Haribhai Dajibhai Patel v. State Of Gujarat Thro' The Joint Secretary
2019-12-12
BIREN VAISHNAV
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. In this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the prayer of the petitioners reads as under: “6(a) Be pleased to issue a writ or certiorari or writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 30.05.2006 passed by the respondent No.1 herein in revision application No.1 of 2001 and further be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated 6.3.2001 passed by the respondent No.2 herein in case No.1 of 2002;” 2. The prayer raised in the context of the following facts: 2.1. One Lalabhai Purshotamdas Patel was an owner of an agricultural land bearing revenue Survey no.27/3, admeasuring A 0:13 Gunthas. The said land is situated within the revenue limits of village Dhamod, Taluka Lunawada, District Panchmahals. Lalabhai Purshotamdas Patel executed a registered sale deed on 16.01.1975 and sold the land to one Dhulabhai Rayjibhai and Haribhai Dajibhai for a consideration of Rs.7,999/-. 2.2. It is the case of the petitioners that the name of the father Haribhai was mutated in the land record i.e. village form No.6 as mutation entry No.659. On 18.4.1975, one co-owner namely: Dhulabhai Rayjibhai Patel relinquished his share in favour of the petitioner's father, co-owner Haribhai Patel. Mutation entry No.661 was also accordingly mutated. According to the petitioners, the respondent No.3 – the original owner moved an application before the Mamlatdar to initiate proceedings under the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as the `Fragmentation Act' for short). It was the case of the original owners/heirs before the Mamlatdar that the sale of land in favour of Haribhai Patel could not have taken because the land was a fragment. After hearing the purchaser and the respondent No.3, the Deputy Collector, by his order dated 19.2.1983 permitted the sale of land of Survey No.27/3 on condition that the land will be consolidated with the two other existing land bearing revenue Survey Nos.19 and 20 paiki which belonged to the petitioners. Revenue entry was accordingly mutated by virtue of this order. 2.3. It is the case of the petitioners that respondent No.3 assailed the order by filing a revision which was dismissed.
Revenue entry was accordingly mutated by virtue of this order. 2.3. It is the case of the petitioners that respondent No.3 assailed the order by filing a revision which was dismissed. It appears that notice was issued on 31.5.2000 by the Deputy Collector, under the provisions of Section 7 read with Section 9(1)(2) and (3) of the Act calling for an explanation from the petitioners regarding the sale of land. After hearing the parties, the petitioners, purchasers and respondent No.3, the Deputy Collector, by his order dated 6.3.2001 allowed the fragmentation case No.1/2001 holding that the sale of the land was against the provision of Section 7(1) of the Act and, therefore, declared the same as invalid under Section 9(1) of the Act. 2.4. The petitioners aggrieved by this order, preferred a revision application before the State Government and the State Government, by an order dated 30.5.2006 dismissed the revision. Hence, this petition. 3. Mr.Sunil Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners has made submissions and contended that the orders dated 6.3.2001 and 30.5.2006 passed by the authorities below are illegal and, therefore, be set aside. He submitted as under: 3.1. Drawing my attention to the mutation entry at page No.28 of the paper-book, Mr.Joshi contended that the predecessor in title of the respondent No.3 had sold the land to the petitioners on 16.1.1975. Thereafter, Dhulabhai had relinquished his share in favour of the petitioners on 18.4.1975 and accordingly, the revenue records were mutated in the year 1975. 3.2. Mr.Joshi pointed out that 8 years after the sale, at the instance of the owner of the land, who sold the land to the petitioners on 1.6.1983, the Mamlatdar gave a report, pursuant to which, the proceedings were taken under the Fragmentation Act. Reading the order of the Deputy Collector of February, 1983, Mr.Joshi would contend that the sale of land by the father of the respondent No.3 was an admitted position. That on the basis of the map of the DILR, which was produced before the Deputy Collector, it was found that lands being Revenue Survey Nos.19 and 20 were also belonging to the petitioners and, therefore, on the condition that land Revenue Survey Nos.27/3 would be consolidated with these lands, the sale of the land of Survey No.27/3 was accepted. 3.3. Mr.Joshi would submit that accordingly the Mamlatdar, Lunawada was directed to execute this order. 3.4.
3.3. Mr.Joshi would submit that accordingly the Mamlatdar, Lunawada was directed to execute this order. 3.4. Reliance is placed on page Nos.41 to 44 wherein assessment cards of the property in question was done, which showed that houses have been constructed on the lands in question. It appears and it is so contended by Mr.Joshi that more than 17 years after the sale was confirmed and 25 years of the sale deed, it appears that Mamlatdar on 26.4.2000 made a report pursuant to which the same authority which have earlier permitted the sale, reversed its stand and held that there was breach of the Fragmentation Act and, therefore, the sale was in breach of the provisions of Section 7(1) and, therefore, the sale was treated as invalid. 3.5. Taking me through the order so passed by the Deputy Collector, Mr.Joshi assailed the said order and held that it was not open for the Deputy Collector to hold that the lands at Survey Nos.19 and 20 were not belonging to the petitioners and, therefore, there was no possibility of consolidating the same with the lands purchased i.e. Survey No.27/3 and submitted that finding of the Deputy Collector was wrong. 3.6. Inviting my attention to page Nos.119 and 120 of the paper-book, Mr.Joshi places reliance on a map and a certificate of Talati-Cum-Mantri, wherein, according to Mr.Joshi, it was clearly stated that the lands at Survey No.20 was an unpartitioned/undivided land and, therefore, the finding of the Deputy Collector that there was partitioned lands was contrary to the facts on record. Mr.Joshi would submit that there was no partition by metes and bounds. The Survey No.20 belongs to the family members of the petitioners. That it was an internal family arrangement, no partition had taken place and, therefore, the finding of the Deputy Collector was confirmed by the State in revision, cannot be considered as a legal and valid ground to hold that the petitioners have committed breach of the Act. 3.7. He would further submit that after pocketing consideration after the sale of land, it was not open for the respondent to sale as there was breach of the Fragmentation Act. They could not have been heard by the Deputy Collector. 3.8.
3.7. He would further submit that after pocketing consideration after the sale of land, it was not open for the respondent to sale as there was breach of the Fragmentation Act. They could not have been heard by the Deputy Collector. 3.8. Mr.Joshi, then, invited my attention to the fact that a Civil Suit being Regular Civil Suit No.46/1984 was filed by the respondent No.3 – original owner wherein, the event of sale was completely denied. Averments in the plaint were read out to suggest that in the suit, it was pleaded by the respondent – original seller that there was no sale at all, whereas, before the Revenue Authorities, as it is evident from reading the order of the Collector of February, 1983, the seller had admitted of such sale. 3.9. Mr.Joshi, therefore, submitted that it is not open for the authorities, 17 years after the sale having taken place to hold that the sale was in violation of Fragmentation Act and, therefore, it is required to set aside such sale. If the Mamlatdar did not execute his order, the petitioners cannot be found faulted with. 3.10. Inviting my attention to Section 9 of the Fragmentation Act, Mr.Joshi would contend that if there is a breach of the provisions of the Act, the land would not automatically revert to the original owner. 4. Mr.K.B. Pujara, learned counsel has appeared for Muljibhai Laldas Patel - respondent No.3 herein and submitted as under: 4.1. He submitted that it is an undisputed fact that the land in question i.e. the land at Survey No.27/3 was a fragment land and a revenue entry was so recorded on 18.12.1955. 4.2. He submitted that the parties were aware of the fragmentation and the applicability of the Fragmentation Act. Inviting my attention to the sale deed and the conditions therein to submit that the sale of the land was on a condition that it shall be consolidated. In absence of abiding to such a condition and not consolidating the land with any other contiguous land so as to prevent breach of the Act, it is not open for the petitioners now to contend that there can be no breach of the Fragmentation Act. 4.3.
In absence of abiding to such a condition and not consolidating the land with any other contiguous land so as to prevent breach of the Act, it is not open for the petitioners now to contend that there can be no breach of the Fragmentation Act. 4.3. Mr.Pujara would thereafter submit that, initially, it was a Mamlatdar's report of 1.6.1983, by which, action was sought to be initiated for the breach of the provisions of the Fragmentation Act, mainly on the reliance of the statement of the predecessor that he was the owner of adjacent lands i.e. Revenue Survey Nos.19 and 20 and on the basis of the map that he produced, the Deputy Collector was misled into granting permission of sale of land on the condition that the same is consolidated. 4.4. According to Mr.Pujara, it is not open for the petitioners to contend that there was delay in taking action, particularly, when though a specific condition therein the sale deed of the sale being continued to consolidate the land and the Collector passed such order in the year 1983, since for 17 years, nothing was done at the hands of the petitioners, Mamlatdar was constrained to initiate proceedings by forwarding a proposal to the Deputy Collector on 26.4.2000 pursuant to which notices were issued on 31.5.2000. 4.5. Drawing my attention to the orders of the Deputy Collector dated 6.3.2001, Mr.Pujara would contend that reading of the order would indicate as certain important facts were recorded by the Deputy Collector in his order of March, 2001. The Deputy Collector found that the land was sold consciously keeping in view the provisions of the Fragmentation Act and, therefore, the conditional sale that the land will be consolidated. It was found that Survey No.20/2 and Survey No.19 which were initially treated as land adjacent and contiguous for consolidation, were then found to be owned by one Patel Nathabhai Dharmabhai and others and the Deputy Collector found on the basis of the explanation of the Talati-Cum-Mantri of 22.6.2000, the lands were not owned by the petitioners. The owners were different than that one of Survey No.27.3. On the basis of the Map, it was found that the owners of the contiguous lands were different and, therefore, consolidation was not possible.
The owners were different than that one of Survey No.27.3. On the basis of the Map, it was found that the owners of the contiguous lands were different and, therefore, consolidation was not possible. It was accordingly found that the sale of the lands at Survey No.27/3 was in breach of the Fragmentation Act and the order of the Collector therefore, is just and proper. 4.6. Mr.Pujara invited my attention to the sequence of dates and would contend that it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to say that the authorities could not have exercise powers after unreasonable period of time. In- fact, though the sale deed was conditional to the effect that the petitioners shall consolidate the lands in the spirit of the Scheme of the Fragmentation Act, the petitioners did not. Even 7 years after the sale deed, in the year 1983, when the Deputy Collector passed the order permitting the sale on condition of consolidation, nothing was done for a period of 17 years and the petitioners, for the first time, made an application on 7.8.2000 for the consolidation of lands. Therefore, having waited for such a long time of 17 years, the petitioners could not then turn round and contend that the order of the Deputy Collector suffers from the vices of delay. In support of his submissions, Mr.Pujara has relied on the following authorities: (a) Saburbhai Hemabhai Chauhan v. State reported in 2000(1) GLR 835 ; (b) J.K. Patel v. District Collector, Mehsana reported in 1996(2) GLR 688 (c) (Brahmbhatt) Amabalal (Ashabhai * Ors.) v. Special Secretary, Revenue Department reported in 1983(2) GLR 1091 : and (d) Govindsingh Ramsingbhai Vaghela v. G.Subbarao, Assistant Collector, Dhola & Ors. reported in 11 GLR 897 (DB). These authorities were relied on by Mr.Pujara by contending that the vice of delay shall not hurt the exercise of powers when the transaction itself was void. When evidently there was a breach of the provisions of the Fragmentation Act, merely because the Deputy Collector revised the order in the year 2000, 17 years after the first order by exercising such powers cannot be faulted with. 4.7. Even otherwise, Mr.Pujara would contend that there has been no delay.
When evidently there was a breach of the provisions of the Fragmentation Act, merely because the Deputy Collector revised the order in the year 2000, 17 years after the first order by exercising such powers cannot be faulted with. 4.7. Even otherwise, Mr.Pujara would contend that there has been no delay. In-fact, it is the petitioners who did not act upon the condition of sale and wish consolidation after a period of 17 years compelling the authorities to initiate proceedings under the Fragmentation Act. 5. To the decision cited by Mr.Pujara, Mr.Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Valjibhai Jagjivanbhai v. State of Gujarat reported in 2005(2) GLH 34 . Reliance was placed on paragraph No.23 of the judgment to contend that if the transaction under Section 9(1) of the Act has been allowed to remain effective for so long, it cannot be said to be non-existent merely because it is void. It remains effective till it is invalidated and set aside. He would submit that the judgments cited by Mr.Pujara have been considered in the decision and, therefore, those judgments will not apply. 6. Mr.Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners relies on a decision of this Court in the case of Paliben Wd/O. Kikubhai Kuvariyabhai Koli Patel v. Deputy Collector, Valsad and others reported in 2013(1) GLR 231 . In support his submission, he relied on paragraph No.8 of the judgment to submit that exercise of powers under Section 9 after a long delay would be unreasonable. 7. Mr.Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners also relies on a decision of this Court in the case of Ramsingbhai Bavlabhai Koli and others v. State of Gujarat and others reported in 2014(1) GLR 436 . By relying on such decision, he would support his contention that after a reasonable period, no initiation of proceedings can be held to be valid and legal. 8. Mr.Joshi has also relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Narendrabhai Maganbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat reported in 2019(1) GLH 33 in support of his contention as aforesaid and also to support his contention that the respondent No.3 would have no locus to challenge the same, after having sold the land. He cannot be permitted to adopt a policy of dog in a manger to extract more money. 9.
He cannot be permitted to adopt a policy of dog in a manger to extract more money. 9. Mr.Joshi has further placed reliance on a decision of full bench of this Court in the case of Dashrathlal M. Patel Heirs & LR Maganbhai Joitaram & others v. State of Gujarat reported in 2011 Law Suit (Guj) 713 to submit that the decision relied by Mr.Pujara in the case of Govindsingh Ramsingbhai Vaghela (Supra) was no longer. 10. Mr.Jayneel Parikh, learned Assistant Government Pleader appeared for respondent No.1 – State of Gujarat and supported the orders passed by the authorities below. He submitted that the Deputy Collector and the State had validly exercised the powers to hold that the petitioners had committed breach of Section 7(1)(2) and (3) of the Fragmentation Act and, therefore, the orders needed to be confirmed and the petition be dismissed. 11. Having considered the submissions of the learned advocates for respective parties and having gone through the memo of petition, there are undisputed facts which need to be considered: (A) It was undisputed fact that the land in question was a fragment land for which the mutation entry No.137 dated 18.12.1955 was entered into the Revenue Record. From the orders impugned, it is evident too that the land belongs to one Lalabhai Purshotamdas Patel. (B) The land was sold to the petitioners. A specific condition was incorporated in the sale deed that the land shall be consolidated with the contiguous land so as to come within the validity of the Fragmentation Act. (C) It is also evident that 7 years after the sale deed was executed, the Mamlatdar initiated proceedings for the breach of the Fragmentation Act. It is, at the instance that the petitioners produced a 7/12 extract and map of DILR to suggest that they had contiguous lands at Survey Nos.19 and 20/1 which belonged to them. Based on this record, the sale was confirmed on the condition that he will consolidate such lands.
It is, at the instance that the petitioners produced a 7/12 extract and map of DILR to suggest that they had contiguous lands at Survey Nos.19 and 20/1 which belonged to them. Based on this record, the sale was confirmed on the condition that he will consolidate such lands. (D) From the impugned order dated 6.3.2001, so confirmed by the Special Secretary by his order dated 30.5.2006, it is evident that 25 years after the execution of the sale deed and 17 years after the order of the Deputy Collector, in March, 1983, it was only for the first time on 7.8.2000 the petitioners made a request for consolidation of the lands i.e. land at Survey Nos.27/3 to that of lands at Survey Nos.19 and 20. (E) It was on application made by the petitioners that when the statement of the Mamlatdar was taken on 22.6.2000 that what was revealed on the spot was that the lands at Survey Nos.20/2 and 19 were in-fact not in the ownership of the petitioners but were owned by separate entities whose names are mentioned in the impugned orders. (F) The impugned orders' reading would indicate that the authorities were conscious of the fact that there was a specific condition in the sale deed that the sale shall be consolidated only if it is in the spirit to prevent a breach of Fragmentation Act. That sale deed was made in the year 1975. For 7 years, the petitioners did not act upon to abide by the condition in the sale deed. It was in the year 1983, therefore, the Mamlatdar sought to initiate proceedings for the breach of condition wherein the Deputy Collector observed that the sale be confirmed subject to the lands being consolidated with the contiguous land at Survey Nos.19 and 20. (G) Even 17 years thereafter, the petitioners did not move to execute the order dated 19.2.1983 of the Collector and only on 7.8.2000 moved the machinery. When the map of the Talati-Cum-Mantri was produced before the authorities (Page No.69), inspection on the spot would reveal that land at Survey Nos.19 and 20 paiki were not of the petitioners. It is not open for Mr.Joshi to contend that land in-fact belongs to the petitioners while there was no partition by metes and bounds were owned by their family members by virtue of a internal family arrangements.
It is not open for Mr.Joshi to contend that land in-fact belongs to the petitioners while there was no partition by metes and bounds were owned by their family members by virtue of a internal family arrangements. This was certainly not a case when the permission was granted. (H) Even otherwise, reliance cannot be placed on the documents produced by Mr.Joshi in his rejoinder that is a map at page No.119 and a certificate of Talati-Cum-Mantri of 7.7.2006 because they are much after the date of the impugned orders and, therefore, would not support the stand of the petitioners. (I) Admittedly, having purchased the land on a specific condition to get the same consolidated with contiguous land and having not turned up for a period of 17 years and only move the machinery in the August, 2000, for the first time and when found that the land contiguous to the lands sold were not that of the petitioners, the authorities cannot be faulted to have invoked their powers for the breach after the delay as so canvassed by Mr.Joshi, learned counsel for the petitioners. 12. Reading of the provisions of the Fragmentation Act, particularly, Section 7 of the Act would indicate that the fragment has to be transferred only to an owner of a contiguous Survey number. 13. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act would indicate that if there is a breach of Section 7, the transfer would be contrary to the provisions of the Act and shall be void. Sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Act would therefore warrant eviction of such an owner. For the sake of convenience, Sections 7 and 9 of the Fragmentation Act are reproduced hereunder: “7. Transfer; and lease of fragments.
Sub-section (3) of Section 9 of the Act would therefore warrant eviction of such an owner. For the sake of convenience, Sections 7 and 9 of the Fragmentation Act are reproduced hereunder: “7. Transfer; and lease of fragments. - [(1) Any fragment in respect of which a notice has been given under sub- section (2) of section 6 may be transferred to any agriculturalist as defined in relevant tenancy law: Provided that if such fragment is transferred to the owner of a contiguous Survey number or recognized sub-division of a Survey number, then such fragment shall be consolidated:] [[Provided further], the holder of such fragment may mortgage or transfer it to the State Government or a land mortgage bank or any other co- operative society as security for any loan advanced to him by the State Government or such bank or society as the case may be.] (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in [any law for the time being in force or in any instrument or agreement], no such fragment shall be leased to any person other than a person cultivating any land which is contiguous to the fragment. 9. Penalty for transfer or partition contrary to Provisions of the Act. - (1) The transfer or partition of any land contrary to the provisions of this Act shall be void. [(2) The owner of any land so transferred or partitioned shall be liable to pay the fine of rupees five thousand or ten per cent. of the market value of the land, whichever is more, for the urban area as the Collector may direct; and rupees two thousand or ten per cent. of the market value of the land, whichever is more, for the remaining area. Such fine shall be recoverable as an arrears of land revenue.] [(3) Any person unauthorized occupying or wrongfully in possession of, any land, the transfer or partition of which, either by the act of parties or by the operation of law, is void under the provisions of this Act, may be summarily evicted by the Collector].” 14. To the submission of Mr.Joshi that the petitioners have no locus to challenge the same once having pocketed the money, I find support of the decision in the case of Govindsingh Ramsingbhai Vaghela (Supra), wherein, this Court while considering the question categorically held as under: "17. RE.
To the submission of Mr.Joshi that the petitioners have no locus to challenge the same once having pocketed the money, I find support of the decision in the case of Govindsingh Ramsingbhai Vaghela (Supra), wherein, this Court while considering the question categorically held as under: "17. RE. GROUND (F) : It is no doubt true that the words used in sec. 9 sub-sec. (3) are only these, namely, "Any person ... may be summarily evicted by the Collector" and the sub-section does not say in so many terms that having summarily evicted such person, the Collector may restore possession of the land to the original owner but that is clearly implicit in the sub-section. The Collector is given the power to summarily evict a person when it is found that by reason of the transfer being void, he is unauthorizedly in occupation or wrongfully in possession of the land. And this power is obviously conferred upon the Collector to secure enforcement of the salutary and beneficent provisions of the Act. If transfer has been made contrary to the provisions of the Act, it must not have any effect at all and the status quo ante must be restored, for otherwise the object of the Act would be frustrated. Even after the transfer is declared void, the transferor may not take action to recover possession of the land, for then he would have to return the purchase price received by him which he may not want to do and in that event the land would continue to remain in possession of the transferee and the object of the legislation would be defeated. The Legislature, therefore, did not leave it to the transferor to adopt proceedings for recovering possession of the land but provided that the Collector may summarily evict the transferee or any other person who is unauthorizedly in occupation or wrongfully in possession of it, so that possession could be restored to the transferor and the effect of the transfer obliterated. It could not have been intended by the Legislature that the Collector after evicting the unauthorized occupant should retain possession of the land with himself or it should be appropriated to the use of the State. If such had been the intention, there would have been clear and express words to that effect.
It could not have been intended by the Legislature that the Collector after evicting the unauthorized occupant should retain possession of the land with himself or it should be appropriated to the use of the State. If such had been the intention, there would have been clear and express words to that effect. There being no such provision, the Collector must obviously, after summarily evicting the unauthorized occupant, hand back possession to the person who is the owner of the land. The Collector cannot, in the absence of specific provision to that effect, retain possession as against the owner of the land. This ground is, therefore, without substance and must be rejected." 15. Though Mr.Joshi would submit that the said judgment has been subsequently considered and not approved by the full bench in the case of Dashrathlal M. Patel (Supra), reading of the said decision would indicate that the question that whether the property once sold in breach of the provisions of the Fragmentation Act would entitle the purchaser to seek reversion of land has been confirmed by the aforesaid judgment. 16. As far as question of delay and the case law by the respective parties, what is evident on the reading of the decision is that if the transaction is void, the question before the Court was whether it needs to be so declared or if it is void-ab-initio, it need not be so declared even if there is delay. Limitation would not come in its way. 17. Be that as it may be, from the facts on hand, what is unequivocally clear is that, it is not open for the petitioners to plead and cry, foul on the question of limitation. The petitioners when purchased the lands in the year 1975 were aware of the condition in the sale deed. For 7 years, they did nothing to act in conformity with the sale deed. In the 1983, therefore, proceedings under the Fragmentation Act were initiated for the breach of such proceedings. The Deputy Collector, in the year 1983 confirmed the sale on certain conditions with the petitioners were bound to comply with. That the petitioners did not act for a period of 17 years. The Mamlatdar was again requested on 7.8.2000 by the petitioners to confirm their sale.
The Deputy Collector, in the year 1983 confirmed the sale on certain conditions with the petitioners were bound to comply with. That the petitioners did not act for a period of 17 years. The Mamlatdar was again requested on 7.8.2000 by the petitioners to confirm their sale. They, therefore did not act for a period of 17 years and, therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to contend that the authorities were estopped from cancelling the sale after a period of 25 years. On the contrary, it was the petitioners who were guilty on the count of delay at their hands having once purchased the land in question and not to abide by the conditions of the sale deed so as to confirm the purchase in consonance with the provisions of the Fragmentation Act. 18. In accordance with the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Govindsingh Ramsingbhai Vaghela (Supra), the orders passed by the authorities below i.e. order dated 6.3.2001 by the Deputy Collector and so confirmed by the State by the order dated 30.5.2006 are held to be valid and legal. 19. With the aforesaid, this petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs. Interim Relief stands vacated forthwith. Rule is discharged.