JUDGMENT : Dr. Vineet Kothari, J. (Prayer: Tax Case Appeals filed under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras 'D' Bench, dated 29.04.2015 in ITA Nos.840/Mds/2014, 846/Mds/2014, 842/Mds/2014, 848/Mds/2014, 851/Mds/2014, 843/Mds/2014, 838/Mds/2014, 841/Mds/2014, 850/Mds/2014, 849/Mds/2014, 839/Mds/2014, 844/Mds/2014, 845/Mds/2014 and 847/Mds/2014, respectively.) 1. The Revenue has filed these appeals against the respondent- City Union Bank Limited, under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ('Act' in short), raising the purported substantial questions of law, arising from the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dated 29.04.2015 in ITA Nos.840/Mds/2014, 846/Mds/2014, 842/Mds/2014, 848/Mds/2014, 851/Mds/2014, 843/Mds/2014, 838/Mds/2014, 841/Mds/2014, 850/Mds/2014, 849/Mds/2014, 839/Mds/2014, 844/Mds/2014, 845/Mds/2014 and 847/Mds/2014, whereby the learned Tribunal allowed the appeals filed by the Assessee and dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue for the Assessment Years 1991-92, 1998-99, 1993-94, 2001-2002, 2004-2005, 1995-1996, 1988-1989, 1992-1993, 2003-2004, 2002-2003, 1990-1991, 1996-1997, 1997-1998 and 2000-2001, respectively. 2. Learned counsel for the Appellant/Revenue has urged the following two contentions before us: (i) That the learned Tribunal has erred in upholding the orders passed by the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) dismissing the Revenue's appeals as far as Re-assessment Proceedings under Sections 147/148 of the Act initiated against the respondent Bank are concerned, on the ground that such Re-assessment Proceedings have been initiated beyond the limitation of 4 years from the end of the relevant Assessment Years and the Assessing Authority had not, in the reasons recorded for such Re-assessment, indicated that there was a failure on the part of the Assessee to fully and truly disclose the relevant materials which resulted in such escapement of income and therefore, in the absence of any such stipulation in the reasons recorded for re-assessment, the Re-assessment Proceedings were held to be without jurisdiction and were liable to be quashed. He further submitted that the learned Tribunal has relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Fenner (India) Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in (2000) 241 ITR 672, whereas later on, the Gujarat High Court in the case of I.P.Patel and Co. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax ([2012] 346 ITR 207 (Guj)), has held that mere non-mention of the words, viz. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax ([2012] 346 ITR 207 (Guj)), has held that mere non-mention of the words, viz. 'failure of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly', will not render the Re-assessment Proceedings non-est and without jurisdiction, if the reasons so apparently conveyed such failure on the part of the Assessee to fully and truly disclose the relevant material. (ii) Secondly, the learned counsel for the Revenue urged before us that for the Assessment Years in question, when such Re-assessment Proceedings were initiated within a period of 4 years from the end of the relevant Assessment Years, the learned Tribunal had erred in holding that such re-assessments were initiated merely on a change of opinion, even though the earlier Assessment Orders were made by the Assessing Authority upon scrutiny of the relevant material under Section 143(3) of the Act. He, therefore, submitted that the learned Tribunal has erred in setting aside the Re-assessment Proceedings for all the aforesaid Assessment Years in question, thus giving rise to the substantial questions of law, requiring consideration by this Court. 3. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had in the first instance, dealing with the appeals for the Assessment Years 1988-89 and other Assessment Years for which the Re-Assessment Proceedings were initiated after four years, remitted the matter back to the Assessing Authority for verifying as to whether the Assessee had not disclosed all the primary facts fully and truly at the time of assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act, and also whether if the notice under Section 147 of the Act was issued beyond four years from the relevant Assessment Year, whether the same was issued after obtaining the due approval from the higher authorities. The relevant portion of the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) dated 20.12.2013 for the Assessment Year 1988-89, is quoted below for ready reference: “I have carefully considered the rival contentions and the materials on record. In the case under consideration, the fact is that the Appellant did disclose the interest paid on the purchases of securities and claimed that the same was revenue in nature. This claim of the Appellant was duly allowed in the assessment made under Section 143(3) after due consideration. Hence the opinion that is now being canvassed is mainly because another opinion has been formed on this matter. This claim of the Appellant was duly allowed in the assessment made under Section 143(3) after due consideration. Hence the opinion that is now being canvassed is mainly because another opinion has been formed on this matter. This new opinion is apparently on account of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Vijaya Bank (187 ITR 541). However, as pointed out by the Appellant, even decisions of courts could no be a source or an antidote on matters which has been deliberated upon and closed earlier, as has been held by the Calcutta and Gujarat High Court in the decisions cited by the Appellant in his arguments. The Assessing Officer has not established that the Appellant had not disclosed all primary facts fully and truly at the time of assessment U/s.143(3) and the assessments were completed on scrutinizing the books of accounts along with relevant records and documents. The attempt of the Assessing Officer to assess the broken period interest was only on account of change of opinion and on that account the Assessing Officer was not competent to commence reassessment proceedings. Assuming for a moment there was escapement of income chargeable to tax due to allowance the escapement of that income alone is not sufficient to justify the initiation of action U/s.147 after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The further condition that such escapement must be by reason of failure on the part of the assessee either to file the return or to disclose truly and fully all material facts necessary for the assessment should be satisfied for initiating action U/s.147. Since, the Appellant has placed all facts along with the return of income and since assessment was completed U/s.143(3) and since the notice U/s.148 was issued beyond the period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment years, notice so issued U/s.148 of the IT Act is bad in law. In this regard Assessing Officer is directed to verify the contention of the Appellant that the notice issued u/s 147 of the IT Act is beyond time limit of 4 years, hence the Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to issue such notice. In this regard Assessing Officer is directed to verify the contention of the Appellant that the notice issued u/s 147 of the IT Act is beyond time limit of 4 years, hence the Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to issue such notice. The Assessing Officer may verify from miscellaneous records whether the contention of the Appellant that notice issued is beyond 4 years and out of time to initiate the reassessment proceedings and whether the Assessing Officer is justified in reopening the assessment which was completed u/s 143(3) where in the Appellant had not disclosed all primary facts fully and truly at the time of assessment u/s 143(3), warranting the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment proceedings once again without any fresh material on record to prove that there is income escaped assessment. The Assessing Officer may verify the contentions of the Appellant whether a notice u/s 147 has been issued within 4 years time or beyond 4 years with the approval of higher authorities for issuing the said notice. Since on the same issue the Appellant has gone and appealed before ITAT which in turn remitted back the appeal to the undersigned to examine the validity of issue of notice u/s 147. Instead of going into merits of the case the Assessing Officer may verify the validity of issue of notice u/s 147 within 4 years for reopening the assessment or beyond 4 years. If it is beyond 4 years if the notice has been issued without obtaining approval from higher authorities the reopening is itself bad in law and accordingly the contention of the Appellant has to be accepted or allowed. Subject to the above remark the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed for statistical purposes.” 4. The learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, after considering the findings of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and after quoting brief reasons for reopening of all the Assessment Orders involved in the present cases, held that since the Assessing Authority had not stated that there was failure on the part of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly all the material facts, notices under Sections 147 and 148 of the Act were liable to be quashed in view of the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Fenner (India) Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in (2000) 241 ITR 672. The relevant portion of the order passed by the Tribunal in this regard, is quoted below for ready reference: “2. First, we will take up the assessee's appeal in ITA Nos.838, 839, 840, 841, 843, 844, 847, 848, 849 & 850/Mds/2014. Since in all these appeals, the issue is common, we consider the facts narrated in ITA No.838/Mds/2014. 3. The first common ground in these appeals is with regard to validity of reopening of assessment though reopening was made after the end of the four years from the assessment orders. When the original assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Act, according to the ld.AR, the very initiation of proceedings under sec.148 was bad in law because, the conditions precedent to the reopening of assessment were absent in these cases. He submitted that in these cases, the original assessments were completed u/s.143(3) of the Act and no action to be taken for reopening of such assessment after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for those assessment years. He submitted that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) even after satisfying himself satisfied that the assessment was reopened after four years in these cases, when the original assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Act and there was no omission on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all materials for the purpose of assessment, instead of deciding the issue, he remitted the issue back to the file of the Assessing Officer, which is inappropriate. On the other hand, the ld. DR relied on the orders of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). 4. We have heard both the parties and perused the orders of the authorities below and gone through the materials on record. In these cases, the assessments were completed u/s.143(3) of the Act as follows: ITA No. Asst.Year Date of original Assessment Date of reopening Reasons for reopening 838/14 1988-89 30/11/1990 25/3/1999 Non disallowance of broken period interest 839/14 1990-91 23/12/1992 25/03/1999 Non disallowance of broken period interest 840/14 1991-92 10/01/1994 29/05/2001 (i) Non disallowance of entertainment expenses, share issue expenses. (ii) Non disallowance u/s.14A (iii) Excess deduction u/s.36(1)(viia) 841/14 1992-93 28/03/1995 26/03/1998 Non disallowance of provision for salary arrears. (ii) Non disallowance u/s.14A (iii) Excess deduction u/s.36(1)(viia) 841/14 1992-93 28/03/1995 26/03/1998 Non disallowance of provision for salary arrears. 843/14 1995-96 13/03/1998 20/03/2002 (i) Excess deduction u/s.36(1)(viia) (ii)Excess deduction of depreciation on buildings 844/14 1996-97 13/03/1998 20/03/2002 - do - 847/14 2000-01 26/03/2003 09/03/2006 (i) Excess deduction u/s.36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) (ii)Non disallowance of broken period interest 848/14 2001-02 20/11/2003 28/03/2008 (i) Recognition of commission, exchange and brokerage on receipt basis. (ii) Non inclusion of claims under ECGC & DICGC. 849/14 2002-03 01/03.2005 18/07/2008 (i) Recognition of commission, exchange and brokerage on receipt basis. (ii) Non inclusion of claims under ECGC & DICGC. (iii)Non inclusion of stale drafts. 850/14 2003-04 31/03/2006 18/07/2008 (i) Recognition of commission, exchange and brokerage on receipt basis. (ii) Non inclusion of claims under ECGC & DICGC. As seen from the above chart, there is no allegation by the Assessing Officer that there is any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose all material facts for the purpose of assessment. The assessee having furnished all material facts for the purpose of assessment, even if an assessee erroneously placed higher deduction, in respect of issues raised by the Assessing Officer in his reasons recorded, it will not be a case of failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts and the notice u/s.148 issued to the assessee beyond the period of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment year is liable to be invalid, the same to be annulled. Our view is fortified by the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of Fenner (India) Ltd. v. ITO reported in 241 ITR 672, wherein it was held that to initiate any proceedings u/s.147 of the Act, after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year, the Assessing Officer must necessarily record not only his reasonable belief that income has escaped assessment but also the default or failure committed by the assessee, which was not done by the Assessing Officer. Accordingly, the appeals in ITA Nos.838, 839, 840, 841, 843, 844, 847, 848, 849 & 850/Mds/2014 are allowed.” 5. Accordingly, the appeals in ITA Nos.838, 839, 840, 841, 843, 844, 847, 848, 849 & 850/Mds/2014 are allowed.” 5. As far as the question of other Assessment Orders quashed by the learned Tribunal as the learned Tribunal held that it was so done merely on a change of opinion, relevant findings of the learned Tribunal following the Supreme Court decision in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India Limited ([2010] 320 ITR 561 (SC)) are also quoted below for ready reference: “5. Next, we will consider ITA Nos.842, 845, 846 & 851/Mds/2015. In these cases, the grievance of the assessee is that though original assessment was completed u/s.143(3) of the Act, the Assessing Officer reopened the assessment without any tangible material came into his possession and came to the conclusion that there is escaped income and reopening is only mere change of opinion. It cannot be per se the reason to reopen the assessment. In these cases, the facts are that the assessment was completed under sec.143(3) of the Act. The assessment was reopened by recording the reasons for considering the following issues: 1. Interest paid on purchase of securities. 2. Expenditure for increase in capital. 3. Expenses on issue of rights issue. 4. Loss on sale of securities. 5. Fees payable for liability. 6. Excess claim of depreciation on building. 6. According to the ld.AR, there is no fresh tangible materials to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income. The Assessing Officer seeing the same records, the income has been assessed to tax. The ld. AR submitted that this was brought to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), who instead of annulling the assessment, remitted the issue back to the file of the Assessing Officer to examine the validity of reopening u/s.147. 7. We have heard both the parties and perused the materials on records. In these cases, the Assessing Officer has not pointed out any new material, which came into possession after completing the assessment u/s.143(3). 7. We have heard both the parties and perused the materials on records. In these cases, the Assessing Officer has not pointed out any new material, which came into possession after completing the assessment u/s.143(3). In our opinion, after 1st April, 1989, the Assessing Officer has the power to reopen the assessment u/s.147, if the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment and if there is no tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income; “mere change of opinion” cannot be a reason to reopen the assessment, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Kelvinator India Ltd. (320 ITR 561). In these cases, issues are already considered by the Assessing Officer in his original assessments u/s.143(3). Being so, he cannot relook the same records so as to make additions, which amounts to double taxation. Accordingly, we are inclined to annul all the assessments made u/s.147 of the Act.” 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the Appellant Revenue and upon perusal of the order passed by the Tribunal, we are of the considered opinion that no substantial question of law arises in the present case and the orders passed by the learned Tribunal with regard to both the aforesaid issues, deserve to be upheld. 7. As far as the question of failure of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly the relevant materials in the original Assessment Proceedings is concerned, it is a matter of fact. The Proviso to Section 147(1) of the Act requires such failure on the part of the Assessee to be attributed to the Assessee, in case the Assessing Authority seeks to invoke the larger limitation beyond four years from the end of the relevant Assessment Years. The provisions of the Statute are very clear and the same are quoted below for ready reference: “Income escaping assessment. 147. The provisions of the Statute are very clear and the same are quoted below for ready reference: “Income escaping assessment. 147. If the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section, or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in this section and in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year) : Provided that where an assessment under sub-section (3) of section 143 or this section has been made for the relevant assessment year, no action shall be taken under this section after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year,unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under section 139 or in response to a notice issued under subsection (1) of section 142 or section 148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment, for that assessment year:” 8. The learned single Judge of this Court, in the case of Fenner (India) Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in (2000) 241 ITR 672, which has been relied upon by the learned Tribunal, in our opinion, rightly held that the pre-condition for the exercise of power under Section 147 in cases where power is exercised within a period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year is the belief reasonably entertained by the Assessing Officer that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that assessment year. However when such power is invoked after the expiry of the period of four years from the end of the assessment year, such limitation can be overcome only if the Assessing Authority records the reason that there has been failure on the part of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly all the material facts and such failure on the part of the Assessee has resulted in the escapement of income taxable in his hands. The relevant portion from the aforesaid judgment is quoted below for ready reference: “The pre-condition for the exercise of the power under section 147 in cases where power is exercised within a period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year is the belief reasonably entertained by the AO that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that assessment year. However, when the power is invoked after the expiry of the period of four years from the end of the assessment year, a further precondition for such exercise is imposed by the proviso, namely, that there has been a failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under section 139 or in response to a notice issued under section 142 or section 148 or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. Unless the condition in the proviso is satisfied, the Assessing Officer does not acquire jurisdiction to initiate any proceeding under section 147 of the Act after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year. Thus in cases where the initiation of the proceedings is beyond the period, of four years from the end of the assessment year, the Assessing Officer must necessarily record not only his reasonable belief that income has escaped assessment but also the default or failure committed by the assessee. Failure to do so would vitiate notice and the entire proceedings. The relevant words in the proviso are: “.... unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee ........” Mere escape of income is insufficient to justify the initiation of action after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year. The relevant words in the proviso are: “.... unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee ........” Mere escape of income is insufficient to justify the initiation of action after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year. Such escapement must be by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee either to file a return referred to in the proviso or to truly and fully disclose the material facts necessary for the assessment.” 9. As far as the decision of the Gujarat High Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant/Revenue in I.P.Patel and Co. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (supra) is concerned, it is a possible view to take that mere repetition of these words in the reasons recorded or in the notice under Section 148 sent to the Assessee for re-assessment about the failure on the part of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, may not be necessary, provided if on the face of the reasons so recorded and conveyed to the Assessee, it is apparent that such failure on the part of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts for assessment is clearly made out. 10. The Proviso to Section 147 of the Act provides for such a condition, which is jurisdictional in nature and in order to lift the embargo of the limitation of four years, it is not only necessary that the Assessing Authority should have a reasonable belief about the escapement of income but should also be able to attribute the escapement of income to the failure on the part of the Assessee to fully and truly disclose the relevant materials during original assessment proceedings resulting in such escapement of income. Either the reasons so recorded on the face of it attributes such failure of the Assessee or the Assessing Authority so clearly states in the reasons recorded and conveyed by him that there has been failure on the part of the Assessee to fully and truly disclose the relevant materials and thus on account of such failure, the income has escaped assessment at the time of the original assessment and upon such satisfaction being recorded only, the Assessing Authority can proceed further for re-assessment under Sections 147/148 of the Act. Instead of any Court of law taking up this exercise of drawing the inference as to whether the reasons recorded by the Assessing Authority giving jurisdiction to re-assess is on account of the failure of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly, it would be much more appropriate for the Assessing Authority himself to record the reasons in that manner, because the Proviso to Section 147 clearly so stipulates and gives the jurisdiction to re-assess beyond four years at the end of the relevant Assessment Year only subject to the condition precedent, viz. there being a failure on the part of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly the relevant materials resulting in the escapement of income. We are of the opinion that it is incumbent on the part of the Assessing Authority to record such reasons specifically in that manner and in accordance with the rigor of the tenor of the language employed in the Proviso to Section 147 of the Act. 11. In the facts and circumstances of the case, from the reasons for reopening, which we find only in the form of Assessment Proceedings as reproduced by the learned Tribunal, we cannot infer any such failure on the part of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly the relevant material resulting in such escapement of income in the form of either excess deductions or some additions or deductions under Section 36(1) of the Act. 12. All these deductions/allowance/disallowance of expenses were dealt with by the Assessing Authority at the time of original assessment upon scrutiny made under Section 143(3) of the Act and there is nothing on record to show that there was non-application of mind on the part of the Assessing Authority on these aspects of the matter at the time of original assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act. 13. Therefore, on the second aspect of the matter also, we do not find anything wrong in the orders passed by the learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal that the inference of the Assessing Authority about the escapement of income was merely on account of change of opinion and that there was no reasonable belief that the income escaped assessment. 13. Therefore, on the second aspect of the matter also, we do not find anything wrong in the orders passed by the learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal that the inference of the Assessing Authority about the escapement of income was merely on account of change of opinion and that there was no reasonable belief that the income escaped assessment. The learned Tribunal was justified in relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Kelvinator of India Limited ([2010] 320 ITR 561 (SC))(wrongly printed as 328 ITR 561 in the order of the learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal). The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the above judgment, dealt with the amendment in law, with effect from 1st April 1989 under Section 147 of the Act, prior to and after enactment of the Direct Tax Law (Amendment) Act, 1987, and held as under: “On going through the changes, quoted above, made to Section 147 of the Act, we find that, prior to Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, re-opening could be done under above two conditions and fulfillment of the said conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make a back assessment, but in Section 147 of the Act [with effect from 1st April, 1989], they are given a go-by and only one condition has remained, viz., that where the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, confers jurisdiction to re-open the assessment. Therefore, post-1st April, 1989, power to re-open is much wider. However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words “reason to believe” failing which, we are afraid, Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to re-open assessments on the basis of “mere change of opinion”, which cannot be per se reason to re-open. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to re-assess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review; he has the power to re-assess. But re-assessment has to be based on fulfilment of certain pre-condition and if the concept of “change of opinion” is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of re-opening the assessment, review would take place. One must treat the concept of “change of opinion” as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. One must treat the concept of “change of opinion” as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1st April, 1989, the Assessing Officer has power to re-open, provided there is “tangible material” to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to Section 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted the words “reason to believe” but also inserted the word “opinion” in Section 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the Companies against omission of the words “reason to believe”, Parliament re-introduced the said expression and deleted the word “opinion” on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the Assessing Officer. We quote hereinbelow the relevant portion of Circular No.549 dated October 31, 1989 ([1990] 182 ITR (St.) 1, 29), which reads as follows: “7.2 Amendment made by the Amending Act, 1989, to reintroduce the expression `reason to believe' in Section 147.--A number of representations were received against the omission of the words `reason to believe' from Section 147 and their substitution by the `opinion' of the Assessing Officer. It was pointed out that the meaning of the expression, `reason to believe' had been explained in a number of court rulings in the past and was well settled and its omission from Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen past assessments on mere change of opinion. To allay these fears, the Amending Act, 1989, has again amended Section 147 to reintroduce the expression `has reason to believe' in place of the words `for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, is of the opinion'. Other provisions of the new Section 147, however, remain the same.” For the aforestated reasons, we see no merit in these civil appeals filed by the Department; hence, dismissed with no order as to costs.” 14. These words enabling the Assessing Authority to undertake the Re-assessment Proceedings, viz. Other provisions of the new Section 147, however, remain the same.” For the aforestated reasons, we see no merit in these civil appeals filed by the Department; hence, dismissed with no order as to costs.” 14. These words enabling the Assessing Authority to undertake the Re-assessment Proceedings, viz. that the 'reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief' on the basis of 'tangible material' to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income, are the conditions precedent for invoking Re-assessment Jurisdiction, and though the distinction between the two, viz. 'change of opinion' on the one side and 'reason to believe' on the other side is thin, it is definite and discernible. We do not find that the Tribunal, on the basis of the alleged reasons for reopening, wrongly found it to be a mere case of change of opinion or it has erred in arriving at such conclusion relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 15. Therefore, we do not find any substantial question of law arising for consideration in these appeals. The appeals filed by the Revenue therefore, deserve to be dismissed and accordingly the same are dismissed. No costs. Registry to forward a copy of this order to the Assessee forthwith.