JUDGMENT : BELA M. TRIVEDI, J. 1. The present appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 25.02.1994 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar (hereinafter referred to as “the Sessions Court”) in Sessions Case No. 163 of 1991, whereby the respondents­accused Nos. 1,2 and 3 have been acquitted from the charges levelled against them for the offences punishable under Sections 498A read with 114, 304B read with 114, and Section 302 read with 114 and the respondents­accused Nos. 4 and 5 have been acquitted from the charges leveled against them for the offences punishable under Section 498A of IPC. As such the respondent No. 5 Dhudhiben has expired during the pendency of the Appeal and therefore the appeal has stood abated qua the respondent No. 5. 2. At the outset, it may be stated that initially the charge­sheet was filed by the Investigating Officer against the respondents­accused Nos. 1­3 only and accordingly charge was framed by the Sessions Court at Exh. 3 against the said three accused, however during the course of the trial the respondents­accused Nos. 4 and 5 were added as the accused and the supplementary charge was framed against the said accused on 01.09.1993. Accordingly the trial had proceeded against all the five accused and the Sessions Court after appreciating the evidence on record acquitted all the accused from the respective charges leveled against them vide the impugned judgment and order dated 25.02.1994. 3. The case of the prosecution in nutshell was that the deceased­ Meenaben Govind Harji happened to be the wife of the accused no. 1 Parmar Govind Harji, sister­in­law(Bhabhi) of the accused No. 2 Parmar Damuben @ Damayanti Hirji and accused no. 3 Rathod Ranjanben, and happened to be the daughter­in­law of the accused No. 4 Harjibhai Dudhabhai and accused No. 5 Dudhiben wife of Harjibhai. The accused No. 1 had married the deceased­ Meenaben on 30.05.1991 and after the marriage the deceased was staying with her in­laws at Savarkundla. It was further the case of the prosecution that on the fateful day of the incident i.e. on 13.09.1991 at about 6:00 a.m. the deceased was doing her routine work near the almond tree grown in the open area of the accused's house and at that time the accused Nos. 2 and 3 poured kerosene oil on her. It was further the case of the prosecution that on the fateful day of the incident i.e. on 13.09.1991 at about 6:00 a.m. the deceased was doing her routine work near the almond tree grown in the open area of the accused's house and at that time the accused Nos. 2 and 3 poured kerosene oil on her. Thereafter, the accused No. 3 caught hold of the said Meenaben and accused No. 2 set her ablaze by lighting the matchstick in presence of the accused No. 1. As a result thereof, the said Meenaben received serious burn injuries and she succumbed to the said injuries on 14.09.1991, during the course of her treatment at the K K Hospital, Savarkundla. When Meenaben was admitted in the hospital, the Executive Magistrate was called to record her dying declaration and the same was recorded in the question and answer form at about 8:55 a.m. on 13.09.1991. Thereafter, her complaint came to be recorded by the Police Inspector, Savarkundla Police Station at about 10.45 a.m. which was registered against the accused nos. 1, 2 and 3 for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 304B, 498A and 114 of the IPC. The Investigating Officer after collecting sufficient evidence against the said three accused submitted the chargesheet in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Savarkundla, who committed the case to the Sessions Court. The same was registered as Sessions Case No. 163 of 1991. 4. The Sessions Court framed the charge against all the three accused on 04.05.1992 for the alleged offences. The said charge having been denied by the said accused, the prosecution had adduced oral as well as documentary evidence. As stated earlier, during the course of trial, the involvement of the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in the alleged offence having been revealed, they were also added as accused Nos. 4 and 5 and the supplementary charge was framed against them on 10.09.1993, pursuant to the application Exh.57 given by the Additional PP. After the closure of the evidence by the prosecution, the further statements of all the accused were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. wherein they denied the allegations leveled against them. The accused No. 1 Govindbhai and accused No. 3 Ranjanben also submitted their further statements in writing at Exh. 109 and 110 respectively. 5. The accused no. After the closure of the evidence by the prosecution, the further statements of all the accused were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. wherein they denied the allegations leveled against them. The accused No. 1 Govindbhai and accused No. 3 Ranjanben also submitted their further statements in writing at Exh. 109 and 110 respectively. 5. The accused no. 1 in his further statement had stated inter alia that on the date of the incident in question, at about 6:30 a.m. his wife Meenaben was trying to light up the Chula (Indian Stove) and at that time she suddenly caught fire and started burning. He therefore tried to extinguish the fire by covering her with the mattresses, etc,. At that time, other persons from this house and from outside had also gathered there and then he along with others had taken his wife to the hospital for treatment. He had denied that he had harassed his wife mentally or physically or made any demand of T.V. or Fridge as alleged. The accused no. 1 had also examined himself as D.W. 1 at Exh. 113. 6. The accused Ranjanben also had stated in her further statement inter alia that on the date of incident at about 6:45 a.m. she was inside the house and her sister­in­law (the deceased) was doing her routine work outside the house, and at that time she (the accused) heard the scream of her brother (accused No. 1 Govindbhai) and therefore she came out of the house and saw that Meenaben was burning under the almond tree and that her brother and one Nathabhai Knajibhai were trying to extinguish the fire by covering her with the mattresses, etc,. She and her sister also brought mattresses, etc., to extinguish the fire. She had stated that thereafter she and her brother and others had taken Meenaben to the hospital. After reaching the hospital, the Deputy Mamlatdar had come to record the dying declaration of Meenaben, when she was under the treatment. According to her, at that time, Meenaben was not in a position to speak. She had also denied all the charges and allegations leveled against her. 7. After reaching the hospital, the Deputy Mamlatdar had come to record the dying declaration of Meenaben, when she was under the treatment. According to her, at that time, Meenaben was not in a position to speak. She had also denied all the charges and allegations leveled against her. 7. So far as the oral evidence led by the prosecution is concerned, it appears that the prosecution had examined as many as 8 witnesses out of which the P.W. 1­ Dawood Bachubhai was the panch witness in respect of panchnama of scene of offence at Exh. 15, the P.W. 2 Kantilal Giridharbhai was the panch witness in respect of panchnama of the recovery of the articles from the scene of offence at Exh. 17, the P.W. 3 was Dr. Madhubhai Kalyanji who had carried out the post­ mortem of the deceased Meenaben at Exh. 19. The P.W. 4 Trikambhai Naranbhai happened to be the elder brother of the father of the deceased Meenaben. The P.W. 5 was Bhikabhai Naranbhai, the father of the deceased Meenaben. The P.W. 6 was the Deputy Mamlatdar­ Premjibhai Dhudhabhai who had recorded the dying declaration of the deceased Meenaben at Exh. 84. The P.W. 7 was Ganpatlal Balmukund Kadel who was the Police Inspector who had taken down the complaint of the said Meenaben and had carried out the investigation and submitted the charge­sheet in the Court. The P.W. 8 was Dr. Kathad who had treated Meenaben in the hospital on 13.09.1991 immediately after the alleged incident. 8. 84. The P.W. 7 was Ganpatlal Balmukund Kadel who was the Police Inspector who had taken down the complaint of the said Meenaben and had carried out the investigation and submitted the charge­sheet in the Court. The P.W. 8 was Dr. Kathad who had treated Meenaben in the hospital on 13.09.1991 immediately after the alleged incident. 8. The main thrust of the prosecution case rested on the dying declaration of the deceased Meenaben recorded by the Executive Magistrate and on the complaint lodged by her before the Police Inspector, in which she had alleged inter alia that she was burnt by her sisters­in­law Damuben and Ranjanben in presence of her husband Govindbhai, However, since the accused had raised the defence in the further statement that Meenaben had received the burn injuries accidentally when she was trying to light up the fire in the stove (chula), it would be necessary to closely scrutinize the evidence of the doctors who had treated her in the hospital immediately after the incident in question and who had carried out the post­mortem after her death, in the light of the evidence of the Executive Magistrate who had recorded her dying declaration and in the light of the evidence of the Police Officer who had recorded her complaint on the same day. 9. As regards the death of the said Meenaben, the evidence of P.W. 3 Dr. Madhubhai Kalyanji who had carried out the post­mortem of the deceased Meenaben and submitted the report at exh. 19 would be relevant. He had stated inter alia that Meenaben had received burn injuries to the extent of 84% as stated in column no. 17 of the report at exh. 19 and the said injuries were anti­mortem in nature. The cause of death was 'shock due to burns'. In the cross­examination on the question being asked as to 'how the said Meenaben had received the burn injuries?' he had stated that it was difficult to state as to whether it was accidental or she had tried to commit suicide. He had admitted that she had no burn injuries on her soles and therefore it could be said that she was able to move while burning. He had admitted that Meenaben had third degree burns and therefore she was given heavy dose of pain killers, and that if the patient was given heavy dose of pain killers she would feel drowsy. He had admitted that Meenaben had third degree burns and therefore she was given heavy dose of pain killers, and that if the patient was given heavy dose of pain killers she would feel drowsy. According to him, the post­mortem report was prepared by him and Dr. Kathad. 10. In light of this evidence of Dr. Madhubhai Kalyanji, let the evidence of P.W. 8 Dr.Kathad be looked into. He had also stated in his evidence before the Court at Exh. 103 that the said Meenaben had received burn injuries to the extent of 84%. He had further stated that when she was brought to the hospital at about 7:00 a.m. on 13.09.1991 she was conscious and was able to speak and that she had died on the next day i.e. on 14.09.1991 at about 1:00 p.m. He had also stated that he had telephoned to the police chowki for making necessary arrangement for recording her dying declaration as her medical condition was serious and that at about 8:55 a.m. the Executive Magistrate had come to record the dying declaration of Meenaben. He had also stated that at that time the patient was conscious and he had made an endorsement in that regard on the dying declaration at Exh.84. In the cross examination, he had stated that he had taken the Executive Magistrate to the patient and after the dying declaration was recorded by him, he had made the endorsement that the patient was conscious on the said dying declaration at about 8:55 a.m. He had admitted that he had not made any endorsement as regards the fitness of the mental condition of the patient, while making endorsement on the dying declaration at exh. 84 and that he had given “Fort Win” injection as a pain killer when she was admitted and thereafter given another injection at about 9:00 a.m. While admitting that at 9:00 a.m., her general condition was poor, he had stated that he could not say whether at that time she was conscious or not. He had further admitted that since her both the hands had 9% burns, they were required to be treated as 100% burns so far as the said limbs were concerned and in that case, it was not possible to obtain her thumb impression. He had further admitted that since her both the hands had 9% burns, they were required to be treated as 100% burns so far as the said limbs were concerned and in that case, it was not possible to obtain her thumb impression. He also stated that her each leg had 16% burns, however the soles of her legs were not burnt and that she would feel pain if her toe impression was sought to be taken. He had denied that he had made the endorsement on the dying declaration at Exh. 84 without examining said patient. 11. At this juncture, it would be also relevant to refer to the evidence of the Executive Magistrate P.W.6 Premjibhai Dhudhabhai, examined at Exh. 82 who had recorded the dying declaration of the deceased Meenaben at Exh. 84. He had stated that on 13.09.1991, he had received the Yaadi from Mr. Pathak from the Savarkundla Police Station with a request to come to the K.K. Hospital for recording the dying declaration and accordingly he had gone to the said hospital and met the concerned doctor. The doctor had examined the patient and made endorsement that the patient was conscious, and thereafter he had started recording the dying declaration of the deceased Meenaben in the question and answer form. According to him, the patient Meenaben was answering the questions as asked by him and he was recording her answers as stated by her. He had further stated that as it was not possible to take her thumb impression, he had taken the toe impression of her left leg. On showing the dying declaration at Exh. 84, he had stated that it was in his handwritings and the endorsement thereon was made by the doctor in his presence. In the cross­examination, he had admitted that the dying declaration was recorded between 8:55 a.m. to 9:05 a.m. He had stated that Meenaben was immediately answering to the questions asked by him, however he did not remember whether he had to repeat any question. He had also understood the answers given by Meenaben and he was not required to ask Meenaben to repeat her answers. He had also understood the answers given by Meenaben and he was not required to ask Meenaben to repeat her answers. He had admitted that in answer to the question as to “when the kerosene oil was poured?”, the word “Aaje” (Today), was smaller in size than other words and that if the said word was removed, it could not be said as to when the kerosene oil was poured. He had further stated that he had started recording of the dying declaration immediately after the doctor made endorsement with regard to her consciousness at 8:55 a.m. He admitted that he had not taken any certificate from the doctor as regards the mental state of Meenaben. He had denied the suggestion that Meenaben was having problem in speaking and had breathing problem. He had denied that the words “salgavi che” (has been burnt) were subsequently added by him in the dying declaration at Exh. 84. He had denied the suggestion that Meenaben was not conscious and was not in a position to give her dying declaration. 12. So far as the evidence of the Investigating Officer is concerned, the Police Inspector Ganpatlal Balmukund Kandel has been examined at Exh. 94. He had stated inter alia that on 13.09.1991 he having received the information from the Head Constable Mr. M K Charel that one lady named Meenaben Govindbhai Harji with burn injuries was admitted in the hospital, he had gone to the hospital and had interrogated Meenaben. At that time, one elderly person had also reached there who was the father of Meenaben, accompanied by one Mr. M J Joshi. He had stated that thereafter he had recorded the complaint as stated by Meenaben in presence of the said M J Joshi, and thereafter had taken the thumb impression of her right thumb. The said complaint was taken down by him at about 11:45 a.m. It was later on exhibited as Exh. 95. He had stated about the further investigation carried out by him. He had further stated that the said Meenaben having expired on 14.09.1991 he had submitted the report for adding Section 302 and 304B of IPC in the complaint. The said complaint was taken down by him at about 11:45 a.m. It was later on exhibited as Exh. 95. He had stated about the further investigation carried out by him. He had further stated that the said Meenaben having expired on 14.09.1991 he had submitted the report for adding Section 302 and 304B of IPC in the complaint. His evidence as regards the investigation carried out by him shall be dealt with hereinafter at appropriate stage, however as regards the mental state of complainant Meenaben, he had stated that he had not obtained any medical certificate from the medical officer before recording the complaint Exh. 95 that Meenaben was in a conscious state of mind and it was possible for her to give complaint. However he had denied that Meenaben was not able to speak as she had received severe burn injuries. 13. In the light of the aforestated evidence if the evidence of P.W. 1­ Dawood Bachubhai­panch witness is appreciated, he had stated inter alia that on 13.09.1991 he was called as panch witness at the house of Govindbhai Harji and in his presence certain burnt articles were seized by the police as per the panchnama Exh. 15. He had stated that from the scene of offence the mattresses, bedsheets, one can of kerosene, matchsticks were seized and they were sealed in his presence. He had also stated that some burnt leaves of the almond tree were also seized and sealed and that all the articles contained the smell of kerosene oil. He had identified his signature on the panchnama and on the muddamal slips as also had identified the accused no. 2 sitting in the Court by stating that she was present when the panchnama was drawn. In the cross­examination, he had adhered to his version stated in the examination­in­chief. He had further submitted that the distance between the almond tree and the stove was about 10­12 feet and that there were tiffin, cup and saucer and other utensils lying at the place in respect of which four photographs were taken. He had categorically denied that there was an utensil for heating the water lying near the said stove. 14. The other panch witness P.W. 2 Kantilal Giridharbhai, in whose presence the cotton ball was rubbed on the floor and seized and sealed in a bottle as per the panchnama Exh. He had categorically denied that there was an utensil for heating the water lying near the said stove. 14. The other panch witness P.W. 2 Kantilal Giridharbhai, in whose presence the cotton ball was rubbed on the floor and seized and sealed in a bottle as per the panchnama Exh. 17, had also admitted the contents of the panchnama and his signature thereon. In the cross examination, he had stated that the accused Govindbhai had asked him to inform the relatives of the deceased by calling on the number 3592 and accordingly he had spoken on that number, and that thereafter from the hospital he had called up Trikambhai through the phone number of one Advocate Virjibhai, and told the said Trikambhai that the daughter of Bhikhabhai was burnt. He had further stated that he had talked to the victim as to how she had received the burn injuries and she had told him that when she was trying to light up the stove, she suddenly caught fire and received the burn injuries. In the cross ­examination by the learned APP, the said witness had admitted that he had not stated in his police statement about his talk with the deceased Meenaben. 15. The prosecution had also examined PW.5 Bhikabhai Naranbhai who was the father of the deceased Meenaben, at exh. 53. He had stated inter alia that he had received the news at about 8:00 a.m. on 13.09.1991 that his daughter Meenaben was burnt and was admitted in the hospital and therefore he along with his wife, his brother Trikambhai, Lilaben Joshi, Pathubhai Joshi and M B joshi had gone to Savarkundla by taxi and directly gone to the government hospital. He had stated that when they had reached there at about 9:30 a.m., he came to know that the dying declaration of his daughter was already recorded by the Mamlatdar. He further stated that he had requested PSI to record the complaint of his daughter in presence of Mr. M J Joshi. He himself had also asked his daughter Meenaben as to what had happened and at that time she had told him that since he (her father) did not give T.V. and fridge, her two sisters­in­law had burnt her by pouring kerosene oil on her in presence of her husband. M J Joshi. He himself had also asked his daughter Meenaben as to what had happened and at that time she had told him that since he (her father) did not give T.V. and fridge, her two sisters­in­law had burnt her by pouring kerosene oil on her in presence of her husband. He had also stated that after the marriage of his daughter, she had come twice at his house and had told him that if he did not give T.V. and fridge, she would be killed by her in laws. According to him, his daughter had also complained about the mental harassment caused by her mother­in­law, father­in­law, husband and sisters­in­law. In the cross examination, he had admitted that the in­laws of his daughter Meenaben already had TV in their house but did not have the fridge. He also admitted that after the engagement of his daughter with his son in law, both of them were going out and his son­in­law also used to write letters to his daughter. He was cross examined at length as regards the alleged demand of TV and fridge made by the in­ laws of his daughter and he had admitted that he had not told about the said demand to anybody till the incident took place. He was also confronted with his police statement, however he had adhered to his statement that he had told the police that his daughter had told him about the demand of TV and Fridge by her in­laws. 16. PW. 4 Trikambhai, the uncle of the deceased Meenaben was examined at Exh. 20. He had also by and large supported the version of his brother Bhikabhai to the effect that on receiving the phone call at about 7:00 a.m. on 13.09.1991, he along with his brother and other persons had gone to Savarkundla in taxi and had found that Meenaben had received burn injuries and she was under treatment. According to him, he had also asked Meenaben as to what had happened and she had told him that her two sisters­in­law had set her ablaze by pouring kerosene oil on her as her father had not given TV and fridge in dowry. According to him, the said Meenaben also told him that her husband, parents­in­law, sisters­in­law were subjecting her to mental and physical cruelty and her sisters­in­law used to say that they wanted a new Bhabhi. According to him, the said Meenaben also told him that her husband, parents­in­law, sisters­in­law were subjecting her to mental and physical cruelty and her sisters­in­law used to say that they wanted a new Bhabhi. In the cross­examination, he was confronted with his police statement and he had admitted that he had not stated before the police that Meenaben had told him in the hospital that her husband, parents­in­law, sisters­in­law were subjecting her to mental and physical cruelty. 17. Now, the Court is quite conscious about the powers of the High Court in the appeal against acquittal. It is well settled that the powers of the High Court in Appeal against acquittal are not circumscribed, but the presumption of innocence is strengthened if an accused is acquitted by the trial court as held by the Supreme Court in case of Jaisingh and Others versus State of Karnataka reported in (2007)10 SCC 788 . The Court is also alive to the settled legal position that the reversal of the trial court's judgment should be made only in case where the view taken was not possible on evidence or was perverse, with the broad understanding that if two views were possible, the one taken by the trial court in favor of the accused should be retained. However, it may also be noted that as held in catana of decisions, it is open to the High Court to re­appreciate the evidence and the conclusions drawn by the trial court, and nothing prevents the High Court to come to the conclusion different than that of the trial court if the same is found to be perverse. The word “perverse” in terms as understood in law has been defined to mean “against the weight of evidence”. Beneficial reference to the decision of Supreme Court in case of Gamini Bala Koteswara & Ors. versus State of A.P. reported in AIR 2010 Supreme Court 589 be made in this regard. 18. As regards the delay occurred in hearing the appeal against acquittal also, it would be apposite to regurgitate the settled legal position that mere delay in hearing the appeal against acquittal shall not be a reason for exonerating the accused who is found guilty on re­appreciation of evidence. 18. As regards the delay occurred in hearing the appeal against acquittal also, it would be apposite to regurgitate the settled legal position that mere delay in hearing the appeal against acquittal shall not be a reason for exonerating the accused who is found guilty on re­appreciation of evidence. Very pertinent observations made by the Supreme Court in case of Shyam Babu versus State of U.P. reported in AIR 2012 Supreme Court 3311 in this regard are reproduced hereinbelow: “17. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that considering the fact that though the appeal was filed before the High Court at Allahabad in the year 1981, the same was disposed of by the High Court only on 13.01.2006, i.e., after a gap of 25 years and, the sole appellant be discharged from the commission of offence on the ground of delay. We are unable to accept the said contention. This Court, in a series of decisions, held that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to criminal proceedings unless there is express and specific provisions to that effect. It is also settled law that a criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the Society even though it is committed against an individual. After considering various decisions including the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : (AIR 1992 SC 170: 1992 AIR SCW 1872) and Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 : (1994 Cri LJ 3139) and a decision rendered by seven learned Judges of this Court in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002) 4 SCC 578 : ( AIR 2002 SC 1856 : 2002AIR SCW 1841), recently on 17.08.2012, a Bench of two Judges of this Court in Ranjan Dwivedi etc. v. C.B.I., Through the Director General (Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 200 of 2001), reported in 2012 AIR SCW 4591) rejected similar argument based on delay either at the stage of trial or thereafter. 18. In the case on hand, merely because the High Court has taken nearly 25 years to dispose the appeal, the present appellant cannot be exonerated on the ground of delay.” 19. 18. In the case on hand, merely because the High Court has taken nearly 25 years to dispose the appeal, the present appellant cannot be exonerated on the ground of delay.” 19. Keeping in view the aforestated legal position, let us consider the submissions made by the learned Advocates for the parties in the light of the evidence adduced by the prosecution before the trial court and the findings recorded by the trial court, to come to the conclusion as to whether the same could be said to be perverse findings warranting interference in the appeal. 20. The learned APP, Mr. H.K. Patel vehemently submitted that the trial court had committed gross error in not believing the dying declarations of the deceased which were recorded almost immediately after the alleged incident and there was no reason much less cogent reason recorded by the trial court to disbelieve the same. Relying upon the decision of the 5 Judges Bench in Laxman Verus State of Maharashtra reported in (2002) 6 Supreme Court Cases 710, he submitted that the doctor's certificate as to the mental fitness of the declarant is not sine qua non for the credibility of the dying declaration. According to him, in the instant case, the P.W. 8 Dr. Kathad had given treatment to the deceased and made endorsement on the dying declaration at Exh. 84 that the patient was conscious and even otherwise the P.W.6 Executive Magistrate and P.W. 7 Investigating Officer both had categorically stated in their respective evidence that Meenaben was conscious while she made her dying declaration. He submitted that from the said evidence of dying declaration and from the panchnama of the scene of offence, it was clearly established by the prosecution that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 sisters­in­law of the deceased Meenaben had set her ablaze by dousing kerosene oil on her when she was doing her routine work at about 6:00 o' Clock in the morning on 13.09.1991. 21. However, the bone of contention raised by Mr. Gondaliya for the respondent is that the deceased Meenaben having received 84% burn injuries was unable to speak and was not so conscious as to give her statement to the Executive Magistrate or the Investigating Officer and therefore the alleged dying declaration at Exh. 84 and the complaint at Exh. 95 were not reliable. Gondaliya for the respondent is that the deceased Meenaben having received 84% burn injuries was unable to speak and was not so conscious as to give her statement to the Executive Magistrate or the Investigating Officer and therefore the alleged dying declaration at Exh. 84 and the complaint at Exh. 95 were not reliable. According to him, there was no endorsement made either on the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate at Exh. 84 or on the complaint recorded by the Investigating Officer at Exh. 95 that the patient was in a fit condition of mind to give dying declaration. He also submitted that there were interpolations at two places in the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate and therefore also such dying declaration could not be said to be truthful. He further submitted that the dying declaration was allegedly recorded when the patient Meenaben was under the influence of the pain killers and “Fort Win” injections and when her health had already started deteriorating after 9:00 a.m. as admitted by the Investigating Officer. He further elaborated his submissions by contending inter alia that when both of her thumbs were severely burnt, the Investigating Officer could not have taken her thumb impression on the complaint more particularly, when the Executive Magistrate had taken the toe impression in the dying declaration recorded by him at Exh. 84, on the ground that it was not possible to take her thumb impressions due to burn injuries thereon. He lastly submitted that if the said dying declarations were not believed, there was no evidence against any of the accused and the trial court had rightly acquitted all the accused by giving them benefit of doubt. He also relied upon the further statements of the accused Nos. 1 and 2 to submit that the deceased had caught fire when she was trying to light up the stove in the morning. 22. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned Advocates for the parties, it appears that the entire case of prosecution hinged on the dying declaration made by the deceased Meenaben, before the Executive Magistrate, and on the complaint made by her before the Investigating Officer in the form of dying declaration and on the two oral declarations made by her to her father Bhikabhai and uncle Trikambhai. It is pertinent to note that the concept of dying declaration is found in Section 32 of the Evidence Act. In view of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, the statements written or verbal, of relevant facts made by the person who is dead, are themselves relevant facts, when the statement are made by him as to the cause of his death, or as to the circumstances of transaction which resulted into his death, in cases in which the cause of death of that person comes into question. The principle on which the dying declaration are admitted in evidence is indicated in a legal maxim “Nemo moriturus praesumuntur mentiri” i.e. a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. As regards the admissibility of the dying declaration, the Supreme Court as back as in 1958 in case of Khushal Rao versus State of Bombay reported in AIR 1958 Supreme Court 22 had laid down following principles: “16. As regards the admissibility of the dying declaration, the Supreme Court as back as in 1958 in case of Khushal Rao versus State of Bombay reported in AIR 1958 Supreme Court 22 had laid down following principles: “16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made ; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions ­and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human, memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the. circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.” 23. In case of Lallubhai Devchand Shah and others v. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1776 the Supreme Court has observed as under: “9. Both the courts have accepted the truthfulness of Sharda's dying declaration and on that basis the High Court has confirmed the conviction of the accused. The law with regard to dying declarations is very clear. A dying declaration must be closely scrutinized as to its truthfulness like any other important piece of evidence in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, bearing in mind on the one hand, that the statement is by a person who has not been examined in court on oath and on the other hand, that the dying man is normally not likely to implicate innocent persons falsely. See Khushal Rao v. the State of Bombay 1958 SCR 552 =( AIR 1958 SC 22 ). If the Court is satisfied on a close scrutiny of the dying declaration that it is truthful it is open to the court to convict the accused on its basis without any independent corroboration. In the present case, we find that on a close scrutiny of the dying declaration both the Courts after a detailed consideration of the evidence have come to the conclusion that the dying declaration is true. The normal rule so far as this court is concerned is that when the High Court accepts a piece of evidence as true, this court does not examine the evidence afresh for itself unless there is substantial error of law or procedure or there is a failure of justice by reason of misapprehension or mistake in reading the evidence or the case involves a question of principle of general importance. See: Brahmin Ishwarlal Manilal v. The State of Gujarat Cri. A. No. 120 of 1963, D/­ 10­8­65 and Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab. 1970 (2) SCC 113 = (AIR 1970 SC 4566). 24. Again, in case of Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1992 Supreme Court 1817, the Supreme Court summed up the principles governing the dying declarations in para. 17 as under: “17. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross­ examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. 17 as under: “17. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross­ examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under: (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. Mannu Raja v. State of U.P., [1976] 2 SCR 764: AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2199 (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416 ; Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 164 . (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. Rama Chandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 S.C. 1994 . (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. Rasheed Beg v. Sate of Madhya Pradesh, [1974] 4 S.C.C. 264. (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. Rama Chandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 S.C. 1994 . (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. Rasheed Beg v. Sate of Madhya Pradesh, [1974] 4 S.C.C. 264. (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M. P.., AIR 1982 S.C. 1021 ) (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. 1981 SCC (Crl.) 581). (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617 ). (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 207 SC 1505) (ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nanahau Ram and another v. State, AIR SC 912) (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (State U.P. v. Madan Mohan, AIR 1989 S.C. 1519 )” 25. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned advocates appearing for the parties, in the light of the aforestated legal position and in the light of the evidence on record, it appears that the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate at exh. 84 was in the question and answer form. The deceased had stated in reply to the question as to 'who poured kerosene oil on her?', that Damuben and Ranjanben had poured kerosene oil and set her ablaze. Now so far as her complaint at exh. 84 was in the question and answer form. The deceased had stated in reply to the question as to 'who poured kerosene oil on her?', that Damuben and Ranjanben had poured kerosene oil and set her ablaze. Now so far as her complaint at exh. 95 is concerned, it was alleged that at about 6:00 a.m. when she was near the almond tree situated at the open space of their house, her husband was sleeping in the house and at that time her sisters­in­law Ranjanben and Damuben had brought 5 litres can of kerosene oil and poured on her and thereafter Ranjanben had caught hold of her and Damuben had lit the matchstick to set her ablaze. She thereafter started screaming and therefore her husband Govindbhai came there and he was watching the same. She had further alleged that after she was burnt, her husband had put mattresses on her and other persons had also arrived there, and thereafter her husband and others had taken her to the government hospital for treatment. She had further stated that the reason of burning her was that her husband was telling her that she was not being liked by him and her sisters­in­law were telling her that they wanted new Bhabhi. Thus, as per the complaint, she was set ablaze by her two sisters­in­law in presence of her husband. 26. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to the further statement of the accused No. 1­Govindbhai recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. As regards the incident, he had stated that on the previous day he, his wife and his sisters had watched a movie on the VCR and on the next day morning i.e. on the date of incident in question, his wife Meenaben was doing her routine work outside the house. He had got up at about 6:30 to 6:45 a.m. and at that time his sisters were working inside the house. According to him, Meenaben was trying to light up the Chula (Indian stove) and she caught fire accidentally and therefore he immediately rushed to her and had thrown mattresses on her to extinguish the fire. At that time, the main door of his house “dela” was open and therefore other persons from outside had also rushed inside and thereafter Meenaben was taken to the hospital by him and other persons. At that time, the main door of his house “dela” was open and therefore other persons from outside had also rushed inside and thereafter Meenaben was taken to the hospital by him and other persons. The respondent ­accused No. 1 Govindbhai had also examined himself at Exh. 113 and had reiterated the version as stated by him in his further statement. 27. The respondent accused Ranjanben had stated in her further statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C that on the date of incident her sister­in­law Meenaben was doing her routine work outside the house and she was inside the house and that she heard the scream of her brother Govindbhai at about 6:45 a.m. and she saw that her Meena Bhabhi was burning under the almond tree and her brother and Nathabhai Kanjibhai were trying to extinguish the fire by putting mattresses and bed sheets etc., on Meenaben. 28. Now, so far as the veracity of the dying declaration at Exh. 84 and the contents of the complaint at Exh. 95 is concerned, it may be noted that in both the said dying declarations, the deceased had consistently alleged that on the date of incident her sisters­in­law Ranjanben and Damuben had poured kerosene on her when she was working outside the house near the almond tree and they had set her ablaze. Though clouds of suspicion were sought to be raised by the learned Advocate Mr. Gondaliya by contending that the said dying declarations were not trustworthy and reliable, as they did not bear the endorsements of the doctors that the patient was in a fit state of mind to give the dying declaration, the Court does not find any substance in the said submission. As stated earlier, the PW. 8 Dr. Kathad who had given treatment to the deceased immediately after she was taken to the hospital had stated in his substantive evidence before the Court that though she had received 84% burn injuries, she was conscious and able to speak and that he had also made endorsement on the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate at exh. 84. He had categorically denied the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the defence that Meenaben was not able to speak because of her injuries. The PW. 84. He had categorically denied the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the defence that Meenaben was not able to speak because of her injuries. The PW. 6 Premjibhai Dhudhabhai ­Executive Magistrate who had recorded the dying declaration of Meenaben had also categorically stated in his substantive evidence before the Court that Meenaben was conscious and able to speak. He had also stated that she was answering to each and every question asked by him and he did not have to repeat the questions, nor he had to ask Meenaben to repeat her answers as she was able to understand and answer the questions. Though, it is true that the time mentioned at the endorsement made by the doctor on the dying declaration at Exh. 84 recorded by the Executive Magistrate is shown to be 8:55 a.m. and P.W. 8 Dr. Kathad had stated in his evidence that he had made endorsement after the dying declaration was recorded at about 9:00 a.m., such discrepancy in the timing of making the endorsement by the doctor could not be said to be material contradiction to hold that the entire dying declaration was not reliable and not trustworthy. 29. As such the Five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in case of Laxman versus State of Maharashtra(supra) has held inter alia that even absence of doctor's certification as to the mental fitness of the declarant would not make the dying declaration not reliable and that such certification was not a sine qua non for the creditability of the dying declaration. The Supreme Court in para. 5 of the said case observed as under: "The Court also in the aforesaid case relied upon the decision of this Court in Harji Kaur v. State of Punjab wherein the Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application would not render the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. For the reasons already indicated earlier, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this Court ion Paparambaka Rossama v. State of A.P. to the effect that “in absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit states of mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration” has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind especially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this Court in Paparambaka Rossama v. State of A.P. must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat.” 30. The aforestated legal position has been followed by the Supreme Court in number of other cases. To cite a few are in the case of Govindappa and others versus State of Karnataka reported in (2010) 6 SCC 533, in the case of Pawan Kumar versus State of H.P. reported in AIR (2017) Supreme Court 2459 and Bhagwan versus State of Maharashtra through Secretary Home, Mumbai, Maharashtra reported in AIR (2019) Supreme Court 4170. 31. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, not only that the endorsement was made by the PW. 8 Dr. Kathad in the dying declaration at Exh. 84 recorded by the Executive Magistrate, as regards the conscious state of the patient Meenaben, both the said witnesses had categorically stated before the Court that the said Meenaben was conscious and she was able to speak and understand when her dying declaration Exh. 84 and her complaint Ex. 95 were recorded. Kathad in the dying declaration at Exh. 84 recorded by the Executive Magistrate, as regards the conscious state of the patient Meenaben, both the said witnesses had categorically stated before the Court that the said Meenaben was conscious and she was able to speak and understand when her dying declaration Exh. 84 and her complaint Ex. 95 were recorded. The said Meenaben had also made oral declaration before her father Bhikhabhai and her uncle Trikambhai on almost on the same lines as stated in her dying declaration at Exh. 84 and the complaint at Exh. 95. However, even if the oral dying declarations made by the said Meenaben before her father Bhikhabhai and her uncle Trikambhai are not believed, the Court has no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate and the complaint recorded by the Investigating Officer, who were absolutely independent witnesses. 32. It is also further required to be noted that the story of the accused Govindbhai and Ranjanben as regards the incident in question narrated by them in their further statements that the deceased Meenaben caught fire accidentally when she was trying to light up the stove was not substantiated by any evidence. On the contrary, it was falsified from the other evidence more particularly the scientific evidence namely the report of FSL. It is pertinent to note that the half burnt clothes, mattresses and the cotton ball rubbed on the floor seized by the Investigating Officer in presence of the panch witnesses were sent to the FSL for examination, and as per the report, the residuals of the kerosene oil were found on the said articles. When from the half burnt clothes and from the mattresses which were put on the deceased Meenaben when she was burning, the residuals of kerosene oil were found, the whole story of the accused that she caught fire when she was lighting up the stove gets falsified inasmuch as in that case no such presence of kerosene oil residuals would have been found on her clothes or her mattresses etc., seized from the scene of offence. It is also pertinent to note that she was found burning under the almond tree and the leaves of the tree were also found burnt to the ashes. It is also pertinent to note that she was found burning under the almond tree and the leaves of the tree were also found burnt to the ashes. From the panchnama of the scene of offence and from the evidence of the panch witnesses also it transpires that the distance between the said tree and the stove was about 10 to 12 feet. Even according to the accused no. 1 Govindbhai, he was inside the house when the alleged incident took place and on hearing her scream he came out. So, there was no occasion for him to see as to how she accidentally caught flame and got burn injuries as sought to be stated by him in his further statement. There was nothing to suggest during the cross­examination of witnesses or in the further statements of the accused that she was pouring kerosene oil on the Chula and suddenly caught fire. The very pressure of the residuals of the kerosene oil in the muddamal articles seized from the scene of the offence falsified the defence of the accused raised in their further statements. Ofcourse, the Court cannot base conviction on the statement made by the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., nonetheless a false plea raised by the accused in the further statement could be used against them and in aid to the case of prosecution. 33. Thus, considering the totality of the attending circumstances and the evidence on record, the Court is of the opinion that the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate was absolutely trustworthy and reliable. The said dying declaration also gets corroboration from the allegations made in the complaint recorded by the Investigating Officer. As held by the Supreme Court in case of Lallubhai Devchand Shah and others v. State of Gujarat (supra), the dying man normally would not implicate the innocent person. On the close scrutiny of the said dying declaration, in the light of the scientific evidence collected by the prosecution, the Court finds dying declaration made by the deceased Meenaben absolutely trustworthy and reliable. As per the said dying declaration, the sisters­in­law Ranjanben and the Damuben had doused kerosene oil on Meenaben when she was doing her routine work in the morning near the almond tree on the fateful day and she was set ablaze by them. As per the said dying declaration, the sisters­in­law Ranjanben and the Damuben had doused kerosene oil on Meenaben when she was doing her routine work in the morning near the almond tree on the fateful day and she was set ablaze by them. Hence, the role played by both of them has been duly proved by the prosecution by leading cogent evidence. So far as the accused no. 1 Govindbhai is concerned, the only allegation made against him in the complaint was that he came out of the house on hearing the screams and saw her burning, and thereafter he tried to extinguish the fire by throwing mattresses on her. As such no allegation is made by Meenaben in her dying declaration at Exh. 84 recorded by the Executive Magistrate against her husband. Ofcourse, she had made the allegation in her complaint against her husband that he used to tell her that he did not like her and that her sisters­in­law had set her ablaze in presence of her husband, however even according to her complaint her husband came out of the house hearing the screams after she was set to fire. Hence, even if the allegations made in the complaint as a whole are taken to be true then also the only role alleged against the accused no. 1 was that after he came out of the house he saw her burning and thereafter he tried to extinguish the fire. As such no overtact has been alleged against him which could be termed as an “abatement” within the meaning of Section 107 of the IPC, punishable under Section 114 of the IPC. 34. All the five accused were also charged for the offences under Section 498A of IPC as well as Section 4 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, however it is pertinent to note that the accused nos. 4 and 5 who happened to be the father­in­law and mother­in­law of the deceased were subsequently added as the accused during the course of the trial, and there were no allegations made or charge framed against them prior to commencement of the trial. As regards the demand of TV and fridge allegedly made by the accused, the prosecution had relied upon the evidence of the father and uncle of the deceased Meenaben. As regards the demand of TV and fridge allegedly made by the accused, the prosecution had relied upon the evidence of the father and uncle of the deceased Meenaben. They had alleged in their oral evidence before the Court inter alia that Meenaben had told them that she was burnt to death as her father did not give TV and fridge in dowry. According to them, she was also subjected to cruelty as he could not meet with the said demand. However, the Court does not find substance in the said allegations with regard to the demand of TV an fridge by way of dowry. No such allegations have been made by the said Meenaben in her dying declaration Exh. 84 and her complaint Exh. 95. The father Bhikhabhai had for the first time alleged in the Court about the said demand of TV and fridge, and he himself had admitted that he had not stated anything with regard to the said demand in his police statement. Thus, the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused with regard to the demand of dowry or with regard to mental or physical cruelty so as to constitute offences under Section 498A of IPC or under Section 4 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 35. From the aforediscussed evidence, the Court unhesitantly arrives at the conclusion that the trial court had committed gross error in appreciating the evidence on record and had recorded perverse findings resulting into acquittal of all the accused. There being clinching evidence against the respondent­accused Nos. 2 and 3 adduced by the prosecution, the Sessions Court could not have given benefit of doubt to them. It is needless to say that the exaggerated devotion to the rule of 'benefit of doubt' must not nurture fanciful doubts of lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice in accordance with law as held by Supreme Court in case of Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court 209. 36. Having regard to the attending circumstances and to the totality of the evidence on record, the Court has no hesitation in reversing the findings of acquittal recorded by the Sessions Court qua the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 i.e. original accused Nos. 2­Parmar Damuben @ Damayanti Hirji and accused no. 36. Having regard to the attending circumstances and to the totality of the evidence on record, the Court has no hesitation in reversing the findings of acquittal recorded by the Sessions Court qua the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 i.e. original accused Nos. 2­Parmar Damuben @ Damayanti Hirji and accused no. 3 Rathod Ranjanben and to hold that both the said respondents­accused had committed the offence under Section 302 read with Section 114 of IPC, by pouring kerosene oil on the deceased Meenaben and setting her ablaze as alleged by the prosecution. 37. The said two respondents­accused i.e. Parmar Damuben @ Damayanti Hirji and Rathod Ranjanben therefore are convicted for the said offences under Section 302 read with Section 114 of IPC. The judgment and order dated 25.02.1994 passed by the Sessions Court, Bhavnagar in Sessions Case No. 163 of 1991 stands modified to the aforesaid extent. The minimum sentence prescribed under Section 302 being life imprisonment, the Court does not find it necessary to hear the said respondents­accused on the issue of sentence. Both of them therefore are directed to undergo life imprisonment and pay fine of Rs. 25,000/­ each, in default thereof, to undergo further imprisonment of one year for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 114 of IPC. They are directed to surrender before the trial Court within six weeks from today failing which non­ bailable warrants shall be issued against the said respondents. The appeal stands partly allowed. Record and proceedings be sent back to the Court concerned forthwith.