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2019 DIGILAW 1139 (RAJ)

Manju Lata W/o Late Shri Chhagan Lal Saini v. Mahipal Singh S/o Shri. Mangal Singh

2019-04-15

SABINA

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JUDGMENT : 1. Appellants-claimants have filed this appeal challenging the award dated 11.01.2017 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, whereby, Insurance Company was exonerated from its liability to indemnify the appellants. 2. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the appellants had filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, seeking compensation on account of death of Chagan Lal in the motor vehicle accident, which had occurred on 08.02.2014. Tribunal vide its award dated 11.01.2017 has allowed the claim petition filed by the claimants, but has exonerated the Insurance Company from its liability to indemnify the insured due to breach of terms of the insurance policy. Learned counsel has submitted that the only prayer in the present case raised by the claimants is that the Insurance Company should be directed to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants and liberty should be granted to the Insurance Company to recover the same from the insured. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amrit Paul Singh and Another. Vs. Tata AIG General Insurance Company Limited and Others 2018(7) Supreme Court Cases 558, wherein it was held as under :- “In the case at hand, it is clearly demonstrable from the materials brought on record that the vehicle at the time of the accident did not have a permit. The appellants had taken the stand that the vehicle was not involved in the accident. That apart, they had not stated whether the vehicle had temporary permit or any other kind of permit. The exceptions that have been carved out under Section 66 of the Act, needless to emphasise, are to be pleaded and proved. The exceptions cannot be taken aid of in the course of an argument to seek absolution from liability. Use of a vehicle in a public place without a permit is a fundamental statutory infraction. We are disposed to think so in view of the series of exceptions carved out in Section 66. The said situations cannot be equated with absence of licence or a fake licence or a licence for different kind of vehicle, or, for that matter, violation of a condition of carrying more number of passengers. We are disposed to think so in view of the series of exceptions carved out in Section 66. The said situations cannot be equated with absence of licence or a fake licence or a licence for different kind of vehicle, or, for that matter, violation of a condition of carrying more number of passengers. Therefore, the principles laid down in Swaran Singh (supra) and Lakhmi Chand (supra) in that regard would not be applicable to the case at hand. That apart, the insurer had taken the plea that the vehicle in question had no permit. It does not require the wisdom of the “Tripitaka”, that the existence of a permit of any nature is a matter of documentary evidence. Nothing has been brought on record by the insured to prove that he had a permit of the vehicle. In such a situation, the onus cannot be cast on the insurer. Therefore, the tribunal as well as the High Court had directed the insurer was required to pay the compensation amount to the claimants with interest with the stipulation that the insurer shall be entitled to recover the same from the owner and the driver. The said directions are in consonance with the principles stated in Swaran Singh (supra) and other cases pertaining to pay and recover principle.” 3. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pappu and Others Vs. Vinod Kumar Lamba and Others. (2018) 3 Supreme Court Cases 208, wherein, it was held as under:- “The next question is : whether in the fact situation of this case the insurance company can be and ought to be directed to pay the claim amount, with liberty to recover the same from the owner of the vehicle (respondent No.1)? This issue has been answered in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. (supra). In that case, it was contended by the insurance company that once the defence taken by the insurer is accepted by the Tribunal, it is bound to discharge the insurer and fix the liability only on the owner and/or the driver of the vehicle. However, this Court held that even if the insurer succeeds in establishing its defence, the Tribunal or the Court can direct the insurance company to pay the award amount to the claimants and, in turn, recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. However, this Court held that even if the insurer succeeds in establishing its defence, the Tribunal or the Court can direct the insurance company to pay the award amount to the claimants and, in turn, recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. The three-Judge Bench, after analysing the earlier decisions on the point, held that there was no reason to deviate from the said well-settled principle. In paragraph 107, the Court then observed thus: “We may, however, hasten to add that the Tribunal and the court must, however, exercise their jurisdiction to issue such a direction upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case and in the event such a direction has been issued, despite arriving at a finding of fact to the effect that the insurer has been able to establish that the insured has committed a breach of contract of insurance as envisaged under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act, the insurance company shall be entitled to realize the awarded amount from the owner or driver of the vehicle, as the case may be, in execution of the same award having regard to the provisions of Sections 165 and 168 of the Act. However, in the event, having regard to the limited scope of inquiry in the proceedings before the Tribunal it has not been able to do so, the insurance company may initiate a separate action therefor against the owner or the driver of the vehicle or both, as the case may be. Those exceptional cases may arise when the evidence becomes available to or comes to the notice of the insurer at a subsequent stage or for one reason or the other, the insurer was not given an opportunity to defend at all. Such a course of action may also be resorted to when a fraud or collusion between the victim and the owner of the vehicle is detected or comes to the knowledge of the insurer at a later stage.” Further, in paragraph No.110, the Court observed thus: 110. Such a course of action may also be resorted to when a fraud or collusion between the victim and the owner of the vehicle is detected or comes to the knowledge of the insurer at a later stage.” Further, in paragraph No.110, the Court observed thus: 110. The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in these petitions are as follows: (i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. (ii) Insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition filed under Section 163A or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 inter alia in terms of Section 149(2)(a) (ii) of the said Act. (iii) The breach of policy condition, e.g. disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in Sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time, (iv) The insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defences raised in the said proceedings but must also establish 'breach' on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof where for would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstance of each case. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstance of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/ are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply "the rule of main purpose" and the concept of "fundamental breach" to allow defences available to the insured under Section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver, (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case. (viii) xxx (ix) xxx (x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Section 149(2) read with Sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the tribunal Such determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the tribunal to the Collector in the same manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by Sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the tribunal. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by Sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the tribunal. (xi) The provisions contained in Sub-section (4) with proviso thereunder and Sub-section (5) which are intended to cover specified contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured can be taken recourse of by the Tribunal and be extended to claims and defences of insurer against insured by, relegating them to the remedy before, regular court in cases where on given facts and circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the adjudication of the claims of the victims.” (emphasis supplied) 15. In the present case, the owner of the vehicle (respondent No.1) had produced the insurance certificate indicating that vehicle No. DIL-5955 was comprehensively insured by the respondent No.2 (Insurance Company) for unlimited liability. Applying the dictum in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. (supra), to subserve the ends of justice, the insurer (respondent No.2) shall pay the claim amount awarded by the Tribunal to the appellants in the first instance, with liberty to recover the same from the owner of the vehicle (respondent No.1) in accordance with law.” 4. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Swaran Singh and Ors. (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases 297, wherein, it was held as under:- "In Pragraph 110(viii) of the report in Swaran Singh (Supra), it has been also held that the same would be the position in case the driver of the offending vehicle had a learner's licence. The ratio of the law laid down by this Court in Swaran Singh (Supra) is in consonance with the object behind the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. The ratio of the law laid down by this Court in Swaran Singh (Supra) is in consonance with the object behind the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. Taking into account the same and the decision of this Court in Swaran Singh (Supra), we are of the view that in the facts of the present case the insurer-respondent No.2 (Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.) should be directed to satisfy the award as enhanced by us and thereafter would be at liberty to recover the said amount from the owner of the lorry (transport vehicle). In doing so we have also taken note of the fact that the respondent No.1 (S.S.Murthy), the owner of the vehicle, despite service of notice has chosen not to appear before this Court." 5. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 has opposed the appeal and has submitted that since there was breach of terms of the insurance policy, Insurance Company cannot be fastened with the liability to pay the amount of compensation. 6. In the present case, the question that requires consideration is as to whether the Insurance Company can be directed to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants at the first instance and then recover the same from the insured. The question involved in the present case is no longer res-integra. In view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, there is force in the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. 7. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed to the extent that the amount of compensation granted by the Tribunal to the claimants shall be paid by the Insurance Company to the claimants in the first instance and the Insurance Company would be at liberty to recover the said amount from the owner of the offending vehicle in accordance with law. 8. Appeal stands disposed of accordingly.