JUDGMENT : Biren Vaishnav, J. 1. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is filed with a prayer to quash and set aside the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal dated 17.04.2015 passed in Review Application No.TEN/CS/5/2013 in Revision Application No.TEN/BS/179/91. 2. The facts in brief are as under: 2.1 The question pertains to agricultural land of Revenue Survey Nos.40, 51, 54, 55 and 58 of Block No.41 admeasuring 5-84-00 sq. meters situated at Andharwadi, Taluka: Vyara, District: Tapi. 2.2 The respondent no.1 filed a Tenancy Case No.47/77 before Mamlatdar, Vyara, claiming tenancy right against his brother Abhesinh. The Mamlatdar by his order dated 25.07.1977 declared him as tenant. The petitioner's father preferred Tenancy Appeal No.84 of 1977 before the Deputy Collector who vide his order dated 18.09.1978 rejected the appeal. On a revision preferred by the petitioners, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by its order dated 19.12.1979 quashed the orders below and remanded the matter to the learned Mamlatdar and ALT Vyara. 2.3 The Mamlatdar by his order dated 16.09.1989 in Tenancy Case No.70/B/1/85/89 declared the respondent no.1 to be a tenant of his real brother. 2.4 The petitioners filed Tenancy Appeal No.35 of 1990 and the Deputy Collector by his order dated 24.10.1990, allowed the appeal. The respondent no.1 preferred Revision Application No.TEN/BS/179/1991 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal under Section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. 2.5 The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by its order dated 11.12.2013 rejected the Revision of the respondent no.1 on merits. The respondent then filed a review being Review Application No.CS/5/2013 under Section 76, before another member and by the impugned order dated 17.04.2015 the Revision was allowed and the order of the Mamlatdar, Vyara, dated 16.09.1989 declaring the respondent no.1 as tenant was restored. 3. Mr. N.V. Gandhi learned advocate for the petitioners took me through the order of the Tribunal in the first round i.e. order dated 11.12.2013 and submitted that the Tribunal on legal interpretations of the term “family” under the Tenancy Act came to the conclusion that, both the petitioner and the respondent were members of the same family which was admitted and accordingly the order of the Deputy Collector dated 24.10.1990 was therefore rightly confirmed. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. Gandhi submitted that the Tribunal has seriously erred by misreading the definition of “to cultivate personally” as defined under sub-section (6) of section 2 of the Tenancy Act read with provisions of section 4(a) of the Tenancy Act. He further submitted that the Tribunal should have appreciated that the term “a member of the owner's family as defined under section 4 of the Tenancy Act means a person who is connected by blood of affinity and there is no reason why a family should not comprise not only of parents and children but other relatives also. He relied on the decision of this Court in case of Smt. Amtibai v. Patel Shankarbhai reported in AIR 1983 N.O.C. 84 (Guj) where the Court was pleased to hold that “Where an uncle in law of landlady was cultivating the land, such person being related to landlady by marriage is also a member of her family and consequently he cannot claim himself to be a deemed tenant. He further submitted that the Tribunal ought to have appreciated that the intention of the legislature was to exclude the members of the landholders' family like children, cousins and other descendants of common ancestor from claiming the benefit of section 4. The mere fact that there was separation between the members of the family would not alter the blood relationship arising out of biological propensity. It can never be extinguished by separation in property of status of joint family as blood is always thicker than water. He has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in case of Valand Mafatbhai Kashibhai v. Valand Vithalbhai Motibhai reported in 1994 (1) GCD 14 and submitted that in this case the cousin was claiming tenancy rights and in the facts of the present case, the real brother is claiming the tenancy rights and the question of not having joint estate would not arise as they are real brothers hailing from one branch. 5. Shri Gandhi submitted that the Tribunal would not have, in exercise of powers of review, set aside an order by exercising powers under Section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. He placed reliance on Section 17 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 and Sections 76 and Section 78 of the Tenancy Act. 5. Shri Gandhi submitted that the Tribunal would not have, in exercise of powers of review, set aside an order by exercising powers under Section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. He placed reliance on Section 17 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 and Sections 76 and Section 78 of the Tenancy Act. He relied on the following decisions to support his arguments: I. In case of Atulbhai Balabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in 1999 (2) G.L.H. 314 II. In case of Bhogilal M. Vaishnav v. State of Gujarat reported in 1994 (2) G.L.R. 1555 III. In case of Revandas Ranchhodbhai Rathod v. Jyotiben Wd/o. Rameshbhai Madhusudan Thakar & Ors. reported in 2011 (3) G.L.H. 1 IV. In case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Ors. reported in AIR 2013 SC 3301 6. He also relied on the decision of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No.18130 of 2014 in case of Sureshbhai Dullabhai Patel v. Ramnikbhai Ravjibhai Patel decided on 04.09.2015. 7. Mr.Maulin Raval learned Senior Advocate with Mr.Rajesh Dewal and Mr.Chintan Gandhi vehemently supported the order passed in review. He submitted that the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal dated 11.12.2013 was patently illegal, contrary to the provisions of Section 2(6) and Section 4 of the Tenancy Act. Mr.Raval would invite my attention to the chain of events in his reply at page 49 onwards and would submit that on two occasions the Mamlatdar had held the respondent to be a tenant, one in 1977 and in 1989 and the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal completely ignored this position. He submitted that there cannot be any restrictions in the exercise of powers of review at the hands of the Tribunal. Any judicial fora has an inherent right to correct its mistakes and orders and the Tribunal by the impugned order has done so. He took me through the memo of revision/review at page 66 and read out the grounds in support of the review. 8. In support of his submissions, Mr.Raval learned Senior Advocate relied on the following decisions: I. In case of S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka reported in 1993 (Supp 4) SCC 595 II. In case of Ram Kirpal v. Union of India and Anr. reported in 1998 (2) G.L.H. 54 III. 8. In support of his submissions, Mr.Raval learned Senior Advocate relied on the following decisions: I. In case of S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka reported in 1993 (Supp 4) SCC 595 II. In case of Ram Kirpal v. Union of India and Anr. reported in 1998 (2) G.L.H. 54 III. In case of ( Smt.) Chandramati D. Thakor v. Jayantilal Dahyalal Jani and another reported in 1996 (2) G.L.H. 1064 IV. In case of Revandas Ranchhodbhai Rathod v. Jyotiben Wd/o. Rameshbhai Madhusudan Thakar & Ors. reported in 2011 (3) G.L.H. 1 9. He would, based on these judgments, submit that mistakes is a valid reason to recall an order even when there are no rules framed. 10. Having considered the submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties, the following question of law arises for consideration of this Court i.e. whether the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal does have the power to review its own order once having considered such questions on the context of legal and factual aspects placed before it. 11. Before we discuss the case law, the relevant sections need to be reproduced which are as under: Section 17 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 “17. 11. Before we discuss the case law, the relevant sections need to be reproduced which are as under: Section 17 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 “17. Review of orders of Tribunal :- (1) The Tribunal may, either on its own motion or on the application of any party interested, and where the State Government is heard under Sec. 15 of the application by that Government, review its own decision or order in any case, and pass in reference thereto such order as it thinks just and proper : Provided that no such application made by any party shall be entertained, unless the Tribunal is satisfied that there has been the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of such party or could not be produced by him at the time when its decision was made, or that there has been some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason: Provided further, that no such decision or order shall be varied or revised, unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order.” Section 76 of the Tenancy Act (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 an application for revision may be made to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the said Act against any order of the Collector except an order under Section 32-P of an order in appeal against an order under sub-section (4) of Section 32-G on the following grounds only: (a) the order of the Collector was contrary to law; (b) that the Collector failed to determine some material issue of law; or (c) there was a substantial defect in following the procedure provided by this Act or that there has been failure to take evidence or error in appreciating important evidence which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. (2) In deciding applications under this Section, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal shall follow the procedure which may be prescribed by rules made under this Act after consultation with the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. (2) In deciding applications under this Section, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal shall follow the procedure which may be prescribed by rules made under this Act after consultation with the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. Section 78 of the Tenancy Act (1) The Collector in appeal and the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in appeal under section 75 and in revision under section 76 may confirm, modify or rescind the order in appeal or revision or its execution or may pass such other order as may seem legal and just in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) The orders of the Collector in appeal or of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal or of the State Government in appeal or revision shall be executed in the manner provided for the execution of the orders of the Mamlatdar and Tribunal under section 73. 12. In case of Bhogilal M. Vaishnav (supra), this Court held as under: “3. The moot question that arises for consideration is as to whether the Tribunal could have reviewed the earlier order, as sought to be done by it, under Sec. 17 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957. The Tribunal when moved for review by the respondent No. 2, initially made a preliminary order on 29-1- 1991, deciding to review the matter. The Tribunal found that if the appeal was not legally competent, the papers could have been returned for presentation to proper forum and there was no need to confirm the orders of the lower authorities. It will be noticed that the finding that the appeal was not legally competent was based on the facts established. The Tribunal had, earlier, considered the issue of ownership of land and found that the claim of the respondent No. 2 over the land could not be sustained on the ground of ownership and further found that this was a case of grant, pure and simple and therefore, the matter did not fall under the provision of Sec. 37(2) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code specified in the First Schedule to the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act. Therefore, the appeal could not be entertained by the Tribunal inasmuch as it has jurisdiction under Sec. 9 of that Act only in respect of the matters enumerated in the said Schedule. Therefore, the appeal could not be entertained by the Tribunal inasmuch as it has jurisdiction under Sec. 9 of that Act only in respect of the matters enumerated in the said Schedule. If the Tribunal at a later stage found fault in the papers not being returned then the question of review would have been confined only to the aspect of returning the papers. The Tribunal, however, did not confine the review application only to that aspect which was highlighted in its preliminary order dated 29-1-1991 when it decided to list the matter for final hearing for the purpose of reviewing the earlier decision. 4. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Tribunal was entitled to review its earlier decision on the ground of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason and, therefore, having once decided to review the matter it was open to the Tribunal to re-appreciate the entire evidence and to come to its own findings. The Tribunal indeed has having initially by its order dated 29-1-1991 opened up the door for review on the ground that the Tribunal ought to have returned the papers and need not have confirmed the orders of the Collector and the Deputy Collector while holding that the appeal did not lie, has embarked upon reappreciation of the entire evidence for coming to a different conclusion. A bare reading of the order of the Tribunal made earlier and the order made in review clearly discloses that the Tribunal has while reviewing the earlier order, virtually sat in appeal over it and reappreciated the entire evidence for coming to different findings. The Tribunal cannot under the guise of exercise of review jurisdiction under Sec. 17 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957 exercise an appellate power and do reappraisal of the entire evidence for coming to different conclusions purely upon appreciation of evidence. The power of review under Sec. 17 does not permit the Tribunal to act as a Court of appeal. All that the Tribunal can do is to correct patent errors or to exercise power for similar sufficient reasons. The Tribunal has, in the instant case, virtually usurped powers of an appellate forum and has reheard and redecided the matter. Such a course was not permissible to the Tribunal to adopt.” 13. All that the Tribunal can do is to correct patent errors or to exercise power for similar sufficient reasons. The Tribunal has, in the instant case, virtually usurped powers of an appellate forum and has reheard and redecided the matter. Such a course was not permissible to the Tribunal to adopt.” 13. In case of Atulbhai Balabhai Patel (supra), this Court has considered the question whether the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, while exercising powers of revision under section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, has the powers to review its own decision. The Court, held as under: “5.2 While exercising the powers of revision under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act, by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 76(2) of the Tenancy Act, the Tribunal has to follow the procedure prescribed by the Rules made under the Tenancy Act. Section 76 of the Tenancy Act also provides that the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in revision under Sec. 76 may confirm, modify or rescind the order in appeal or revision or in execution or may pass such other order as may seem legal and just in accordance with the provisions of the Tenancy Act. Similarly, the orders of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in revision under the Tenancy Act are required to be executed in the manner provided for execution of the orders of the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Land Tribunal. Thus, while exercising powers of revision under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act, the Tribunal is not exercising any of the powers under the Tribunal Act and, therefore, the power of review conferred by Sec. 17 of the Tribunal Act is not available to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal while deciding revision applications under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act. The Tribunal Act itself makes the distinction between the powers exercised by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal under the Tribunal Act and the very same Tribunal exercising the powers under the Tenancy Act. Section 19 of the Tenancy Act throws light on this distinction. The Tribunal Act itself makes the distinction between the powers exercised by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal under the Tribunal Act and the very same Tribunal exercising the powers under the Tenancy Act. Section 19 of the Tenancy Act throws light on this distinction. 5.3 Whenever the legislature has thought it fit to confer powers of review upon the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, it has provided so specifically and unequivocally, but the very fact that such power of review is not conferred on the Tribunal while exercising the revisional powers under the Tenancy Act is a clear indication that the Tribunal is not to have any power of review while deciding revision applications under the Tenancy Act. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal while exercising the appellate powers under the provisions of Sec. 36 of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 is vested with powers of review by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 36(3) of the said Act which confers upon the Tribunal all the powers of a Civil Appellate Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In absence of a similar provision in the Tenancy Act, it is obvious that the Tribunal exercising the powers of revision under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act has no power of review. The learned Counsel for the petitioners relied on the following decisions of the Apex Court : 1. AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1273, N. Chandramouli v. Chikkalakkaiah, 2. JT 1993 (3) Supreme Court 594, Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi v. The Speaker, 3. AIR 1972 Supreme Court 2522, Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, 4. AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1803 (1814), Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India, 5. AIR 1980 Supreme Court 674, M/s. Northern India Caterars (I) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, 6. AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1461, R. R. Verma v. Union of India. [6] On the other hand, Mr. A. J. Patel, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 8 (hereinafter referred to as “the respondents”) submitted as under: 6.1 While sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 9 confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to entertain and decide appeals from and revise orders of officers in respect of cases arising under the provisions of the enactments specified in the first schedule to the Act, sub-secs. (2) and (3) of Sec. 9 empower the State Government to add to or omit any of the entries in the first schedule. (2) and (3) of Sec. 9 empower the State Government to add to or omit any of the entries in the first schedule. Moreover, Sec. 12 of the Act provides that nothing contained in the Act shall affect any powers or functions of the Tribunal which may be conferred by or under any other law for the time-being in force to entertain and decide appeals, applications or revisions. Section 12 thus contains a provision which is in addition to the enactments specified in the first schedule. Hence, the order under review pending before the Tribunal was passed in accordance with the provisions contained in Sec. 9 read with Sec. 12 of the Act. 6.2 Moreover, Sec. 17 of the Act provides for review of orders of the Tribunal. The power to review its own decision cannot be confined to the decision rendered by the Tribunal only in respect of cases arising under the provisions of the enactments specified in the first schedule as Sec. 12 of the Act itself contemplates that the Tribunal may be conferred with the jurisdiction to hear appeals/revisions in respect of cases arising under the provisions of the other Acts as well. The Tenancy Act, Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act and Gujarat Devasthan Inam Abolition Act and similar other tenure abolition Acts confer upon the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal appellate and/or revisional jurisdiction. The revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal in respect of cases under the Tenancy Act is conferred by the provisions of Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act. The opening words in Sec. 76(1) of the Act, therefore, clearly contemplate that the jurisdiction of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which was otherwise restricted by Sec. 9(1) of the Tribunal Act to the enactments in the first schedule stands expanded by the provisions contained in Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act read with Sec. 12 of the Tribunal Act. This revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act is thus clearly referable to Sec. 12 of the Tribunal Act. This revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act is thus clearly referable to Sec. 12 of the Tribunal Act. Hence, the Legislature contemplated, while conferring the revisional jurisdiction on the Tribunal under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act, that the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act would be as wide as the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Sec. 9 of the Tribunal Act and, therefore, the power of review specifically conferred on the Tribunal under Sec. 17 of the Tribunal Act also is available while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act. The language used by the Legislature in Sec. 17 of the Tribunal Act specifically uses the words “its own decision or order in any case” are wide enough to embrace the decisions rendered by the Tribunal under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act as well. 6.3 Even otherwise Regulation 55 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Regulations, 1951, framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 14 of the Tribunal Act provides for applicability of Civil Procedure Code in matters not provided for in the said Regulations. Hence, even if the power of review is not available under Sec. 17 of the Tribunal Act, the power of review is certainly available to the Tribunal through the provisions of Sec. 104 and Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. [7] Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, this Court finds considerable substance in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the power of review under Sec. 17 of the Tribunal Act is available only in respect of cases arising under the enactments specified in the first schedule to the Tribunal Act. The provisions of Sec. 9 of the Tribunal Act clearly provide that the powers being conferred on the Tribunal to entertain and decide appeals and revisions under the Tribunal Act are only in respect of the enactments specified in the first schedule to the Tribunal Act. Admittedly, the Tenancy Act is not included in the first schedule to the Tribunal Act. Hence, the Tribunal while exercising the powers under the Tribunal Act, cannot deal with the cases arising under the Tenancy Act. Admittedly, the Tenancy Act is not included in the first schedule to the Tribunal Act. Hence, the Tribunal while exercising the powers under the Tribunal Act, cannot deal with the cases arising under the Tenancy Act. Even under the provisions of Sec. 12 of the Tribunal Act, the Tribunal would not be in a position to entertain appeals or revisions under the Tenancy Act since the Tenancy Act is not one of the enactments in the first schedule. All that Sec. 12 of the Act does is merely to save the powers of the legislature to confer power on the Tribunal to decide appeals/revisions arising from orders under other enactments and that is how the power to hear revision applications under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act is conferred on the Tribunal by specific provisions of Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act. In other words, what Sec. 12 of the Tribunal Act does is merely to save the powers or functions of the Tribunal conferred upon it or which may be conferred upon it by or under any other law to entertain and decide appeals/revisions or other proceedings. Section 12 of the Tribunal Act does not add to the powers or functions of the Tribunal under any other law. Hence, if the Tenancy Act does not confer any power of review upon the Tribunal while exercising the revisional power under Sec. 76 of the Act, Sec. 12 of the Tribunal Act cannot be invoked to give wider meaning to Sec. 17 of the Tribunal Act. The words “the Tribunal may ........ review its own decision or order in any case.......” merely mean that the Tribunal can review its own decision or order in any case arising under any enactment in the first schedule to the Tribunal Act. If the legislature intended that the Tribunal exercising revisional power under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act could exercise all the powers conferred upon the Tribunal under the Tribunal Act, the wording of sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act would have been quite different. The legislature could and would have simply provided that in deciding applications under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal shall exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as are conferred on and prescribed for the Tribunal under Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957. The legislature could and would have simply provided that in deciding applications under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal shall exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as are conferred on and prescribed for the Tribunal under Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957. It is to be noted that the power of review such as one conferred by the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. Is a substantive power and is not a mere matter of procedure. The provisions of the Tenancy Act do not confer any such power of review on the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The revisional power of the Tribunal under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act itself is narrowly circumscribed. The Tribunal is not to exercise any original jurisdiction, but it merely sits in revision over the orders of the Collector, if the order is contrary to law or if the Collector failed to determine some material issue of law or if there was a substantial defect in procedure or there was failure to take evidence or there was error in appreciating important evidence which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. The legislature does not, therefore, appear to have intended to confer further powers as contained in the first proviso to Sec. 17 of the Tribunal Act which contains grounds of review, analogous to the grounds of review under Order 47, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. Hence, the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents that the power of review of the Tribunal exercising the revisional powers under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act must be inferred as arising out of the provisions of Sec. 17 read with Sec. 12 of the Tribunal Act cannot be accepted. [8] However, that is not the end of the matter as the question posed in this petition must be treated to have been covered by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Kirpal v. Union of India & Anr., 1998 (3) GLR 1892 . It has been held in the said decision that “as a general rule, a judgment, decree or final order once drawn up and signed, cannot subsequently be altered, varied or amended in any manner by the Court or Tribunal which pronounced it. However, there is a well recognized exception to the said general rule. It has been held in the said decision that “as a general rule, a judgment, decree or final order once drawn up and signed, cannot subsequently be altered, varied or amended in any manner by the Court or Tribunal which pronounced it. However, there is a well recognized exception to the said general rule. It is a maxim of law that an act of a Court shall prejudice no man - actus curiae neminem gravabit. Every Tribunal has an inherent jurisdiction, apart from statutory jurisdiction to correct any error committed by itself, It can invoke such jurisdiction and can exercise it in an appropriate case when its conscience is aroused and if it considers that without the exercise of such powers, the ends of justice would be frustrated.” The aforesaid ratio has been laid down by the Division Bench after considering the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of J. K. Synthetics v. Collector of Central Excise, 1996 (6) SCC 92 , Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde & Ors. v. Mallika Arjun B. Tirimela, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 137 and Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Ors., 1980 (Suppl.) SCC 420 as well as the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S. Nagaraj & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., JT 1993 (5) Supreme Court 27. It is further required to be noted that the Division Bench has further made a distinction between substantive review and procedural review. The Division Bench has held that the power of procedural review is inherent in every Tribunal even in the absence of any statutory provision and that it is only for substantive review that a specific statutory provision is required to be inserted in the statute under which the Tribunal is set up or is exercising jurisdiction. [9] It is, therefore, required to be clarified that the expression “review” is used in the two distinct senses, namely, (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a Court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. When a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justiciae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal. The principle that the power to review must be conferred by statute either specially or by necessary implication is inapplicable to decisions of a Judicial Tribunal which is supposed to do complete justice to the parties before it. To extend the principle to decisions rendered by a Judicial Tribunal would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. This general principle is, of course, subject to the rider that such power of even procedural review may be excluded if there is any indication in the statute contrary to the aforesaid general principle. Having examined the scheme of the Tenancy Act, it is clear that there is nothing contrary to the aforesaid general principle to exclude the inherent power of the Tribunal for procedural review. [10] In view of the above discussion, it must be held that while exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 76 of the Tenancy Act, the Tribunal has the power of procedural review which inheres in every Tribunal, but it does not have the power of substantive review. The Tribunal, therefore, cannot rehear the matter on merits.” 14. Even a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Revandas Ranchhodbhai Rathod (supra) after considering the entire case law on the subject of review held as under: “6. However, in the present appeal, learned counsel Mr. A.J. Patel appearing with learned counsel Mr. Bhavir G. Patel has raised the following legal issues for our considerations. As these issues are important, we have thought fit to examine them in detail. The principal contentions raised on behalf of the appellants are as under:- (i) Gujarat Revenue Tribunal while exercising the powers of revision under Section 76 of the Tenancy Act is not exercising any of the powers under the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act and, therefore, the power of review conferred by Section 17 of the Tribunal Act is not available to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal while deciding the revision applications under Section 76 of the Tenancy Act. It is submitted that the Tribunal Act itself makes the distinction between the powers exercised by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal under the Tribunal Act and the very same Tribunal exercising the powers under the Tenancy Act. (ii) The second contention raised is that whenever the Legislature has thought fit to confer powers of review upon the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, it has provided so, specifically and unequivocally, but the very fact that such power of review is not conferred on the Tribunal while exercising the revisional powers under the Tenancy Act is a clear indication that the Tribunal is not to have any power of review while deciding the revision applications under the Tenancy Act. (iii) The third contention is that the Tribunal is constituted under the Tribunal Act. Although the Tribunal Act confers the power of review, by virtues of power under Section 77 of the Act, the said power is available only when the Tribunal exercises the jurisdiction in respect of the cases arising under the provisions of the enactments specified in the First Schedule to the Tribunal Act. The Tenancy Act is not included in the First Schedule to the Tribunal Act, and therefore, the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal while exercising the powers under the Tribunal Act, cannot deal with the cases arising under he Tenancy Act. It is only on account of the specific provisions of Section 76 of the Tenancy Act that the Tribunal is vested with the jurisdiction to decide the revision application under the Tenancy Act and, therefore, the power of review conferred by Section 17 of the Tribunal Act is not available to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal while exercising the power under Section 76 of the Tenancy Act. (iv) The last contention of the learned counsel, which, according to us, deserves to be considered closely, is assuming for a moment that Section 17 of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act confers power upon the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal to review its own orders, the power is only that of procedural review and not substantive review. It is submitted that the Revenue Tribunal is empowered to review its judgment or order to merely correct procedural technicalities on the principle that an act of Court shall prejudice no men – actus curiae nemi nen gravabit. Elaborating further, counsel submits that the Revenue Tribunal has an inherent jurisdiction apart from statutory jurisdiction to correct any error committed by itself. Elaborating further, counsel submits that the Revenue Tribunal has an inherent jurisdiction apart from statutory jurisdiction to correct any error committed by itself. It can invoke such jurisdiction and can exercise it in an appropriate case when its conscience is aroused and if it considers that without exercise of such powers the ends of justice would be frustrated. Learned counsel submits that there is no power of substantive review and therefore the Tribunal cannot respondent-open the case and decide it on merits. Counsel further submits that in the present case the entire matter was reopened by the Tribunal and was heard on merits by reviewing its earlier judgment and order. 10. In paragraph 12, the final conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge is as under:- “12. In view of the above discussion, it is held that while the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal exercising the powers of revision under Section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 does not have the power of reviewing its own decision on the basis of any statutory provisions contained in the said Act or in the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, the Tribunal does have the inherent power of procedural review as explained by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Kirpal vs.Union of India & Anr. 39(3) GLR 1892.” 11. Now, so far as the above referred judgment is concerned, the ratio of the same makes it abundantly clear that Gujarat Revenue Tribunal exercising the powers of revision under Section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 does not have the power of reviewing its own decision on the basis of any statutory provision contained in the said Act or in the Bombay Land Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957, but the Tribunal does have inherent power of procedural review. We are in complete agreement with the principle laid down in the aforesaid judgment referred to above of this Court.” 15. Even after considering the decisions of the Supreme Court and considering the scope of review, what was held was that under the Bombay Tenancy Act, the Tribunal has no powers of review. 16. What is therefore evident on reading the judgments cited by both sides is that the expression 'review' has two perceptions. One is the procedural review and the other is review on merits. 16. What is therefore evident on reading the judgments cited by both sides is that the expression 'review' has two perceptions. One is the procedural review and the other is review on merits. It is true that when a review is sought due to a procedural defect or an inadvertent error such power infers on the Court or the Tribunal. What is evident in the facts of the case is what was filed by the respondent no.1 before the Tribunal was an application under Section 76 of the Tenancy Act. Therefore, though the Tribunal would have an inherent power of review, it does not have the power to substantively review a matter and rehear the matter on merits. 17. On perusal of the original order dated 11.12.2013 passed by the Tribunal and the impugned order dated 17.04.2015, what is evident is that the Tribunal has reconsidered the issue on merits and not on the aspect of a procedural error. This, the Tribunal could not have done, in view of the unequivocal position of law in the case of Atulbhai Balabhai Patel (supra) and in the case of Revandas Ranchhodbhai Rathod (supra). This Court while considering the case in the decision of Sureshbhai Dullabhai Patel (supra) has held as under: “10. Though as per decision of this Court rendered in the case of Atulbhai Balabhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat and Others reported in 1999(2) GLH 314 , the powers of the Tribunal to review its decision are on very limited grounds as regards procedural irregularities and not to rehear on merits, however even without considering such aspect of the matter, the Court finds that the impugned order made in the review application preferred by respondent Nos.1 and 2 has gone beyond the limits set for exercising the review powers.” 18. In view of the clear legal position as aforesaid, the order dated 17.04.2015 passed in Review Application No.TEN/CS/5/2013 in Revision Application No.TEN/BS/179/91 is quashed and set aside. The petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.