JUDGMENT : P.G.M Patil, J. 1. The 3rd party applicant being aggrieved by the order dated 21.08.2018 passed in E.P.No.47/2017 on the file of the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Dharwad and confirmed by the judgment and decree dated 20.02.2019 passed in Regular Appeal No.124/2018 on the file of the IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad has filed this second appeal. 2. The status of the parties is referred as per their ranking before the trial Court in E.P.No.47/2017. 3. The brief facts of the case are as follows: The plaintiff Subbaraju filed a suit in O.S.No.192/1996 for partition and separate possession of his share in the suit schedule property against the defendants. The said suit came to be decreed by judgment and decree dated 09.10.2002. Thereafter FDP No.4/2007 was filed and final decree was drawn on 25.11.2016. Thereafter the decree holder filed EP No.47/2017 for effecting actual partition and taking physical possession of the suit property allotted to his share. It is admitted that the present appellant who claims to be representing the firm Ramashraya Book Depot was defendant No.3 in the suit and FDP and is also J.Dr.No.3 in the EP. It is seen from the records that there were several proceedings between the present appellant and the respondent after passing of the preliminary decree in O.S.No.192/1996 and after passing final decree in FDP No.4/2007. In the course of execution proceedings in EP No.47/2017, the present appellant Vasant Laxman Akalwadi, who is also arrayed as J.Dr.No.3 in the execution petition filed an application I.A.No.5 under Order XXI Rules 97, 98, 99, 100 and 101 read with Section 47 and 151 of CPC, as 3rd party applicant representing Ramashraya Book Depot which is a partnership firm, as one of its partners, with a prayer to determine the legal rights of the applicant's firm in and over the suit property. 4. It is the case of the applicant that he is doing partnership business in the suit property and he is in possession of the same in the capacity of partner in the firm. The two other partners of the firm are the present decree holder Subbaraju and his wife Smt. Shashikala Akalwadi. He further contended that the firm is situated in C.T.S. No. 406/1A/1B of Dharwad. The two other partners of the firm are the present decree holder Subbaraju and his wife Smt. Shashikala Akalwadi. He further contended that the firm is situated in C.T.S. No. 406/1A/1B of Dharwad. The partnership firm is a separate legal entity and it was not a party in O.S.No.192/1996 or F.D.P. No.4/2007 and therefore the possessory rights of the partnership firm are yet to be determined. He has further contended that as on the date of filing of the application, partnership firm was not dissolved in accordance with law and the business is continued in the sole premises. There is no separate order for exclusive possession of the suit property in the decree passed in O.S.No.192/1996 or in F.D.P. No.4/2007. Therefore, the D.Hr. is not entitle for exclusive possession of the suit property. In order to protect the legal rights of the partnership firm, necessary enquiry may be held by giving an opportunity to lead evidence of the parties. 5. The decree holder resisted the said application by filing objections. He contended that as per the final decree, he is entitled to get exclusive possession of the suit property measuring 504 Sq.ft. as shown in the sketch by letters ABCD annexed to the decree. He referred to the Regular Appeal No.256/2017 filed by the J.Dr. No.3, which came to be dismissed and thereafter he preferred R.S.A. No.100430/2018 which was also dismissed on 15.07.2018. Further J.Dr. No.3 had filed another application under Section 148 of CPC before the executing Court which was rejected as not maintainable. Thereafter, J.Dr.No.3 also filed another application under Section 47 of the CPC praying the Court to hold enquiry to determine the rights of the firm Ramashraya Book Depot and the said application was also dismissed on 06.08.2018. Therefore the same issue cannot be raised in the present application once again by J.Dr. No.3. This application is filed when the possession warrant was issued by the Court for delivery of the possession of the suit property to the D.Hr. J.Dr. No.3 obstructed for handing over possession of the property. In this regard, a detailed report is submitted by the Bailiff. He has also further contended that the claim of J.Dr. No.3 has already been adjudicated in the earlier application filed under Section 47 of CPC. The share allotted in the suit property in favour of the decree holder is not the asset of the partnership firm. In this regard, a detailed report is submitted by the Bailiff. He has also further contended that the claim of J.Dr. No.3 has already been adjudicated in the earlier application filed under Section 47 of CPC. The share allotted in the suit property in favour of the decree holder is not the asset of the partnership firm. The partnership firm is not related to the suit property. Further, the applicant himself has dissolved the partnership firm by issuing notice w.e.f. 31.07.2015. Therefore, the partnership firm is already dissolved. Further, the decree holder and his wife are also the partners in the said firm contributing 70% of the shares. Therefore, the interim application is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected. 6. The executing Court after hearing both the parties dismissed the said application by its order dated 21.08.2018. 7. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present appellant filed Regular Appeal No.124/2018 on the file of IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad. The appellate Court after hearing both the parties, dismissed the appeal by judgment and decree dated 20.02.2019. Therefore the appellant being aggrieved by the orders passed by both the Courts below has filed this Regular Second Appeal. 8. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and also the respondent on admission. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that the appellant-Ramashraya Book Depot is a partnership firm and the application was filed by him representing the said firm as one of the partners to determine the rights of the said firm in and over the suit property, therefore the executing Court ought to have held regular enquiry by giving opportunity to lead oral evidence. On the other hand, the executing Court dismissed the application without conducting proper enquiry. 10. The learned counsel further submitted that the partnership firm is in possession of the suit property, therefore the decree holder is not entitle for physical possession of the property allotted to his share and is entitle only for symbolic possession of his share in the suit property. Therefore the learned counsel further submitted that the Courts below are not justified in rejecting I.A.No.5 filed by the 3rd party applicant and therefore this substantial question of law may be framed and the appeal be admitted and heard on merits. Therefore the learned counsel further submitted that the Courts below are not justified in rejecting I.A.No.5 filed by the 3rd party applicant and therefore this substantial question of law may be framed and the appeal be admitted and heard on merits. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on certain decisions in support of his contentions 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the application filed by the present appellant as 3rd party applicant itself is not maintainable and that the applicant never contended in the suit or other proceedings that the suit schedule property is the property of the partnership firm. 12. The learned counsel further submitted that in order to protract the benefit of the decree by the decree holder, the appellant herein has been filing one or the other proceedings. 13. Learned counsel further submitted that the appellant herein had previously filed another application under Section 47 of C.P.C. and the same prayer is made for determining the rights of the partnership firm in and over the suit property and the said application was dismissed and has reached finality as no appeal was filed against the said order. 14. Learned counsel further submitted that the decree holder and his wife are the major shareholders in the partnership firm and therefore the appellant being one of the partners of the said firm was not authorized to file the application in view of Order XXX Rule 1 of C.P.C. Further the applicant himself issued notice to the two other partners for dissolution of the partnership firm w.e.f. 31.07.2015 as per the notice issued by the appellant himself. Therefore no question of representing the partnership firm by the appellant arises after dissolution of the firm. 15. Learned counsel further submitted that the appellant had instituted many proceedings against the decree holder and all these proceedings were decided against him and to protract the delivery of possession of the property to the decree holder the present application was filed. Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon certain decisions in support of his submission. 16. On considering the material on record, this Court has to find out as to whether there is any substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal as required under Section 100 of CPC. 17. Admittedly, the decree holder filed O.S.No.192/1996 and the said suit was decreed on 09.10.2002. 16. On considering the material on record, this Court has to find out as to whether there is any substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal as required under Section 100 of CPC. 17. Admittedly, the decree holder filed O.S.No.192/1996 and the said suit was decreed on 09.10.2002. Thereafter J.Dr.No.3, who is the present appellant, challenged the said judgment and decree in R.A.No.121/2009 and RSA No.5887/2012, which were dismissed. Thereafter the decree holder filed FDP No.4/2007 in which final decree was drawn on 25.11.2016. Admittedly the present appellant is party to all these proceedings as defendant No.3 and he is J.Dr.No.3 in the execution proceedings in E.P.No.47/2017. The learned counsel for the respondent has produced copies of various proceedings initiated by J.Dr.No.3 after passing preliminary decree and also after passing final decree. All these proceedings are not disputed by the appellant. It is also not disputed that the present appellant had filed application under Section 47 of CPC before the executing Court for determination of the rights of the partnership firm in and over the suit property and the said application was adjudicated and dismissed on 06.08.2018. It is also admitted that the present appellant has not challenged the said order, rejecting the application filed under Section 47 of CPC and it has reached finality. 18. It is contended by the appellant that when an application was filed by the 3rd party, the partnership firm, seeking determination of rights of the firm in the suit property, it was necessary on the part of the executing Court to enquire and determine the rights of the firm. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellant has relied on a decision in the case of Messrs Paramound Industries v. C.M.Malliga, (1991) ILR(Kar) 254. In this case, the Division Bench of this Court has held as follows: "1. It is open to the person in possession of an immoveable property, not being a party to the decree for possession or ejectment or an order of eviction passed under the Act, to obstruct the execution either by filing an objection to the execution before the delivery warrant is issued; or to obstruct the execution of the delivery warrant. 2. It is open to the person in possession of an immoveable property, not being a party to the decree for possession or ejectment or an order of eviction passed under the Act, to obstruct the execution either by filing an objection to the execution before the delivery warrant is issued; or to obstruct the execution of the delivery warrant. 2. The executing Court cannot proceed further in the execution without determining the objections filed by such a Person in terms of Rules 98 to 103 of Order 21 of the C.P. Code in the same manner as a suit, irrespective of the fact whether or not an application is filed by the decree-holder for removal of obstruction under Rule 97 of Order 21 C.P.C." 19. Therefore when an application is made by the 3rd party as an obstructor for execution of decree, the executing Court is required to decide the same in the same manner as in a suit. 20. It is also necessary to observe that in case the application filed by the 3rd party is prima facie not maintainable, whether the executing Court is required to hold a detailed enquiry on the said application has to be considered. The executing Court has relied on the decision reported in AIR 1998 SC 1754 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: "The question also squarely falls within the adjudicatory process contemplated in Order 21 Rule 97(2) of the code. The adjudication mentioned therein deed not necessarily involved a detailed enquiry or collection of evidence. Court can make the adjudication on admitted facts or even on the averments made by the resistor. Of course the court can direct the parties to adduce evidence for such determination if the court deems it necessary." 21. Therefore relying on this decision, the executing Court has come to the conclusion that in the present case, it is not obligatory on the part of the Court to adjudicate the application by conducting enquiry and it is just and sufficient to decide the application on the basis of the record. The manner in which the executing Court heard and disposed of the application cannot be held as illegal or against to the procedure, as such on this ground the impugned order passed by the executing Court cannot be held as not sustainable, to constitute substantial question of law. 22. The manner in which the executing Court heard and disposed of the application cannot be held as illegal or against to the procedure, as such on this ground the impugned order passed by the executing Court cannot be held as not sustainable, to constitute substantial question of law. 22. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of Gujarath High Court in the case of Parmanand Vadilal Vasani and Anr. vs. State of Gujarat and Anr. passed in Special Civil Application No.4468/87 decided on 25.01.1994. In the said case, the Gujarat High Court has held that "registration of partnership firm is not compulsory, such registration enables partnership firm to file suit with respect to certain transaction connected with contract with partnership firm-unregistered firm cannot be in position to file such suit". 23. In the present case, the respondent is not disputing the partnership firm of which he is also one of the partners and the respondent and his wife contribute 70% of share in the said firm, whereas the other shareholder applicant contribute 30% of share. 24. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied on a decision of the Apex Court, in the case of Kazi Akeel Ahemed v. Ibrahim, (1996) 8 SCC 372 . In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "When an application under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code is made, it contemplates an investigation into the claim made in the application, in accordance with the provisions contained in Rule 98 and the rules following thereafter. But in the special facts and circumstances of the present case, there is no reason to hold such an enquiry or investigation as the same would be a futile exercise in view of the fact that civil suit instituted by the respondent making the same claim as has been made by him in his application under Order 21 Rule 97 has been dismissed by the civil court on 2-11-1995. A perusal of the said judgment goes to show that respondent was unable to produce any evidence, oral or documentary, to prove that he was holding the shop in question as a tenant in his own rights. These facts clearly go to show that the claim of the respondent that he was a tenant was wholly fictitious and without any foundation and it was for this reason that the suit had been dismissed with costs. These facts clearly go to show that the claim of the respondent that he was a tenant was wholly fictitious and without any foundation and it was for this reason that the suit had been dismissed with costs. Having regard to these facts and circumstances, there is absolutely no merit in the application of the respondent resisting the execution of the decree validly passed by a competent court of Law." 25. The learned counsel for the respondent has further relied on another decision of the Apex Court, in the case of Bool Chand v. Rabia, (2016) 14 SCC 270 , in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: "While a genuine petition for execution of a decree can certainly be considered, the court cannot be oblivious of frivolous objections being filed after a decree is passed in long-drawn contested proceedings. Attempt to deprive the decree-holder of benefit of such decree should be discouraged by the court where such objection is raised. The impugned order is thus, clearly erroneous and unsustainable and not a result of sound judicial approach." 26. Therefore in view of the decisions referred above, this Court find no fault with the executing Court for adjudicating the application filed by the appellant without recording oral evidence of the parties. 27. The appellant as a 3rd party applicant has stated in the application that the suit property is the property of the partnership firm, which was never contended in any previous proceedings. He has also contended that the partnership firm is a separate legal entity and that as on that date the partnership firm was not dissolved in accordance with law. On the other hand, the appellant himself issued notice to other two partners for dissolution of the firm Ramashraya Book Depot on 31.07.2015 and by this notice, he has clearly stated that the partnership firm is hereby dissolved with effect from 31.07.2015. Even he has further stated in the said notice that in view of the dissolution of the partnership firm, he is the only partner having right to continue business in the name of Ramashraya Book Depot. 28. It is also seen from the deed of partnership firm that operation of the partnership is 'at will' as can be seen from Clause 17 in the partnership deed. 28. It is also seen from the deed of partnership firm that operation of the partnership is 'at will' as can be seen from Clause 17 in the partnership deed. Therefore, the appellant at his will dissolved the firm by notice as provided under Section 43(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. After having dissolved the partnership firm, the appellant cannot be permitted to contend that he is representing the firm. He cannot maintain the application under Order XXI Rules 97, 98, 99, 100 and 101 of CPC, when the firm has already been dissolved. The applicant, one of the partners was also not authorized to file the application by the other partners, which is again the mandatory requirement of Order XXX Rule 1 of CPC. 29. Therefore the application filed by the appellant before the executing Court is prima facie not maintainable and as such it was rightly rejected by the said Court. 30. Under these circumstances, this Court hold that the appellant has not made out any substantial questions of law to be framed in the present appeal. Under the facts and circumstances, it cannot be held that the Courts below are not justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellant as representing the partnership firm. 31. Under these circumstances, it is made out by the respondent that the appellant is trying to delay and protract the execution of the final decree by filing such applications and the same has to be discouraged as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bool Chand v. Rabia stated supra. Accordingly, this Court answer the point for consideration in the negative. As the appeal is devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. In view of the disposal of the appeal, the pending applications, if any, stand disposed of as they do not survive for consideration.