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2019 DIGILAW 1142 (GAU)

Vanlalruatpuia v. State of Mizoram

2019-10-22

MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA, NELSON SAILO

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JUDGMENT : Michael Zothankhuma, J. Heard Mr. Victor L. Ralte, the learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, the Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State. 2. This is an appeal challenging the Judgment and Order dated 04.05.2018 passed by the Special Court, POCSO Act, 2012 in SR No. 1/2018 arising out of Siaha Police Station Case No. 75/2017, by which the appellant has been convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 15 years with a fine of Rs. 3000/-, in default, 30 days RI, vide Order dated 07.05.2018. 3. The prosecution case in brief is that C. Nikheni, mother of the victim, filed an FIR on 01.08.2017 with the Siaha Police Station stating that on 31.07.2017 at around 3 a.m, her daughter H. C. Lalpianthangi, 12 years, who was sleeping over, in the residence of her friend Lalduatpuia, was raped by one Ruatpuia S/o Laldina. In pursuance to the FIR filed on 01.08.2017, Siaha Police Station Case No. 75/2017 dated 01.08.2017 was registered. Investigation into the case was initiated and charge sheet was filed, whereby a prima facie case was found to the effect that the appellant Vanlalruatpuia had raped the victim who was 11 years 7 months. 4. Charge was framed against the appellant on 31.01.2018 which stated that the offence of penetrative sexual assault punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act had been committed, wherein the appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the trial proceeded and four prosecution witnesses alongwith three defence witnesses were examined by the Trial Court. The appellant was thereafter examined under Section 313 CrPC. The learned Trial Court thereafter found the appellant to be guilty of having committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act and convicted the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, vide the impugned Judgment and Order dated 04.05.2018. The appellant was sentenced to undergo 15 years Rigorous Imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 3000/-, in default, 30 days RI, vide Order dated 07.05.2018. 5. The appellant's counsel submits that a perusal of the evidence and the documents on record indicates that the victim was tutored while giving her statement, inasmuch as, the victim in her examination-in-chief has stated that she had gone to the residence of the accused for studying and sleeping, as there was noise in her house. 5. The appellant's counsel submits that a perusal of the evidence and the documents on record indicates that the victim was tutored while giving her statement, inasmuch as, the victim in her examination-in-chief has stated that she had gone to the residence of the accused for studying and sleeping, as there was noise in her house. However, the evidence of DW1, who was the wife of the owner of the house in which the victim slept, stated in her evidence that she had seen the victim running past her house and on being asked, the victim had told her that she was afraid of her elder brother who had climbed a partition wall with the aim to enter into her room. DW-I then asked the victim to stay in her house to sleep, which was agreed upon by the victim. The appellant's counsel thus submits that the testimony of the victim is not reliable as the reason for sleeping over in her neighbour's house was not for the purpose of studying, but due to the reason that the victim was afraid of her brother. 6. The appellant's counsel also submits that the Medical Officer was not examined to prove the Medical Examination Report of the victim and that the age of the victim was also not proved. The learned counsel submits that though there is no dispute to the fact that the victim was a minor at the time of the alleged incident, there is no proof that the victim was below 12 years of age at the time of the alleged incident. In this regard, he has relied upon the Certificate of Child Dedication issued by the Evangelical Church of Mara Land, which shows that the date of birth of the victim was 17.12.2005 and that the date of dedication was 13 days after her birth, i.e. 30.12.2005. He submits that the name of C. Nikheni(PW1) was shown as the mother of the victim in the said certificate. However, the evidence of C. Nikheni (PW1) is to the effect that she had taken custody of the victim girl after the victim had attained 8 months of age, thereby implying that the victim was an adopted child. He submits that the name of C. Nikheni(PW1) was shown as the mother of the victim in the said certificate. However, the evidence of C. Nikheni (PW1) is to the effect that she had taken custody of the victim girl after the victim had attained 8 months of age, thereby implying that the victim was an adopted child. Thus, on considering the fact that the victim girl came into the custody of C. Nikheni (PW-1) eight months after her birth, the victim could not have been less than 12 years at the time of the alleged incident, which in turn would not attract Section 5 (m) of the POCSO Act, 2012. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the evidence of PW1 is to the effect that PW1, while examining the private parts of the victim, found the same to be swollen. However, in the cross examination of PW1, she stated that there was some bruise mark and some injury near the private parts of the victim. The Medical Examination Report dated 01.08.2017 however does not mention any swelling, bruise mark or injury mark on/ near the victim girl's private parts. He thus submits that the above inconsistencies do not prove that rape had been committed by the appellant on the victim girl. 8. The appellant's counsel also submits that there is serious contradiction with regard to the victim's girl evidence, which is to effect that she saw the appellant's face at the time of the incident, as the electric bulb in the room of the accused was switched on, while the electric bulb in the room where the incident took place was switched off. The appellant's counsel submits that the electric bulb in the room of the accused was not switched on but it was actually the bulb in the sitting room which was switched on at the night of the alleged incident. 9. The appellant's counsel also submits that there is a delay in filing the FIR, as the incident had allegedly occurred in early morning hour of 31st July, 2017, but the FIR had been lodged only on 01.08.2017. The appellant's counsel also submits that the maker of the certificate of Child Dedication was not examined by the Trial Court to prove the age of the victim. The appellant's counsel also submits that the maker of the certificate of Child Dedication was not examined by the Trial Court to prove the age of the victim. He thus submits that due to the inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence, the impugned Judgment and Order dated 04.05.2018 and the Order dated 07.08.2018 should be set aside and quashed. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the appellant has cited the following Judgments:- (1) In the case of Narender Kumar Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 7 SCC 171 . (2) In the case of K. Venkateshwarlu Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 8 SCC 73 (3) In the case of Rajesh Patel Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 3 SCC 791 . 10. Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, the Addl. Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submits that it is not the case of the appellant that there was any enmity between the families, who are neighbours. Thus, there was no reason for PW1 to lodge a false case. The Addl. Public Prosecutor also submits that the appellant did not question the validity of the Medical Examination Report or the age of the victim in the Trial Court. The Addl. Public Prosecutor also submits that minor discrepancies cannot be a ground for throwing out a reliable prosecution case, keeping in mind the fact that there is no evidence to show that the victim girl was not a reliable witness. The Addl. Public Prosecutor also submits that just because the defence witnesses have tried to paint a picture that the victim girl was afraid of her brother, does not mean that the appellant had not raped the victim girl. She accordingly prays that the impugned Judgment and Order and Sentence order should be upheld. 11. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 12. The facts of the case shows that the victim girl, who was allegedly 11 years 7 months at the time of the alleged incident, went to spend two nights in the house of her neighbour on 29.07.2017 and 30.07.2017, as her friend Duatpuia lived in the neighbouring house. The victim left her neighbour's house on 31.07.2017 morning at around 8 pm and went to the shop which was being run by her mother (PW1). PW1 thereafter told the victim girl to go home. The victim left her neighbour's house on 31.07.2017 morning at around 8 pm and went to the shop which was being run by her mother (PW1). PW1 thereafter told the victim girl to go home. The victim girl apparently went to her home and locked the door and when asked the reason for the same, she apparently stated that she was afraid of some miscreants. As she was advised by PW-1, the victim took a bath. As the victim complained that she was having some pain in the area around her private parts, PW1 inspected the private parts of the victim and found that it was swollen. On being asked the reason for the same, the victim told PW1 that the appellant had raped her. She also stated that the reason for the delay in disclosing the incident was due to the fact that the appellant had threatened to kill her if she disclosed the incident. The FIR was thereafter filed by PW1 at the Siaha Police Station on 01.08.2017. Thereafter, the Medical Examination of the victim was done by Medical Officer on 01.08.2017 at 5 pm. In the Medical Examination Report dated 01.08.2017, it is recorded at serial Nos. 9, 11 and 8 as follows:- "9. Short History of incident: Alleged rape by some person on 30.07.2017 at around 3.30 am. 11. Change of clothing or Bath or wash after incident: Had taken bath and changed clothing. 8. X-Ray report for age determination (when age cannot be ascertained by Medical Officer): Hymen:- Ruptured with distortion of Hymen." 13. The evidence of the victim (PW2) is as follows:- "IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL JUDGE, POCSO SIAHA DISTRICT: SIAHA Form No. (M) 2 FORM FOR RECORDING DEPOSITION The Deposition of Witness No. 2 for the prosecution aged about 12 years, taken on oath or solemn affirmation, before me Dr. HTC. Lalrinchhana of this 15 day of February 2018. My name is HC. Lalpiangthangi, My father's/husband's name is HC. Zalchaw I am by religion Christian. My home is at mauza Siahatla - I Police Station Siaha district Siaha, I reside at Siahatla-I present in Mauza Siahatla-I, Police Station Siaha, district Siaha where I am reside. On the night of July 30th 2017, I slept at the resident of the accused from our house, for studying my lesson as there was noise in our house. My home is at mauza Siahatla - I Police Station Siaha district Siaha, I reside at Siahatla-I present in Mauza Siahatla-I, Police Station Siaha, district Siaha where I am reside. On the night of July 30th 2017, I slept at the resident of the accused from our house, for studying my lesson as there was noise in our house. I took sleep at around 9:00 pm in the master bedroom of Mrs. C. Zothanguri (Rosie), I slept in the floor with Mr. Duatpuia who is about 9 years old and he is the son of Mrs. C. Zothanguri. Mrs. Zothanguri and her husband also slept in the bed in the same room. I took sleep in their house because of that Mrs. C. Zothanguri is a close relative of my mother, being the same clan. On the late night I heard the sound of the accused-Lalruatpuia and I therefore woke up, although I thought he would go to the toilet, he rather came and enter into our room, he suddenly closed my mouth with hand and he warned me not to make any sound or to disclose the incident. He thereby put down my pants and underpant upto my knee and he inserted his male organ into my vagina by missionary style. I never have any other men in the previous, the accused thereby opened my virginity, I therefore sustained hurt in my private parts due to penetration and bleeding was also caused. I do not notice whether the accused was ejaculated upon me or not. At the same time of the incident took place, electric bulb of the accused room was switched on. Whereas it was switched off in our room, I therefore identified that the culprit was the accused, due to electric light in his room. After the accused left me for his own room, there was the morning light. When the accused came into our room, I saw that he dressed in Jeans pant and chapel without wearing any shirt. As I was threatened by the accused to kill me, I belatedly disclosed the matter to my mother. When I informed to my mother, I told her that there was pain in my private part and she enquired into and I therefore disclosed that incident to her. As I was threatened by the accused to kill me, I belatedly disclosed the matter to my mother. When I informed to my mother, I told her that there was pain in my private part and she enquired into and I therefore disclosed that incident to her. All the time of the incident took place I studied in Class 4 in Primary School 2 Siaha tla, but I do not continue my schooling distance of our school and the accused residence. Ext P-7 is my statement recorded by Chief Judicial Magistrate. Ext P.7(a) is my signature. Ext P.8 is my child dedication certificate. XXX by defence Counsel 1. I denied that it was because of my parents request to Smt. Zothanguri, i took sleep in their house in the night of 30.07.2017. 2. Even on the night of 29 July, 2017 I sleep in the house of Smt. Zothanguri and as it was a rainy season, I was so muddy while reaching of their house. 3. When the accused committed penetrative sexual offence upon me he undressed his chapel, undressing his jeans pant upto his knees. 4. It is a fact that there was no tearing of my clothes due to the incident. 5. It is a fact that at the time of the incident the accused spread out my legs. 6. It is a fact that I denied that I am afraid of my brother Mr. Mesalea alias Daodao. 7. It is a fact that I myself cleaned blood stains in my pants while washing of my clothes. 8. I denied that only because of my families instruction, I agitated against the accused. Re-examination. I do not have any knowledge about semen and its forms and natures. But I found that there was some fluid in my clothes which was germinated from my vagina after the accused had finished penetration." 14. In the case of Narendra Kumar (supra), the Apex Court has held at para Nos. 20, 22, 25, 29 & 30 as follows: 20. It is a settled legal proposition that once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the court as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her statement. It is a settled legal proposition that once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the court as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. 22. Where evidence of the prosecutrix is found suffering from serious infirmities and inconsistencies with other material, prosecutrix making deliberate improvements on material point with a view to rule out consent on her part and there being no injury on her person even though her version may be otherwise, no reliance can be placed upon her evidence. (Vide: Suresh N. Bhusare & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra. 25. In Tameezuddin v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court held has under: "9. It is true that in a case of rape the evidence of the prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, but to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if the story is improbable and belies logic, would be doing violence to the very principles which govern the appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter." 29. However, even in a case of rape, the onus is always on the prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. It is no part of the duty of the defence to explain as to how and why in a rape case the victim and other witness have falsely implicated the accused. Prosecution case has to stand on its own legs and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. However great the suspicion against the accused and however strong the moral belief and conviction of the court, unless the offence of the accused is established beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of legal evidence and material on the record, he cannot be convicted for an offence. There is an initial presumption of innocence of the accused and the prosecution has to bring home the offence against the accused by reliable evidence. There is an initial presumption of innocence of the accused and the prosecution has to bring home the offence against the accused by reliable evidence. The accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt. 30. Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. There must be proper legal evidence and material on record to record the conviction of the accused. Conviction can be based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it lends assurance of her testimony. However, in case the court has reason not to accept the version of prosecutrix on its face value, it may look for corroboration. In case the evidence is read in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, the prosecutrix case becomes liable to be rejected." 15. In the case of K. Venkateshwarlu (supra), the Apex Court has held that the evidence of a child witness has to be subjected to closest scrutiny and can be accepted only if the court comes to the conclusion that the child understands the question put to him and he is capable of giving rational answers (see Section 118 of the Evidence Act). A child witness, by reason of his tender age, is a pliable witness. He can be tutored easily either by threat, coercion or inducement. Therefore, the court must be satisfied that the attendant circumstances do not show that the child was acting under the influence of someone or was under a threat or coercion. Evidence of a child witness can be relied upon if the court, with its expertise and ability to evaluate the evidence, comes to the conclusion that the child is not tutored and his evidence has a ring of truth. It is safe and prudent to look for corroboration for the evidence of a child witness from the other evidence on record, because while giving evidence a child may give scope to his imagination and exaggerate his version or may develop cold feet and not tell the truth or may repeat what he has been asked to say not knowing the consequences of his deposition in the court. Careful evaluation of the evidence of a child witness in the background and context of other evidence on record is a must before the court decides to rely upon it. 16. Careful evaluation of the evidence of a child witness in the background and context of other evidence on record is a must before the court decides to rely upon it. 16. In the case of Rajesh Patel (supra), the Apex Court has held that the non-examination of the doctor who has examined the Prosecutrix after 12 days of the occurrence has prejudiced the case of the defence as a reasonable doubt is created. 17. In the case of State of M.P vs Dayal Sahu, (2005) CriLJ 4375, the Apex Court has held in para 12 as follows:- "12. A plethora of decisions by this Court as referred to above would show that once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence and accepted by the courts as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the courts for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. It is also noticed that minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Non-examination of doctor and non-production of doctor's report would not cause fatal to the prosecution case, if the statements of the prosecutrix and other prosecution witnesses inspire confidence. It is also noticed that the Court while acquitting the accused on benefit of doubt should be cautious to see that the doubt should be a reasonable doubt and it should not reverse the findings of the guilt on the basis of irrelevant circumstances or mere technicalities." 18. Without going into the merits of the case, this Court finds that there has been an error committed by the Trial Court in convicting/punishing the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act for aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 5(m), while framing charge only for penetrative sexual assault under Section 3 of the POCSO Act. 19. Charge had been framed against the appellant on 31.01.2018 and the contents of the charge are reproduced below:- "That you, on the night of dt. 30th July, 2017, you had committed penetrative sexual assault upon one minor Ms. 19. Charge had been framed against the appellant on 31.01.2018 and the contents of the charge are reproduced below:- "That you, on the night of dt. 30th July, 2017, you had committed penetrative sexual assault upon one minor Ms. Lalpianthangi (11 yrs) in your residential house at Siahatla-1, Siaha and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and within the cognizance of this Court. And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge." In the impugned Judgment & Order dated 04.05.2018, the learned Trial Court had also quoted Section 3 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 20. Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 states that whoever commits penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. However, in para 19 of the impugned Judgment & Order, the learned Trial Court has held that the commission of the penetrative sexual assault upon the victim, who was below 12 years old, falls under Section 6, read with clause (m) under Section 9 of the POCSO Act. 21. Section 9(m) states as follows:- "9.Aggravated sexual assault.- (m) whoever commits sexual assault on a child below twelve years; or" 22. Thus, a perusal of the charge framed against the appellant shows that he had been charged only for penetrative sexual assault, which was punishable under Section 4 of the POCSO Act. However, the appellant has been convicted under Section 6 for having committed aggravated sexual assault under Section 9(m). 23. The punishment for aggravated sexual assault is provided in Section 10 of the POCSO Act. However, this case pertains to aggravated penetrative sexual assault and as the appellant has been convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the learned Trial Court seems to have made a typographical mistake, as the conviction under Section 6 is relatable only to aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 5. As it involves a child below 12 years, the offense would specifically attract Section 5(m) of the POCSO Act. 24. As it involves a child below 12 years, the offense would specifically attract Section 5(m) of the POCSO Act. 24. Thus, on a reading of the impugned judgment & order, it is clear that the learned Trial Court has convicted and punished the appellant under Section 6 for having committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 5 (m) of the POCSO Act. However, at the time of framing of charge, the learned Trial Court did not frame a charge of aggravated penetrative sexual assault against the appellant. 25. Section 211 of the Cr.P.C states as follows:- "211. Contents of charge. - (1) Every charge under this Code shall state the offence with which the accused is charged. (2) If the law which creates the offence gives it any specific name, the offence may be described in the charge by that name only. (3) If the law which creates the offence does not give it any specific name, so much of the definition of the offence must be stated as to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. (4) The law and section of the law against which the offence is said to have been committed shall be mentioned in the charge. (5) The fact that the charge is made is equivalent to a statement that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular case. (6) The charge shall be written in the language of the Court. (7) If the accused, having been previously convicted of any offence, is liable, by reason of such previous conviction, to enhanced punishment, or to punishment of a different kind, for a subsequent offence, and it is intended to prove such previous conviction for the purpose of affecting the punishment which the Court may think fit to award for the subsequent offence, the fact, date and place of the previous conviction shall be stated in the charge; and if such statement has been omitted, the Court may add it at any time before sentence is passed." The object of framing a charge is to enable an accused to have a clear idea of what he is being tried for and of the essential facts that he has to meet. The charge must also contain the particulars of date, time, place and person against whom the offence was committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. The accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy, the exact nature of the charge against him, and unless he has such knowledge, his defence will be prejudiced. 26. In the present case, while charge had been framed against the appellant in respect of a lesser offence, he has been convicted for a more serious offence, having a harsher punishment. 27. The learned Trial Court should not have convicted the appellant for having committed the offence under Section 5(m), while having framed the charge only in respect of penetrative sexual assault, i.e., Section 3 of the POCSO Act. Further, the learned Trial Court did not even alter the charge from penetrative sexual assault to aggravated penetrative sexual assault, prior to convicting/punishing the appellant under Section 5(m)/6, POCSO Act. 28. In the present case, even assuming that there was alteration of charge, every such alteration of charge has to be read and explained to the accused. Section 216 Cr.P.C states as follows:- "216. Court may alter charge.- (1) Any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced. (2) Every such alteration or addition shall be read and explained to the accused. (3) If the alteration or addition to a charge is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is not likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused in his defence or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case, the Court may, in its direction, after such alteration or addition has been made, proceed with the trial as if the altered or added charge had been the original charge. (4) If the alteration or addition is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused or the prosecutor as aforesaid, the Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary. (4) If the alteration or addition is such that proceeding immediately with the trial is likely, in the opinion of the Court, to prejudice the accused or the prosecutor as aforesaid, the Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial for such period as may be necessary. (5) If the offence stated in the altered or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is obtained, unless sanction has been already obtained for a prosecution on the same facts as those on which the altered or added charge is founded." 29. It is a well settled legal position that if an accused is charged of a major offence but is not found guilty thereunder, he can be convicted of a minor offence, if the facts established indicate that such minor offence has been committed. However, in the present case, while the appellant had been charged for penetrative sexual assault, he has been convicted of a more major offence under Section 5 (m) of the POCSO Act. Thus, it was the duty of the Trial Court to have read and explained to the appellant the alteration of charge. However, neither was charge altered nor was Section 216(2) Cr.P.C followed. 30. Accordingly, we are of the view that prejudice has been caused to the appellant as he was entitled to know with certainty and accuracy, the exact nature of the charge against him. We are thus of the view that the impugned Judgment & Order dated 04.05.2018 and the Order dated 07.05.2018 passed by the Special Court, POCSO Act, Siaha, in S.R No. 1/2018, arising out of Siaha P.S Case No. 75/2017 are not sustainable. 31. In view of the reasons stated above the case should be remanded back to the learned Trial Court to start the proceedings afresh from the stage of Consideration of charge or alteration of the charge by following the provisions of Section 216(2) Cr.P.C. 32. Accordingly, the matter is remanded back to the Trial Court, who shall proceed with the case from the stage of consideration of charge or alteration of the charge. Accordingly, the matter is remanded back to the Trial Court, who shall proceed with the case from the stage of consideration of charge or alteration of the charge. Consequently, the impugned Judgment & Order dated 04.05.2018 and the Order dated 07.05.2018 passed by the Special Court, POCSO Act, Siaha, in S.R No. 1/2018, arising out of Siaha P.S Case No. 75/2017 is hereby set aside. Send back the LCR. Authorization Letter I hereby authorize Justice Nelson Sailo to pronounce the judgment & order in respect of Crl. A No. 20/2018 "Shri Vanlalruatpuia vs State of Mizoram & Another", while sitting singly.