JUDGMENT : A.S. SUPEHIA, J. 1. The present petition has been confined to the petitioner No. 2-Malek Gulammohammad Abbasmiya. 2. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. G.M. Joshi has submitted that the petitioner was initially appointed as an Auto Electrician in 1988 and thereafter, he is continued as such till today. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Joshi, upon instructions of learned advocate Ms. Nandini Joshi, has submitted that the petitioner has been assigned the work of Driver, however, his designation of Auto Electrician has remained as such. He has submitted that the petitioner is neither conferred the regular pay-scale nor regularized in service though, he is serving as full time employee. 2.1 Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Joshi has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others vs. Umadevi and Others, 2006 (4) SCC 1 and has submitted that after long passage of time, the respondents may be directed to regularize him in service. 3. Learned advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw for the respondent has submitted that the petitioner cannot be regularized in service since his appointment is irregular as his name was called from the Employment Exchange. It is further submitted that since the provision of Government Resolution dated 17.10.1988 are not applicable to the respondent-Corporation, service of the petitioner cannot be regularized. He has also submitted that since the respondent-Corporation is a loss making Government Corporation and its financial position is weak, no directions may be issued for regularizing the petitioner in service. 4. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties. 5. By the order dated 22.03.2005, while issuing rule, this court has observed thus: “Learned advocate for the petitioners placed reliance on the decision of learned Single Judge of this court dated 27th March, 2002 passed in Special Civil Application No. 4847/91. It is stated that the LPA filed against the said decision also came to be rejected. Learned counsel, Mr. Munshaw appearing for the respondent Corporation submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has granted interim stay against the implementation of the said decisions in Civil Appeal No. 5880 and 5881 of 2004. Rule. It would, however, be open for either side to move for appropriate interim order or final orders depending on the further progress made in the appeals before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.” 6. Rule. It would, however, be open for either side to move for appropriate interim order or final orders depending on the further progress made in the appeals before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.” 6. Thus, the petitioner had placed reliance on the decision of the Coordinate Bench dated 27.03.2002 passed in Special Civil Application No. 4847 of 1991, which was the subject matter of challenge in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 1151 and 1152 of 2002 and ultimately, the Apex Court vide order dated 25.02.2010 passed in Civil Appeal Nos.5880 and 5881 of 2004, has set aside the observations made by the Coordinate Bench of this court in light of the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of Umadevi (supra) and State of Punjab and Another vs. Surjit Singh and Others, 2009 (9) SCC 514 . 7. This court has perused the common judgment and order dated 27.03.2002 passed by the Coordinate Bench in Special Civil Application No. 4847 of 1991 and allied matter. 8. It appears that the peons, who were serving under the respondent-Corporation had approached this court to regularize their service from the date of their joining. After a prolix judgment, this court directed the respondent-Corporation to regularize daily wagers/part timers w.e.f. 01.01.1996 and further direction was issued to fix their wages notionally. 9. The aforesaid judgment was carried in appeal by the respondent-Corporation and by the judgment and order dated 19.07.2003 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1151 of 2002 and allied matters, the Division Bench of this Court dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal. The respondent-Corporation challenged the same before the Apex Court by filing Civil Appeal Nos. 5880 of 2004 and by the judgment and order dated 25.02.2010, the Civil Appeal was allowed in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Umadevi (supra) and Surjit Singh (supra). 10. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner has been serving continuously since 1988 under the respondent-Corporation and the respondent-Corporation is beneficiary of his service. 11. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Umadevi (supra). The Apex Court in its penultimate directions has directed thus: “53. One aspect needs to be clarified. 11. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Umadevi (supra). The Apex Court in its penultimate directions has directed thus: “53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa (supra), R.N. Nanjundappa (supra), and B.N. Nagarajan (supra) and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not sub-judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.” 12. The Apex Court has directed to regularize the service of the employees, who are continued for more than ten (10) years. In the present case, the petitioner is working since 1988 under the respondents. 13. The aforesaid judgment of Surjit Singh (supra) is considered by the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab and Others vs. Jagjit Singh and Others, 2017 (1) SCC 148 . After considering the aforesaid judgments in the cases of Umadevi (supra) and Surjit Singh (supra), the Apex Court has held thus: “48. 13. The aforesaid judgment of Surjit Singh (supra) is considered by the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab and Others vs. Jagjit Singh and Others, 2017 (1) SCC 148 . After considering the aforesaid judgments in the cases of Umadevi (supra) and Surjit Singh (supra), the Apex Court has held thus: “48. First and foremost, it is essential for us to deal with the judgment dated 11.11.2011 rendered by the full bench of the High Court (in Avtar Singh vs. State of Punjab and Others, CWP No. 14796 of 2003). A perusal of the above judgment reveals, that the High Court conspicuously focused its attention to the decision of the Constitution Bench in the Secretary, State of Karnataka case. While dealing with the above judgment, the full bench expressed the view, that though at the first impression, the judgment appeared to expound that payment of minimum wages drawn by regular employees, had also to be extended to persons employed on temporary basis, but a careful reading of the same would show that, that was not so. Learned counsel, representing the State of Punjab, reiterated the above position. In order to understand the tenor of the aforesaid assertion, reference was made to paragraphs 44 and 48, of the judgment of the Constitution Bench, which are extracted hereunder: “44. The concept of “equal pay for equal work’’ is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the rules. This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the goby to the procedure established by law in the matter of public employment.......It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality. xxx xxx xxx 48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the department concerned on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating un-equals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled.” 49.................. 49.1 We are of the considered view, that in paragraph 44 extracted above, the Constitution Bench clearly distinguished the issues of pay parity, and regularization in service. It was held, that on the issue of pay parity, the concept of ‘equality’ would be applicable (as had indeed been applied by the Court, in various decisions), but the principle of ‘equality’ could not be invoked for absorbing temporary employees in Government service, or for making temporary employees regular/permanent. All the observations made in the above extracted paragraphs, relate to the subject of regularization/permanence and not, to the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’. As we have already noticed above, the Constitution Bench unambiguously held, that on the issue of pay parity, the High Court ought to have directed, that the daily-wage workers be paid wages equal to the salary, at the lowest grade of their cadre. This deficiency was made good, by making such a direction. 49.2 Insofar as paragraph 48 extracted above is concerned, all that needs to be stated is, that they were merely submissions of learned counsel, and not conclusions drawn by this Court. Therefore, nothing further needs to be stated, with reference to paragraph 48. This deficiency was made good, by making such a direction. 49.2 Insofar as paragraph 48 extracted above is concerned, all that needs to be stated is, that they were merely submissions of learned counsel, and not conclusions drawn by this Court. Therefore, nothing further needs to be stated, with reference to paragraph 48. 49.3 We are therefore of the view, that the High Court seriously erred in interpreting the judgment rendered by this Court in the Secretary, State of Karnataka case, by placing reliance on paragraphs 44 and 48 extracted above, for drawing its inferences with reference to the subject of pay parity. On the above subject/issue, this Court’s conclusions were recorded in paragraph 55 (extracted in paragraph 36, hereinabove), which have already been dealt with by us in an earlier part of this judgment. 50. It would also be relevant to mention, that to substantiate its inference drawn from the judgment rendered by this Court in the Secretary, State of Karnataka case, the full bench of the High Court, placed reliance on State of Punjab vs. Surjit Singh and while doing so, reference was made to the following observations recorded in paragraphs 27 to 30 (of the said judgment). Learned counsel for the State of Punjab has reiterated the above position. Paragraphs 27 to 30 aforementioned are being extracted hereunder: “27. While laying down the law that regularization under the constitutional scheme is wholly impermissible, the Court in State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , had issued certain directions relating to the employees in the services of the Commercial Taxes Department, as noticed hereinbefore. The employees of the Commercial Taxes Department were in service for more than ten years. They were appointed in 1985-1986. They were sought to be regularized in terms of a scheme. Recommendations were made by the Director, Commercial Taxes for their absorption. It was only when such recommendations were not acceded to, the Administrative Tribunal was approached. It rejected their claim. The High Court, however, allowed their prayer which was in question before this Court. 28. This Court stated: (Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , pp. Recommendations were made by the Director, Commercial Taxes for their absorption. It was only when such recommendations were not acceded to, the Administrative Tribunal was approached. It rejected their claim. The High Court, however, allowed their prayer which was in question before this Court. 28. This Court stated: (Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , pp. 1920, para 8) “8.........It is seen that the High Court without really coming to grips with the question falling for decision in the light of the findings of the Administrative Tribunal and the decisions of this Court, proceeded to order that they are entitled to wages equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in government service with effect from the dates from which they were respectively appointed. It may be noted that this gave retrospective effect to the judgment of the High Court by more than 12 years. The High Court also issued a command to the State to consider their cases for regularisation within a period of four months from the date of receipt of that order. The High Court seems to have proceeded on the basis that, whether they were appointed before 171984, a situation covered by the decision of this Court in Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily Wage Employees Assn. vs. State of Karnataka, (1990) 2 SCC 396 and the scheme framed pursuant to the direction thereunder, or subsequently, since they have worked for a period of 10 years, they were entitled to equal pay for equal work from the very inception of their engagement on daily wages and were also entitled to be considered for regularisation in their posts.” 29. It is in the aforementioned factual backdrop, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 the Constitution of India, directed: (Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , p. 43, para 55) “55.........Hence, that part of the direction of the Division Bench is modified and it is directed that these daily-wage earners be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of their cadre in the Commercial Taxes Department in government service, from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Since, they are only daily-wage earners, there would be no question of other allowances being paid to them. Since, they are only daily-wage earners, there would be no question of other allowances being paid to them. In view of our conclusion, that the courts are not expected to issue directions for making such persons permanent in service, we set aside that part of the direction of the High Court directing the Government to consider their cases for regularisation. We also notice that the High Court has not adverted to the aspect as to whether it was regularisation or it was giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court. In such a situation, the direction in that regard will stand deleted and the appeals filed by the State would stand allowed to that extent. If sanctioned posts are vacant (they are said to be vacant) the State will take immediate steps for filling those posts by a regular process of selection. But when regular recruitment is undertaken, the respondents in Case Nos. 3595-3612 and those in the Commercial Taxes Department similarly situated, will be allowed to compete, waiving the age restriction imposed for the recruitment and giving some weightage for their having been engaged for work in the Department for a significant period of time. That would be the extent of the exercise of power by this Court under Article 142 the Constitution to do justice to them.” 30. We, therefore, do not see that any law has been laid down in para 55 of the judgment in Umadevi case. Directions were issued in view of the limited controversy. As indicated, the State’s grievances were limited.” 51.1 It is apparent, that this Court in State of Punjab vs. Surjit Singh, did hold, that the determination rendered in paragraph 55 of the judgment in the Secretary, State of Karnataka case, was in exercise of the power vested in this Court, under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. But the above observation does not lead, to the conclusion or the inference, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is not applicable to temporary employees. In fact, there is a positive takeaway for the temporary employees. The Constitution Bench would in the above situation, be deemed to have concluded, that to do complete justice to the cause of temporary employees, they should be paid the minimum wage of a regular employee, discharging the same duties. In fact, there is a positive takeaway for the temporary employees. The Constitution Bench would in the above situation, be deemed to have concluded, that to do complete justice to the cause of temporary employees, they should be paid the minimum wage of a regular employee, discharging the same duties. It needs to be noticed, that on the subject of pay parity, the findings recorded by this Court in the Secretary, State of Karnataka case, were limited to the conclusions recorded in paragraph 55 thereof (which we have dealt with above, while dealing with the case law, on the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’). *** *** *** 58. In our considered view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a welfare state. Such an action besides being demeaning, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Any one, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not do so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to his family, at the cost of his self respect and dignity, at the cost of his self worth, and at the cost of his integrity. For he knows, that his dependents would suffer immensely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act, of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation. 59............. 60. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ in relation to temporary employees (daily-wage employees, adhoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the concerned employees (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees, holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ summarized by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals, were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre/establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of their employment, the concerned temporary employees were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities, which at some point in time, were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts, were also posted to discharge the same work, which was assigned to temporary employees, from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There can be no doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable to all the concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged Government employees, holding the same post.” 14. The Apex Court has extended the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ in relation to temporary employees (daily-wage employees, adhoc appointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the concerned employees (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees, holding the same/corresponding posts. The respondents are unable to satisfy this court that they are not taking full time work from the petitioner, which is being done by regular employee. 15. In the present case, the petitioner is serving since 1988 continuously on daily wages basis. The respondents are unable to satisfy this court that they are not taking full time work from the petitioner, which is being done by regular employee. 15. In the present case, the petitioner is serving since 1988 continuously on daily wages basis. He is also discharging the same work, which is assigned to other employees form time to time. The Apex Court has thereafter, directed that such employees would be entitled to draw wages at the minimum pay-scale (at the last grade in the regular pay-scale) extended to regular employees holding the same post. 16. Thus, in view of the law enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of Umadevi (supra) and Jagjit Singh (supra), the respondents are hereby directed to place the petitioner in the minimum of the pay scale (at the last grade in the regular pay-scale), which is to be granted to regular employees holding the same post. It is clarified that such benefits shall be given to the petitioner after completion of ten (10) years of the service. The petitioner was appointed in 1988 and hence, after completion of ten (10) years, he shall be placed in the minimum of the pay-scale at the last grade in the regular pay-scale, which has been extended to the regular employees holding the same post. Necessary arrears shall also be paid to the petitioner. Necessary orders shall be passed within a period of two (2) months from the date of receipt of the writ of this order. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. 17. As a consequence, Civil Application No. 3 of 2019 also stands disposed of.