ORDER : Rule returnable forthwith. Ms. M.D. Mehta, learned Additional Public Prosecutor waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of respondent­State. 1. The applicant is convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. He completed 8 years of his sentence. He convicted in Special Case No. 10 of 2003 on 25.06.2007 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The Criminal Appeal No. 981 of 2007 was allowed by this Court on 29.08.2011. Thereafter, the present applicant with other convicts approached the Apex Court by way of Criminal Appeal No. 146 of 2012. The applicant had been convicted by the Apex Court. 2. The applicant, after once the appeal had rejected by the Apex Court, surrendered on his own on 22.07.2019. 3. It is the grievance on the part of the applicant that he has been denied the furlough leave, although, the main convict­Asgarali has also granted furlough leave, prior to the confirmation of the conviction by the Apex Court. According to the applicant, he is the sole male member responsible for the funds needed by the family. The applicant is therefore before this Court seeking following main relief: ”(A)Your Lordships be pleased to allow this application. (B) Your Lordships be pleased to allow this Special Criminal Application, and be pleased to release the petitioner on Furlough leave to the petitioner.” 4. This Court has heard learned advocate Mr. Hemant Raval for the applicant and learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms. M.D. Mehta for the respondent­ State. 5. It is to be noted at the outset that the present applicant has undergone 8 years and 9 months. 6. Prior to the Supreme Court confirmed the conviction in relation to the present applicant, he has not been granted either parole or furlough leave. The only time he has been granted parole leave was from 27.10.2019 to 04.11.2019 for the period of 9 days, when he was granted for his nephew's marriage and surrendered in time. The details of other convicts have been provided to this Court and it is noticed that Mahommad Faruk Usmangani Haji Faruk prior to the confirmation of the sentence by the Apex Court, has been granted many a time parole leave. The furlough leave was granted to only three convicts, viz. Kalim Ahemad @ Kalimulla Mahomad Habib and Anas Abdul Rashid Machiswala. The furlough leave was granted to only three convicts, viz. Kalim Ahemad @ Kalimulla Mahomad Habib and Anas Abdul Rashid Machiswala. It is also noticed that, Asgarali who had the lead role in commission of crime in the case, also had been granted furlough leave, which eventually, had been counted in his remission and at the time of his release, 90 days were already considered. 7. In this backdrop of facts, both the sides have argued before this Court. Learned advocate Mr. Raval has urged that the very objective of the furlough is well defined under the Rules and the Full Bench while interpreting the statute and considering the Furlough and Parole Rules, has narrated the true objectives. He further has urged that no purpose is going to be served denying the furlough leave to these persons, which is meant for humanizing the prison system and to maintain continuity with the family life and also for facilitating the confidence in prisoner as rehabilitation and reformation are two very vital aspects of the prison system. He has urged that, this applicant and other co­ convicts who are from Gujarat are from business family and they continued to do business after they were released by this Court and some of them were income tax payers. 8. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms. Mehta argued that the prison authorities have got the discretionary powers to consider grant or refusal of the furlough due to the prisoners, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the each case. The late surrender of the accused – convict, the gravity of offences, impact of releasing them on public life are some of the aspects which cannot be overlooked by the prison authorities. She has therefore urged that furlough system which is being introduced as a measure of panel reform shall have to be used appropriately by the Court and considering the police report, in the instant case, and more particularly, bearing in mind their involvement in a serious case, the case has rightly not been considered. She has urged that the State has to also safeguard the rights of the citizens while considering the rights of the prisoners. 9. She has urged that the State has to also safeguard the rights of the citizens while considering the rights of the prisoners. 9. Having thus heard both the sides, at the outset, the Court needs to consider the Furlough and Parole Rules which have been framed in exercise of the powers under Section 59 (5) and Section 28 of the Prisons Act. The State Government under Section 59(5) has been given discretion to make the Rules consistent with the Prisons Act, 1894 for the award of marks, the suspension or remission and consequent shortening of sentences, and the grant of release on parole or furlough and determining the conditions on which and the authority by which the sentences may be suspended or remitted and the prisoners may be released on parole or furlough. The Full bench of this Court in the case of Bhikhabhai Devsi v. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in (1987) 2 GLR 1178 has held that, the parole and furlough rules are part of the penal and prison system with a view to humanise the prison system. These rules enable the prisoner to obtain his release and to return to the outside world for a short prescribed period. The objects of such a release of prisoner can be read from the report submitted by the All India Jail Manual Committee as also the objects mentioned in Model Prison Manual. These objects are: (i) to enable the inmate to maintain continuity within his family life and deal with family matters; (ii) to save the inmate from the evil effects of continuous prison life; (iii) to enable the inmate to maintain constructive hope and active interests in life. 10. Apt would be to reproduce the relevant paragraphs, which reads as under: “12. In view of this guiding and binding principle of interpretation, let us have a look at the purposes of the present legislation and furlough system. 13. The parole and furlough rules are part of the penal and prison system with a view to humanise the prison system. These rules enable the prisoner to obtain his release and to return to the outside world for a short prescribed period. The objects of such a release of prisoner can be read from para 101 of the report submitted by the All India Jail Manual Committee as also the objects mentioned in Model Prison Manual. These rules enable the prisoner to obtain his release and to return to the outside world for a short prescribed period. The objects of such a release of prisoner can be read from para 101 of the report submitted by the All India Jail Manual Committee as also the objects mentioned in Model Prison Manual. These objects are: (i) to enable the inmate to maintain continuity with his family life and deal with: family matters; (ii) to save the inmate from the evil effects of continuous prison life; (iii) to enable the inmate to maintain constructive hope and active interests in life." 14. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons for Bombay (Prisons Amendment) Act No. 27 of 1953, the Jail Reforms Committee had recommended and the Govt. accepted the recommendation that ­ "there should be the system of release of prisoners on furlough under which well behaved prisoners of certain categories should, as a matter of right have a spell of freedom occasionally after they undergo a specified period of imprisonment, so that they may maintain contact with their near relatives and friends and may not feel uprooted from society . Government accepted these recommendations and also decided that the furlough period should count towards the prisoner's sentence. xx xx xx xx The experience has shown that the system has worked satisfactorily. The Prisons Act, 1894 does not specifically provide for the grant of furlough and the remission of sentence consequent upon it. In order to place the system on a permanent footing and to enable the Govt. to delegate its powers to the Inspector General of Prisons, it is necessary that the Prisons Act, 1894 should be amended in its application to the State of Bombay." 15. Thus, the Legislature has put the furlough system in the Act and it is made a matter of right. 16. In furtherance of these objects, the parole and furlough rules are framed in exercise of powers under Ss. 59(5) and 28 of the Prisons Act, 1894. Section 3 defines various terms in the Act and Cls. (5A) and (5B) of S. 3 define furlough system, and parole system. 16. In furtherance of these objects, the parole and furlough rules are framed in exercise of powers under Ss. 59(5) and 28 of the Prisons Act, 1894. Section 3 defines various terms in the Act and Cls. (5A) and (5B) of S. 3 define furlough system, and parole system. Clause (5A) added by Bombay Act XXVII of 1953 reads as under :­ (5A) : "furlough system means the system of releasing prisoners in jail on furlough in accordance with the rules for the time being in force." Section 59(5) reads as follows :­ "S. 59 : Power to make rules: The State Govt. may make rules consistent with this, Act ­ xx xx xx xx (5) for the award of marks, the suspension or remission and consequent shortening of sentences, and the grant of release on parole or furlough and determining the conditions on which and the authority by which the sentences may be suspended or remitted and the prisoners may be released on parole or furlough." Thus, the rules have to be consistent with the Act as S. 59 expressly provides. One more relevant provision is S. 48A (also added by Act 27 of 1953) which reads as follows : ­ "S. 48A: Punishment for breach of conditions of suspension or remission of sentence or of grant of furlough:­ If any prisoner fails without sufficient cause to observe any of the conditions on which his sentence was suspended or remitted or furlough or release on parole was granted to him, he shall be deemed to have committed a prison offence and the Supdt. may, after obtaining his explanation, punish such offence by (1) a formal warning as provided in Clause (i) of S. 46; (2) reduction in grade if such prisoner has been appointed an officer of prison; (3) loss of privileges admissible under the remission or furlough or parole system; or (4) loss of such other privileges as the State Govt. may by general or special order, direct." 17. Rule 1287 of the Bombay Jail Manual is also relevant for our present purpose. It reads as under : ­ "In each case of late surrender or breach of any of the conditions of furlough or parole, the necessary punishment or punishments should be awarded by the Supdt. of Prison with due regard to the circumstances of each case. Rule 1287 of the Bombay Jail Manual is also relevant for our present purpose. It reads as under : ­ "In each case of late surrender or breach of any of the conditions of furlough or parole, the necessary punishment or punishments should be awarded by the Supdt. of Prison with due regard to the circumstances of each case. All the punishments mentioned below or in S. 48­A of the Prisons Act, 1894 need not necessari1y be awarded in each case but it is left to the discretion of the Supdt. to decide which particular punishment or punishments should be awarded. If, in certain cases, the Supdt. is satisfied that the overstayed was for good or sufficient reasons, he may excuse the prisoner. However, before awarding any punishment, the Supdt. should invariably obtain a prisoner's explanation in each case of overstayed of period or breach of any conditions of furlough or parole. (1) A maximum cut of 5 days' remission for each day of overstay : Provided that where the prisoner has not sufficient remission to his credit, he shall cease to earn remission in future for such period as the Supdt. may direct. (2) Stoppage of canteen concession for a period of not less than one month and not more than three months. (3) Withholding concession of either interviews or letters or both, for a maximum period of three months. (4) In cases of furlough, the furlough period not to be counted towards sentence." 18. From the aforesaid provisions in the Prisons Act, the definition and the creation of furlough system there is no doubt that the prisoners have a privilege admissible to them under the furlough system as mentioned in R. 2(17) of the furlough rules. Even if furlough is not an absolute right of the prisoner, nonetheless it is a right and privilege admissible and regulated under the rules and it can be granted, refused or withdrawn as per rules. 19. Section 48A is the express provision for a case where a prisoner fails without sufficient cause to observe any of the conditions on which furlough or parole was granted to him and he is deemed to have committed a prison offence and the Supdt. may, after obtaining his explanation, punish for such offence by one or more punishments, combination of which is permissible and contemplated. Such punishments are: 1. a formal warning; 2. may, after obtaining his explanation, punish for such offence by one or more punishments, combination of which is permissible and contemplated. Such punishments are: 1. a formal warning; 2. reduction in grade; 3. loss of privilege admissible under remission system; 4. loss of privilege admissible under furlough system; 5. loss of privilege admissible under parole system; 6. loss of such other privileges as the State Govt. may, by general or special order, direct. 20. Rule 1287 of the Bombay Jail Manual clearly gives guidelines to the punishing authority and it provides that in case of late surrender, necessary punishment or punishments should be awarded with due regard to the circumstances of each case, and all the punishments need not necessarily be awarded in each case, but it is left to the discretion of the authorities to decide. It also states that in a given case, if Supdt. is satisfied that the overstayed was for good or sufficient reasons, he may excuse the prisoner. Thus, the prisoner may not be awarded any punishment whatsoever. In other cases of insufficient reasons refusal of punishment or punishments may be awarded having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the gravity of the prison offence. One of the punishments is a maximum cut of 5 days' remission for each day of overstay and other permissible punishment is the forfeiture of privilege furlough or to direct that the furlough period shall not be counted towards sentence. 24. A similar question had arisen in the case of Atulji Magaji v. State of Gujarat 1984 Guj LH 139. In that case, R. 4(6) was invoked and the authorities had denied furlough to the concerned prisoner on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct. The unsatisfactory conduct was said to be based on two prison offences and two punishments in August and Sept., 1985. In the first incident it was alleged that the prisoner took 'Khichadi' instead of loaves as the prisoner was not feeling well. In the other incident the prisoner had purchased lemons from the Jail Canteen itself and for each of these two offences, remission of 5 days was cut. Because of these two jail punishments of cut in remission of 10 days (5 + 5), the prisoner was said to be disentitled to any furlough and was considered ineligible by the jail authorities. Because of these two jail punishments of cut in remission of 10 days (5 + 5), the prisoner was said to be disentitled to any furlough and was considered ineligible by the jail authorities. The Division Bench held that such trivial jail offences and minor lapses could not be said to be such as would enable the Superintendent of Prisons to form an opinion that the conduct of the prisoner was not satisfactory enough to deprive him of his privilege of furlough. Had that been so, the furlough would have been forfeited by imposing that punishment and it was, therefore, held that even though the prisoner had committed minor prison offences, he did not forfeit the privilege of furlough and his request for furlough was required to be considered on merits, by the prison authorities. This view clearly supports the view canvassed by the petitioner in the present petition. 25. The learned Counsel for the respondents has strongly relied upon the observations of the Division Bench in the case of Juvansinh (1973) 14 Guj LR 104 (supra). In that case, the challenge was to the validity of R. 4(2) which disentitled prisoners convicted of offences under Ss. 392 to 402 (both inclusive) of the I.P.C. (robbery, dacoity, etc.) to furlough leave. The prisoners of that category are totally considered ineligible for furlough and the R. 4(2) was challenged as violative of Art 14 of the Constitution. It was contended that if prisoners convicted for more serious offences such as murder are not excluded from taking furlough leave, why the petitioner prisoner covered by R. 4(2) should be denied the right to claim furlough leave. The Division Bench held as under: "But in introducing penal reforms, the State which runs the administration on behalf of the society and for the benefit of the society at large cannot be unmindful of safeguarding the legitimate rights of the citizens in regard to their security in the matters of life and liberty. It is for this reason that in introducing such reforms, the authorities cannot be oblivious of the obligation to the society to render it immune from those who are prone to criminal tendencies and have proved their susceptibility to indulge in criminal activities by being found guilty (by a Court) of having perpetrated a criminal act. It is for this reason that in introducing such reforms, the authorities cannot be oblivious of the obligation to the society to render it immune from those who are prone to criminal tendencies and have proved their susceptibility to indulge in criminal activities by being found guilty (by a Court) of having perpetrated a criminal act. One of the discernible purposes of imposing the penalty of imprisonment is to render the society immune from the criminal for a specified period. It is, therefore, understandable that while meting out humane treatment to the convicts care is taken to ensure that kindness to the convicts does not result in cruelty to the society. Naturally enough, the authorities would be anxious to ensure that the convict who is released on furlough does not seize the opportunity to commit another crime when he is at large for the time being under the furlough leave granted to him by way of a measure of penal reform. This appears to be the object underlying R. 4 which enjoins that prisoners of the specified categories shall not be enlarged on furlough." 26. The Division Bench proceeded to consider different clauses of R. 4 and tried to find a common rationale in all the clauses. Regarding habitual prisoners, (R. 4(i)), it was held that if committing the offence has become a habit, a prisoner is less likely to respond to the corrective treatment aimed at his reform while he is undergoing the sentence and so he cannot safely be set at large before the expiration of his term of imprisonment and that prohibition offenders (R. 4(3)), also become slaves of the habit or way of life and find it difficult to free themselves from the bondage of habit and a break from the prison life will expose them to the same temptation. Rule 4(5) was said to disqualify persons having tendency towards crime and it was held that it would not be advisable to expose the society to the risk of their being released. Same purpose is said to be pervading in CL (6) and CL (10). It is in the light of this purposeful approach the validity of R. 4(2) was examined and it was held that the offenders of robbery and dacoity are risky to the society. Robbery has an element of violence along with theft or extortion. Same purpose is said to be pervading in CL (6) and CL (10). It is in the light of this purposeful approach the validity of R. 4(2) was examined and it was held that the offenders of robbery and dacoity are risky to the society. Robbery has an element of violence along with theft or extortion. If 5 or more persons commit robbery, it becomes dacoity and when so many persons enter upon a life of crime and form a group, it is likely to become an organised gang and there is great danger in letting them loose. It becomes a habit or way of life and there is no guarantee that such prisoner will not indulge in similar activity again if he is set at large. Therefore, the Division Bench observed that: "None of the twin objects of punishments of imprisonment would then be served. Neither would he be reformed nor would the society remain immunized from his criminal activity for the specified period." Moreover, the offences of this nature are not directed against particular individual, but any individual or against the society at large and the entire society is exposed to danger. Therefore, on the consideration that release of such persons would expose the society to the danger emanating from them, that category of prisoners is excluded from being considered eligible for parole and that has been upheld by the Division Bench. 27. The rationale and principle behind R. 4 is clear. The furlough system has been introduced as a measure of penal reform and to humanise the penal system. The objects as reported by the Jail Reforms Committee are already quoted above. Would such object be achieved by denying furlough to all such prisoners who may have defaulted by surrendering late after release on parole or furlough? Would it be rational and reasonable to hold them ineligible for being released on furlough because they have defaulted by surrendering late in past ? Are all such prisoners similarly situated and form one class, irrespective of the facts and circumstances of lateness in surrendering ? Is the authority powerless to do justice even when the circumstances so require ? Would it be rational and reasonable to hold them ineligible for being released on furlough because they have defaulted by surrendering late in past ? Are all such prisoners similarly situated and form one class, irrespective of the facts and circumstances of lateness in surrendering ? Is the authority powerless to do justice even when the circumstances so require ? As seen earlier, similar question was before the Supreme Court in the case of Ganesh Prasad ( AIR 1985 SC 964 ) (supra), as to when a tenant who has failed to deposit the rent as directed, whether the Court shall order the defence to be struck off having regard to the use of word 'shall', the High Court had answered the question in the affirmative and held that the tenant will have to bear the consequences and once the default is found, the Courts are powerless and statutory consequences are bound to follow. But the Supreme Court reversed that finding and held that having regard to the legislative intent and object, the word 'shall' must mean 'may' and the authority has the discretion to strike off or not to strike off the defence having regard to the facts and circumstances. 28. The object of parole and furlough rules is to humanise penal system and to enable the prisoner to maintain continuity with his family life and to deal with the family matters and to save him from evil effects of continuous jail life and to enable him to gain self confidence and to maintain constructive hopes and active interest in life. Since these are the clear objects of furlough system, could it have been intended that the benefit and privilege of furlough should be denied to a prisoner merely on the ground of lateness in surrendering after release on parole or furlough, irrespective of anything and any circumstances justifying or mitigating the default or in any way not showing any tendency to escape or any risk to the society in any manner whatsoever? It is not possible to hold that irrespective of all these circumstances, such a prisoner surrendering late is totally disqualified from the consideration for release on furlough. It is not possible to hold that irrespective of all these circumstances, such a prisoner surrendering late is totally disqualified from the consideration for release on furlough. The cases of prisoners who have surrendered late have to be examined on merits and the prison authority will have the power, duty and discretion to consider and to grant or refuse furlough and, therefore, the word 'shall' in the context of R. 4(10) latter part will have to be read as 'may'. 28A. The mandatory interpretation of R. 4(10) sought by the respondents would be inconsistent with the Act and its objects. The furlough system is created by the Act with avowed object reforming the prisoner and humanising penal system. 29. As far as the first part of R. 4(10) is concerned, in respect of prisoners who have escaped or attempted to escape, such prisoners, a class by themselves, cannot be trusted for being released on furlough and, therefore, in such cases, the prison authority would be justified in not considering their request for furlough. However, in cases of late surrender, where there is no element of escape, but merely there is a delay in surrendering, the question will have to be examined on the facts and circumstances and merits of each case. A given case of a prisoner defaulting in timely surrender, who is wanted by the jail authorities and who is not available at the place where ordinarily he should be and who is apprehended by the police or who surrenders because of the chase by the authority, may fall under the first part where he cannot be trusted to be released on furlough again. But such cases are at the other extreme. 30. Other cases of late surrender may be of voluntary surrenders and the lateness may not be unduly long and not without sufficient cause or reason. In such cases sufficiency of such a cause related to time will certainly have to be considered by the authority. Section 48­A itself provides for cases of later surrender. 30. Other cases of late surrender may be of voluntary surrenders and the lateness may not be unduly long and not without sufficient cause or reason. In such cases sufficiency of such a cause related to time will certainly have to be considered by the authority. Section 48­A itself provides for cases of later surrender. As seen earlier it provides that if any prisoner fails without sufficient cause to observe any of the conditions on which his sentence was suspended or remitted or furlough or release on parole was granted to him, he shall be deemed to have committed a prison offence and the Superintendent may, after obtaining his explanation, punish such offence by different punishments including the loss of privilege of furlough. Thus, if he shows sufficient cause, it would not be an offence at all. However, even if the cause is not sufficient, the Superintendent will have to consider his explanation and having regard to the insufficient cause or no cause and the degree of gravity of offence in the facts and circumstances of the case, decide about the quantum and nature of punishment. If he does not think it fit to impose the punishment of forfeiture of furlough and to impose higher punishment, R. 4(10) cannot be read as a total and automatic prohibition granting furlough to a defaulting and punished prisoner. That would be clearly and directly contrary to S. 48A of the Prisons Act, 1894. Rules have to be consistent with the Act and in order to harmonise R. 4(10) and make it consistent with the mandate of S. 48A the only way to read the latter part of R. 4(10) is to hold it to be directory and giving discretion to the authority to consider and to grant or refuse furlough in cases of prisoners who have surrendered late. Any other construction to the contrary as is canvassed by the respondent authorities would not only make R. 4(10) latter part unreasonable and arbitrary, but would also directly go against S. 48A of the Act. Any other construction to the contrary as is canvassed by the respondent authorities would not only make R. 4(10) latter part unreasonable and arbitrary, but would also directly go against S. 48A of the Act. It is well settled that all the provisions have to be read together and construed harmoniously and this rule can be read harmoniously with the Act so as to achieve the object of the Act and the Rules and the construction which is sought to be placed does not in any way go against any of the objects of the Act or the Rules. 31. The respondent authorities have also relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench in Special Criminal Appln. No. 496 of 1981 with Special Criminal Appln. No. 527 of 1981, Nanubhai Bhanjibhai v. State of Gujarat decided on Nov. 5, 1982. In that case, the Division Bench was called upon to decide the validity and interpretation of Note 3 to R. 3 of the Furlough Rules and the question of validity or interpretation of R. 4(10) was not directly involved. However, the Division Bench has observed as follows : ­ "In our opinion, plain reading of R. 4 makes it clear that the prisoners enumerated in Cls. (1) to (3) and (7) to (10) are not eligible to be released on furlough. So far as the prisoners enumerated in Cls. (4) to (6) of R. 4 are concerned, the authority concerned has power to grant or refuse to release prisoners on furlough. In other words, while Cls. (1) to (3) and (7) to (10) of R. 4 deal with eligibility criteria, Cls. (4) to (6) deal with power of the authority concerned to refuse release of a prisoner on furlough. Prisoners failing within the categories namely Cls. (1) to (3) and (7) to (10) do not have right to claim release on furlough." 32. These observations of the Division Bench were not called for in that case and were not the subject­matter of controversy and they are too wide. In that case, the case was concerned with Clause 4(4) only which reads as under : ­ "4. (1) to (3) and (7) to (10) do not have right to claim release on furlough." 32. These observations of the Division Bench were not called for in that case and were not the subject­matter of controversy and they are too wide. In that case, the case was concerned with Clause 4(4) only which reads as under : ­ "4. When prisoners shall not be granted furlough The following categories of prisoners shall not be considered for release on furlough : ­ x x x x x x (4) Prisoners whose release is not recommended in Greater Bombay by the Commissioner of Police and elsewhere, by the District Magistrate on the ground of public peace and tranquillity." 11. The Division bench of this Court in case of Vallabh Ramji v. State in Criminal Misc. Application No. 105 of 1989 dated 16.02.1993 was considering the question of refusal of the right of the furlough on the ground of adverse police opinion / report, the Court after hearing the parties, held as under: “(4) As against the above miss valikarimwala the learned app instructed by the jail officers present in the court has not been able to controvert the above factual position regarding satisfactory law abiding conduct of the petitioner inside and out ­ side the jail when he came to be so released on parole. When such is the factual uncontroversial position on the record we are quite surprised and shocked too as to where indeed was any scope for the alleged adverse police opinion to have place on the record (?) and yet when on the said ground the rightful furlough of petitioner is rejected from. If that is no the non ­ application of mind and abdication of the statutory function then what else it is ? thus perse the mechanical chanting of the phrase adverse police opinion is something totally contradictory to otherwise self ­ evident material available on the record this is to say the least appears to be quite distasteful. Time and again it has been repeatedly pointed out by this court that the mere chanting of the phrase adverse police opinion without there being anything in support of the same on the record is not just and sufficient to turn down the parole/furlough leave application. Time and again it has been repeatedly pointed out by this court that the mere chanting of the phrase adverse police opinion without there being anything in support of the same on the record is not just and sufficient to turn down the parole/furlough leave application. Not only that but twice or thrice even the copies of such judgments on the point have been forwarded to the concerned authorities for much needed perusal and follow ­ up action and yet the same is surprisingly of no avail. An ­ opinion is always a matter of inference to be drawn and the conclusion arrived at on the basis of availability of relevant material. Thus if there is no material on the record there is indeed no question of either drawing inference or final conclusion by way of final opinion: in fact turning to the facts and circumstances of the instant case the record of petitioner is so clear and self ­ evident that only opinion which could have been derived would have been favourable and not adverse as alleged. Rather favourable opinion is the only un-escapable conclusion that has got to be drawn from the jail record itself. Any way under the circumstances when it was pointed out to the learned app as to why we should not issue notice to the concerned authority to remain personally present and explain to the court this clear and difficult to conceive approach of not taking into consideration the previous judgments of this court on the point and further still as to why concerned authority should not be asked to pay cost to the petitioner personally from his pocket the learned app had sought sometime so as to enable her to contact the authority concerned for reconsideration of the impugned order in the light of previous judgments of this court. Accordingly court is happy to be informed today that the inspector general of prisons ahmedabad having reconsidered the case has granted first furlough to the petitioner and therefore to that extent nothing further is required to be done in this matter. “ 12. In the instant case, the total period which is undergone in the jail by the petitioner is 9 years and a person has been denied the furlough leave only on the ground of negative opinion/ report of the police dated 17.10.2019. “ 12. In the instant case, the total period which is undergone in the jail by the petitioner is 9 years and a person has been denied the furlough leave only on the ground of negative opinion/ report of the police dated 17.10.2019. The report is indicative that, if this person is released on furlough leave, there is a likelihood of peace in the society, being breached and jeopardized since he is also convicted under the POTA. Every case has to be taken on an individual basis and the report shall need to be obtained and examined accordingly merely on the ground that the person is undergoing the imprisonment and also convicted under POTA may not be the ground of denying the furlough leave, when the co­convicts have already been granted on the very ground. 13. This Court finds no material despite specific inquiry from the learned Additional Public Prosecutor baring these two lines, which is a stereotype report, there is no explanation as to why in case of co­convicts who are similarly placed, the authority had chosen to give them furlough leave. The convict who has a most serious role amongst the all, also has been granted furlough leave and the remission of sentence has been given on the strength thereupon. 14. Resultantly, this application deserves to be allowed, as the challenge shall need to be interfered with, by directing the authority to consider his case for releasing him on furlough leave. Direct service is permitted.