JUDGMENT R. K. Deshpande, J. - The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines "criminal contempt" contained in Section 2(c) as under : "2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (c) "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which- (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any Court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner." 2. Whether the physical attack or assault on the Judicial Officer by the respondent -contemnor, who is a practising lawyer and working as the Assistant Public Prosecutor, in the premises of the District Court at Nagpur, during working hours, constitutes a "criminal contempt", as defined under Section 2(c), reproduced above, is the question involved in the present case. 3. The incident occurred on 26122018 and the offences punishable under Sections 332, 353 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code were registered against the contemnor vide Crime No.538 of 2018 in the Sadar Police Station, Nagpur. Upon getting information of such incident on that date itself, this Court issued notice to the contemnor as to why an action for contempt of Court should not be initiated against him. 4. In response to the notice issued by this Court, Shri Subodh Dharmadhikari, the learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Chinmay Dharmadhikari, Advocate, appears for the respondent-contemnor. 5. On the last occasion, we invited the attention of the learned Senior Advocate to the provision of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which is reproduced below : "10. 4. In response to the notice issued by this Court, Shri Subodh Dharmadhikari, the learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Chinmay Dharmadhikari, Advocate, appears for the respondent-contemnor. 5. On the last occasion, we invited the attention of the learned Senior Advocate to the provision of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which is reproduced below : "10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate Courts.:- Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of Courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself: Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." We asked the learned Senior Advocate to address us on the question as to whether the bar created under the proviso below Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 operates in the present matter to take the cognizance of the act, which prima facie constitutes the contempt, particularly when the offences punishable under Sections 332, 353 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code are already registered. 6. The learned Senior Advocate has invited our attention to the decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of (i) Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras, (1952) AIR SC 149 ; and (ii) Arun Paswan, SI v. State of Bihar and others, (2004) 5 SCC 53 , and submitted that the bar provided for taking cognizance of contempt under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would not operate, as this Court has expressed that prima facie the conduct of the contemnor constitutes the criminal contempt. 7. On merits, the learned Senior Advocate submitted that the contemnor may not be compelled to file an affidavit in respect of the facts pertaining to the incident in question, inasmuch as the same would amount to disclosure of his defence in the criminal prosecution to be set in motion on the basis of the registration of Crime No.538 of 2018 in the Sadar Police Station at Nagpur for the offences punishable under Sections 332, 353 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. According to him, this would violate the fundamental right of the contemnor against self-incrimination guaranteed under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. It is urged that the present contempt proceedings be kept in abeyance till the conclusion of the trial in respect of the offences alleged against the contemnor. 8. Before the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Bathina Reddy''s case, cited supra, an argument was that a libellous reflection upon the conduct of a Judge in respect of his judicial duties would certainly come under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, which defines "defamation" and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court was barred under Section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926. The Apex Court considered the bar created under Section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, which is reproduced below : Section 2(3) : "No High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code." The language of the proviso below Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as we find, is almost identically worded and the ratio of the said decision would apply to the facts of this case. 9. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has held that the jurisdiction of the High Court is excluded only in cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt of a subordinate Court are punishable as contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not where these acts merely amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided for in the Indian Penal Code. The Apex Court further holds in Para 9 of the said decision as under : "9. ...... The Apex Court further holds in Para 9 of the said decision as under : "9. ...... It seems, therefore, that there are offences which are punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code and as subordinate Courts can sufficiently vindicate their dignity under the provisions of criminal law in such cases the legislature deemed it proper to exclude them from the jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 2(3), Contempt of Courts Act, but it would not be correct to say that the High Court''s jurisdiction is excluded even in cases where the act complained of, which is alleged to constitute contempt, is otherwise an offence under the Indian Penal Code." In the present case, the offences alleged against the contemnor and punishable under Sections 332, 353 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, are not described and made punishable as contempt under any specific provision of the Indian Penal Code, but the act complained of, is alleged to constitute contempt. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, the bar created under the proviso below Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 shall not operate to proceed with the trial initiated upon suo motu proceedings for contempt. We are, therefore, in agreement with the submission of the learned Senior Advocate Shri Subodh Dharmadhikari. 10. We, therefore, admit this petition for contempt upon framing of the charge as under: You, Dipesh Madanlal Parate, the contemnor, has committed an act of physical attack or assault upon the Judicial Officer Shri K.R. Deshpande, Civil Judge, Senior Division, in the premises of the District Court at Nagpur on 26-10-2018 at about 12 noon, and has threatened him to kill, thereby deterring him from performing or discharging his duty, which constitutes an act of "criminal contempt", as defined under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Though we have framed the charge and the petition for contempt is admitted, in our view, it may not be desirable to proceed further in the matter till the decision of the Court of competent jurisdiction is delivered in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 332, 353 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code in Crime No.538 of 2018. Though we have framed the charge and the petition for contempt is admitted, in our view, it may not be desirable to proceed further in the matter till the decision of the Court of competent jurisdiction is delivered in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 332, 353 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code in Crime No.538 of 2018. We find substance in the plea that the fundamental right of the contemnor guaranteed under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India needs to be protected and to proceed further in this petition and decide it prior to conclusion of the prosecution for the said offences, would take away the fundamental right. 11. We, therefore, pass an order as under : (1) This petition for criminal contempt is admitted on the charge framed against the contemnor. (2) This petition is kept in abeyance till the decision in the prosecution against the contemnor for the offences alleged. (3) The office is directed to list this matter before this Court as and when the proceedings in Crime No.538 of 2018 are concluded. Order accordingly.