Much too often this has now become an accompaniment to retirement. Indubitably the sophist will nimbly counter that our Constitution does not explicitly guarantee either the right to a speedy trial even to the incarcerated, or assume the presumption of innocence to the accused. But we must remember that both these factors are legal ground norms, are inextricable tenets of common law jurisprudence, antedating even the Magna Carta of 1215, which assures that We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right. In similar vein the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 assures that No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time and in its second sub article that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” 5.4 The Apex Court highlighted the law relied on its own earlier decision as under: “The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the use of nolle persequi, an indefinite but ominous and omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution in Klapfer vs. State of North Carolina, (1967) 386 U.S. 213. In Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 the Constitution Bench of this Court unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a fundamental right, and we can do no better the extract these paragraphs from that celebrated decision. 86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. 86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar while dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India has observed thus: No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. 11. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in departmental inquiries has been emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225, underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. 1973, that it encompasses all stages, viz. The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225, underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Cr.P.C. 1973, that it encompasses all stages, viz. investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial, that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this right had been denied in the particular case before it. Keeping these factors in mind the CAT had in the case in hand directed that the Appellants suspension would not be extended beyond 90 days from 19.3.2013. The High Court had set aside this direction, viewing it as a substitution of a judicial determination to the authority possessing that power, i.e. the Government. This conclusion of the High Court cannot be sustained in view of the following pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in Antulay: 86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are: (1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. (2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. (3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are: (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction. (3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are: (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction. (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal. (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. (4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, delay is a known defence tactic. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily pre-judice the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation. (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on what is called, the systemic delays. (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. (6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barke 33 L Ed 2d 101 it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate. The same idea has been stated by White, J. in U.S. vs. Ewell, 15 L Ed 2d 627 in the following words: “...the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances.” However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case. (7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the demand rule. An accused cannot try himself, he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker 33 L Ed 2d 101 and other succeeding cases. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker 33 L Ed 2d 101 and other succeeding cases. (8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors balancing test or balancing process and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. (9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. (10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit in-effectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial. (11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. (11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.” 5.5 The decision in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) was followed by this Court in Hiteshkumar Nagindas Patel vs. State of Gujarat and Another being Special Civil Application No. 35 of 2017 decided on 10.01.2017. The Court directed the authority to decide the representation in light of the decision in Ajay Kumar Chaudhary (supra). 5.6 It may be noted that in Hiteshkumar Nagindas Patel (supra) the order of suspension was passed in the year 2016. In the facts of the present case, the petitioner was suspended before 3 years on 26.07.2016. The authorities are duty bound to apply the principles laid down in Ajay Kumar Chaudhary (supra) to the facts of the case of the present petitioner. 6. Accordingly this petition is disposed of by directing the respondents to act through their competent authority to consider the case of the petitioner for revocation of the suspension order which was passed on 26.07.2016 in light of and applying the principles laid down in Ajay Kumar Chaudhary (supra). Such decision shall be taken within period of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of the present order. 7. This petition stands disposed of in terms of the above said observations and directions. 8. Direct service is permitted.