JUDGMENT : Manoj Misra, Suresh Kumar Gupta, JJ. 1. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners; Sri Deepak Mishra, the learned A.G.A., for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3; Sri Abhishek Srivastava for the respondent No. 4; and have perused the record. 2. The instant petition seeks quashing of the first information report (in short F.I.R.) dated 20.10.2015 which has been lodged at P.S. Kavi Nagar, District- Ghaziabad as Case Crime No. 1343 of 2015, under Sections 420, 407, 468, 471, 406 and 120B, I.P.C. 3. The impugned first information report has been lodged by an authorized representative of Edelweiss Housing Finance Ltd. (respondent No. 4) against the petitioners and one Smt. Geeta Devi (non-petitioner). 4. The allegations in the first information report are : that Edelweiss Housing Finance Ltd. (for short informant-company) is a registered company doing business in financing, housing loans, etc.; that in the month of December, 2012/January, 2013, the accused-petitioners, some of whom are directors in M/s. Pooja Quench Distributors India Pvt. Ltd. (petitioner No. 1), applied to the-informant-company for a housing loan to purchase a property i.e., House No. KF 41, Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad by creation of mortgage thereon; that in connection therewith, property papers of the aforementioned property, which was stated to be owned by Geeta Devi (co-accused-non-petitioner), were shown to the informant-company to indicate that the said property was allotted and leased to Devendra Kumar Jain (allottee) by Improvement Trust (currently Ghaziabad Development Authority), vide lease deed dated 2.2.1977, which was assigned to Smt. Geeta Devi, vide instrument dated 19.7.1978, following which, Geeta Devi obtained freehold rights from Ghaziabad Development Authority vide instrument dated 22.3.2005; that by disclosing that the said property has been purchased by the petitioners from Geeta Devi, vide sale-deed dated 8.3.2013, and by depositing papers thereof, loan of Rs. 3 crores, to finance the purchase, was obtained from the informant-company, which was disbursed by the informant-company by issuing bank draft of Rs. 3 crores, to finance the purchase, was obtained from the informant-company, which was disbursed by the informant-company by issuing bank draft of Rs. 3 crores in favour of Geeta Devi; that after paying few installments, in between April, 2013 and October, 2013, the accused-petitioners defaulted in payment of the installments; that, consequently, the informant-company tried to contact the borrowers and when it failed in its efforts, an officer of the informant-company was deputed for enquiry/inspection, whereupon, it was found that the property wore locks of I.D.B.I. Bank; that, when a detailed enquiry was made, it was found that the said property had been purchased by a person named Rajesh Singh, who had borrowed loan from I.D.B.I. Bank against mortgage of the property and, as he had defaulted in repayment of the loan, the I.D.B.I. Bank had taken possession thereof; that upon further enquiry, it was found that the purchaser company (M/s. Puja Quench Distributors Pvt. Ltd-petitioner No. 1) through its Director (Sunder Singh-petitioner No. 2) and other co-purchasers, namely, Smt. Kamlesh Singh (petitioner No. 3) and Rajendra Kumar (petitioner No. 4) for the purpose of obtaining loan facility had set up an impostor of Geeta Devi as also fabricated papers to show execution of sale-deed in their favour. Thus, in pith and substance, the allegations in the impugned first information report are that by setting up forged and fabricated documents, loan was obtained from a finance company with an intent to defraud the finance company. 5. The petitioners have not disputed that the sale-deed, which was deposited with the informant, was a forged and fabricated document and that it was executed by an impostor of Geeta Devi. Rather, the case of the petitioners is that they are innocent and they had no reason to suspect that their vendor is an impostor of Geeta Devi. In that regard, it would be apposite to reproduce paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of the writ petition, which are extracted below: "13. That petitioner was accosted by the accused, father-in-law Bhan Singh Nagar, brother-in-law Ved Prakash Nagar and Manoj Nagar all residents of KI 140 Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad, who are all related as in-laws to his younger brother Rajkumar with the proposal for the sale of house and property located at KF 41 Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad. 14. That petitioner was accosted by the accused, father-in-law Bhan Singh Nagar, brother-in-law Ved Prakash Nagar and Manoj Nagar all residents of KI 140 Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad, who are all related as in-laws to his younger brother Rajkumar with the proposal for the sale of house and property located at KF 41 Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad. 14. That the aforementioned accused presented one imposter a lady Smt. Geeta Devi as the owner of the property at KF 41 Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad which she wanted to sell and further claimed that they had advanced some amount to this lady aforementioned. 15. That the petitioners had no reason to suspect all that was falsely projected before him as the accused were closely related to his younger brother." 6. However, the petition has not been pressed on that ground. This petition has been pressed by claiming that the police after registration of the first information report had investigated the matter and had submitted a final report on 9.11.2015; that to the final report, a protest petition was filed by the informant, upon which a direction was issued by the concerned Magistrate for further investigation; that pursuant to the order for further investigation, the matter was investigated and the police, yet again, submitted a final report on 30.11.2017; that on the said final report, again, by order dated 18.9.2018, the court of A.C.J.M.-VIth, Ghaziabad, upon protest by the informant, rejected the final report and remanded the matter for further investigation; that, in between, on 16.11.2018, the petitioners, as borrowers, have entered into a settlement/compromise with the informant (creditor) and, by now, abiding the terms of the settlement, borrowers have paid off the dues therefore, as the informant-company is not interested in pursuing the matter, the first information report should be quashed. 7. From the averments made in paragraph 9 of the petition, it appears that pursuant to the order of the concerned Magistrate, dated 18.9.2018, directing further investigation, the investigation is in progress. Interestingly, neither the order directing further, investigation has been brought on record nor it has been challenged in this petition. It has also not been urged before us that the said order has been challenged in any proceeding and that it has been stayed or set aside. 8. Interestingly, neither the order directing further, investigation has been brought on record nor it has been challenged in this petition. It has also not been urged before us that the said order has been challenged in any proceeding and that it has been stayed or set aside. 8. On 18.4.2019, Sri Abhishek Srivastava, who had appeared for the respondent No. 4, had stated before the court that he would have no objection if the impugned first information report is quashed. But he, however, sought time to file an affidavit. 9. Pursuant to the order dated 18.4.2019, Sri Abhishek Srivastava, Advocate, has filed an affidavit of Sri Ragvendra Singh, Law Officer/Authorised representative of the informant-company, stating that, as per the terms and conditions of settlement entered by the parties, Rs.1.5 crores has been received, as per schedule, towards full satisfaction of the informant-company. In paragraph 7 of that affidavit, it is stated that since the parties have not only arrived at a settlement but also complied with the terms and conditions of the settlement dated 16.11.2018, the informant-company does not want to prosecute the petitioners any further. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners, by placing reliance on decisions of the Apex Court in Manoj Sharma v. State : 2008 (16) SCC 1 ; Central Bureau of Investigation, ACB, Mumbai v. Narendra Lal Jain and others : (2014) 5 SCC 364 : 2014 (1) ACR 1125 (SC) and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another : (2012) 10 SCC 303 , has submitted that in view of compromise between the parties, the first information report for offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471, 34 and 120B, I.P.C. can and ought to be quashed even though the offences might be non-compoundable. 11. Learned A.G.A. has submitted that cases of economic offences or bank fraud or fraud relating to financial institutions stand on a different footing as they have an impact on the society at large and, therefore, neither the F.I.R. nor the proceedings in pursuance thereof can be quashed on the basis of compromise between immediately affected parties. In such matters the proceeding would have to be brought to its logical conclusion as per law. In such matters the proceeding would have to be brought to its logical conclusion as per law. He has further submitted that, in the instant case, the petitioners have not disputed the position that the sale-deed was obtained from an impostor of the owner and the same was used for creating a mortgage to obtain loan from a public limited company. It was urged that though it may be true that the informant-company might have entered into a settlement with the borrower but who set up the impostor; who was behind the fraud; as to why funds were released without proper verification of the documents; whether original documents were at all there, if so, whether they were checked, are all issues which concern the society at large, inasmuch as the informant is a public limited company, where members of public must have subscribed to its capital, and there may be lenders lending there money to it. He submitted that such financial frauds have a cascading effect on the economy of the nation and destroys faith in the financial system. He has thus submitted that this is not a case where the first information report or the consequential investigation should be quashed on the basis of compromise between immediately affected parties. In support of his submission, the learned A.G.A. has placed reliance on decisions of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra through C.B.I, v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi and others, (2014) 15 SCC 29 ; and in Gopakumar B. Nair v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, (2014) 5 SCC 800 : 2014 (2) ACR 1712 (SC). He has thus prayed that the petition be dismissed and the investigation be allowed to come to its logical conclusion. 12. We have considered the rival submissions and have perused the record carefully. 13. A perusal of the record including the pleading of the writ petitioners would reflect that even the petitioners do not dispute that the sale-deed which was submitted for obtaining loan was a false document and was executed by an impostor. Though it has not been brought to our notice as to why, earlier, final report was submitted as also why further investigation was directed by the concerned Magistrate but, what is clear is that, the order of further investigation is operating. Though it has not been brought to our notice as to why, earlier, final report was submitted as also why further investigation was directed by the concerned Magistrate but, what is clear is that, the order of further investigation is operating. The only question therefore, that remains for us to examine, is whether on the basis of a private settlement between borrower and the creditor, the investigation on the first information report, which discloses commission of non-compoundable offences, relating to forgery and setting up of forged documents to obtain loan from a public limited finance company, can be quashed. 14. The issue as to when a non-compound able offence can be quashed on the basis of a compromise had been an issue engaging attention of the courts time and again. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Gian Singh's case (supra) had laid down law in that regard, as found in paragraph 61 of the report, which is extracted below: "61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or F.I.R. or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.;(i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil favour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above questions is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." 15. From above extract, it is clear that before exercising extraordinary power to quash the F.I.R. or the proceeding, relating to a non-compoundable offence, on the basis of a compromise, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime so as to ascertain whether it has serious impact on society. 16. From above extract, it is clear that before exercising extraordinary power to quash the F.I.R. or the proceeding, relating to a non-compoundable offence, on the basis of a compromise, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime so as to ascertain whether it has serious impact on society. 16. In cases relating to financial fraud, particularly, where forged papers are set up for obtaining loan facility; and those relating to prevention of corruption matters, the Apex Court had been consistent in its view that such matters affect the society at large. In this regard, it would be worthwhile to notice the decision of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra through C.B.I. v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi and others (supra) where it has been observed as follows: "26. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view. Be it stated, that availing of money from a nationalised bank in the manner, as alleged by "the investigating agency, vividly exposits fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as narrated in the charge-sheet cannot be put in the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it has immense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handling of finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of these kind of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominantingly of civil character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a hazard in the financial interest of the society. The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation. The cleverness which has been skillfully contrived, if the allegations are true, has a serious consequence. A crime of this nature, in our view, would definitely fall in the category of offences which travel far ahead of personal or private wrong. It has the potentiality to usher in economic crisis. Its implications have its own seriousness, for it creates a concavity in the solemnity that is expected in financial transactions. It is not such a case where one can pay the amount and obtain a "no due certificate" and enjoy the benefit of quashing of the criminal proceeding on the hypostasis that nothing more remains to be done. Its implications have its own seriousness, for it creates a concavity in the solemnity that is expected in financial transactions. It is not such a case where one can pay the amount and obtain a "no due certificate" and enjoy the benefit of quashing of the criminal proceeding on the hypostasis that nothing more remains to be done. The collective interest of which the court is the guardian cannot be a silent or a mute spectator to allow the proceedings to be withdrawn, or for that matter yield to the ingenuous dexterity of the accused persons to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 of the Code and quash the proceeding. It is not legally permissible. The court is expected to be on guard to these kinds of adroit moves. The High Court, we humbly remind, should have dealt with the matter keeping in mind that in these kind of litigations the accused when perceives a tiny gleam of success, readily invokes the inherent jurisdiction for quashing of the criminal proceeding. The court's principal duty,- at that juncture, should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of allegations and the crux of the settlement. It is the experience of the Judge comes to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and courageous prudence. As we find in the case at hand the learned single Judge has not taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts in proper perspective and quashed the criminal proceeding. The said quashment neither helps to secure the ends of justice nor does it prevent the abuse of the process of the court nor can it be also said that as there is a settlement no evidence will come on record and there will be remote chance of conviction. Such a finding in our view would be difficult to record. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the social interest would be on peril and the prosecuting agency, in these circumstances, cannot be treated as an alien to the whole case. Ergo, we have no other option but to hold that the order of the High Court is wholly indefensible." 17. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the social interest would be on peril and the prosecuting agency, in these circumstances, cannot be treated as an alien to the whole case. Ergo, we have no other option but to hold that the order of the High Court is wholly indefensible." 17. Likewise, in Gopakumar B. Nair's case (supra), by taking a similar view, a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court had refused to quash the proceedings against a borrower on account of alleged settlement with the Bank upon finding that the accused had also been charged for commission of substantive offence under Section 471, I.P.C. In that regard, it would be useful to reproduce paragraph 14 of the judgment, as reported, which is extracted below: "The aforesaid principle of law may now be applied to the facts of the present case. At the very outset a detailed narration of the charges against the accused-appellant has been made. The appellant has been charged with the offence of criminal conspiracy to commit the offence under Section 13(1)(d). He is also substantively charged under Section 420 (compoundable with the leave of the court) and Section 471 (non-compoundable). A careful consideration of the facts of the case would indicate that unlike in Nikhil Merchant (supra) no conclusion can be reached that the substratum of the charges against the accused-appellant in the present case is one of cheating nor are the facts similar to those in Narendra Lal Jain (supra) where the accused was charged under Section 120B read with Section 420, I.P.C. only. The offences are certainly more serious; they are not private in nature. The charge of conspiracy is to commit offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The accused has also been charged for commission of the substantive offence under Section 471, I.P.C. Though the amounts due have been paid the same is under a private settlement between the parties unlike in Nikhil Merchant (supra) and Narendra Lal Jain (supra) where the compromise was a part of the decree of the court. There is no acknowledgement on the part of the bank of the exoneration of the criminal liability of the accused-appellant unlike the terms of compromise decree in the aforesaid two cases. There is no acknowledgement on the part of the bank of the exoneration of the criminal liability of the accused-appellant unlike the terms of compromise decree in the aforesaid two cases. In the totality of the facts stated above, if the High Court has taken the view that the exclusion spelt out in Gian Singh (supra) (para 61) applies to the present case and on that basis had come to the conclusion that the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. should not be exercised to quash the criminal case against the accused, we cannot find any justification to interfere with the said decision." 18. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. Jagjit Singh, (2013) 10 SCC 686 : 2014 (1) ACR 179 (SC), a first information report was registered against Director of Company and Officers of Indian Overseas Bank on allegations that the accused obtained loan for his company against security on forged/fabricated documents and Indian Overseas Bank including its officers and managers helped him in obtaining such loan. Later, the borrower settled the dispute with Indian Overseas Bank and paid the amount, pursuant to the order passed by Debt Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta. By giving reference of the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused moved an application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. before the High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground that in view of the alleged amicable settlement between the parties, the proceedings were liable to be quashed. The High Court quashed the proceedings against which the Central Bureau of Investigation filed an appeal before the Apex Court. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order passed by the High Court, the Apex Court observed that the offences when committed in relation with Banking activities, including offences under Section 420/471, I.P.C., have harmful effect on the public and threaten the well being of the society. It was observed that one may say that the bank is the victim in such cases but, in fact, the society in general, including customers of the Bank is the sufferer. 19. Similarly, in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Maninder Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 389 : 2015 (3) ACR 3106 (SC), the Apex Court, in paragraph 16, had observed as follows: "16. The allegation against the respondent is "forgery" for the purpose of cheating and use of forged documents as genuine in order to embezzle the public money. 19. Similarly, in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Maninder Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 389 : 2015 (3) ACR 3106 (SC), the Apex Court, in paragraph 16, had observed as follows: "16. The allegation against the respondent is "forgery" for the purpose of cheating and use of forged documents as genuine in order to embezzle the public money. After facing such serious charges of forgery, the respondent wants the proceedings to be quashed on account of settlement with the bank. The development in means of communication, science and technology etc. have led to an enormous increase in economic crimes viz. phishing, ATM frauds etc. which are being committed by intelligent but devious individuals involving huge sums of public or Government money. These are actually public wrongs or crimes committed against society and the gravity and magnitude attached to these offences is concentrated at public at large." 20. At this stage, it may be noticed that in the decision of Central Bureau of Investigation, ACB, Mumbai, Narendra Lal Jain (supra), on which reliance has been placed by the petitioner, the Apex Court had approved quashing of the proceeding by the High Court on the basis of settlement as there was no allegation of using a forged document for the purpose of obtaining loan. The decision in Narendra Lal Jain's case (supra) was considered and distinguished in Gopakumar B. Naifs case (supra) by observing that in Narendra Lal Jain's case (supra), the accused was charged for offences punishable under Section 120B read with Section 420, I.P.C. only and there was no charge of an offence punishable under Section 471, I.P.C. 21. The question therefore, that now arises for our consideration is whether the facts giving rise to the impugned F.I.R. reflects a private dispute between borrower and the creditor or it has larger ramification that affects the society at large. If we hold that such transaction would have affect on the society then, on the basis of private settlement between borrower and creditor, the first information report cannot be quashed. 22. To answer the above question, we would have to analyze the thrust of the allegations made in the impugned first information report. If we hold that such transaction would have affect on the society then, on the basis of private settlement between borrower and creditor, the first information report cannot be quashed. 22. To answer the above question, we would have to analyze the thrust of the allegations made in the impugned first information report. The thrust of the allegations is that the borrowers had set up a false document for the purpose of taking loan from a public limited housing finance company and, after payment of few installments, they committed default and, when it was inquired, it was found that the property belonging to someone else was mortgaged by setting up a false document. The first information report was lodged in the year 2015 whereas the settlement between the parties came in the year 2018 much after the order of the Magistrate directing further investigation in the matter. 23. Whether the aforesaid transaction has potential to have an impact on the society at large would have to be examined with reference to the manner in which a- finance company functions. 24. The business of a public limited finance company, as is the case here, is ordinarily run by borrowing funds from open market and by subscription of its shares by members of the public. In a public limited company, the shareholders and the creditors put their money to run its business. Finance companies may also generate finances by taking deposits from members of public. Therefore, if a finance company is defrauded, the impact of its financial morass would be on the public at large and such impact may shake the confidence of the public in the financial system. 25. In view of the above, keeping in mind the law laid down by the Apex Court noticed above, we are of the considered view that an act of defrauding a public limited finance company by setting up forged papers, is an act which has potential to affect the society at large and, therefore, a criminal case based on such a transaction cannot be quashed on the basis of settlement or compromise. 26. A fortiori the prayer of the petitioners to quash the first information report and the consequential investigation, cannot be accepted. The petition is dismissed. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations made in the impugned F.I.R.