JUDGMENT : Ved Prakash Vaish, J. Heard Sri Vinod Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Rakesh Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for respondents No.2 to 5. 2. The appellant assails impugned judgment and decree dated 18.11.2000 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Hardoi, in Regular Civil Appeal No.51 of 1999, whereby the appeal filed by the appellant-Sri Chhote was dismissed. 3. Briefly stating that the facts of the present case are that one Chhote filed a suit for permanent and mandatory injunction bearing Regular Suit No.82 of 1992 titled as Chhote vs. Ram Hriday and another. The case of plaintiff-Chhote was that he is owner of the disputed land which is Plot No.1780 situated in Village and Post Mansoor Nagar, Tehsil Shahabad, District Hardoi; the defendants tried to interfere in his possession; the defendants have illegally constructed a wall and put up a tin, installed a hand pipe etc. The plaintiff-Chhote sought relief of injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in his possession on the disputed plot; the plaintiff also sought relief of mandatory injunction directing the defendants to remove the unauthorized and illegal construction raised by them. During pendency of the suit, defendant No.1, namely, Ram Hriday died on 31.07.1996 and his legal heirs were substituted. 4. The suit was contested by the defendants by filing written statement, defendants denied the allegations made in the plaint. It was stated that the suit is barred by Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "C.P.C.). 5. On completion of pleadings, following issues were framed by learned trial court:- ^^1& D;k oknh fookfnr Hkwfe xkVk la0 1780 dk ekfyd o dkfct gS \ 2& D;k izfroknhx.k }kjk fd;s x;s voS/k fuekZ.k vUrxZr xkVk la0 1780 dks gVokus dk oknh dks vf/kdkj gS \ 3& D;k okn dk ewY;kadu de fd;k x;k gS rFkk ml ij U;k; 'kqYd de vnk fd;k x;k gS \ 4& D;k oknkLin Hkwfe ij fLFkr dqvka xkVk la0 1780 esa fufeZr ugha gS tSlk fd oknksRrj esa fn;k x;k gS ;fn ugha rks mldk izHkko \ 5& D;k okn esa lkoZtfud fuekZ.k foHkkx dks i{kdkj u cuk;s tkus ls vla;kstu dk nks"k gS \ 6& D;k fookfnr lEifRr izfroknhx.k dh iSr`d lEifRr ugha gS ftl ij izfroknhx.k dk dCtk vjlk njkt ls gS \^^ 6. In support of his case, the plaintiff-Chhote examined himself as PW-1 and Rampal as PW-2. In support of his case, the plaintiff-Chhote examined himself as PW-1 and Rampal as PW-2. The defendants examined Vishun Narayan as DW-1 and Gajodhar as DW-2. 7. By judgment and decree dated 28th October, 1998 the suit was dismissed by learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hardoi. Against the said judgment and decree, plaintiff-Chhote filed an appeal bearing Civil Appeal No.51 of 1999. The said appeal was also dismissed by learned Additional District Judge, Hardoi vide judgment and decree dated 18.11.2000. 8. The appellant, namely, Om Prakash has filed the present second appeal in March, 2001. 9. Vide order dated 15.03.2001, my learned predecessor admitted the appeal on the substantial questions of law formulated at "(a) and (b)" in the memo of appeal. The same are as under:- "(a) Whether a suit can be dismissed merely on the ground of non-identifiability of the land without exhausting all legal steps to get it located? (b) Whether after non-acceptance of a Survey Commission report, submitted in the case for technical grounds, it was not incumbent upon the Court to issue another Survey Commission to get the land in Suit located on the spot?" 10. A substantial question of law has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and sons Ltd. vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., (1962) AIR SC 1314 to mean as under:- "(6).......The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would in or opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the questions is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 11. If the questions is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 11. What is 'substantial question of law' is no more res integra in view of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 . In the said case it was held that:- "12. The phrase 'substantial question of law', as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying 'question of law', means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction to - technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of 'substantial question of law' by suffixing the words 'of general importance' as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance........". 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and others vs. S.N. Goyal, (2008) AIR SC 2594 has laid down the law with respect to 'Substantial Questions of Law'. The relevant part of the judgment of the Supreme Court is extracted herein below: (9.1) Second appeals would lie in cases which involve substantial questions of law. The word 'substantial' prefixed to 'question of law' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lies between the parties. 'Substantial questions of law' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. In the context of section 100 CPC, any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. 'Substantial questions of law' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. In the context of section 100 CPC, any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing in the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law. Where there is a clear and settled enunciation on a question of law, by this Court or by the High Court concerned, it cannot be said that the case involves a substantial question of law. It is said that a substantial question of law arises when a question of law, which is not finally settled by this court (or by the concerned High Court so far as the State is concerned), arises for consideration in the case. But this statement has to be understood in the correct perspective. Where there is a clear enunciation of law and the lower court has followed or rightly applied such clear enunciation of law, obviously the case will not be considered as giving rise to a substantial question of law, even if the question of law may be one of general importance....." 13. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the suit filed by the plaintiff-Chhote was dismissed by learned trial court on the ground that the disputed land is not identifiable, Survey Commission was appointed who submitted a report and, in case, the report of the Survey Commission (61C) was not acceptable, another Survey Commission ought to have been appointed. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant also submits that the trial court has erred inholding that the disputed land belongs to Public Works Department (P.W.D.), Hardoi, Uttar Pradesh and the Public Works Department was a necessary party. 15. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents urges that the appellant was neither a party in the suit nor in the first appeal and the appeal filed by the appellant is not maintainable. 16. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the trial court has rightly observed that the plaintiff-Chhote was not owner of the disputed land. According to him, there is no illegality or infirmity in the judgments passed by the trial court and the first appellate court. 17. 16. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the trial court has rightly observed that the plaintiff-Chhote was not owner of the disputed land. According to him, there is no illegality or infirmity in the judgments passed by the trial court and the first appellate court. 17. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel for both the parties. I have also carefully considered the material available on record. 18. On a specific query put to learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant was neither party in the suit nor in the first appeal, how the second appeal filed by appellant, Om Prakash is maintainable. Counsel for appellant states that the appellant purchased the disputed land from the plaintiff, Chhote vide registered sale deed dated 02.12.1998; an application for impleadment (application 19 C) was filed on 05.07.2000 which was dismissed by learned first appellate court. 19. It is settled principle of law that a person who is not a party to the suit or that who is stranger to the suit, is not entitled to file an appeal. 20. Undisputedly, the appellant, Om Prakash was neither a party in the suit nor in the first appeal. It is an appeal presented by a person having no lis because an appeal cannot be presented by any person like a plaintiff or defendant of a suit, but can be presented only by a party to the suit, if he or she is aggrieved by the judgment. An appeal can be filed by a person who is not a party but who is aggrieved by the judgment, if he or she (as the case may be) seeks and obtains the leave of the Court to prefer an appeal against the judgment. 21. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Indian Bank Ltd., Madras vs. Seth Bansiram Jashamal (Firm) and another, (1934) AIR Madras 360 (DB) it was held that no person who is not a party to the suit can prefer an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code. 22. 21. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Indian Bank Ltd., Madras vs. Seth Bansiram Jashamal (Firm) and another, (1934) AIR Madras 360 (DB) it was held that no person who is not a party to the suit can prefer an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code. 22. Similarly, A Division Bench of Patna High Court, in the case of Shah Zarihul Haque vs. Syed Rashid Ahmad and others,1935 AIR Patna 261 (DB) it was observed that there is no right of appeal in every matter which comes under the consideration, such right must be given by statute or some authority equivalent to a statute. A person who was not a party to original action could not file an appeal. 23. Similarly, in the case of Indradeo Narain Singh vs. Gouri Shankar, (1918) AIR Patna 364, a receiver was appointed in execution of a mortgage decree. The petitioner who was not a party to the suit objected to the receiver taking possession of the property on the ground that his father had taken a lease of the property and that he was entitled to retain possession, because although the lease was subsequent to the mortgage, yet he had paid off debts and other charges prior to the decree in the suit under which the sale had been held, and that he was entitled to retain possession of the property as holder of prior charges. The objection was over ruled on the ground that the lease had no existence in the eyes of law having been laid during the pendency of the mortgage suit. The objector preferred appeal to the High Court. It was held that the objector, not having been a party to the suit, had no right of appeal. 24. A similar question was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Smt. Ganga Bai vs. Vijay Kumar and others, (1974) AIR SC 1126 and it was observed as under:- "15. It is thus clear that the appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 in the High Court was directed originally not against any part of the preliminary decree but against mere finding recorded by the trial court that the partition was not genuine. The main controversy before us centers round the question whether that appeal was maintainable. On this question the position seems to us well-established. The main controversy before us centers round the question whether that appeal was maintainable. On this question the position seems to us well-established. There is a basic distinction between the right of suit and the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring suit of a civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may, at one's peril, bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit howsoever frivolous the claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. But the position in regard to appeals is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute." 25. The observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly explains the distinction between a right to appeal which is a creature of statute as contrasted with a right to file a suit, which is also limited to a person, referred to under Section 9 of the C.P.C. provided he has got a cause of action and a remedy to be sought. 26. In the instant case, admittedly the appellant, Om Prakash was neither a party in the suit nor in the first appeal. 27. As regards, submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant, Om Prakash moved an application for impleadment on 05.07.2000 before learned Additional District Judge, it may be mentioned that the said application was dismissed by learned Additional District Judge, Hardoi vide order dated 02.08.2000. The said order was not challenged by the appellant at any point of time and has therefore, attained finality. 28. In view of the aforesaid facts of the case, as a matter of fact two substantial questions of law which have been framed by my learned predecessor does not arise. 29. It will not be out of place to mention here that the appellant has not moved any application seeking leave of the Court to file an appeal against the impugned judgment and decree. Thus, the appeal is not maintainable. 30. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails, same deserves to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed. 31. 29. It will not be out of place to mention here that the appellant has not moved any application seeking leave of the Court to file an appeal against the impugned judgment and decree. Thus, the appeal is not maintainable. 30. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails, same deserves to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed. 31. No order as to costs. 32. Lower court records be sent back forthwith.