JUDGMENT : BELA M. TRIVEDI, J. 1. The present appeal filed by the appellant – original accused under Section 374 of Cr.P.C., is directed against the judgment and order of conviction dated 18.2.2014 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Morbi (hereinafter referred to as "the Sessions Court") in Sessions Case No.51 of 2011, whereby the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo life-imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default thereof, to undergo further simple imprisonment for two months. 2. The case of the prosecution as unfolded before the Sessions Court was that the appellant – accused Dineshbhai Vasantbhai alias Babalal Kanani and the deceased Uttambhai were very close friends, however, the deceased Uttambhai used to insist the accused to commit an act against the order of nature and he also had a lusty eye on his wife. The accused, therefore, being fed up with such conduct of the said Uttambhai, had called him at his house situated in Sankadisheri Green Chowk at about 8.30 a.m., on 27.8.2011 when nobody was at home. When the said Uttambhai came to the said house of the accused, some quarrel had taken place between them, and thereafter, the accused inflicted number of injuries with the knife on the person of the said Uttambhai. As a result thereof, the said Uttambhai succumbed to the said injuries. The appellant – accused thereafter went to Morbi City Police Station with the blood-stained knife and his blood-stained clothes, and lodged the complaint. On the basis of the said complaint, the FIR was registered as I-CR No.180 of 2011 at the said Police Station for the offence under Section 302 of IPC and Section 135 of Bombay Police Act. The Investigating Officer, after collecting sufficient evidence against the accused submitted the charge-sheet before the Court of Additional Chief Magistrate at Morbi, who committed the case to the Sessions Court for trial, where it was registered as Sessions Case No.51 of 2011. 3. The sessions Court, framed the charge against the accused at Exh.9 for the alleged offences, however, the same having been denied by the accused and he having claimed to be tried, the prosecution examined 26 witnesses and produced number of documents in support of the charge levelled against the accused. 3. The sessions Court, framed the charge against the accused at Exh.9 for the alleged offences, however, the same having been denied by the accused and he having claimed to be tried, the prosecution examined 26 witnesses and produced number of documents in support of the charge levelled against the accused. Out of the witnesses examined by the prosecution, most of the panch witnesses, the witnesses who had the knowledge of the alleged incident, the father of accused and the wife of the accused had turned hostile and not supported the case of prosecution. The Sessions Court had also not permitted the FIR registered pursuant to the complaint given by the accused, to be received in evidence. However, relying upon the evidence of the father and the uncle of the deceased Uttambhai and relying upon the other evidence with regard to the investigation carried out by the Investigating Officer, the Sessions Court held the charges levelled against the accused as proved and convicted and sentenced for the alleged offences as stated herein above. 4. Learned Sr. Advocate Mr.K.B. Anandjiwala appearing for the appellant – accused, placing heavy reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Aghnoo Nagesia Vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1966 SC 119 , and the provisions contained in Sections 24 to 26 of the Evidence Act, submitted that the confession made before the police under no circumstance is admissible in evidence against the accused and even if the First Information Report is given by the accused himself before the Police Officer, which amounts to a confessional statement, the proof of such confession is prohibited by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. According to him, the confession before the Police Officer in the form of FIR would not only include the admission of the offence, but also all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence contained in the confessional statement, and therefore, no part of confessional statement would be receivable in evidence except to the extent the ban of Section 25 is lifted by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Mr.Anandjiwala, submitted that the entire case of prosecution depended on the circumstantial evidence and as laid down by the Supreme Court in catena of decisions, the entire chain of circumstances has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt unerringly pointing out the quilt of the accused. Mr.Anandjiwala, submitted that the entire case of prosecution depended on the circumstantial evidence and as laid down by the Supreme Court in catena of decisions, the entire chain of circumstances has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt unerringly pointing out the quilt of the accused. According to him, the Sessions Court had committed gross error in holding that the prosecution had established the chain of circumstances beyond reasonable doubt, when all the material witnesses and the panch witnesses had turned hostile and when there was no reliable and cogent evidence produced by the prosecution connecting the accused with the alleged crime. 5. Mr.Anandjiwala, referring to the evidence of the witnesses, more particularly the evidence of PW-4 Vasantlal Nathalal, father of the accused and PW-21 Hetalben Sandipbhai Boriya, ex-wife of the accused, submitted that on the day of incident in question, the accused was at Rajkot along with his parents and his wife, and therefore, there was no possibility of accused committing the crime as alleged by the prosecution. He further submitted that the panch witnesses in whose presence the inquest panchnama and the panchnama of scene of offence were allegedly drawn, had turned hostile. Similarly, the PW-10 to PW-19, who allegedly had the knowledge about the commission of offence, had turned hostile. There was also no evidence adduced by the prosecution, runs the submissions of Mr.Anandjiwala, to show that the accused was staying at the house from where the dead-body of the deceased was found. According to him, the evidence of PW-26 Sureshbhai Vishwanath Dave, the Mamlatdar, who had carried out the survey for preparing the voters' list could not be said to be a reliable piece of evidence. There was also no clear evidence of the PW-1 Dr. P. G. Bhatt, who had carried out the postmortem of the deceased to show that the injuries found on the dead-body of the deceased were possible with the muddamal knife allegedly produced by the accused in the police station. Lastly he submitted that there was no explanation coming forth as to why the accused was not arrested till 5 O'clock in the evening when as per the case of the prosecution, the FIR was registered at the instance of the accused at about 12.15 hours. Lastly he submitted that there was no explanation coming forth as to why the accused was not arrested till 5 O'clock in the evening when as per the case of the prosecution, the FIR was registered at the instance of the accused at about 12.15 hours. Thus, according to him, as the entire case had many loopholes, and the prosecution which had failed to prove the entire chain of circumstances beyond reasonable doubt, the benefit of which should be given to the appellant – accused. 6. Learned APP Mr.H. K. Patel, however, has placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Bheru Singh S/o Kalyun Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1995 AIR SCW 2126 to submit that where the accused himself lodges the FIR, the fact of his giving information to the police is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, and to the extent it is non-confessional in nature, it would also be relevant under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. According to him, the relationship of the accused with the deceased, and the motive for the commission of crime etc., could not be said to be confessional statement hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Even the production of the muddamal knife by the accused at the police station, which had blood stains thereon is also saved by the provisions of the Evidence Act. Mr.Patel further relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Navaneethakrishnan Vs. State by Inspector of Police, reported in AIR 2018 SC 2027 to contend that the place where the dead-body of the deceased was lying was discovered at the instance of the appellant – accused, and therefore, the said information discovered at the instance of the accused would be admissible in view of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 7. Mr.Patel emphatically urged that the plea of alibi as sought to be raised during the cross- examination of the hostile witnesses PW-4 Vasantlal, father of the accused and PW-29 Hetalben, wife of the accused, was not stated by the accused in his further statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., nor the appellant has raised any ground in this regard in the memo of appeal filed before this Court. He further submitted that the panch witness Chandrakant Natwar examined at Exh.60 in whose presence the blood stained clothes of the accused were ceased as per the panchnama Exh.61, and PW-9 Dilip Prafulchandra Somaiya the panch witness examined at Exh.62 in whose presence the clothes of the deceased Uttambhai were ceased as per the panchnama Exh.63 had fully supported the case of prosecution, and that the said clothes and the muddamal article knife having been sent to the FSL for examination, the blood group "O" found on the muddamal knife and on the clothes of the accused matched with the blood group "O" of the deceased Uttambhai as per the serological report at Exh.91 and the cut-marks found on the clothes of the deceased were also found to be possible with the muddamal knife as per the report of the scientific officer (Exh.92). 8. As regards the motive, Mr.Patel relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Amitava Banerjee Alias Amit Alias Bappa Banerjee Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 554 submitted that failure to prove the motive in cases resting on circumstantial evidence is not fatal by itself, nonetheless in the instant case, the prosecution had sought to prove the same by examining PW-2 Jagdishbhai Devjibhai, father of the deceased and PW-3 Amrutlal Devjibhai, uncle of the deceased, before whom the accused had made extra-judicial confession. He has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of A.N. Venkatesh and Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 714 to submit that by virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act the conduct of the accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and such evidence on his conduct could be used as a missing link in the chain of circumstances sought to be proved by the prosecution. 9. Before appreciating the rival contentions raised by the learned Advocates for the parties, it may be stated at the outset that in the instant case, the FIR was registered at the Morbi Police Station on 27.8.2011 at the instance of the appellant – accused himself. 9. Before appreciating the rival contentions raised by the learned Advocates for the parties, it may be stated at the outset that in the instant case, the FIR was registered at the Morbi Police Station on 27.8.2011 at the instance of the appellant – accused himself. Hence, it would be beneficial to refer to the legal position propounded by the Supreme Court as to what extent the "admission" and "confession" made by the accused, would be admissible in evidence. Since heavy reliance is placed on the decision of the Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in case of Aghnoo Nagesia Vs. State of Bihar (supra) by the learned Sr. Anandjiwala, the relevant part thereof is reproduced as under:- "9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions of law dealing with confessions made by an accused. The law relating to confessions is to be found generally in ss. 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and ss. 162 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act are to be found under the heading "Admissions". Confession is a species of admission, and is dealt with in ss. 24 to 30. A confession or an admission is evidence against the maker of it, unless its admissibility is excluded by some provision of law. Section 24 excludes confessions caused by certain inducements, threats and promises. Section 25 provides : "No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence." The terms of s. 25 are imperative. A confession made to a police officer under any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers a confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also a confession made before any investigation has begun. The expression "accused of any offence" covers a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence when he made the confession. Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a confession made by him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The partial ban imposed by s. 26 relates to a confession made to a person 138 other than a police officer. Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a confession made by him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The partial ban imposed by s. 26 relates to a confession made to a person 138 other than a police officer. Section 26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed by s. 25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by ss. 24, 25 and 26. It provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the use of any statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of the offence Order investigation, save as mentioned in the proviso and in cases falling under sub­s (2), and it specifically provides that nothing in it shall be deemed to affect the provisions of S.27 of the Evidence Act. The words of s. 162 are wide enough to include a confession made to a police officer in the course of an investigation. A statement or confession made in the course of an investigation may be recorded by a Magistrate under s. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject to the safeguards imposed by the section. Thus, except as provided by s. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession by an accused to a police office­ is absolutely protected under s. 25 of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the course of an investigation, it is also protected by s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to any other person made by him while in the custody of a police officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions seem to proceed upon the view that confessions made by an accused to a police officer or made by him while he is in the custody of a police officer are not to be trusted, and should not be used in evidence against him. They are based upon grounds of public policy, and the fullest effect should be given to them. 10 & 11 xxx 12. Shortly put, a confession may be defined as an admission of the offence by a person charged with the offence. A statement which contains self­exculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession, if the exculpatory statement is of some fact which, if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. If an admission of an accused is to be used against him, the whole of it should be tendered in evidence, and if part of the admission is exculpatory and part inculpatory, the prosecution is not at liberty to use in evidence the inculpatory part only. See Hanumant v. State of M. P. and Palvinder Kaur v. the State of Punjab. The accused is entitled to insist that the entire admission including the exculpatory part must be tendered in evidence. But this principle is of no assistance to the accused where no part of his statement is self­ exculpatory, and the prosecution intends to use the whole of the statement against the accused. 13. to 20. xxx 21. Section 27 applies only to information received from a person accused of an offence in the custody of a police officer. Now, the Sub Inspector stated that he arrested the appellant after he gave the first information report leading to the discovery. Prima facie, therefore, the appellant was not in the custody of a police officer when he gave the report, unless it can be said that he was the in constructive custody. On the question whether a person directly giving to a police officer information which may be used as evidence against him ­may be deemed to have submitted himself to the custody of the police officer within the meaning of s. 27, there is conflict of opinion. See the observations of Shah, J. and Subba Rao, J. in State of U. P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya. See the observations of Shah, J. and Subba Rao, J. in State of U. P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya. For the purposes of the case, we shall assume that the appellant was constructively in police custody and therefore the information contained in the first information report leading to the discovery of the dead bodies and the tangi is admissible in evidence. The entire evidence against the appellant then consists of the fact that the appellant gave information as to the place where the dead bodies were lying and as to the place where he concealed the tangi', the discovery of the dead bodies and the tangi in consequence of the information, the discovery of a blood­stained chadar from the appellant's house and the fact that he had gone to Dungi Jharan Hills on the morning of August 11, 1963. This evidence is not sufficient to convict the appellant of the offenses under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code." 10. It would be also relevant to reproduce the observations made by the Supreme Court with regard to the issue of admissibility in evidence of the admission and confession made by the accused before the police officer, in case of Bheru Singh S/o Kalyun Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), as relied upon by the learned APP Mr. Patel:- "16.A confession or an admission is evidence against the maker of it so long as its admissibility is not excluded by some provision of law. Provisions of Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and of Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deal with confessions. By virtue of the provisions of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, a confession made to a police officer under no circumstance is admissible in evidence against an accused. The section deals with confessions made not only when the accused was free and not in police custody but also with the one made by such a person before any investigation had begun. The expression "accused of any offence" in Section 25 would cover the case of an accused who has since been put on trial, whether or not at the time when he made the confessional statement, he was under arrest or in custody as an accused in that case or not. The expression "accused of any offence" in Section 25 would cover the case of an accused who has since been put on trial, whether or not at the time when he made the confessional statement, he was under arrest or in custody as an accused in that case or not. Inadmissibility of a confessional statement made to a police officer under Section 25 of the Evidence Act is based on the ground of public policy. Section 25 of the Evidence Act not only bars proof of admission of an offence by an accused to a police officer or made by him while in the custody of a police officer but also the admission contained in the confessional statement of all incriminating facts relating to the commission of an offence. Section 26 of the Evidence Act deals with partial ban to the admissibility of confessions made to a person other than a police officer but we are not concerned with it in this case. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is in the nature of a proviso or an exception, which partially lifts the ban imposed by Section 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and makes admissible so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates to the fact thereby discovered, when made by a person accused of an offence while in police custody. Under Section 164 CrPC a statement or confession made in the course of an investigation, may be recorded by a Magistrate, subject to the safeguards imposed by the section itself and can be relied upon at the trial. 17. Where the first information report is given by an accused himself to a police officer and amounts to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. No part of the confessional statement can be proved or received in evidence, except to the extent it is permitted by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The first information report recorded under Section 154 CrPC is not a substantive piece of evidence. It may be used to corroborate the informant under Section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him under Section 145 of the Evidence Act in case the informant appears as a witness at the trial. The first information report recorded under Section 154 CrPC is not a substantive piece of evidence. It may be used to corroborate the informant under Section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him under Section 145 of the Evidence Act in case the informant appears as a witness at the trial. Where the accused himself lodges the first information report, the fact of his giving the information to the police is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act and to the extent it is non­confessional in nature, it would also be relevant under Section 21 of the Evidence Act but the confessional part of the first information report by the accused to the police officer cannot be used at all against him in view of the ban of Section 25 of the Evidence Act." 11. The observations made by the Supreme Court in case of A. N. Venkatesh and Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka (supra) as regards the relevance of the conduct of the accused in view of Section 8 of the Evidence Act as also reproduced hereunder. "9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simplicitor, that the accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where the dead body of the kidnapped boy was found and on their pointing out the body was exhumed, would be admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 or not as held by this Court in Prakash Chand Vs. State ( AIR 1979 SC 400 ). Even if we hold that the disclosure statement made by the accused appellants(Ex. P14 and P15) is not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant under Section 8. The evidence of the investigating officer and PWs 1, 2, 7 and PW4 the spot mazhar witness that the accused had taken them to the spot and pointed out the place where the dead body was buried, is an admissible piece of evidence under Section 8 as the conduct of the accused. The evidence of the investigating officer and PWs 1, 2, 7 and PW4 the spot mazhar witness that the accused had taken them to the spot and pointed out the place where the dead body was buried, is an admissible piece of evidence under Section 8 as the conduct of the accused. Presence of A­1 and A­2 at a place where ransom demand was to be fulfilled and their action of fleeing on spotting the police party is a relevant circumstance and are admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act." 12. The sum total of the above referred judgments would be that the confession made to a police officer under any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the accused in view of the ban contained in Section 25 of the Evidence Act. It covers a confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also a confession made before any investigation has begun. The expression "accused of any offence" would cover a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence when he made the confession. Of course, Section 27 in the form of proviso, partially lifts the ban imposed by Section 25 and 26. It provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. It is pertinent to note that if the statement made by the accused contains an admission, a part of which is exculpatory and a part inculpatory, the prosecution cannot be permitted to use the inculpatory part only, and the accused would be entitled to insist that the entire admission including the exculpatory part must be tendered in evidence. Now, when the accused himself gives the First Information Report to a police officer, which amounts to a confessional statement, the proof of the confession is prohibited by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. No part of confessional statement can be proved or received in evidence, except to the extent it is permitted by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Now, when the accused himself gives the First Information Report to a police officer, which amounts to a confessional statement, the proof of the confession is prohibited by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. No part of confessional statement can be proved or received in evidence, except to the extent it is permitted by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. However, where the accused lodges the FIR, the fact of his giving information to the police is relevant fact and is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct by virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, and to the extent it is non-confessional in nature, it would also be relevant by virtue of Section 21 of the Evidence Act. In any case, the confessional part of the first information report by the accused to the police officer cannot be used at all against him in view of the ban of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. 13. Keeping in view the above stated legal position, if the evidence adduced by the prosecution in the instant case is appreciated, it transpires that the FIR was lodged by the appellant – accused himself at about 12.15 hours on 27.8.2011 on the basis of which the investigating officer had initiated investigation and subsequently arrested him on the same day. It is pertinent to note that the Sessions Court, considering the settled legal position had not received in evidence the FIR lodged by the appellant – accused and the same was given only the mark and not the final exhibit. Though the learned APP has sought to submit that the statements made in the said FIR lodged by the accused so far as they were admission of facts and not the confessional statements should have been permitted by the Sessions Court to be read in evidence, the Court is of the opinion that the Sessions Court has rightly not exhibited the FIR lodged by the accused containing inculpatory as well as exculpatory statements, inasmuch as part of it contained the admission and part of it contained the confession. In any case, as stated herein above, the conduct of the appellant – accused going to the police station with blood-stained knife and clothes and giving information, as also pointing out the place where the dead-body of Uttambhai was lying, would be a relevant piece of evidence by virtue of Section 8 read with Section 21 of Evidence Act. 14. If the chronology of events as emerging from the evidence on record is seen, it has come on record from the depositions of the Investigating Officer, the Police Inspector Atulkumar Rajendrasinh Jankat and other witnesses that the accused had gone to the Morbi City Police Station at about 8.30 hours on 27.8.2011 with blood stained clothes and blood stained knife for lodging an FIR, which was taken down by the I. O., and on the basis of which the I-C.R. No.180 of 2011 was registered for the offence under Section 302 of IPC. Though the said FIR has not been marked as exhibit for the purpose of reading in evidence, the offence being serious offence, he had made special reports, which were placed on record at Exh.83 and 84, in which the appellant was shown as the complainant as well as the accused. It further appears from the evidence of the said I.O. along with the inquest panchnama at Exh.53 and panchnama of scene of offence at Exh.59 that the said I.O. had gone to the scene of offence, which was the house of Vasantbhai Nayalal Kanani situated at Sankadisheri, Near Green Chowk, Morbi, as was shown by the accused, and where the dead-body of Uttambhai was lying. The inquest panchnama appears to have been carried out between the time 12.30 to 14.00 hours and the panchnama of scene of offence was drawn between the time 14.30 to 15.30 hours in presence of the respective panch witnesses. Thereafter the officers from FSL were also called and the dead- body was sent to the hospital for performing postmortem. The appellant – accused though was present at the police station, appears to have been arrested as per the panchnama Exh.61 between the time 17.00 to 18.00 hours in presence of the panch witnesses. Thereafter the officers from FSL were also called and the dead- body was sent to the hospital for performing postmortem. The appellant – accused though was present at the police station, appears to have been arrested as per the panchnama Exh.61 between the time 17.00 to 18.00 hours in presence of the panch witnesses. It is true that the panch witnesses the PW-5 Kailashbhai Amrutlal Soni and the PW-6 Narendra Manoharlal Solanki in whose presence the inquest panchnama (Exh.53) was drawn, and the PW-7 Ballab Mansukh Hirani in whose presence the panchnama of scene of offence (Exh.59) was drawn, had turned hostile, however, the I.O., in his evidence had duly stated about the investigation carried out by him. It may be noted that the panch witness PW-8 Chandrakant Natwarlal in whose presence the accused was searched and arrested as per the panchnama (Exh.61) had fully supported the case of prosecution. Be that as it may, it is fairly well settled that the evidence of Investigating Officer can be relied upon to prove the recovery of incriminating material/articles even when the panch witnesses turn hostile. The said legal position has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the latest judgment in the case of Mallikarjun and Others Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 359 , the relevant part of which is reproduced as under:- "23. ... There is no merit in the contention that merely because the panch witnesses turned hostile, the recovery of the weapon would stand vitiated. It is fairly well settled that the evidence of the Investigating Officer can be relied upon to prove the recovery even when the panch witnesses turned hostile. In Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat and others (2011) 11 SCC 111 , it was held as under:­ “33. In Modan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1978) 4 SCC 435 it was observed (at SCC p. 438, para 9) that where the evidence of the investigating officer who recovered the material objects is convincing, the evidence as to recovery need not be rejected on the ground that seizure witnesses did not support the prosecution version. Similar view was expressed in Mohd. Aslam v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 9 SCC 362 . 34. In Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2004) 10 SCC 657 , it was further held that: (SCC p. 661, para 10) “10. Similar view was expressed in Mohd. Aslam v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 9 SCC 362 . 34. In Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2004) 10 SCC 657 , it was further held that: (SCC p. 661, para 10) “10. … even if panch witnesses turn hostile, which happens very often in criminal cases, the evidence of the person who effected the recovery would not stand vitiated.” 35. This Court has held in a large number of cases that merely because the panch witnesses have turned hostile is no ground to reject the evidence if the same is based on the testimony of the investigating officer alone. In the instant case, it is not the case of defence that the testimony of the investigating officer suffers from any infirmity or doubt. (Vide Modan Singh case, Krishna Gopal case and Anter Singh case.)” 15. Thus, having regard to the evidence of the I.O. and the panch witnesses, as also the panchnamas with regard to the inquest, the scene of offence, the search of the person of the accused and of the seizure of the clothes and the knife etc., from the accused, it was duly established by the prosecution that the dead- body of Uttambhai was lying in the house situated at Sankadisheri, Near Green Chowk, Morbi on the basis of the information given by the accused. Hence, even if the FIR registered at the instance of the appellant – accused was not admitted in evidence, the fact discovered as regards the place of incident in question where the dead-body was lying and the knowledge of the accused about the said place of the incident would be a relevant piece of evidence in view of Section 27 read with Section 8 of the Evidence Act. 16. The expression "fact discovered" contained in Section 27 has been explained by the Supreme Court in case of Anter Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2004) 10 SCC 657 , whereby it has been observed that the expression "fact discovered" includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to the said fact. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2004) 10 SCC 657 , whereby it has been observed that the expression "fact discovered" includes not only the physical object produced, but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to the said fact. Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in case of Pullukuri Kotaya vs Emperor, reported in AIR 1947 Privy Council 67 and in case of Udai Bhan vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1962 SC 1116 also. To be precise, the Supreme Court, in case of Anter Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, has summed up the issue under Section 27 of the Evidence Act in paragraph 16 as under:- "16. The various requirements of the Section can be summed up as follows: (1) The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue. It must be borne in mind that the provision has nothing to do with question of relevancy. The relevancy of the fact discovered must be established according to the prescriptions relating to relevancy of other evidence connecting it with the crime in order to make the fact discovered admissible. (2) The fact must have been discovered. (3) The discovery must have been in consequence of some information received from the accused and not by accused's own act. (4) The persons giving the information must be accused of any offence. (5) He must be in the custody of a police officer. (6) The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to. (7) Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly to the fact discovered can be proved. The rest is inadmissible." 17. The other circumstance which shed light on the involvement of the appellant – accused is that the I.O. had also collected the blood in the cotton threads from the scene of offence as per the panchnama (Exh.59) for being sent to the FSL for examination and had also seized the clothes of the accused after his arrested as per the panchnama (Exh.61). As per the serological report (Exh.91) the blood group "O" found in the cotton thread collected from the scene of offence, the blood group "O" found on the clothes of the accused as well as on the knife seized as per the panchnama (Exh.61), matched with the blood group "O" of the deceased, whereas the blood group of the accused was found to be "A". The prosecution, therefore, had also proved that the blood group found on the clothes of the accused as well as on the knife recovered from the accused was that of the deceased Uttambhai. 18. So far as the place of incident in question is concerned, it was submitted by the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Anandjiwala for the appellant that the house did not belong to the accused as sought to be established by the prosecution, however, the Court does not find any substance in the said submission. Though PW-10 to PW-19, who were either the neighbours or staying in the same street where the alleged incident had taken place, had turned hostile, most of the said witnesses had admitted in their respective cross-examinations by the prosecution that the house Vasantbhai Kanani, i.e. the father of the accused was situated at Sankadisheri, Near Green Chowk, Morbi. The prosecution had also examined the PW-26 Sureshbhai Vishwanath Dave, who happened to be the Mamlatdar at Morbi. As per his evidence and the voters' list produced at Exh.102, it was clearly established that the names of the accused, his wife, his mother and his father were shown at Sr. No.1237 to 1240 in the said voters' list in respect of the house No.9-3-5 situated at Sankadisheri, Near Green Chowk, Vibhak-13, Morbi. In the cross- examination also, he had stated that the said list was being prepared after verifying the documents as regards the residence of the concerned persons. 19. It is further pertinent to note that PW-21 Hetalben who happened to be the ex-wife of the accused Dineshbhai, examined at Exh.77, though had turned hostile, had admitted in her cross- examination that after the incident in question, she had lodged a complaint on 4.11.2012 against her husband i.e. Dineshbhai and her in-laws for the offences under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506(2) and 114 of IPC (Exh.81). Apart from the fact that in the said complaint she had stated that after her marriage with the accused, she was staying with her in-laws at Sankadisheri, Near Green Chowk, Morbi and that she was being harassed by her in-laws, she had also alleged against her husband i.e. the accused in the present case that he had committed murder of Uttambhai on 27.1.2011. Of course, in the cross- examination, she had stated that she had signed the said complaint without reading the contents thereof, however it is required to be noted that no objection was raised by the defence's side against exhibiting the said complaint as Exh.81, and therefore, the same could be read in evidence for a limited purpose so far as the place of residence of the accused mentioned therein is concerned. Pertinently, the prosecution had also produced the sale deed in respect of the said house in question at Exh.86 from which it transpires that the said house at Sankadisheri, was purchased in the name of Smt. Jaishreeben Vasantlal Kanani, the mother of the accused Dineshbhai. The said document was also admitted without any objection from the defence's side. The Court, therefore, finds much substance in the submission of the learned APP that the prosecution had also duly established the fact that the house from which the dead-body of Uttambhai was found as per the information given by the accused, in fact, belonged to the accused and his parents. 20. As regards the motive, the prosecution has relied upon the extra-judicial confession made by the accused before the PW-2 Jagdishbhai Devji, the father of the deceased. Of course, proof of motive is not a sine qua non for convicting the accused as the motive would be known only to the perpetrator of the crime and not to the others. The Supreme Court in case of Amitava Banerjee Alias Amit Alias Bappa Banerjee Vs. State of West Bengal (supra), in this regard held as under:- "41. Motive for the commission of an offence no doubt assumes greater importance in cases resting on circumstantial evidence than those in which direct evidence regarding commission of the offence is available. And yet failure to prove motive in cases resting on circumstantial evidence is not fatal by itself. State of West Bengal (supra), in this regard held as under:- "41. Motive for the commission of an offence no doubt assumes greater importance in cases resting on circumstantial evidence than those in which direct evidence regarding commission of the offence is available. And yet failure to prove motive in cases resting on circumstantial evidence is not fatal by itself. All that the absence of motive for the commission of the offence results in is that the court shall have to be more careful and circumspect in scrutinizing the evidence to ensure that suspicion does not take the place of proof while finding the accused guilty. 42. Absence of motive in a case depending entirely on circumstantial evidence is a factor that shall no doubt weigh in favour of the accused, but what the Courts need to remember is that motive is a matter which is primarily known to the accused and which the prosecution may at times find difficult to explain or establish by substantive evidence. 43. Human nature being what it is, it is often difficult to fathom the real motivation behind the commission of a crime. And yet experience about human nature, human conduct and the frailties of human mind has shown that inducements to crime have veered around to what Wills has in his book "Circumstantial Evidence" said: "The common inducements to crime are the desires of revenging some real or fancied wrong; of getting rid of rival or an obnoxious connection; of escaping from the pressure of pecuniary or other obligation or burden of obtaining plunder or other coveted object; or preserving reputation, either that of general character or the conventional reputation or profession or sex; or gratifying some other selfish or malignant passion." 44. The legal position as to the significance of motive and effect of its absence in a given case is fairly well­ settled by the decisions of this Court to which we need not refer in detail to avoid burdening this judgment unnecessarily. See Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., Surinder Pal Jain v. Delhi Administration, Tarseem Kumar v. Delhi Administration, Jagdish v. State of M.P., and Mulakh Raj v. Satish Kumar." 21. In the light of above legal position, let us consider the evidence of PW-2 Jagdishbhai. See Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., Surinder Pal Jain v. Delhi Administration, Tarseem Kumar v. Delhi Administration, Jagdish v. State of M.P., and Mulakh Raj v. Satish Kumar." 21. In the light of above legal position, let us consider the evidence of PW-2 Jagdishbhai. He had stated inter alia that the accused Dineshbhai staying at Sankadisheri, Near Green Chowk, Morbi happened to be the friend of his son Uttambhai since last six years and that on the date of the alleged incident i.e. on 27.8.2011 his son Uttambhai had left the house at about 8 O'clock in the morning and he had also left for going to his shop at about 9 O'clock. Thereafter he had received the news from the City Police Station, Morbi that Dineshbhai had committed the murder of Uttambhai and he should reach the police station. According to him, when he reached the police station, the accused Dineshbhai was present there wearing blood stained clothes, and at time the accused had told him that since Uttambhai used to come to his house often and insist to commit the act against the order of nature and was keeping an evil eye on his wife, he had committed the murder of Uttambhai. The said Jagdishbhai had further stated that he thereafter had gone to the house of Vasantlal Kanani, the father of Dineshbhai, at Sankadisheri, and had seen that his son was lying dead and that there were number of stab wounds on his body. He had identified the accused sitting in the Court and had also identified the clothes of his son shown to him in the Court. Though he was cross-examined at length, nothing material beneficial to the defence side was extracted. The PW-3 Amrutlal Devji, who happened to be the uncle of the deceased Uttambhai had also supported the said version by stating that on 27.8.2011 he had gone to the Police Station at Morbi on receiving the news from his brother Jagdishbhai that Uttambhai was murdered, and that he had seen the accused Dineshbhai present there wearing blood stained clothes. Thereafter he along with his brother Jagdishbhai had also gone to the place of incident at Sankadisheri, Near Green Chowk, Morbi where the dead-body of Uttambhai was lying. 22. Thereafter he along with his brother Jagdishbhai had also gone to the place of incident at Sankadisheri, Near Green Chowk, Morbi where the dead-body of Uttambhai was lying. 22. It cannot be gainsaid that an extra-judicial confession by the accused before any person would be a very weak piece of evidence, more particularly when it is made by the accused under police custody. The Court, therefore, is of the opinion that the extra-judicial confession made by the appellant – accused before the said Jagdishbhai when he was at the police station could not be relied upon by the prosecution as a cogent piece of evidence for the purpose of proving the motive. Except the said evidence of Jagdishbhai, there is hardly any evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused to commit the crime. Nonetheless as per the settled legal position stated herein above, failure to prove motive in cases resting on circumstantial evidence would not be fatal by itself. 23. Adverting to the last submission made by the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Anandjiwala for the appellant that the prosecution had failed to prove the presence of the appellant – accused at Morbi inasmuch as from the evidence of PW-4 Vasantlal Kanani, the father of the accused and from the evidence of PW-21 Hetalben, ex-wife of the accused, it had emerged that on the date of incident in question, the accused Dineshbhai was at Rajkot and not at Morbi, it is significant to note that neither such plea of alibi was taken by the appellant – accused in the further statement recorded by the Sessions Court under Section 313 of Cr. P.C., nor the appeal memo of the present appeal contains any such ground of alibi as sought to be pleaded by Mr.Anandjiwala. 24. It is axiomatic that the object of recording the further statement of the accused under Section 313 is to bring to the notice of the accused the incriminating evidence and to give him an opportunity to explain the same, if he chooses to do so. The essential features of Section 313 and the principles of law enunciated in various judgments have been succinctly summarized in case of Ashokkumar Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 350 . The paragraphs 29 to 31 thereof reads as under:- "29. The essential features of Section 313 and the principles of law enunciated in various judgments have been succinctly summarized in case of Ashokkumar Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 350 . The paragraphs 29 to 31 thereof reads as under:- "29. Now we may proceed to discuss the evidence led by the prosecution in the present case. In order to bring the issues raised within a narrow compass we may refer to the statement of the accused made under Section 313, Cr.P.C. It is a settled principle of law that dual purpose is sought to be achieved when the Courts comply with the mandatory requirement of recording the statement of an accused under this provision. Firstly, every material piece of evidence which the prosecution proposes to use against the accused should be put to him in clear terms and secondly, the accused should have a fair chance to give his explanation in relation to that evidence as well as his own versions with regard to alleged involvement in the crime. This dual purpose has to be achieved in the interest of the proper administration of criminal justice and in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C.. Furthermore, the statement under Section 313 of the Cr.PC can be used by the Court in so far as it corroborates the case of the prosecution. Of course, conviction per se cannot be based upon the statement under Section 313 of the Cr.PC. 30. Let us examine the essential features of this section and the principles of law as enunciated by judgments of this Court, which are the guiding factor for proper application and consequences which shall flow from the provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.PC. As already noticed, the object of recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.PC is to put all incriminating evidence to the accused so as to provide him an opportunity to explain such incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of the prosecution. At the same time, also permit him to put forward his own version or reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to his involvement or otherwise in the crime. 31. The Court has been empowered to examine the accused but only after the prosecution evidence has been concluded. At the same time, also permit him to put forward his own version or reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to his involvement or otherwise in the crime. 31. The Court has been empowered to examine the accused but only after the prosecution evidence has been concluded. It is a mandatory obligation upon the Court and besides ensuring the compliance thereof, the Court has to keep in mind that the accused gets a fair chance to explain his conduct. The option lies with the accused to maintain silence coupled with simplicitor denial or, in the alternative, to explain his version and reasons, for his alleged involvement in the commission of crime. This is the statement which the accused makes without fear or right of the other party to cross­ examine him. However, if the statements made are false, the Court is entitled to draw adverse inferences and pass consequential orders, as may be called for, in accordance with law. The primary purpose is to establish a direct dialogue between the Court and the accused and to put every important incriminating piece of evidence to the accused and grant him an opportunity to answer and explain. Once such a statement is recorded, the next question that has to be considered by the Court is to what extent and consequences such statement can be used during the enquiry and the trial. Over the period of time, the Courts have explained this concept and now it has attained, more or less, certainty in the field of criminal jurisprudence." 25. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the appellant – accused had simply denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against him. The plea of alibi being a substantive plea of defence, should have been stated by the accused in his further statement under Section 313 of Cr. P.C.. Such a vital plea would not have been missed out by the accused when the incriminating evidence on record was brought to his notice. Similarly, such a vital ground, if not considered by the Sessions Court, could not have been missed out by the appellant to be incorporated in the appeal memo while filing the present appeal. Under the circumstances, the Court does not find any substance in the submission of the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Anandjiwala that the accused was not present in Morbi on the date of incident. Under the circumstances, the Court does not find any substance in the submission of the learned Sr. Advocate Mr.Anandjiwala that the accused was not present in Morbi on the date of incident. Except the bare statements of the father and the ex- wife of the accused that they were at Rajkot along with the accused on 26th and 27th August, 2011, there is no material produced on record in support of such statements of the said witnesses. 26. Thus, various circumstances in the chain of events established by the prosecution, rule out the possibility or reasonable likelihood of the accused being innocent. On the contrary, all the circumstances cumulatively taken together lead to the only irresistible conclusion that the accused alone had committed the alleged crime. Thus, the prosecution by adducing ample cogent and reliable evidence had proved each and every circumstance pointing out unerringly the quilt of the accused. The Sessions Court had rightly appreciated the evidence on record and rightly held the charges levelled against the accused as proved, which findings do not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. 27. In that view of the matter, the Court does not find any substance in the present appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 18.2.2014 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Morbi in Sessions Case No.51 of 2011 is hereby confirmed. The appeal is dismissed.