JUDGMENT : R.M. CHHAYA, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and award dated 08.12.2011 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux), Kachchh at Bhuj in MACP No. 950 of 1996, the original claimants have preferred this appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). 2. The following facts emerge from the record of the appeal as well as the original record and proceedings of the claim petition - 2.1 One Shri Jagatsinh Tapubha Jadeja was travelling from village Tara to Anjar in Maruti car bearing registration No. GJ-12-B-9417 on 24.10.1996 at about 10.00 hrs. As the record shows, at about 10.00 hrs, when the car reached near village Kukma, a truck bearing registration No. GQY 4559 came from the other side being driven in rash and negligent manner in excessive speed and as alleged in the claim petition, it came from the wrong side and collided with the Maruti car because of which the Maruti car was dragged with the truck for some distance and thereafter the truck got turtled on its wrong side. The deceased Jagatsinh Tapubha Jadeja received serious injuries and died on the spot. It was the case of the original claimants that the deceased was about 28 years old and was working as Police Constable and had income of Rs. 2,810/- per month. The appellants preferred claim petition under section 166 of the Act and claimed compensation of Rs. 10,00,000/- and thereafter amended the claim to Rs. 35 lakhs. The original claimants also preferred an application under section 163A of the Act by filing separate application being exhibit 6 in the claim petition. The application so filed under section 163A of the Act was heard and allowed and the Tribunal was pleased to award compensation of Rs.3,91,660/- with interest at the rate of 15% p.a. by judgment and order dated 30.07.1997. After the said award passed under section 163A of the Act below application exhibit 6, the insurance company deposited the awarded amount before the Tribunal on 24.02.1998 and the same was disbursed amongst the appellants as per the judgment dated 30.07.1997 and thus the amount of compensation as awarded under section 163A came to be paid to the applicants. Issues were framed as regards negligence below exhibit 25 by the Tribunal. Issues were framed as regards negligence below exhibit 25 by the Tribunal. The appellants thereafter, filed an application being exhibit 32 with a prayer that they may be permitted to proceed with the petition under section 166 of the Act and that they were ready to give undertaking to give credit of the amount awarded to them as compensation in the claim petition under section 163A of the Act. The Tribunal permitted to so vide order dated 20.03.2010. 2.2 The appellant No.1, wife of the deceased, was examined at exhibit 42 and she also filed further affidavit at exhibit 49 as regards last salary slip of the deceased. The Tribunal formulated points to the effect that whether the claimants would be entitled to amount of compensation under Section 166 of the Act after having obtained compensation under section 163A of the Act and after hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties, by the impugned judgment and award, was pleased to dismiss the claim petition under section 166 of the Act. Being aggrieved the said judgment and award, the present appeal is filed by the original claimants. 3. Heard Mr. Jenil M. Shah, learned advocate for the appellants and Mr. Maulik J. Shelat, learned advocate for respondent no.3 Insurance Company. Though served, no one appears for the other respondents 4. Mr. Shah, learned advocate appearing for the appellants contended that the order passed below exhibit 32 has become final and that the award passed by the Tribunal dated 20.03.2010 under section 163A was an interim order and therefore the Tribunal has committed an error in rejecting the claim petition under section 166 of the Act. It was contended that the Tribunal has overlooked the fact that the Tribunal itself allowed the trial of the claim petition under section 166 of the Act and thereafter oral evidence was adduced at exhibit 42 and exhibit 49 with cross-examination as well as documentary evidence at exhibits 50 and 51 and therefore, the Tribunal ought to have examined the claim petition under section 166 of the Act independently and therefore, the judgment and award rejecting the claim petition under section 166 of the Act is erroneous. It was further contended by Mr. Shah that the Tribunal has wrongly relied upon the ratio laid down in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Dhanbai Kanji Gadhvi & Ors. It was further contended by Mr. Shah that the Tribunal has wrongly relied upon the ratio laid down in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Dhanbai Kanji Gadhvi & Ors. reported in 2011 (2) GLR 1534 and the said judgment is not applicable to the present case and the Tribunal has not proceeded further as per the position of law as existed at the relevant point of time. Relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of C.V. Rajendran & Anr. vs. N.M. Muhammed Kunhi reported in AIR 2003 SC 649 and the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corp. Vs. State of U.P. Reported in AIR 2005 SC 446 , it was contended by Mr. Shah that the principles of res judicata also applies to the different stages of the trial of the same proceedings as per the settled position of law. It was contended that the Tribunal has come to an erroneous finding that as the claimants have received amount of compensation under section 163A of the Act, they are not entitled to get compensation under section 166 of the Act. On the aforesaid grounds, it was contended by Mr. Shah that the appeal be allowed as prayed for and appropriate compensation be granted to the claimants under section 166 of the Act. 5. Per contra Mr. Maulik J. Shelat, learned advocate appearing for respondent no.3 insurance company has opposed this appeal. Mr. Shelat contended that the Tribunal has rightly appreciated the fact that as the appellants-orig. Claimants have already availed benefit of Section 163A of the Act and has also considered the fact that the amount so awarded under section 163A of the Act has already been received by the appellants-orig. Claimants, the claimants have no right to claim double compensation under section 166 of the Act. Mr. Shelat contended that section 163A and section 166 of the Act provides for two options for compensation and once having opted for the same, it is not open for the claimants to contend that they are also entitled to separate compensation under section 166 of the Act as well. Mr. Shelat, learned advocate appearing for the respondent no.3 insurance company has relied upon the following judgments to buttress his arguments - (1) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Dhanbai Kanji Gadhvi & & Ors. Mr. Shelat, learned advocate appearing for the respondent no.3 insurance company has relied upon the following judgments to buttress his arguments - (1) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Dhanbai Kanji Gadhvi & & Ors. - 2011 (11) SCC 513 (2) The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Ravindra Purshottam Senghani & Ors. - 2012 (2) GLH 325 (3) Geetaben W/o. Kishorsinh Jadeja & Ors. vs. Govind Malsi Daniya & Ors. - 2014 (4) GLR 2841 Mr. Shelat further contended that the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of C.V. Rajendran & Anr.(supra) and U.P. State Road Transport Corp.(supra), relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellants as regards principles of res judicata has no application to the present case as the compensation under section 163A and under section 166 of the Act are based on provisions of the Act and the compensation under section 163A cannot be termed as interim compensation. Mr. Shelat therefore contended that the appeal being meritless, the same deserves to be dismissed. 6. No other or further contentions, grounds or submissions have been made by the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. 7. Before reverting to the submissions made by the learned advocates appearing for the parties, it would be appropriate to note at this stage that along with claim petition under section 166 of the Act, a separate application was filed under section 163A below exhibit 6, which was allowed and compensation of Rs. 3,91,660/- with 15% interest was awarded by an order dated 30.07.1997. As the record indicates, the respondent insurance company deposited an amount of Rs. 4,40,618/- on 24.02.1998 and the said amount has been disbursed as per the award dated 30.07.1997 passed under section 163A of the Act amongst the appellants on 20.08.1998. Section 163A came to be inserted by Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14.11.1994, i.e., before the date of accident. Section 163A is a special provision for determining the compensation on structured formula basis and the same is based on no fault liability and the compensation is granted as provided in second schedule. The question therefore, which arises in this appeal is to the effect that whether remedy for payment of compensation under sections 163A and 166 can be simultaneously resorted to or not and whether remedy for payment of compensation under section 163A is an interim compensation or not. 8. The question therefore, which arises in this appeal is to the effect that whether remedy for payment of compensation under sections 163A and 166 can be simultaneously resorted to or not and whether remedy for payment of compensation under section 163A is an interim compensation or not. 8. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in (2004) 5 SCC 385 has held that compensation determined and paid under section 163A of the Act is final and not interim one. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) has also decided similar issue and has observed thus - “10. However, in Deepal Girishbhai Soni & Ors. Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda (2004) 5 SCC 385 , the question which was considered by a three Judge Bench of this Court was whether a proceeding under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a final proceeding, by reason whereof, the claimant who has been granted compensation under Section 163A, is debarred from proceeding with any further claims on the basis of fault liability in terms of Section 166. After considering the scheme envisaged by Section 163A of the Act, it is held in the said case that Parliament intended to lay down a comprehensive scheme for the purpose of grant of adequate compensation to a section of victims who would require the amount of compensation without fighting any protracted litigation. What is ruled therein is that the compensation determined and paid under Section 163A of the Act is final and not an interim one. 11. The clear proposition of law which emerges from the decision of this Court in Deepal G. Soni (supra) is that the remedy for payment of compensation both under Sections 163A and 166 being final and independent of each other as statutorily provided, a claimant cannot pursue his remedies thereunder simultaneously. As explained by this Court in the said decision, a claimant, thus, must opt/elect to go either for a proceeding under Section 163A or under Section 166 of the Act, but not under both. 12. As explained by this Court in the said decision, a claimant, thus, must opt/elect to go either for a proceeding under Section 163A or under Section 166 of the Act, but not under both. 12. Applying the principle laid down in Deepal Soni (supra) to the facts of the case, it will have to be held that the respondents having obtained compensation, finally determined under Section 163A of the Act are precluded from proceeding further with the petition filed under Section 166 of the Act. The exception mentioned by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment that a petition under Section 166 of the Act can be proceeded further if it is filed before passing of an award passed under Section 163A of the Act is not supported by the scheme envisaged under Section 163A and 166 of the Act and is contrary to the principle of law laid down by this Court in Deepal Soni's case. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned judgment of the High Court upholding the order passed by the Tribunal to permit the respondents to proceed further with the petition filed under Section 166 of the Act cannot be sustained and will have to be set aside.” 9. The Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) has also considered similar issue and considering the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala and Ors. reported in (2001) 5 SCC 175 and in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra) and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) has observed thus - “23. Having noticed the facts in detail, let us trace the development of law on the point. 24. After Section 163A of the Act was added to the statute, the question of nature of compensation payable under such provision came up for consideration before the Apex Court in case of Hansraj Kodala (supra). The Apex Court opined that the compensation payable under Section 163A of the Act was not as an alternative or in addition to the compensation payable under Section 168 of the Act. Section 168 of the Act pertains to award of the Claims Tribunal on application for compensation made under Section 166 of the Act. The Apex Court opined that the compensation payable under Section 163A of the Act was not as an alternative or in addition to the compensation payable under Section 168 of the Act. Section 168 of the Act pertains to award of the Claims Tribunal on application for compensation made under Section 166 of the Act. The Apex Court was of the opinion that for claiming compensation, it was open for the claimant to file petition under Section 163A of the Act and seek speedy remedy for compensation on the structured formula but the claimant could not thereafter maintain further claim under Section 166 of the Act. 25. The view of the Apex Court in case of Hansraj Kodala (supra) was soon thereafter doubted by another Bench and the issue was, therefore, placed before the larger Bench of three Judges. Such issue was decided in case of Deepal Girishbhai (supra). The Apex Court confirmed the view in the earlier decision in case of Hansraj Kodala (supra) and went on to opine that proceedings under Section 163A of the Act would be available only to those cases where the annual income does not exceed Rs.40,000/-, and other claims, are required to be determined in terms of Chapter-XII of the Act. The Apex Court concluded as under:- “67. We, therefore, are of the opinion that Kodala has correctly been decided. However, we do not agree with the findings in Kodala that if a person invokes provisions of Section 163-A, the annual income of Rs.40,000 per annum shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under Section 163-A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct scheme, only those whose annual income is up to Rs.40,000 can take the benefit thereof. All other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act.” We may however notice that in the said decision, the Apex Court converted the application under Section 163A of the Act into one under Section 140 of the Act, required the claimant to return excess amount after adjustment and thereafter, permitted the claimant to press Claim Petition under Section 166 of the Act on merits. 26. The law on the issue, therefore, is sufficiently clear. 26. The law on the issue, therefore, is sufficiently clear. As laid-down by the Apex Court in the case of Hansraj Kodala (supra) and also in case of Deepal Girishbhai (supra), the Claim Petition under Section 163A of the Act is not in addition to the petition under Section 166 of the Act. The applicant has a choice either to file application under Section 163A of the Act if such provision is applicable in his case and seek a quicker resolution to his dispute by adoption of structured formula or maintain the claim petition under Section 166 of the Act which does not depend on such fixed parameters provided in the Act. But the claimant cannot maintain both the proceedings. Once application under Section 163A of the Act is heard and decided, it is not open for the claimant to maintain his application under Section 166 of the Act or for the Tribunal to decide and dispose of the same on merits. 27. The learned Single Judge of this Court took a view that as long as application under Section 163A of the Act is filed after petition under Section 166 of the Act, both would be maintainable. The Apex Court reversed such decision in case of Dhanbai Kanji (supra). While doing so, the Apex Court held and observed as under:- "11. The clear proposition of law which emerges from the decision of this Court in Deepal G. Soni is that the remedy for payment of compensation both under Sections 163-A and 166 being final and independent of each other as statutorily provided, a claimant cannot pursue his remedies thereunder simultaneously. As explained by this Court in the said decision, a claimant thus, must opt/elect to go either for a proceeding under Section 163-A or under Section 166 of the Act, but not under both. 12. Applying the principle laid down in Deepal G. Soni to the facts of the case, it will have to be held that the respondents having obtained compensation, finally determined under Section 163-A of the Act are precluded from proceeding further with the petition filed under Section 166 of the Act. 12. Applying the principle laid down in Deepal G. Soni to the facts of the case, it will have to be held that the respondents having obtained compensation, finally determined under Section 163-A of the Act are precluded from proceeding further with the petition filed under Section 166 of the Act. The exception mentioned by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment that a petition under Section 166 of the Act can be proceeded further if it is filed before passing of an award passed under Section 163-A of the Act is not supported by the scheme envisaged under Sections 163-A and 166 of the Act and is contrary to the principle of law laid down by this Court in Deepal G. Soni case. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned judgment of the High Court upholding the order passed by the Tribunal to permit the respondents to proceed further with the petition filed under Section 166 of the Act cannot be sustained and will have to be set aside." 28. To complete the sequence, we may record that in case of National Insurance Company Limited V/s. Sinitha and others reported in (2012)2 SCC 356 , the Apex Court considered the decision in case of Hansaraj Kodala (supra) and opined that in said case, the Supreme Court did not decide that the determination of compensation under Section 163A of the Act is based on no fault liability principle. 29. We, therefore, agree with the counsel for the appellant that it was not open for the Claims Tribunal to allow the Claim Petition under Section 166 of the Act in the present case since previously the claim petition under Section 163A of the Act was already decided and partly allowed. In our view, therefore, the Tribunal committed an error. Our case is very similar to one decided by the Supreme Court in case of Dhanbai Kanji (supra). It was a case where the Claims Tribunal had previously allowed application of the claimant under Section 163A. When the petition under Section 166 came up for consideration, the Insurance Company filed application objecting to the Tribunal entertaining such petition. Tribunal rejected the application. The Insurance Company therefore, approached the High Court. Learned Single Judge dismissed the petition holding that since application under Section 163A was filed after filing of petition under Section 166 of the Act, both were maintainable. Tribunal rejected the application. The Insurance Company therefore, approached the High Court. Learned Single Judge dismissed the petition holding that since application under Section 163A was filed after filing of petition under Section 166 of the Act, both were maintainable. In further appeal by the Insurance Company, the Apex Court reversed the decision of the High Court relying on the decision in case of Deepal Girishbhai (supra). In our case also, facts are very similar. Only difference is that the Insurance Company did not file separate application before the Tribunal opposing maintainability of the petition but, instead raised such objection during the course of the proceedings in the written statement as well as in the oral arguments before the Tribunal and challenged the final decision of the Tribunal on the claim petition. To our mind this difference is not material. 30. Before closing, however, we would like to record that in the present case, the law has acted rather harshly against the claimant. The claimant filed his petition under Section 166 of the Act which was accompanied by an application under Section 140 of the Act seeking interim compensation. Soon thereafter, the claimant withdrew such application under Section 140 of the Act in view of the fact that he had filed application under Section 163A of the Act. In response to such application under Section 163A of the Act, the Insurance Company contended that even if the compensation is to be granted, the same should be subject to outcome of the Claim Petition under Section 166 of the Act. On such basis, the Claims Tribunal proceeded to decide application under Section 163A of the Act treating it as interim in nature. It was for this reason that the Tribunal provided that the claimant should not allow his claim petition under Section 166 of the Act to go by default or withdraw it. In other words, the Tribunal provided that compensation being granted under Section 163A of the Act was interim in nature and would be open to adjustment when final order under Section 166 of the Act is passed. In such order, compensation may even be lesser than already awarded and in which case, the Insurance Company would be entitled to recover the difference. 31. Law on the issue was not clear when the Tribunal decided claimant's application under Section 163A of the Act. In such order, compensation may even be lesser than already awarded and in which case, the Insurance Company would be entitled to recover the difference. 31. Law on the issue was not clear when the Tribunal decided claimant's application under Section 163A of the Act. The Tribunal decided claimant's application under Section 163A on 13.12.2000. The decision in case of Hansraj Kodala (supra) was rendered on 04.04.2001. The claimant, Insurance Company and the Tribunal all, therefore, proceeded on the basis that such adjudication of compensation was interim in nature and not final.” 11. Similar view is expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Geetaben W/O. Kishorsinh Jadeja (supra), wherein it has been observed thus - “5.0. Identical question came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhanbhai Kanji Gadhvi and ors (supra). In the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Tribunal passed order permitting the claimants who had already obtained compensation under Section 163 A of the Act, to proceed with the application filed under Section 166 of the Act. The said order came to be confirmed by the High Court, by observing as under: "After hearing and on perusal of the record and from the scheme of the Act, it is clear that proceedings under Sections 163A and 166 of the Act i.e. both proceedings are permissible. In my view, claimant can file both the proceedings and opt for either of proceedings. The only condition is that application for proceeding under section 166 should be filed before the award is passed. Here, in this case, the proceedings were filed before the award is passed." The Hon’ble Supreme Court has quashed and set aside the aforesaid order passed by the learned Tribunal confirmed by High Court to permit the claimant to proceed further with the application under Section 166 of the Act and has held that once the claimant get compensation under Section 163 A of the Act, it shall be treated as final and thereafter the claimants are precluded from pursuing the remedy under Section 166 of the Act. Para 11 to 13 of the aforesaid decision are as under: 11. Para 11 to 13 of the aforesaid decision are as under: 11. On consideration of the object of section 163A of the Act which was inserted by Section 51 of the Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14-11-1994, and the non-obstante clause with which sub-section (1) of Sec. 163A commences, it is manifest that the legislature did not intend to prevent the claimant from getting compensation as per the structured formula merely because in his original claim petition he had prayed for compensation on the basis of fault liability principle. There is no prohibition in any provision of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 against the claimant praying for compensation as per the structured formula after having filed a claim petition under section 166 of the Act. Therefore, this Court finds that the respondents were perfectly justified in making an application at Exhibit 6 in MACP No. 759 of 1997 which was filed under Section 166 of the Act and praying the Tribunal to award compensation to them on the basis of the structured formula mentioned in Section 163A of the Act. This Court further finds that the Tribunal did not commit any error in entertaining the said application and awarding a sum of Rs.2,65,500/- as compensation to the respondents under Section 136A of the Act. 12. However, in Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda (2004) 5 SCC 385 : ( AIR 2004 SC 2107 ), the question which was considered by a three Judge Bench of this Court was whether a proceeding under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a final proceeding, by reason whereof, the claimant who has been granted compensation under Section 163A, is debarred from proceeding with any further claims on the basis of fault liability in terms of Section 166. After considering the scheme envisaged by Section 163A of the Act, it is held in the said case that Parliament intended to lay down a comprehensive scheme for the purpose of grant of adequate compensation to a section of victims who would require the amount of compensation without fighting any protracted litigation. What is ruled therein is that the compensation determined and paid under Section 163A of the Act is final and not an interim one. What is ruled therein is that the compensation determined and paid under Section 163A of the Act is final and not an interim one. The clear proposition of law which emerges from the decision of this Court in Deepal G. Soni (supra) is that the remedy for payment of compensation both under Sections 163A and 166 being final and independent of each other as statutorily provided, a claimant cannot pursue his remedies thereunder simultaneously. As explained by this Court in the said decision, a claimant, thus, must opt/elect to go either for a proceeding under Section 163A or under Section 166 of the Act, but not under both. 13. Applying the principle laid down in Deepal Soni (supra) to the facts of the case, it will have to be held that the respondents having obtained compensation, finally determined under Section 163A of the Act are precluded from proceeding further with the petition filed under Section 166 of the Act. The exception mentioned by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment that a petition under Section 166 of the Act can be proceeded further if it is filed before passing of an award passed under Section 163A of the Act is not supported by the scheme envisaged under Sections 163A and 166 of the Act and is contrary to the principle of law laid down by this Court in Deepal Sonis case. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned judgment of the High Court upholding the order passed by the Tribunal to permit the respondents to proceed further with the petition filed under Section 166 of the Act cannot be sustained and will have to be set aside. 6.0. Now, so far as contention on behalf of the appellants that in view of the order passed by the learned Tribunal passed below Exh.34 allowing the said application submitted by the claimants and permitting the claimants to proceed further with the application under Section 166 of the Act is concerned, We have perused the order passed by the learned Tribunal below Exh.34. The order passed by the learned Tribunal passed below Exh.34 is absolutely contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra). The order passed by the learned Tribunal passed below Exh.34 is absolutely contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra). What is not observed and held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra), is observed and held by the learned Tribunal while passing order below Exh.34 and granting permission to the claimants to proceed further application under Section 166 of the Act. While passing the order below Exh.34 and granting permission to the claimants to pursue / proceed further with application under Section 166 of the Act, the learned Tribunal has observed that as law was not clear prior to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra) and earlier, order under Section 163 A of the Act was treated as interim compensation and therefore, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra) would not be applicable to the application filed prior to judgment and order passed in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra). As stated above, as such similar order has been set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhanbai Kanji Gadhvi & ors (Supra). Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that while laying down the law in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not observed that said decision would be applicable prospectively and / or law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said decision would not be applicable to the claim petition filed prior to the said decision. On the contrary, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically observed, held and directed that order passed under Section 163 A of the Act in the case of claimant of that case would be treated as interim compensation under Section 140 of the Act and the learned Tribunal was directed to proceed further with the claim petition under Section 166 of the Act and while passing such order, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically observed that the said direction is issued in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and same is not to be treated as precedent. Thus, Hon’ble Supreme Court was conscious of the aforesaid fact and therefore have observed that the said direction is under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and same is not to be treated as precedent. Therefore, the observations made by the learned Tribunal while passing order below Exh.34 that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (Supra) would not be applicable to the claim petition filed prior to the said decision is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (Supra), and as such it can be said that what is not observed and granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the learned Tribunal has granted. Under the circumstances, as such the order passed by the learned Tribunal passed below Exh.34 is just contrary to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (Supra) as well as in the case of Dhanbai Kanji Gadhvi & ors (supra). 7.0. Similarly, even reliance placed upon the decision of the learned Single Judge rendered in FA No.4078 of 2008 is concerned, the same being contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (Supra) as well as in the case of Dhanbai Kanji Gadhvi & ors (supra), the same shall not be of any assistance to the appellants. No reliance can be placed upon the decision which is just contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.” 12. In light of the aforesaid decision therefore, in the case on hand also, only because the application below exhibit 32 was allowed and not challenged by the insurance company, does not give further right to the appellants to continue their proceedings under section 166 of the Act and claim double compensation. Considering the provisions of section 163A and 166 of the Act, both are remedies available to the claimants to claim compensation, however, the claimants cannot pursue both the remedies at a time. Having selected the remedy available under the special provisions of section 163A of the Act, which has come in statute w.e.f. 14.11.1994, the appellants cannot be permitted to re-agitate the same thing and claim further or similar compensation under section 166 of the Act. The contention raised by Mr. Having selected the remedy available under the special provisions of section 163A of the Act, which has come in statute w.e.f. 14.11.1994, the appellants cannot be permitted to re-agitate the same thing and claim further or similar compensation under section 166 of the Act. The contention raised by Mr. Shah that the application below exhibit 6 filed for compensation under section 163A is an interim compensation cannot accepted and the application under section 163A of the Act cannot be similar to an application under section 140 of the Act. 13. The principles of res judicata, as contended by Mr. Shah, learned advocate for the appellants does not take the case of the appellants any further in view of the binding decisions of the Apex Court as well as Division Bench of this Court. As held by the Apex Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra), the proceedings under section 163A of the Act is final proceeding and once such compensation is granted under section 163A of the Act, the claimant is debarred from proceeding with any further claims on the basis of fault liability in terms of Section 166 of the Act. Thus, the judgments relied upon by Mr. Shah, learned advocate appearing for the appellants on the ground of res judicata, with respect, are not applicable to the issue that arises in this appeal. 14. The Tribunal has committed no error much less any manifest error which requires any interference by this Court in its appellate jurisdiction under section 173 of the Act. The appeal being devoid of any merits, deserves to be dismissed and the same is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. The Record and Proceedings be transmitted back to the Tribunal forthwith.