ORDER : 1. These three writ petitions since are having the similar issues, as such, have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. It has been submitted by Mr. Atanu Banerjee, learned senior standing counsel-III in W.P. (C) No. 3743 of 2019 and Mr. Krishna Shankar, learned counsel in W.P. (C) No. 3789 of 2019 that the counter affidavit filed by the State-respondent in W.P. (C) No. 3956 of 2019 may be relied upon in W.P. (C) No. 3743 of 2019 and W.P. (C) No. 3789 of 2019. 3. Mrs. Indrani S. Choudhary, learned counsel for the University in all these writ petitions has submitted that the University is to act upon in pursuance to the decision taken by the State-authority and since the impugned orders have been passed by the functionary of the State respondent, at present, she has nothing to say with respect to the legality and propriety of the impugned orders. 4. The prayer made in the writ petitions are for quashing of the order dated 24.07.2019 as contained in Letter No. 1650 subject matter of W.P. (C) No. 3956 of 2019, order dated 10.07.2019 as contained in Memo No. 1479 in W.P. (C) No. 3743 of 2019 and order dated 09.07.2019 as contained in Memo No. 1464 in W.P. (C) No. 3789 of 2019 by which the permanent recognition to run the evening college for the academic session 2019-22 and 2020-23 have been rejected since the condition provided under the newly constituted regulation as contained under notification No. 247 of 2016 dated 05.04.2018 are not being fulfilled. 5. 5. The brief facts of the case of the petitioners which is almost similar in all these writ petitions are that the petitioners’ institutions have been established to run evening college and the appropriate recognition has also been granted in their favour in view of the provision of 15(2)(b) of the Statute Relating to Admission and Exclusion of College Other Than Those Managed and Maintained by the University as approved by the Chancellor vide letter No. BSU-16/86-1096-GS(1) dated 19.04.1986 and in pursuance to the said law the relaxation has been granted to run the institutions in a building which according to the respondent-authorities have been founded to be suitable building as per the provision contained in the statue notified on 15.04.1986 as under 15(2)(b) but after coming into effect of the new rule by way of notification dated 05.04.2018 the permanent recognition to run the institutions has been refused on the ground of non-fulfillment of the condition provided under the provision of statute 16(2)(b). 6. According to the petitioners, the notification dated 05.04.2018 has been notified and implemented w.e.f. 05.04.2018 and these institutions are being run to allow in pursuance to the provision of 15(2)(b), the statute No. 29 notified on 19.04.1986 and therefore, the notification dated 05.04.2018 cannot be made applicable with respect to the case of the petitioner since the institutions in question are running prior to the notification dated 05.04.2018, as such, the petitioners institutions are to be governed by the statue No. 29 notified on 19.04.1986 on the ground of the fact that the notification dated 05.04.2018 cannot be made applicable with retrospective effect. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent-State of Jharkhand in all these three writ petitions has submitted that in view of the provision of 19 of the Statute notified on 05.04.2018 the statute which was notified on 19.04.1986 has been superseded and hence, the provision contained in pursuance to the notification dated 05.04.2018 will be applicable in the case of the petitioners’ institutions as per which the petitioners’ institutions are not fulfilling the eligibility criteria of having building of an existing college. 8. 8. It has been submitted that the provision of Clause 16(2) is pari-materia to that of the Clause 15(2) of the notification dated 19.04.1986 but the conscious legislation has been made by making some deletion by way of amendment under the provision of 15(2)(b) of the statute notified on 19.04.1986 wherein the evening college may be allowed to function but having any building of an existing college or a secondary school or any other suitable building but in the new notification of 05.04.2018 running of evening college or a secondary school or any other suitable building has been repealed, therefore, in view of the super-session of the Act notified on 19.04.1986 by the Act of 05.04.2018 whatever provision is contained under the new law, that is applicable. 9. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of their rival submissions, the issue which is to be answered in this case is the effect of repealment and accrual of a right in favour of the petitioners’ institutions. In order to answer this issue, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is required to be referred which reads hereunder as: “6. Effect of repeal - Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not:- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed. (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act deals with the effect of repeal which provides that the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed or affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, meaning thereby, the effect of repeal would be if anything has been granted in favour of anybody that cannot be taken away since by virtue of repeal act, the right has said to have been accrued and if the right has been accrued the same cannot be taken away by repealment of the provision of the statute. The effect of repealment has been discussed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Hirendra Pal Singh and Others, (2011) 5 SCC 305 wherein their Lordships have held at paragraphs-22 & 24 which are being quoted herein-below: “22. It is a settled legal proposition that whenever an Act is repealed, it must be considered as if it had never existed. The object of repeal is to obliterate the Act from the statutory books, except for certain purposes as provided under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Repeal is not a matter of mere form but is of substance. Therefore, on repeal, the earlier provisions stand obliterated/abrogated/wiped out wholly, i.e. pro tanto repeal. 24. Thus, there is a clear distinction between repeal and suspension of the statutory provisions and the material difference between both is that repeal removes the law entirely; when suspended, it still exists and has operation in other respects except wherein it has been suspended. Therefore, on repeal, the earlier provisions stand obliterated/abrogated/wiped out wholly, i.e. pro tanto repeal. 24. Thus, there is a clear distinction between repeal and suspension of the statutory provisions and the material difference between both is that repeal removes the law entirely; when suspended, it still exists and has operation in other respects except wherein it has been suspended. Thus, a repeal puts an end to the law. A suspension holds it in abeyance.” In the case of Board of Control for Cricket in India vs. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd. (2018) 6 SCC 287 wherein their Lordships have held at paragraph-43 which is being quoted herein-below: “43. Shri Sundaram’s submission is also not in consonance with the law laid down in some of our judgments. The approach to statutes, which amend a statute by way of repeal, was put most felicitously by B.K. Mukherjea, J. in State of Punjab vs. Mohar Singh, SCR at pp. 899-900, thus: (AIR p.99 para 8). “In our opinion the approach of the High Court to the question is not quite correct. Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. It is in the light of these principles that we now proceed to examine the facts of the present case.” This statement of the law has subsequently been followed in Transport and Dock Workers’ Union and Others vs. New Dholera Steamships Ltd. at para 6 and T.S. Baliah vs. ITO, SCR at pp. 71-72.” 10. The issue of repealment and saving was also the subject matter before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Manas Purohit and Others vs. State of Odisha and Others in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 1706 of 2019 wherein a three judges Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold at paragraph 22, 23, 24 and 25, which reads hereunder as: “22. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 also deals with the effect of repeal, which is extracted hereunder: “6. Effect of repeal - Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not: (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect. (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed. (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid. Any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. The provisions contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act stipulate that by the repeal of enactment, the benefit given to the person concerned shall not be affected. The provisions contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act stipulate that by the repeal of enactment, the benefit given to the person concerned shall not be affected. However, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes place. The previous operation of any enactment or anything is duly done or suffered thereunder shall not be affected or any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. However, the best guide is found in what has been saved is by reference to the repealing provisions in the order of 2004 which are clear and unambiguous. 23. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edition by Justice G.P. Singh, following observation has been made: “The distinction between what is, and what is not a right preserved by the provisions of Section 6, General Clauses Act is often one of great fineness. What is unaffected by the repeal of a statute is a right acquired or accrued under it and not a mere hope or expectation of or liberty to apply for, acquiring a right. A distinction is drawn between a legal proceeding for enforcing a right acquired or accrued and a legal proceeding for acquisition of a right. The former is saved whereas the latter is not. In construing identical provisions of section 10 of the Hong Kong Interpretation Ordinance, LORD MARRIS speaking for the Privy Council observed: “It may be, therefore, that under some repealed enactment, a right has been given, but that, in respect of it, some investigation or legal proceeding is necessary. The right is then unaffected and preserved. It will be preserved even if a process of quantification is necessary. But there is a manifest distinction between an investigation in respect of a right and an investigation which is to decide whether some right should or should not be given. On a repeal, the former is preserved by the Interpretation Act. The latter is not. It will be preserved even if a process of quantification is necessary. But there is a manifest distinction between an investigation in respect of a right and an investigation which is to decide whether some right should or should not be given. On a repeal, the former is preserved by the Interpretation Act. The latter is not. The LORD CHANCELLOR’S (LORD HERSCHELL’S) observations in an earlier Privy Council case, that “mere right to take advantage of an enactment without any act done by an individual towards availing himself of that right cannot property be deemed a right accrued” are not to be understood as supporting the view that if steps are taken under a statute for acquiring a right, the right accrues even if the steps taken do not reach the stage when the right is given, nor do the said observations support the view that if no steps are taken for enforcement of a right come into existence, the right is not an accrued right. As explained by SINHA, C.J. the observations of LORD HERSCHLL are only authority for the proposition that the mere right, existing at the date of a repealing statute to take advantage of provisions of the statute repealed is not a right accrued. Inchoate or contingent rights and liabilities, i.e. rights and liabilities which have accrued but which are in the progress of being enforced or are yet to be enforced are unaffected for clause (c) clearly contemplates that there will be situations when an investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may have to be continued or resorted to before the right or liability can be enforced. Such a right or liability is not merely a ‘hope’ which is destroyed by the repeal. It is submitted that as pointed out by SIMON BROWN, L.J., the two expressions are generally used in saving legislations to convey the same idea and are not mutually exclusive. Yet a possible distinction may be made between cases where some step, after the Act comes into force, is needed to be taken by the claimant for getting the right and cases where the Act, without anything being further done by the claimant confers the right. In the former class of cases, it would be a right acquired after the necessary step is taken whereas in the latter class of cases it would be a right accrued by mere force of the Act. In the former class of cases, it would be a right acquired after the necessary step is taken whereas in the latter class of cases it would be a right accrued by mere force of the Act. The right of a tenant, who has the land for a certain number of years and who has personally cultivated the same for that period ‘to be deemed to be protected tenant’ under the provisions of a statute has been held to be an accrued right which will survive the repeal of the statute. Similarly, a right conferred by an Act that every lease shall be deemed to be for a period of ten years is a right acquired and will be unaffected by repeal of the Act. But the so –called right of a statutory tenant to protection against eviction under a Control of Eviction Act is mere advantage and not a right in the real sense and does not continue after repeal of the Act. Similarly on the reasoning that the right of a tenant to get standard rent fixed and not to pay contractual rent in excess of standard rent under a Rent Control Act is only a protective right and not a vested right, it has been held that when during the pendency of an application for fixation of standard rent, the Act is amended and it ceases to apply to the premises in question, the application is rendered incompetent and has to be dismissed as infructuous. The option given to a grantee to make additional purchases of Crown land on fulfilment of certain conditions under the provisions of the statute was held to be not an accrued right when the statute was repealed before the exercise of the option. The privilege to get an extension of a licence under an enactment is not an accrued right and no application can be filed after the repeal of the enactment for renewal of the licence. The right of privilege to claim benefit of condonation of delay is not an accrued right under a repealed provision when the delay had not occurred before the repeal of the said provision. The right of privilege to claim benefit of condonation of delay is not an accrued right under a repealed provision when the delay had not occurred before the repeal of the said provision. The right of pre-emption conferred by an Act it is remedial right or in other words a right to take advantage of an enactment for acquiring a right to land or other property and cannot be said to have been acquired or accrued until a decree is passed and does not survive if the Act is repealed before passing of the final decree. The right of a Government servant to be considered for promotion in accordance with existing rules is not a vested right and does not survive if the Government takes a policy decision not to fill up the vacancy pending revision of the rules and the revised rules with repeal the existing rules do not make him eligible for promotion. General savings of rights accrued, and liabilities incurred under a repealed Act by force of section 6, General Clauses Act, are subject to a contrary intention evinced by the repealing Act. In case of a bare repeal, there is hardly any room for a contrary intention; but when the repeal is accompanied by fresh legislation on the same subject, the provisions of the new Act will have evinces a contrary intention affecting the operation of section 6, General Clauses Act.........When a saving clause in a new Act is comprehensively worded and is detailed, it may be possible to infer that it is exhaustive and expresses a intention not to call for the application of section 6, General Clauses Act. 24. It is apparent from the aforesaid discussion that what is unaffected by the repeal of a statute is a right acquired or accrued and not mere hope or expectation of or liberty to apply for acquiring a right. There is a distinction in making an application for acquiring a right. If under some repealed enactment, a right has been given, but on investigation in respect of a right is necessary whether such right should be or should not be given, no such right is saved. Right to take advantage of a provision is not saved. There is a distinction in making an application for acquiring a right. If under some repealed enactment, a right has been given, but on investigation in respect of a right is necessary whether such right should be or should not be given, no such right is saved. Right to take advantage of a provision is not saved. After repeal, an advantage available under the repealed Act to apply and obtain relief is not a right which is saved when the application was necessary and it was discretionary to grant the relief and investigation was required whether relief should be granted or not. The repeal would not save the right to obtain such a relief. The right of pre-emption is not an accrued right. It is a remedial right to take advantage of an enactment. The right of a Government servant to be considered for promotion under repealed rules is not a vested right unless repeal provision contains some saving and right has been violated earlier. 25. In general savings of the rights accrued under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act are subject to a contrary intention evinced by the repealing Act. It depends upon the repealing provisions what it keeps alive and what it intends to destroy when repeal and saving clause is comprehensively worded, then the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act are not applicable.” 11. It also requires to refer herein in order to answer the argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners, the vested right or the accrual of right. The word vested as has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition) at page-1563, means fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are ‘vested’ when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute vested rights. In Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at page-1397, the word ‘vested’ is defined as a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right, vested interest. The word ‘vested’ is normally used where an immediate fixed right in present or future enjoyment in respect of a property is created. In Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at page-1397, the word ‘vested’ is defined as a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right, vested interest. The word ‘vested’ is normally used where an immediate fixed right in present or future enjoyment in respect of a property is created. With the long usage the said word ‘vest’ has also acquired a meaning as “an absolute or indefeasible right.” It had a ‘legitimate’ or “settled expectation” to obtain right to enjoy the property etc. Such “settled expectation” can be rendered impossible of fulfillment due to change in law by the legislature. Besides this, such a “settled expectation” or the so-called “vested right” cannot be countenanced against public interest and convenience which are sought to be served by amendment of the law. Thus “vested right” is a right independent of any contingency. Such a right can arise from a contract, statute or by operation of law. A vested right can be taken away only if the law specifically or by necessary implication provide for such a course. In the light of the definition of the “vested right” it is evident that right accrues to person or persons attached to an institution or building or anything whatsoever, meaning thereby, if an incumbent is claiming a vested right, he is to substantiate before the court of law that the right has been created in his favour by an order passed in pursuance to the applicable law. Further it is evident from the meaning of the ‘vested’ as per the Black’s Law Dictionary which means the settled or absolute right and the settled or absolute right will only be said to be a right in this nature if the right has been created as a permanent right. 12. In the light of the aforesaid position of law this Court has proceeded to examine the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and for doing so, it requires to refer the provision of Statute No. 29 which has been approved by the Chancellor as on 19.04.1986 relating to admission and exclusion of colleges other than those managed and maintained by the Universities under the provision of 15 thereof, the reference of evening college has been made. 13. Sub-Section 2 of Section 15 confers power regarding grant of affiliation by relaxing some conditions which are: “15. 13. Sub-Section 2 of Section 15 confers power regarding grant of affiliation by relaxing some conditions which are: “15. (2) The provisions of the above articles regarding grant of affiliation may be relaxed in the following matters in the case of the Evening College:- (a) The security deposit may be reduced up to 50%. (b) An Evening College may be allowed to function in the buildings of an existing college or a secondary School or any other suitable building. (c) An Evening College should be given affiliation in a subject requiring attendance at practical classes only if it arranges for the use of the laboratory of the institution in which it is functioning, provided that adequate requisite facilities exist. (d) No additional provision for library need be made if the institution in which the college is functioning has a suitable library, the use of which is permitted to the staff and students of the Evening College. (e) An Evening College may be allowed to have part-time teachers including retired hands, provided they are otherwise qualified.” 14. It requires to be referred herein the meaning and interpretation of super-session in order to have effect of repeal as under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Koteswar Vittal Kamath vs. K. Rangappa Baliya and Co. (1969) 1 SCC 255 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the distinction between super-session of a rule and substitution of rule in para 8 of the report, which reads hereunder as: “...........The process of substitution consists of two steps. First the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place. Even if the new rule be invalid, the first step of the old rule ceasing to exist comes into effect and it was for this reason that the court held in Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid and Co. vs. State of Madras, that on declaration of the new rule as invalid, the old rule could not be held to be revived.” In the case of B.N. Tewari vs. Union of India, AIR 1965 SC 1430 , the constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, has dealt with the effect of substitution by observing therein that promulgating the new carry forward rule of 1955, the Government of India itself cancelled the carry forward rule of 1952. When, therefore, this court struck down the carry forward rule as modified in 1955 that did not mean that the carry forward rule of 1952, which had already ceased to exist because the Government of India itself cancelled it and had substituted a modified rule in 1955 in its place, could revive. In the case of State of Orissa vs. Mangalji Mulji Khara, 1985 Supp SCC 280, the Supreme Court had to consider the effect of super-session of earlier Government notifications by the Orissa Government notifications dated December 29, 1977 wherein it was held that the word "super-session" in this notification was used in the same sense as the words "repeal and replacement" whereby under the previous notifications all that was done by using the words "in super-session of all previous notifications" in the notifications dated December 29, 1977, was that they repealed and replaced previous notifications and did not wipe out any liability incurred under the previous notifications. In the case of Jyothi Home Industries vs. State of Karnataka, (1987) 64 STC 208 at paragraph-32 at page-243 of the report it was observed, the word super-session was judicially understood to mean repeal. The notifications in this case were perilously close to the consequences arising out of a repeal without the benefit of a saving clause in respect of the obligations previously incurred but for the saving principle.” In the case of State of Orissa vs. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. 1985 Supp SCC 280, it was observed, the word super-session in the notifications dated December 29, 1977, is used in the same sense as the words repeal and replacement and, therefore, does not have the effect of wiping out the tax liability under the previous notifications. All that was done by using the words in super-session of all previous notifications in the notifications dated December 29, 1977, was to repeal and replace previous notifications and not to wipe out any liability incurred under the previous notifications. It is therefore evident that the meaning of super-session is same to that of repeal, hence, the provision of clause 6 of the General Clauses Act will be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case since herein the statute of the year 1986 has been superseded by the Act of 2018.” 15. It is therefore evident that the meaning of super-session is same to that of repeal, hence, the provision of clause 6 of the General Clauses Act will be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case since herein the statute of the year 1986 has been superseded by the Act of 2018.” 15. It is the admitted case of the petitioners that the institutions have been established in pursuance to the provision as incorporated under the statute notified on 19.04.1986 and they are running since then. It is further admitted case of the petitioners that as yet the permanent recognition for the said institutions have not been granted rather the petitioners’ institutions have been granted recognition year-wise which is also evident from the impugned orders. 16. The petitioners’ institutions have made application for grant of permanent affiliation for the session 2019-22 and 2020-23. At the time of submission of such applications by the petitioners’ institutions the statute as notified on 19.04.1986 has been superseded by virtue of the new rule notified on 05.04.2018 with the specific provision as contained under the provision of 19 to the effect which reads hereunder as: “19. The Statutes shall come into force in super-session of the Statutes approved by the Chancellor in 19.04.1986 vide letter no. BSU-16/86-1098-GS(1).” It is evident from the aforesaid quoted provision as under the provision of 19, the statute notified on 05.04.2018 came into force in super-session of the statute approved by the Chancellor on 19.04.1986. It is thus evident that on or after 05.04.2018 the procedure which is to be followed is to be based upon the provision contained therein which would be the effect of the provision of 19 of the notification dated 05.04.2018. 17. In the light of the aforesaid legal position, the factual aspect has been scrutinized by this Court. The admitted fact in this case is that the petitioners’ institutions have not been granted permanent recognition rather the applications for granting permanent recognition has been filed as would appear from the impugned orders which does suggest and emphatically demonstrate that no vested right has been said to be created in favour of the petitioners’ institutions since as per the definition of vested right as reflected hereinabove, if the right is not permanent in nature, no vested right can be said to have accrued causing it a vested right. 18. 18. In the present facts, the petitioners’ institutions since are making applications for grant of permanent recognition for the session 2019-22 and 2020-23, as such the applications which have been filed can only be considered on the basis of the prevalent rules. 19. Admittedly the petitioners are claiming the benefit on the basis of the rules notified in 19.04.1986 whereby and whereunder under the provision of statute 15(2)(b) an Evening College may be allowed to function in the building of an existing college or a secondary school or any other suitable building and according to the petitioners the institutions in question are running in a suitable building and hence making applicable the provision of law as notified on 19.04.1986 the recognition is required to be given while on the other hand, the stand of the State is that on the date of making an application since the law notified by virtue of notification dated 19.04.1986 has been superseded by virtue of provision of statute of 19 as contained in notification dated 05.04.2018 whereby and whereunder the condition for grant of affiliation can be relaxed for an evening college allowing it to function in the building of an existing college by repealing the other criteria of running of institutions in the secondary school or any other suitable building. 20. The question is that in view of the provision of statute 19, the statute notified on 19.04.1986 has been superseded by virtue of notification dated 05.04.2018 having no saving clause and furthermore, that no permanent recognition has been granted which is the admitted case of the petitioners, therefore, there is no question of accrual of any vested right in favour of the petitioners’ institutions. 21. 21. In view of the aforesaid fact on the basis of the provision of clause 6 of the General Clauses Act as referred hereinabove, this Court, is of the view that after super-session of the provision of the Act notified on 19.04.1986 in view of the provision of statute 19 of the notification dated 05.04.2018 authorities have rejected the claim of the petitioners holding therein that the condition as required to be fulfilled under Section 16(2) for relaxation to grant affiliation is not being fulfilled since there is no building of an existing college and is it the admitted case of the petitioners that they are running the institutions in the rented building, therefore, the said condition having not in consonance with the provision of statute 16(2)(b) the decision taken against the petitioners’ institutions cannot be said to suffer from infirmity. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also argued out the matter on the ground of non-application of notification dated 05.04.2018 on the ground of retrospectivity but the question herein is that the retrospectivity can only be seen if any right has accrued and that right has been snatched away by retrospective application of a statute. 23. Herein, as has been referred hereinabove that no right has been accrued said to have vested or accrued right, as such, it is not a case of retrospective application rather the Act notified on 05.04.2018 being a prospective Act has been taken into consideration by the authority basis upon which the petitioners’ institutions have not found eligible for relaxation in granting affiliation as per the condition incorporated under the provision of statute 16(2)(b) of the notification dated 05.04.2018. 24. These writ petitions have been filed for issuance of writ of certiorari and it is settled position of law that while issuing writ of certiorari the scope of writ court is very limited as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein the Hon’ble Constitution Bench has held that a writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals i.e., when the authority is found to have acted: (i) without jurisdiction-by assuming jurisdiction where there exist none. (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by over-stepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction. (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by over-stepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction. (iii) acting contrary to law or the rule or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioned failure of justice. 25. It is also settled that the writ of certiorari can only be issued unless the following requirement is satisfied i.e., the error is manifest and apparent on the face of proceeding such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and a grave injustice or gross violation of justice is occasioned thereby. 26. This Court after taking into consideration the aforesaid position of law on the basis of the factual and legal issues as discussed in detail hereinabove, is of the view that the impugned orders suffers from no infirmity, accordingly, all these writ petitions fail and stands dismissed.