JUDGMENT : 1. The present petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for seeking the following reliefs :­ “12(A) Quashing and setting aside the order dated 05.11.2001 imposing monthly pension cut of Rs.1000/­ for five years and to refund the amount already deducted. (B) Directing the respondents to pay the amount of leave encashment and L.T.C., with 12% interest from 01.03.1997 till payment. (C) Directing the respondents to fix and pay final pension and commuted pension and to pay the remaining amount of gratuity of Rs.15000/­ with 12% interest. (D) Directing the respondents to regularize the period of suspension as per law. (E) During the pendency and final disposal of this petition, the Respondents may be directed to pay the amount of leave encashment, LTC and the remaining amount of Rs.15,000/­ to the petitioner forthwith. (F) During the pendency and final disposal of this petition, further implementation of the order dated 05.11.2001 may be stayed and the respondents may be restrained from deducting any amount from the pension of the petitioner as a result of the order dated 05.11.2001. (G) To grant such other and further reliefs’ as may be deemed fit.” 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was serving as a Sales Tax Officer (Class­I). While he was serving at Junagadh, for the period commencing from 06.09.1993 to 03.02.1996, he was posted as a Sales Tax Officer (Circle­2) in Junagadh during 26.09.1992 to 04.09.1993 and during that period, he issued registration certificates in favour of one M/s. Umiya Industries Vanthali and Shreenathji Industries, Shapur. While issuing such registration to these two firms, necessary verification which was required to be undertaken has not been done, which has ultimately resulted into allowing these firms to engage only in billing activity which has caused revenue loss to the department to the extent of Rs.5,87,30,822/­ and while carrying on such registration procedure, the petitioner has shown serious dereliction in discharge of duty. As a result of this, the petitioner was served with the charge sheet on 09.02.1996 imputing certain charges which are reflecting on page 21 of the petition compilation. A detailed charge sheet was submitted indicating the particulars as to which process has not been carried out while issuance of registration to the said firms and by detailing out, the petitioner was called upon by the department. A detailed charge sheet was submitted indicating the particulars as to which process has not been carried out while issuance of registration to the said firms and by detailing out, the petitioner was called upon by the department. It appears that joint inquiry has been conducted of three officers and at later point of time, vide communication dated 11.09.1997, some further charges have been added, in response to the aforesaid registration issue. By that time, the petitioner was already superannuated on 28.02.1997 and came to be retired vide Notification dated 28.02.1997. In exercise of powers under Rule 189(A) and Rule 189(B) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules (“BCSR” for short), it was stated in the retirement order that the departmental inquiries which are initiated against him vide Memos dated 09.02.1996, 27.02.1997 and 27.02.1997 would continue even after the retirement. Now, this petition is concerning with the departmental inquiry which has already been issued pursuant to the Memo dated 09.02.1996, which is prior to petitioner’s retirement, in which the petitioner was dealt with. The Inquiry Officer after conducting an inquiry found that the charges have not been proved, but then having found by the disciplinary authority that such findings of inquiry officer not found satisfactory, the petitioner was served with the show cause notice, granting of opportunity vide communication dated 11.04.2000. To this show cause notice, as a part of the opportunity to the petitioner, reply came to be submitted on 02.06.2000 and thereafter, after relevant examination and stand of the petitioner, an order of penalty came to be issued on 05.11.2001, by virtue of which, an amount of Rs.1000/­ per month from the pension was ordered to be deducted for a period of five years. It is this order, which came to be assailed by way of present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In addition to this, additional relief has also been sought with respect to leave encashment and incidental reliefs which are quoted herein above. It appears that same penalty orders have also been issued with respect to other memos which are already referred to by the petitioner in para 3 onwards. Since this petition is related to penalty order dated 05.11.2001, for which reference is given in the present order. 3. It appears that same penalty orders have also been issued with respect to other memos which are already referred to by the petitioner in para 3 onwards. Since this petition is related to penalty order dated 05.11.2001, for which reference is given in the present order. 3. This petition was heard by this Court at the admission stage, wherein a detailed order is passed since there was an issue related to release of pension and as such, this Court on 02.11.2004, passed the order, which reads as under :­ “By order dated 12th February 2004 Rule was issued in this matter and notice as to interim relief was made returnable on 26th March, 2004. 2. In the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 5th November, 2001 imposing a cut of Rs.1,000/= in the monthly pension of the petitioner for a period of 5 years. The petitioner has further submitted that there was one more order of penalty passed against the petitioner by order dated 27th February, 1997 by which monthly pension of the petitioner was reduced by Rs.500 for a period of one year. The petitioner, however, has not challenged this subsequent order. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that other than these two penalties no penalty is awarded nor is there any other departmental inquiry pending against him. It is submitted that despite this position, the respondents have not finalized the pension entitlement of the petitioner, who retired as far back as on 28th February, 1997. 3. It is stated that the respondents have not paid the withheld amount of gratuity of Rs.15,000, have not finalized the pension of the petitioner nor granted Downloaded on : Wed Dec 11 16:15:07 IST 2019 commutation for pension. The petitioner has also complained that his suspension period is also not regularized. The petitioner has also complained that his leave encashment is also not paid to him. The petitioner complains that the LTC is also released to the petitioner by the respondents. 4. When the petitioner has retired in the year 1997 and when the final order of penalty was passed in the year 2001, it was expected of the respondents to take a final decision with respect to the pension entitlement of the petitioner. The petitioner complains that the LTC is also released to the petitioner by the respondents. 4. When the petitioner has retired in the year 1997 and when the final order of penalty was passed in the year 2001, it was expected of the respondents to take a final decision with respect to the pension entitlement of the petitioner. It is stated that there was yet another inquiry initiated against the petitioner vide charge­sheet dated 27.2.1997, however, the inquiry officer has held that the charges are not proved by his report dated 31st May, 1999. It is submitted that after the enquiry officer submitted his report in the year 1999, the Government has issued a show­ cause notice dated 11th June, 2000 to which the petitioner has made his representation on 12th February, 2000 and thereafter no final decision has been taken by the respondents. 5. Considering these facts and considering the fact that the petitioner is a retired Government Servant whose pension is not being finalised since 1997, it is directed that the petitioner shall make a representation to the respondents within a period of four weeks from today. If such a representation is made, the respondents shall, without any further delay, take a decision particularly, with respect to ­­ (I) the question of final order to be passed in the departmental inquiry against the petitioner initiated by the charge­sheet dated 27th February, 1997 and (ii) with respect to the finalisation of the petitioner’s pension. Such a decision shall be taken within a period of 10 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the representation. It is expected that upon finalisation of the third departmental inquiry, the respondents shall proceed to finalise the pension and other benefits such as leave encashment and LTC of the petitioner on the basis of the penalty order/s and pendency of the petition will not deter the respondents from finalising, at least at this stage, the pension of the petitioner on the basis of the existing orders. D.S. is permitted. 4. The petition after being adjourned from time to time, came up for consideration before this Court, wherein, Ms. D.S. is permitted. 4. The petition after being adjourned from time to time, came up for consideration before this Court, wherein, Ms. Harshal Pandya, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has vehemently contended that by virtue of effect of Rule 189 (A) of BCSR, addition of charge was not permissible at all and since addition of charges which is forming part of the inquiry is after retirement of the petitioner, it is hit by Rule 189 (A) (B) of the BCSR. It has further been contended that the law requires that if the disciplinary authority is not in agreement with the findings of the inquiry officer and for disagreement, personal hearing is expected to have been given, which is not given in the present case and, therefore, also, the action is violative of the principles of natural justice. It has further been contended that the notice which has been given by the disciplinary authority is nothing but reflection of predetermined move of the disciplinary authority and, therefore, such a pre­deceive act, which has resulted into prejudice, which is required to be corrected by setting aside the impugned order of penalty. It has been submitted that time and again, it has been referred that huge financial loss to the extent of more than Rs.5 crores has been caused to the department, but in what manner, the same is the question, is not reflecting anywhere and therefore, the action against the petitioner is not only predetermined, but is laconic in nature and as such also, such action may not be allowed to stand in the eye of law. It has further been contended that the finding of the inquiry officer is exhaustive and sufficiently dealing with each of the allegations which have been attributed against the petitioner, but then, a different opinion is formulated. A bare look at the order would clearly indicate that the same has not dealt the detailed finding of the inquiry officer and, therefore, grave prejudice is caused to the petitioner which ultimately requires this Court to set aside the impugned order passed by the authority. 4.1 To substantiate and strengthen the submission, learned advocate Ms. A bare look at the order would clearly indicate that the same has not dealt the detailed finding of the inquiry officer and, therefore, grave prejudice is caused to the petitioner which ultimately requires this Court to set aside the impugned order passed by the authority. 4.1 To substantiate and strengthen the submission, learned advocate Ms. Pandya has relied upon few decisions delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in AIR 1999 SC 3734 and in the case of Ministry of Finance & Anr., v. S.B. Ramesh reported in AIR 1998 SC 853 and one another decision rendered in Special Civil Application No. 1624 of 2004 decided on 07.12.2018 and thereby has contended that the petition be allowed by granting the relief as prayed for. 4.2 It has further been vehemently contended that addition of charge was otherwise not permissible at all, since Rule 189 of BCSR debars the authority to mutate the charges and initiate any action after a lapse of period of four years and since by virtue of the effect of the said Rule, another charge sheet was not permissible and addition of charge is made, to frustrate the object of Rule 189 of BCSR and the petitioner was dealt with after retirement in respect of those charges, which are otherwise, not permissible to be dealt with. The entire decision making process has therefore, seriously prejudice the petitioner and not permissible in law. It has further been submitted that normally at the time of imposition of penalty, period of suspension will have to be dealt with and treated. No such decision was taken while dealing with the suspension period at this juncture, and therefore, also the entire exercise is arbitrary, illegal and dehorse the procedure. It has further been submitted that apart from this, even for the period commencing from 1996­99, LTC benefits have also been deprived of from the petitioner and, therefore, the same are required to be paid with interest with effect from 01.03.1997. It has further been submitted that apart from this, even for the period commencing from 1996­99, LTC benefits have also been deprived of from the petitioner and, therefore, the same are required to be paid with interest with effect from 01.03.1997. By referring to certain documents, an attempt is made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to indicate that here is the case in which, there is a detailed finding of the inquiry officer and against that a laconic order is passed by the disciplinary authority and in view of this peculiar background of fact, the petition deserves to be considered. No other submissions have been made. 5. To meet with the stand taken by the learned advocate for the petitioner, Mr. D.M. Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader has vehemently contended that here is a case in which, there is no serious prejudicial lapses in procedure while dealing with the petitioner and addition of charges as has been tried to be protested was never agitated at a relevant point of time and having participated in the process of inquiry, now at this stage, such plea is not possible to be entertained and apart from that, a close reading of the said addition of charges has nothing substantial addition, but it is interwoven to the very same charge of the very same firm and, therefore, continuance of allegations, will not permit the petitioner to resort to Rule 189 of BCSR and, therefore, contention raised in that regard is not available to the petitioner. Mr. Devnani, learned AGP has further submitted that here is the case in which there is no procedural lapse at all, as pointed out to the Court nor any irregularity in conducting the departmental inquiry and even on the issue of compliance of principles of natural justice. While arriving at a different opinion, sufficient opportunity is given to the petitioner by giving a specific notice calling upon him to tender his explanation and as such, substantial compliance is made of principles of natural justice. It cannot be said that the action is contrary to the principles of natural justice. While arriving at a different opinion, sufficient opportunity is given to the petitioner by giving a specific notice calling upon him to tender his explanation and as such, substantial compliance is made of principles of natural justice. It cannot be said that the action is contrary to the principles of natural justice. Pre­determined mode is not at all reflecting from a bare reading of the said show cause notice while dealing with the finding of the inquiry officer since the disciplinary authority was of opinion that on crucial issue, the inquiry officer has not properly dealt with and as such when opportunity is given to the petitioner at crucial stage, while considering the case by the disciplinary authority this point of principles of natural justice is not available to the petitioner. 5.1 There are no pleadings in the petition and no relief is sought with respect to the same and that has not been seriously agitated in the present proceedings as well. Mr. Devnani, learned AGP has therefore, refrained himself from dealing with the said issue and has ultimately contended that there is no grave prejudice cause to the petitioner nor sufficiently and conjointly explained in the petition and in absence thereof, the scope of judicial review would be limited. For that purpose, Mr. Devnani, learned AGP has relied upon decision of the Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India reported 1995 (6) SCC 749 and has contended that since there is no procedural lapse at all and there is no element of prejudice and further substantial compliance of principles of natural justice is visible, there is hardly any scope to disturb the view taken by the authority or to substitute thereof and as such no case is made out to call for any interference. 5.2 Regarding Rule 189 of BCSR, it has been submitted that the same cannot come in the way of department since, addition of charges is nothing but interwoven to the main charges which has already been levelled and initiated prior to retirement of the petitioner. In this set of circumstance, the petition being meritless, the same be dismissed in the interest of justice. 6. Having heard the learned counsels for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, few circumstances are not possible to be unnoticed by the Court before arriving at an ultimate conclusion. In this set of circumstance, the petition being meritless, the same be dismissed in the interest of justice. 6. Having heard the learned counsels for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, few circumstances are not possible to be unnoticed by the Court before arriving at an ultimate conclusion. 6.1 First of all the main allegation which has been levelled against the petitioner is that while issuing registration to two firms namely Umiya Industries and Shreenathji Industries as indicated in the charge sheet, no proper verification is made with respect to certain particulars, which are evidently required to be observed and on account of such lapse, having issued registration, those firms entered into billing activity, which has resulted into huge financial loss. The disciplinary authority while examining, has considered and found certain irregularities and arrived at a specific finding, which has resulted into an order of penalty. Chapter­IV of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 is dealing with registrations, licences, recognitions and permits. Sections 29 and 30 are the provisions which are required to be observed while dealing for registration. One of the circumstances which are narrated by the disciplinary authorities have not been considered by the inquiry officer and on account of such issuance of registration, huge revenue loss came to be suffered by the department and as such, the order of penalty. Sections 29 and 30 read as under :­ “Section 29 : Registration. (1) No dealer shall, while being liable to pay tax under Section 3 [or under Section3A] or under sub­section (6)of Section 26, carry on business as a dealer, unless he possesses a valid certificate of registration as provided by this Act; Provided that the provisions of this sub­section shall not be deemed to have been contravened if the dealer having applied for such registration as in this section provided, within the prescribed time, or as the case may be within the period specified in sub­section (6) of Section 26, carried on such business. (2) Every dealer, required by sub­section (1) to possess a certificate of registration, shall apply in the prescribed manner to the prescribed authority. (3) If the prescribed authority is satisfied that an application for registering is in order, it shall register the applicant and issue to him a certificate of registration in the prescribed form. (2) Every dealer, required by sub­section (1) to possess a certificate of registration, shall apply in the prescribed manner to the prescribed authority. (3) If the prescribed authority is satisfied that an application for registering is in order, it shall register the applicant and issue to him a certificate of registration in the prescribed form. (4) The prescribed authority may, after considering any information furnished under any provision of this Act or otherwise received, amend, from time to time, any certificate of registration. (5) When any dealer has been subjected or is liable to be subjected to a penalty under Section 45, or is convicted under Section 75 or has compounded an offence under Section 81 in respect of any contravention of sub­section (1), the prescribed authority shall register such dealer, if such dealer is not registered dealer and issued to him a certificate of registration, and such registration shall take effect from the date of the issue of the certificate in every respect as if it had been under sub­section (3) of the dealer’s application. (6) If any person upon an application made by him has been registered as a dealer under this section, and thereafter, it is found that he ought not to have been registered under the provisions of this section, either because he is not a dealer or because he is not liable to pay tax, he shall be liable to pay tax on his sales or purchases made during the period commencing on the date on which his registration certificate took effect and ending with its cancellation, notwithstanding that he may not be liable to pay tax under the provisions of this Act. (7) Where­ (a) any business, in respect of which a certificate of registration has been issued under this section, has been discontinued or transferred or (b) neither the turnover of sales nor the turnover of purchases of a dealer has during the preceding year exceeded the relevant limit specified in sub­section(4) of Section (3), [or] (c) the turnover of specified sales of a dealer has not, during the preceding year, exceeded the limit specified in sub­section(1) of Section 3A”]. and the dealer applied in the prescribed manner for cancellation of his registration, the prescribed authority shall cancel the registration with effect from such date as it may fix in accordance with the rules: Provided that, where the Commissioner is satisfied that any business in respect of which a certificate has been issued under this section, has been discontinued and the dealer has failed to apply as aforesaid for cancellation of registration, the Commissioner may, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard, cancel the registration with effect from such date as he may fix to be the date from which the business has been discontinued. Provided further that, the cancellation of a certificate of registration on an application of the dealer or otherwise, shall not effect the liability of the dealer to pay the tax (including any penalty) due for any period prior to the date of cancellation whether such tax (including any penalty) is assessed before the date of cancellation but remains unpaid, or is assessed thereafter or his liability to pay tax as provided in section 20. Section 30(B) : Dealers to furnish security. (1) Whether it appears necessary to the authority to which an application is made under Section 29, 30 or 30­A, for issue of certificate of registration so to do for the proper realisation of the tax, interest and penalty payable under this Act, it may by an order in writing and for the reasons to be recorded therein impose as a condition for the issue of a certificate of registration a requirement that the dealer shall furnish in the prescribed manner and within such time as may be specified in the order such security as may be so specified for the aforesaid purpose. (2) Where it appears necessary to the authority referred to in section 29 so to do for the proper realisation of the tax, interest and penalty payable under this Act, it may at any time while any certificate of registration (whether issued before or after the commencement of the Gujarat Sales Tax (Second Amendment Act, 1983) is in force, by an order in writing and for reasons to be recorded therein, require the dealer to whom such certificate has been granted, to furnish in the prescribed manner and within such time as may be specified in the order such security or if the dealer has already furnished any security in pursuance of an order under this sub­section or sub­section (1), such additional security, as may be specified in the order for the aforesaid purpose. (3) No dealer shall be required to furnish any security under sub­section (1) or any security or additional security under sub­section (2) unless he has been given opportunity of being heard. (4) The amount of security which a dealer may be required to furnish under sub­section (1) or sub­section (2) or the aggregate of the amount of such security and the amount of additional security which may be required to furnish under sub­section (2) by the authority referred to therein shall not exceed the amount of tax payable according to the estimate of such authority on the turnover of sales or turnover of purchases of goods of such dealer for the year in which such security or, as the case may be, additional security is required to be furnished. (5) Where the security furnished by a dealer under sub­ section (1) or sub­section (2) is in the form of a surety bond and the surety becomes insolvent or dies, the dealer shall, within thirty days of the occurrence of any of the aforesaid events, inform the authority referred to in section 29 and shall within ninety days of such occurance furnish a fresh security for the same amount as that of the bond in the form of a bond or in any other prescribed manner. (6) The authority referred to in Section 29 may, by order and for good and sufficient cause, forfeit the whole or any part of the security furnished by a dealer for realising any amount of the tax, interest or penalty payable by the dealer: Provided that no order shall be passed under this sub­ section within giving the dealer an opportunity of being heard. (7) Where by reason of an order under sub­section (6) of security furnished by any dealer is rendered insufficient, be shall make up the deficiency in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed. (8) The authority referred to in section 29 may, on an application made by a dealer in that behalf, make an order for refund of any amount or part thereof deposited by the dealer by way of security under this section, if it is not required for the purpose of realisation of tax, interest of penalty. (9) Where a dealer fails to furnish security as required under sub­section (1), (2), (5) or (7), the authority referred to in section 29 shall refuse to issue or, as the case may be, shall cancel the certificate of registration. (10) Provided that the refusal or cancellation of a certificate of registration under this sub­section shall, notwithstanding anything contained in sub­section (3) of Section 3, not effect the liability of the dealer to pay tax (including any penalty and interest) due for any period before or after the date of such refusal or cancellation of the certificate of registration and accordingly the provisions of Section 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 47Am 57 and 59 shall continue to apply.] 6.2 In view of the aforesaid provisions, when the disciplinary authority after considering the explanation of the petitioner has found that there was inadequate securities in both the cases and no timely verification and inquiry is undertaken by the petitioner and further in ‘Nondh’, it was specifically mentioned that on regular interval, verification of manufacturing capacity to be undertaken, but the same have not been adhered to by the present petitioner, which has encouraged the said firms to enter into bogus billing activity at large scale, resulting into loss of revenue to the department. It was specifically, found that when physical verification was made, even place of business was found to be closed on 02.02.1993 and, therefore, for want of proper steps being taken by the petitioner, not only in respect of registration, but in respect of observing noting dated 01.10.1993, the disciplinary authority found the petitioner guilty and that finding is very much reflecting from the record. 6.3 It is also observed from the record that while differing with the findings of the inquiry officer, appropriate opportunity was given to the petitioner by issuing show cause notice by granting 15 days period to tender explanation and a bare reading of the said communication dated 11.04.2000, is not reflecting in the finding, but the same are tentative in nature, for which opportunity is extended to the petitioner. 6.4 The learned counsel for the petitioner could not be able to point out any specific rule or procedural provisions, by virtue of which, personal hearing is required and as such, when opportunity concept is clearly observed by the department, it is difficult for this Court to accept that the action as violative of principles of natural justice, inasmuch as sufficient opportunity to explain has been extended to the petitioner. It has further been found from the record that the findings which have been arrived at by the inquiry officer have not been accepted by the disciplinary authority as certain important issues have not been dealt with at all and that apparently have been found from the record. This Court in limited jurisdiction about scope of judicial review is not inclined to substitute the finding with that of disciplinary authority. 6.5 As against this, the stand taken by the authority in affidavit­in­reply is also sufficient enough to indicate that there is no procedural serious lapses while dealing with the petitioner and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice and therefore, the penalty order is apparently found to be exclusively within the domain of the disciplinary authority. 6.5 As against this, the stand taken by the authority in affidavit­in­reply is also sufficient enough to indicate that there is no procedural serious lapses while dealing with the petitioner and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice and therefore, the penalty order is apparently found to be exclusively within the domain of the disciplinary authority. In respect of leave encashment, a categorical assertion is made by the deponent of the affidavit that an amount of Rs.97.632/­ has already been paid vide cheque No. 2732219 dated 07.12.2005 and even gratuity amount has also been paid and so far as Leave Travel Concession for a period of 1996­1999, the authority has taken into consideration the Government Resolution dated 20.03.1986 of the Finance Department as the said Resolution has provided that any government employee under suspension cannot avail the benefit of LTC and as such on account of the said Government Resolution LTC is not available to the petitioner. Para 8 and 9 of the said affidavit deserves to be quoted herein below, which reflects the stand of the authority. “8. I further submit that the petitioner had been paid the amount of leave encashement of Rs.97,632/­ vide cheque no. 2732219 dated 07.12.2005, I further say and submit that the petitioner has also been paid the gratuity amount of Rs.1,96,466/­ vide letter dated 27.02.2006 issued by the office of the Director of Pension and Provident Fund, Gandhinagar. From the above said order of the Department, it is clear that no gratuity amount has been withheld. Therefore, the total amount of Rs.1,96,466/­ is paid as gratuity to the petitioner. A copy of the order of the office of the Director of Pension and Provident Fund, Gandhinagar and annexed herewith and marked as Annexure­R2. 9. I further say and submit that the petitioner has not been paid any leave concession for the period of 1996 to 1999. The authority has taken into consideration the Government Resolution dated 28.03.1986 of the Finance Department wherein it has been provided that any Government employee under suspension cannot avail the benefit of LTC. I say and submit that the petitioner was under suspension from the period 03.02.1986 to 28.02.1997 i.e. date of retirement and hence as per the provisions of the Government Resolution dated 28.0­3.1986 the petitioner was not entitled to avail LTC as he retired during the suspension. I say and submit that the petitioner was under suspension from the period 03.02.1986 to 28.02.1997 i.e. date of retirement and hence as per the provisions of the Government Resolution dated 28.0­3.1986 the petitioner was not entitled to avail LTC as he retired during the suspension. A copy of the Resolution of Finance Department dated 28.03.1996 is marked and annexed as Annexure­R3.” 6.6 A conjoint effect of aforesaid relevant record of the case would allow the Court to believe that the penalty order cannot be construed as arbitrary, illegal, since the same is based upon proper procedure and upon compliance of the principles of natural justice, it is not possible to be interferred with. 6.7 Now coming to the issue relating to addition of charges, after the date of retirement, it clearly transpires from the record that even the charges are related to very same firms and are interwoven to the main charge and there is no substantive different charges added as can be seen from the communication and as such, the said contention is not possible to be accepted and there seem to be no violation of the mandate of Rule 189 of BCSR, as has been contended. 7. Now in the context of decisions which have been referred to by the learned advocate for the petitioner, both these decisions which are referred to are on different contextual background of fact and the Apex Court in the decision in the case of Yoginath D. Bagde (supra) has found that there was absolute non consideration of the statement of the defence witnesses and then in that peculiar background of fact, proposition was laid down which here in the present case cannot be stretched in which undisputedly sufficient opportunity is extended and the disciplinary authority has considered all the relevant circumstance of the petitioner and passed an order after considering the explanation. The Court see no irregularity in such mode adopted by the disciplinary authority while inflicting penalty. 8. Another decision which has been tried to be relied upon is also in a different background of facts and, therefore, not possible to be relied upon. The Court see no irregularity in such mode adopted by the disciplinary authority while inflicting penalty. 8. Another decision which has been tried to be relied upon is also in a different background of facts and, therefore, not possible to be relied upon. On the contrary, time and again, the Apex Court has propounded that if there is a slight change in the fact, even one additional different fact would make a world of difference in applying the principle of precedent and, therefore, this Court is unable to extend the proposition in this background of different facts altogether. 9. As against this, Mr. Devnani, learned AGP has referred to and relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of B. C. Chaturvedi (supra) in which the scope has been enlisted while dealing with the decision based upon the disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent in that context. The scope of judicial review is propounded which, this Court would like to reproduce some of the relevant observations, since relevant to the issue. “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re­ appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re­ appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case." 10. In view of the aforesaid background of fact and proposition of law as referred above, the petition lacks merit. Hence, the petition is dismissed hereby. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.