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2019 DIGILAW 1138 (HP)

Shri Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2019-08-09

VIVEK SINGH THAKUR

body2019
JUDGMENT : Vivek Singh Thakur, J. 1. This petition has been preferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.PC'), by complainant Shri Devi for quashing the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. 110/2017 dated 13.10.2017, registered in Police Station, Tissa, District Chamba, H.P., under Sections 363, 366, 376, 341 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC' in short) and Section 6 of Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as 'POCSO Act' in short). 2. Status report/response of respondent No. 1-State was called for. As per status report, on 13.10.2017, a complaint was received from complainant-petitioner Shri Devi under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. through the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Chamba, whereupon FIR No. 110/2017 was registered on the basis of the said application, in which it was alleged that in the year, 2015 accused-respondent No. 2 was working as a Compressor Operator in Private Hydro Project Company at Tarela, Tehsil Churah, District Chamba, H.P., and complainant-petitioner was learning tailoring work near the aforesaid Project and during that time accused-respondent No. 2 Ajay Kumar had allured and enticed her to leave the company of her parents and accompany him. Whereupon, on 18.04.2015, when accused-respondent No. 2 came with his paternal Uncle and Aunt in a light vehicle, she accompanied them and after staying for 8-9 days in the house of paternal Uncle of respondent Ajay Kumar, she was taken to the house of accused-respondent, whereafter, on cohabitation with him, she became pregnant. During this period, accused-respondent No. 2 confined her in his house, where she delivered a male child on 31.03.2016. It was further stated in the complaint that her date of birth was 19.02.1999 and at the time when she was enticed to leave the guardianship of her parents, married, violated and caused to deliver a child, she was minor of 16-_ 17 years of age. On the basis of complaint, so filed, investigation was carried on and accused-respondent No. 2 was arrested and challan under Sections 363, 366-A, 376, 341 and 506 IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act, was presented in the Court. 3. On the basis of complaint, so filed, investigation was carried on and accused-respondent No. 2 was arrested and challan under Sections 363, 366-A, 376, 341 and 506 IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act, was presented in the Court. 3. During pendency of the trial, when accused-respondent No. 2 was in judicial lockup as an under trial prisoner, present petition has been moved by complainant-petitioner for quashing the criminal proceedings, on the ground that she is married to accused-respondent No. 2 and they have a male child and she intends to live her married life with accused-respondent No. 2. 4. Complainant-petitioner appeared in Court in person and her statement on oath was recorded on 07.01.2019, wherein she reiterated the facts about working of accused-respondent No. 2 as a Compressor/Machine Operator in a Hydro Project at a place, where she was learning tailoring work. Further that accused-respondent No. 2 came in her contact and at that time she was not matured enough to take decision, however, under influence of accused-respondent No. 2, she had left her house to marry him, who had taken her to his parental house in Jammu and Kashmir and after putting 'Sindur' in her 'Mang', it was said that marriage has been solemnized. According to her, thereafter behaviour of family of accused-respondent No. 2 was not cordial towards her and they started harassing her and at that time she was a minor girl and she was not acquainted with household work and was not having knowledge of cooking food etc., which led to leave matrimonial house by her and she came back to her parental house. It is further stated by her that she was not intending to lodge any complaint against accused-respondent No. 2, but when his family started mounting pressure upon her, she filed a complaint, which led to registration of FIR and as a result thereof, accused-respondent No. 2 had landed in jail and thereafter father and brother of accused-respondent No. 2 had approached her alongwith villagers and had apologized for conduct on their part and also for conduct of accused-respondent No. 2 and had requested her to settle her life with accused-respondent No. 2 with further assurance that they will not harass her in future in any manner and they have also agreed for entering her name in the family register of Panchayat in Jammu and Kashmir. It is further stated by her that now she has become mother of a child of accused-respondent No. 2 and she has also attained the age of 19 years and thus she is capable of taking decision about her future and also that of her child. She has decided to forgive accused-respondent No. 2 and his family and to live with him as his wife. According to her, she has no other mean to earn her livelihood and her parents would not be able to support her for a long time and further that in the society also there is least possibility of accepting her by any other person and in absence of husband it would be difficult to live and take care of child and there will be uncertainty about her future and future of her child. In these circumstances, she has filed present petition for quashing of FIR for her future as well as welfare of the child. 5. It is contended on behalf of the respondent-State that accused-respondent No. 2 is not entitled to invoke inherent jurisdiction of this Court to exercise its power on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties with respect to an offence not compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. 6. Three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and others, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 , explaining that High Court has inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with no statutory limitation including Section 320 Cr.PC, has held that these powers are to be exercised to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of any Court and these powers can be exercised to quash criminal proceedings or complaint or FIR in appropriate cases where offender and victim have settled their dispute and for that purpose no definite category of offence can be prescribed. However, it is also observed that Courts must have due regard to nature and gravity of the crime and criminal proceedings in heinous and serious offences or offence like murder, rape and dacoity etc. should not be quashed despite victim or victim family have settled the dispute with offender. However, it is also observed that Courts must have due regard to nature and gravity of the crime and criminal proceedings in heinous and serious offences or offence like murder, rape and dacoity etc. should not be quashed despite victim or victim family have settled the dispute with offender. Jurisdiction vested in High Court under Section 482 Cr.PC is held to be exercisable for quashing criminal proceedings in cases having overwhelming and predominatingly civil flavour particularly offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil partnership, or such like transactions, or even offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry etc., family disputes or other such disputes where wrong is basically private or personal nature where parties mutually resolve their dispute amicably. It was also held that no category or cases for this purpose could be prescribed and each case has to be dealt with on its own merit but it is also clarified that this power does not extend to crimes against society. 7. The Apex Court in Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbathbhai Bhimsingbhai Karmur and others v. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641 , summarizing the broad principles regarding inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., has recognized that these powers are not inhibited by provisions of Section 320 Cr.P.C. 8. The Apex Court in case Narinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others, reported in (2014)6 SCC 466 and also in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 has summed up and laid down principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with criminal proceedings. 9. It is a matter of fact that during pendency of present petition, accused-respondent No. 2, who was in judicial custody as undertrial prisoner, was enlarged on interim bail on 07.01.2019 and thereafter complainant-petitioner and accused-respondent No. 2 are cohabiting in the matrimonial home of petitioner-complainant i.e. in native village of accused-respondent No. 2 in Jammu alongwith their child. Later on, vide order dated 05.08.2019 passed in Cr.M.P.(M) No. 1757 of 2018, interim bail granted to accused-respondent No. 2 has also been affirmed. Later on, vide order dated 05.08.2019 passed in Cr.M.P.(M) No. 1757 of 2018, interim bail granted to accused-respondent No. 2 has also been affirmed. Since January, 2019, no untoward incident of harassing or torturing the complainant-petitioner has been reported or noticed. 10. It is a peculiar nature of case, where complainant and accused are residing under one and the same roof as husband and wife. Technically speaking, complainant-petitioner has solemnized marriage with accused-respondent No. 2, when she was minor and has not attained the age of discretion at that time, but fact remains that she lived and is living with him in his parental house and has given birth to a child and before attaining age of majority, she also filed a complaint, which resulted into registration of FIR against accused-respondent No. 2 and after attaining the age of discretion, she has filed present petition for quashing the criminal proceedings initiated against her husband for betterment of her life as well as welfare of her child. After grant of bail to accused-respondent No. 2, she has accompanied him alongwith her child and residing in her matrimonial house. It is true that as a matter of principle, quashing of FIR on the basis of compromise should not be permitted in case of heinous crime like Section 376 IPC that too with minor for the reason that said crime is against the society having adverse impact on it and also that possibility of compromise under any kind of pressure, threat or coercion cannot be ruled out. In such cases as victims normally belong to the weaker class. But in given facts and circumstances of the present case, where offence of rape is made out because of the fact that a young girl, without waiting for attaining the age of discretion, has left her house to marry accused-respondent No. 2 and subjected herself to cohabitation, resulting into delivery of child, and now again residing in her matrimonial house with respondent-accused it cannot be compared with other cases. 11. 11. Observation of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in similar case decided on 12.01.2017 in Cr.MMO No. 385 of 2016, titled as Chander Vir Kaundal v. State of H.P., would also be relevant, where it is recorded that looking at the case from another angle, since the petitioner has solemnized marriage with respondent, obviously, there is no possibility of her supporting the charge in case; the petitioner is put to trial. Therefore, in such circumstances, the continuation of criminal proceedings would only cause untoward torture or harassment apart from creating undue social and psychological pressure upon the private parties and it will be an extremely sad story in case complainant is called in the witness box to depose against the accused, who is none; other than her husband. 12. In present case also deposition of victim in the Court in consonance with prosecution case would lead to landing her husband in jail and pushing her and her child in pitch dark whereas retracting from her earlier version may put her in unnecessary trouble. 13. Learned counsel for the complainant-petitioner has also referred to judgments passed by the Coordinate Benches in Cr.MMO No. 301 of 2018, decided on 24.04.2019, titled as Asha Devi and others v. State of Himachal Pradesh and another; Cr.MMO No. 399 of 2018, decided on 18.09.2018, titled as Kajal and another v. State of Himachal Pradesh and another; and Cr.MMO No. 244 of 2019, decided on 07.05.2019 titled as X v. State of H.P. and others, wherein FIRs registered under Section 376 IPC read with provisions of POCSO Act have been quashed in similar circumstances where victims and accused had married to each other. 14. Marriage before attaining age of discretion i.e. 18 years, of a girl is prohibited under Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, but once marriage is solemnized, the said marriage has not been termed as nullity but voidable at the option of the minor involved in the case as per Section 3 of the said Act. 14. Marriage before attaining age of discretion i.e. 18 years, of a girl is prohibited under Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, but once marriage is solemnized, the said marriage has not been termed as nullity but voidable at the option of the minor involved in the case as per Section 3 of the said Act. Victim, in present case, as a minor had not objected the same for a considerable long period and even after leaving the house of her in-laws she had not lodged complaint at the first instance but complained only when in-laws were again insisting her to accompany them and now after attaining age of discretion she is not only ratifying such marriage, but has also expressed her desire to continue that marriage and is continuing the same and living with husband at least since January, 2019 after release of her husband accused-respondent No. 2 on bail. 15. The ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court on the issue of permitting the compromise and quashing of FIR in all cases, the Courts must consider the interest of public at large and the offence offending the Society at large should not be permitted to be compromised and quashing of FIR or criminal proceedings on the basis of such compromise should not be permitted. Present case is somewhat different from general category, as in present case, it is not on the basis of compromise that quashing of FIR has been sought for, but it is a case where interest of victim is also involved and welfare of victim appears to be in closing criminal proceedings as she has proclaimed herself to be wife of accused and also given birth to a child out of the wedlock and the case is made out against accused-respondent No. 2, only for the reason that at that time victim had not attained the age of discretion, and further, it is not a case where it can be said that victim was abducted forcefully and ravished mercilessly and was used as an instrument of enjoyment and thrown out after the use but it is a case where she lived in the matrimonial house for quite long time and delivered a child as noticed supra. Now in the facts and circumstances of the case, this case cannot be termed as a case subjecting the victim-complainant forcibly to illicit sexual intercourse. Now in the facts and circumstances of the case, this case cannot be termed as a case subjecting the victim-complainant forcibly to illicit sexual intercourse. Further, it is a peculiar kind of case where there is a conflict between interest of victim and societal interest. Interest of victim is not purely private in nature as rehabilitation and survival of victim and her child is another issue which involves public interest because to ensure rehabilitation and provide resources for survival of victim is also responsibility of society. Considering entire facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion balance lies in favour of the prayer of the victim. 16. In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized and advised that in the matter of compromise in criminal proceedings, keeping in view of nature of this case, to save the time of the Court for utilizing to decide more effective and meaningful litigation, a commonsense approach, based on ground realities and bereft of the technicalities of law, should be applied. 17. Therefore, in peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the considered opinion that interest of justice shall be served in quashing the FIR as well as criminal proceedings pending against accused-respondent No. 2. Accordingly, FIR No. 110/2017 dated 13.10.2017, registered in Police Station, Tissa, District Chamba, H.P., under Sections 363, 366, 376, 341 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of POCSO Act, is quashed. Consequent to quashing of FIR, criminal proceedings initiated against accused-respondent No. 2 in pursuance thereto, are also quashed. Petition stands disposed of in above terms.