ORDER : 1. The prayers in the petition read as under: “(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow this petition; (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, by quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 21.11.2019 passed by respondent No.1 (Annexure-A hereto) and allow the petitioners to function as the committee member of the APMC, Patan;” 2. The petitioners, who are elected members of the respondent no.3 – Market Committee are before this Court challenging the validity and propriety of the order dated 21.11.2019 passed by the State in exercise of powers under Section 46 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 (‘the Act’ for short). By the impugned order, the State in exercise of powers under Section 46 of the Act has superseded the respondent no.3-Market Committee and appointed an administrator. 3. The facts giving rise to the petition are as under: 3.1 It is the case of the petitioner that the Market Committee viz. the Agriculture Produce Market Committee, Patan, was constituted under Section 11 of the Act. Since there was no elected body for about 10 years, the management was continued through an Administrator. After several litigations, the election of the Market Committee was held and on 13.10.2017, the election was declared and an elected body started working with effect from 25.10.2017. 3.2 The petitioners’ case is that the present 14 elected directors since have no affiliation with the party in power and succeeded in the election and in effective functioning of the Committee took several decisions such as recovery of outstanding dues from one Kantilal Raghuram Thakkar, eviction and action of pulling down illegal constructions which was not to the liking of the President of the Association who was related to the President of the Patan Municipality, renovation of canteen premises, demolition of illegal constructions of one Babaldas Patel, recovery of Market Cess etc. as extensively enumerated in para 3.4(i) to (xi), the petitioners’ actions were not appreciated. 3.3 The disgruntled elements approached the Deputy Chief Minister and the Chief Minister respectively by filing complaints on 02.04.2019 requesting them to look into the administration of the respondent no.3 – Committee and supersede it. as extensively enumerated in para 3.4(i) to (xi), the petitioners’ actions were not appreciated. 3.3 The disgruntled elements approached the Deputy Chief Minister and the Chief Minister respectively by filing complaints on 02.04.2019 requesting them to look into the administration of the respondent no.3 – Committee and supersede it. 3.4 It is the case of the petitioners that the Deputy Director of APMC/District Registrar, Co-operative Societies, carried out the preliminary inquiry and submitted a report on 28.05.2019 to the Director. On the basis of such report, proceedings under Section 44 of the Act were initiated. Since the report was initially not supplied to the petitioners, a copy thereof was subsequently supplied and a notice dated 07.06.2019 was issued under Section 44 of the Act to the Committee. To such notice, the petitioners filed a reply and once again by a letter dated 05.07.2019, certain additional points were sought to be included for the purposes of an inquiry under Section 44 of the Act. When the Committee applied for time, it was adjourned giving only short adjournment and the petitioners therefore filed replies on 10.07.2019 and 24.07.2019. It is the case of the petitioners that Joint Registrar (Audit), ignoring the reply, submitted a report on 29.07.2019 and on the same date the Registrar forwarded the report with his opinion to the Director of APMC. 3.5 The respondent no.2 – Director of APMC forwarded the report to the respondent no. 1 - State, on the basis of which the respondent-State issued a show cause notice dated 06.08.2019, calling upon the petitioners to show cause as to why the Market Committee should not be superseded and an administrator be appointed. The show cause notice had six principal allegations. (i) Illegality in purchase of tarpaulin; (ii) Illegality in tender process in context of construction/renovation of canteen, acquisition of kitchen equipments, storm water drainage line works, electrical and sanitary work of the canteen; (iii) payment of fees to the advocate ( which allegation is subsequently dropped); (iv) allegation with regard to grant and cancellation of licenses; (v) Involvement and the arrest of the petitioner no. 1 – Chairman in a case under the Gambling Act; (vi) Grant of license of “A-Class”. 3.6 In para 3.19 of the petition, by listing out the chain of events, the petitioners have sought to demonstrate about the predetermined approach of the respondent in coming to the decision dated 21.11.2019. 1 – Chairman in a case under the Gambling Act; (vi) Grant of license of “A-Class”. 3.6 In para 3.19 of the petition, by listing out the chain of events, the petitioners have sought to demonstrate about the predetermined approach of the respondent in coming to the decision dated 21.11.2019. The dates and events shall be referred to while noting the submissions of the learned advocate for the petitioners. 3.7 The subject show cause notice dated 06.08.2019 was challenged by the petitioners by filing Special Civil Application No.14362 of 2019. By an order dated 07-09/10/2019, the petition was dismissed. LPA No.1780 of 2019 challenging the order of the learned Single Judge was also dismissed on 18.11.2019. On 19.11.2019, the petitioners filed an additional reply and made a request for cross-examination of the complainants Babaldas Virchanddas Patel and Manoj Khodidas Patel. It is the case of the petitioners that the authorities refused to grant time and by the impugned order dated 21.11.2019 superseded the respondent no.3-Market Committee and appointed an Administrator. 4. Mr. Prakash Jani, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. Hriday Buch appeared for the petitioners. Initially he outlined the manner and the method in which the order dated 21.11.2019 was passed. He submitted that the order was passed on 21.11.2019 and published in the Official Gazette and after the Administrator was appointed, only thereafter the order was made available to the petitioners. Before the petitioners could have access to the order, the complainants who initiated this process were supplied with the copy of the order. 5. Mr. Jani would submit that since the petitioners were efficiently discharging their duties such as demolition of illegal constructions, recovery of market cess etc., every such order passed by the Committee would be stayed by the Director in powers exercised in revision. 5.1 Mr. Jani would further submit that the entire subject of the show-cause notice dated 06.08.2019 and the allegations made therein were a part of the discussions in the resolutions, in which, the Deputy Director as District Registrar was a party to such decisions. In such capacity in accordance with the provisions of Section 11(v) of the Act, the same District Registrar was asked to inquire into the affairs. 5.2 Mr. In such capacity in accordance with the provisions of Section 11(v) of the Act, the same District Registrar was asked to inquire into the affairs. 5.2 Mr. Jani would further submit that in completely mechanical exercise of powers, without independently assessing the situation, a decision to hold an inquiry under Section 44 of the Act was taken, for which, a Joint Registrar (Audit) was appointed to hold an inquiry. According to Shri Jani, based on the preliminary inquiry report dated 28.05.2019 submitted by the District Registrar to the Director, on 07.06.2019, a notice was issued under Section 44 of the Act by the Director appointing one Shri Y. A. Baloch to hold an inquiry. The concerned Joint Registrar on 07.06.2019 formulated 10 issues/irregularities for which it was decided to hold an inquiry. According to Mr. Jani, even before the petitioners could respond to the notice framing such irregularities, the original complainants were made aware of these irregularities as is evident from their letter dated 18.06.2019, requesting to add certain other irregularities. By a communication dated 05.07.2019 at the behest of these complainants, three more instances were added and a further notice was issued. 5.3 The Committee sought time on 10.07.2019. It sought further time and was given time for two days and on 13.07.2019 on an application the hearing was kept on 20.07.2019. Replies were filed on 24.07.2019. Overlooking the reply, the Joint Registrar submitted a report on 29.07.2019 which was received and forwarded by the Director to the State within a day and within seven days, the State issued the show cause notice dated 06.08.2019. Mr. Jani would submit that this would indicate the hot haste with which the State decided to take/initiate action. Mr. Jani submitted that pursuant to the show cause notice, hearing was fixed on 26.08.2019 when the Deputy Secretary was informed that the petitioners had challenged the notice. The matter before this Court was adjourned from time to time i.e. on 29.08.2019, 05.09.2019 and 09.09.2019. The Deputy Secretary adjourned the matter on 18.09.2019. Mr. Jani would draw my attention to the letters dated 09.09.2019 and 18.09.2019 adjourning the proceedings and stressed that the language of such letters would indicate that the State had determined to supersede the respondent no.3-Committee. The Deputy Secretary adjourned the matter on 18.09.2019. Mr. Jani would draw my attention to the letters dated 09.09.2019 and 18.09.2019 adjourning the proceedings and stressed that the language of such letters would indicate that the State had determined to supersede the respondent no.3-Committee. The proceedings were then adjourned to 24.09.2019 and thereafter the petition challenging the show cause notice was heard and by the order of 07.10.2019 and 09.10.2019, the petition was dismissed. 5.4 Inviting my attention to the order passed in the petition, particularly paras 6, 7 and 8 of the order Mr.Jani would submit that it would indicate that at that stage too, the petitioners have pointed out the short span within which a report was made under Section 44 of the Act to come to a conclusion that the petitioners were persistently defaulting in performing their duties. He would further invite my attention to para 14 of the order of this Court and submit that the petitioners did not belong to the party in power and therefore, had fallen out of favour and therefore, the Court had not interfered with the show-cause notice and the Court opined that the respondent-State shall take a decision without being influenced in any manner by the findings given by the inquiry report under Section 44 of the Act. Despite such a categorical assurance given to the High Court, what is evident from the show cause notice and the impugned order is that they are almost reproductions of the report under Section 44 of the Act. 5.5 Mr. Jani would thereafter strongly take support of the observations made in the order passed in the Letters Patent Appeal and submit that the powers of the Court under Article 226 are not limited and if the Court finds that the decision under Section 46 is prima-facie found to be illegal, the same should be set aside even by an interim order. 5.6 Inviting my attention to Ground(P) of the petition at page 29, Mr. Jani would submit that the State Government had not acted independently and fairly in examining the issues involved. The State has shown a complete hostile attitude. 5.6 Inviting my attention to Ground(P) of the petition at page 29, Mr. Jani would submit that the State Government had not acted independently and fairly in examining the issues involved. The State has shown a complete hostile attitude. On the availability of the order of the Letters Patent Appeal, on 19.11.2019, on “advise from the highest quarter” the respondents took a few days to communicate the impugned order, foreclosed the right of the petitioners to approach the Supreme Court and passed the order dated 21.11.2019 impugned in the petition. 5.7 Inviting my attention to the show cause notice, particularly, the allegations in the show cause notice, Mr. Jani would submit that in all there were five charges levelled in the show cause notice dated 06.08.2019. He would extensively refer to each charge, his response to such charge and assail the finding thereon as recorded in the impugned order. Charge – 1 : The Charge pertains to purchase of tarpaulin by the Market Committee. The allegation in the show cause notice is that the Market Committee has passed the resolution no. 27 dated 23.06.2018, to the effect that in accordance with the Government Resolution dated 10.04.2017, it was resolved to distribute tarpaulin to the agriculturists. Tenders were invited for purchase of tarpaulin. 28 agencies had given such tenders. They were opened on 11.08.2019 and five lowest bidders were called on 25.08.2019. The allegation in the notice is that the so called lowest tenderer – Kushal Polymers was in fact not the lowest bidder. However, the other four bidders increased their rates due to change in terms of tender and as a result of negotiations, Kushal Polymers though the highest bidder, became the lowest bidder. This was due to the additional conditions which were subsequently added for the bidders to follow. Only 2833 units were sold. 2167 units remained unsold, lying in the godown causing a loss of Rs.67,41,400/-. According to the show cause notice, payment of Rs.92,50,000/- was made to the supplier in violation of Section 33 of the Act and resolution of 10.04.2017 inasmuch as, no prior approval of the State Government was taken since the expense was exceeding Rs.25 lakhs. Further, no donation could have been given for such a large amount without prior approval and therefore, the society had committed a serious financial irregularity. Response to Charge – 1 : The defence according to Mr. Further, no donation could have been given for such a large amount without prior approval and therefore, the society had committed a serious financial irregularity. Response to Charge – 1 : The defence according to Mr. Jani has been extensively submitted in reply to the show cause notice. It is the case of the petitioners that the charge is misconceived. The subsidy of Rs.450/- to each farmer reducing the price of tarpaulin by such amount could not be termed as donation and therefore no previous permission under Section 33(12A) was necessary. He would further submit that even Unjha Agriculture Produce Market Committee had carried out such distribution in the manner which was attended by the Chief Minister. No action was taken against that society. The letter of the Secretary dated 23.06.2018 had specifically requested for survey of requirement of tarpaulin and it was only thereafter found that 6500 tarpaulins were necessary. 5000 pieces were therefore purchased. Advertisement dated 26.07.2018 was published in the newspaper having wide circulation. 28 parties submitted their offers. Bids were opened. It was necessary to see that the tarpaulin supplied underwent the test of the CEPT. Therefore, when negotiations were held with the five lowest bidders, Kushal Polymers turned out to be the lowest and accordingly a contract was awarded to him. No show cause notice has been issued to the similarly situated Market Committee, Unjha. He would further submit that the District Registrar was a part of the meeting which passed a resolution. Mr. Jani would invite my attention to Section 33(11A) of the Act to submit that it was not donation as defined therein. Reading Section 33(12) with Rules 39 and 73 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market Committee Rules, 1965, it is evident that the Market Committee had the discretion to carry out actions so as to prevent adulteration of earth, dirt and stones with regard to agricultural produce and therefore tarpaulins were necessitated. There is no loss of any tarpaulin so as to warrant any allegation of gross financial irregularity. Charge - 2 : The gist of Charge - 2 is that the Committee committed irregularities and illegalities in grant of contract for canteen renovation, Kitchen equipment storm water works and canteen electricity fittings. According to the show cause notice, since the Committee was a Local Authority, that the opinion of the Municipality was not required was incorrect. Charge - 2 : The gist of Charge - 2 is that the Committee committed irregularities and illegalities in grant of contract for canteen renovation, Kitchen equipment storm water works and canteen electricity fittings. According to the show cause notice, since the Committee was a Local Authority, that the opinion of the Municipality was not required was incorrect. Plans were not approved or sanctioned by the Nagarpalika for additional construction. Only four tenders were submitted. All four bidders were not called for negotiation for reducing the offer. Manoj Chaturdas Patel was awarded the work order after negotiation with him. Revised plans were not sanctioned. Regarding kitchen equipment, it was alleged that since it was entirely connected with the canteen and since there was a stay of the Nagarpalika which was in force, such construction could not be carried out. With regard to storm water drainage line, it was the case of the State that no negotiations were held in a transparent manner. Response to Charge – 2 : Mr. Jani would contend that this charge too was misconceived. No renovation has taken for the last several years. It was therefore resolved to undertake renovation. Mr. Jani would submit that there was a wide publication of the tender notice. A formal resolution was passed. Shri Mansukh Patel, Engineer on the panel of the APMC had approved the plans and opined too that since the Committee was a local authority, no prior approval was necessary from the Nagarpalika. The gambling case against the Chairman and the successful bidder was after the award of the contract. Reliance was placed on the instructions of the Central Vigilance Commission dated 28.01.2010 to submit that in accordance thereto, the lowest tenderers were called for negotiations. The same principle was followed in the award of contract for kitchen equipment, storm water drainage and canteen’s electrical equipments. Charge – 3 : This was regarding payment of advocate fees which was dropped. Charge – 4 : This charge was regarding sanctioning and/or refusal to grant licenses. According to the show cause notice, licenses were granted in favour of individuals who had paid less market fees or cess or were granted to such individuals who had never paid such market fees or cess. Licenses were granted in favour of traders who had not carried out any business. According to the show cause notice, licenses were granted in favour of individuals who had paid less market fees or cess or were granted to such individuals who had never paid such market fees or cess. Licenses were granted in favour of traders who had not carried out any business. Before sanctioning of licenses, inspection was not carried out and therefore, the Committee had acted arbitrarily in refusing and/or sanctioning licenses. Response to Charge – 4 : Mr. Jani would submit that all these actions or circumstances regarding refusal or grant of license were subject to scrutiny in the hierarchical set up under the statute viz. under Section 27 of the Act. There was a further remedy under Section 48 of the Act. Therefore, this charge could never have been a subject matter of proceeding under Section 46 of the Act. Charge – 5 : This charge pertains to involvement of the Chairman, petitioner No.1 in an offense registered on 01.09.2018 under the Gambling Act. According to the show-cause notice, since an FIR is registered against the Chairman, it is unbecoming of a Chairman to hold a post and therefore, subject to the proceedings that may be taken, this amounts to lowering the prestige of the Committee. Response to Charge – 5 : To this charge, Mr. Jani would submit that the Committee consists of 14 elected persons. If the Chairman is found to be involved in gambling on the eve of Janmashtami at some other place, it cannot be taken to be a ground for supercession. At best, there is a separate provision under Section 13 of the Act. Charge – 6 : This charge pertains to irregularity in granting of licenses to category of Class “A”. The case of the Government is that in granting such licenses, there has been a lack of transparency. Response to Charge – 6 : Mr. Jani would submit that 45 license holders’ licences were renewed in the year 2018-19 and 2019-20. This again is a process which is amenable to challenge under Section 27 and therefore, cannot become a subject of super-cession under Section 46 of the Act. 5.8 Mr. Jani would read before me Section 46 of the Act. According to Mr. Jani, there are two conditions subject to which the powers under Section 46 of the Act need to be exercised. 5.8 Mr. Jani would read before me Section 46 of the Act. According to Mr. Jani, there are two conditions subject to which the powers under Section 46 of the Act need to be exercised. Firstly, there has to be a formation of an opinion by the State Government that supercession is necessary. Secondly, supercession can only happen in three eventualities viz. That the Market Committee is not competent to perform it’s duties, that it persistently makes default in performing the duties imposed on it or abuses it’s powers. None of these conditions have been satisfied. Neither is there an independent opinion of the State nor of the three eventualities exist so as to warrant supercession of the Committee. 5.9 Mr. Jani would draw my attention to the show cause notice and comparing the same with the report of the Deputy Director dated 28.05.2019 with that of the report dated 29.07.2019, he would submit that the show-cause notice is nothing but a reproduction of the report under Section 44 of the Act. Drawing my attention to page 299 and the operative part of the order, Mr. Jani would submit that the observation in the impugned order is that the office bearers are trustees of the Committee and are bound to carry out duties as provided under Sections 23 and 26 of the Act. 5.10 Inviting my attention to the time-line in the grounds of the petition and the dates and events, Mr. Jani would submit that the case exhibits an apparent mala-fide exercise of powers only with a view to victimize the elected members who are not affiliated to the party in power in the State Government. Mr. Jani would submit that the machinery has moved swiftly in taking action. On 02.04.2019, a complaint was made, a report was sent on 28.05.2019 by the District Registrar to the Director. Within five days thereof, the District Registrar is asked to inquire into by the Director under Section 44 of the Act. Even additional notice was issued on 05.07.2019, to which reply is filed on 24.07.2019. Within five days i.e. on 29.07.2019 again the Joint Registrar submits his report recommending initiation of proceedings under Section 46 of the Act. The Registrar then submits a report to the Director on 30.07.2019 and the show-cause notice is issued within less than a week on 06.08.2019. Within five days i.e. on 29.07.2019 again the Joint Registrar submits his report recommending initiation of proceedings under Section 46 of the Act. The Registrar then submits a report to the Director on 30.07.2019 and the show-cause notice is issued within less than a week on 06.08.2019. The show-cause notice therefore apparently suffers from total non-application of mind. None of the ingredients of Section 46 of the Act can be invoked in the facts of the case. 5.11 Reiterating again the pleadings of para 3.19, Mr. Jani would submit that swiftly with a predetermined mind, the State has moved in taking the impugned decision after the LPA was dismissed. A request was made for postponing the decision as the petitioners intended to approach the Supreme Court and a request was made for cross-examination of the complainants. The same was refused and the impugned order was passed, though there was specific assurance before the learned Judge where the show cause notice was challenged that complete opportunity of hearing would be given. An assurance was given by the learned Advocate General as recorded in para 18 of the said decision, however, without due process, the decision has been taken. 5.12 Additional paper-book has been relied upon at page 438/74 in reference to the CVC guidelines. Page 438/53 has also been relied on, wherein one Mr. Mansukh Patel has clearly opined that no permission of the Nagarpalika is necessary. Lastly, Mr. Jani placed reliance on the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in support of his submissions: (I) Tarlochan Dev Sharma vs. State of Punjab and Others [ (2001) 6 SCC 260 ] – He relied on para 4 of the decision to submit that from the facts it is apparent that in a democracy governed by the rule of law, once elected to an office, an individual is entitled to hold the office. It is a valuable statutory right and cannot be taken away by single innocuous action or decision. This decision can be a subject matter of judicial review when the order is vitiated by perversity and the order is based on non-existent grounds and vitiated by colourable exercise of powers. It is a valuable statutory right and cannot be taken away by single innocuous action or decision. This decision can be a subject matter of judicial review when the order is vitiated by perversity and the order is based on non-existent grounds and vitiated by colourable exercise of powers. (II) Sharda Kailash Mittal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others [ (2010) 2 SCC 319 ] – This decision was relied upon to suggest that the reasonable opportunity of hearing must be given before removal is ordered, which was not done in the present case. (III) Ravi Yashwant Bhoir vs. District Collector, Raigad and Others [ (2012) 4 SCC 407 ] – Drawing my attention to the definition of ‘misconduct’, Mr. Jani would submit that mere error of judgment would not tantamount to misconduct. Once an order is passed without proper application of mind having a casual approach, such order can be characterized as having been passed mala-fide and thus, is liable to be quashed and set aside. An elected official has to be put on a higher pedestal than a government servant. Elected member cannot be removed without strict adherence to meeting the requirements of principles of natural justice. In the present case, the complainants have failed to establish that they have been deprived of any legal right. (IV) State of Madhya Pradesh and Others vs. Sanjay Nagayach and Others [ (2013) 7 SCC 25 ] – This judgment was relied in the context of the fact that the Registrar under the Act must form an opinion based on an objective criteria. It must be on its own finding and not at the behest of somebody else in power to achieve an ulterior motive. (V) Hiralal G. Siyal and Others vs. State of Gujarat and Others [2003 (1) GLH 467] – Reliance was placed on paras 41 to 43 and 47 and 48 of the judgment in support of his submission that there must be cogent and sufficient material for action to be taken. Such drastic action as the one under Section 46 of the Act cannot be taken so casually. (VI) Om Kumar and Others vs. Union of India [ (2001) 2 SCC 386 ] – Reliance was placed on paras 26 to 30, 49, 52, 60 and 66 to 68 of the judgment on the question of principles of proportionality. Such drastic action as the one under Section 46 of the Act cannot be taken so casually. (VI) Om Kumar and Others vs. Union of India [ (2001) 2 SCC 386 ] – Reliance was placed on paras 26 to 30, 49, 52, 60 and 66 to 68 of the judgment on the question of principles of proportionality. Every action must be tested on the question of proportionality and in the facts of this case, it is not warranted for the State to take such drastic and severe action by taking recourse to supercession under Section 46 of the APMC Act. 6. Mr. Kamal Trivedi, learned Advocate General supported the order passed by the State Government and submitted that it was a case where from the contents of the order the action of the State in exercising powers under Section 46 of the Act was just and proper. 6.1 Mr. Trivedi submitted that from the chronology of dates right from the submission of preliminary inquiry report on 28.05.2019 till the submission of the final report on 29.07.2019, it was evident that a case was made out for supercession of the market committee. 6.2 Mr. Trivedi made his submission with regard to the charges as under: Charge – 1 : It was the charge in the show cause notice that the committee had committed a breach of Section 33(11A) of the Act and the Government Resolution dated 10.04.2017. The committee had not taken prior permission for purchase of 5000 pieces of tarpaulin. Though the resolution dated 23.06.2018 referred to the resolution of 10.04.2017 passed by the government, the subsequent resolution of 05.09.2018 resolved to distribute tarpaulins at concessional rates. The perception of committee that this distribution at a subsidy of Rs.450/- was donation was misconceived. It was in fact a donation as defined under Section 33(11A) of the Act and therefore as per the Government Resolution dated 10.04.2017 the committee ought to have taken the State Government’s approval. The tendering process adopted by the Committee was defective. During the course of inquiry it was found that the report that was produced dated 04.07.2018 was concocted. Nowhere during the course of inquiry under Section 44 or at a later stage during the hearing of the show cause notice was such a report produced. Out of 28 bidders, only four parties were called for negotiation. During the course of inquiry it was found that the report that was produced dated 04.07.2018 was concocted. Nowhere during the course of inquiry under Section 44 or at a later stage during the hearing of the show cause notice was such a report produced. Out of 28 bidders, only four parties were called for negotiation. M/s.Kushal Polymers was the highest bidders despite which he was called for negotiations. A change came to be made in the terms of the tender. As a result of this, the other three bidders were constrained to raise their price. No explanation was coming forth as to why the lowest bidders were called for negotiation and other tenderers were excluded. This clearly suggested that the procedure was adopted with a view to favour M/s.Kushal Polymers, though initially M/s.Sarthi Agro was the lowest. What was found in the inquiry under Section 44 was that a subsidy of Rs.450/- was granted which amounted to a donation without prior approval of the Government. Of the 5000 pieces of tarpaulin ordered, 2167 pieces were lying idle and unsold. There was a loss to the Market Committee causing misuse of funds to the extent of Rs.40,08,950/-. The cash subsidy awarded in respect of 2339 pieces at the rate of RS.450/- came to Rs.10,52,500/-. Therefore, market fund totaling Rs.50,61,500/- was misused. Charge – 2 : This charge pertained to extension, construction and renovation of canteen building. Learned Advocate General referring to the N.A. Permission of 1995 would contend that it was evident that the permission of the local authority was necessary in carrying out such construction. In this case too, it was evident that the canteen building construction was awarded at 18% higher estimate of Rs.1,02,13,570/-. No reasonable person with ordinary prudence would take care to see that the expenditure does not go waste. Though there was an injunction granted by the Nagarpalika, the construction was continued and bills were released in favour of one agency i.e. Manojkumar C. Patel. Of the four tenderers, he was only called for negotiation. The beneficiary happens to be a close friend of the Chairman. Learned Advocate General would submit that the work completion certificate was issued on 22.07.2019. Of the four tenderers, he was only called for negotiation. The beneficiary happens to be a close friend of the Chairman. Learned Advocate General would submit that the work completion certificate was issued on 22.07.2019. The Collector ordered an inquiry which was made by the office of the City Survey Superintendent, who informed that the Committee had not got approved the revised plan as per prevalent rules, provisions and Government Regulations. This according to the learned Advocate General was a serious abuse of process at the hands of the Market Committee. Charge – 3 : Regarding this charge which pertains to tender work of Kitchen equipments, Canteen Electrical and Canteen Sanitary works the Learned Advocate General submitted that though 5 offers were submitted and the lowest was of one M/S Aqua Utility and Design and Management Pvt Limited and the highest offer was of one M/s HNC Projects, it was HNC which alone was called. It reduced the contract price on being called for negotiations. Similar allegation pertaining to continuing the kitchen work even despite the stay of the Nagarpalika is leveled. Shri Trivedi submitted that it is apparent that despite the stay and constraints the fact that the Committee went ahead and awarded the contract of kitchen equipment to one VRV/VRS System and also issued a work order to M/s KSP Equipment for purchasing equipments worth Rs.73,26,681/- and 27,04,668/- speaks volumes of the spending by the Committee inn an indiscriminate manner. Even for Canteen Electrical Works though three parties had submitted their bids/offers only one party M/s Kumar Electricals was called for negotiations. There was a blatant misuse of funds amounting to Rs.2,62,00,000/- in respect of these works against the order of stay granted by the Nagarpalika. The reliance on the Circular of the CVC was misconceived as it was even otherwise not applicable. Similarly the Learned Advocate General Shri Trivedi took me through the findings in the impugned order in regard to the tender work of Sanitary Fittings. Here too only three offers were received ranging from Rs.15-17 lakhs however only the lowest bidder, Dipak Construction was called for negotiation. What according to the Learned Advocate General is important to observe is that the Proprietor of Dipak Construction happens to be the son of the Director, Patan Taluka Vechan Sangh where the Chairman of the Market Committee is the Office bearer. What according to the Learned Advocate General is important to observe is that the Proprietor of Dipak Construction happens to be the son of the Director, Patan Taluka Vechan Sangh where the Chairman of the Market Committee is the Office bearer. The tender process is therefore vitiated because of the proximity of the Proprietor with the Chairman. Charge – 4: Reading out the allegation with regard to the Charge pertaining to Storm Water Drainage line, the Learned Advocate General submitted that of the total number of 5 agencies which had applied, the respective rates were very nearer to each other and one Anubhav Infrastructure was awarded the contract at the rate of Rs.69,43,339/- far exceeding the estimated rate of Rs.58,54,106/- The tender process as only one party was called for negotiation stood vitiated. Charge – 5: The Learned Advocate General though submitted that the said charge was dropped but argued that this also would show and give the Court an insight into how the Committee functioned. He read out the contents of the Show Cause Notice to suggest that an exorbitant amount of Rs.22,00,000/- has been paid towards legal fees to only one Advocate. Twice an amount of Rs.5,50,000/- has been paid to an Advocate for the same matter. Charge – 6: The Charge pertains to issue of grant of licenses. The Learned Advocate General submitted that Mr. P.K. Jani Learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner was wrong in submitting that the issue of licenses could not have been a subject-matter of Section 46 proceedings when the aggrieved party had remedies under Section 27 and Section 48. According to Shri Kamal Trivedi only when there is a question of rejection of licenses that a remedy under the Act is available. What was the issue here was granting of licenses to undeserving traders who had paid little or no cess and had not contributed to the market revenue whereas persons with large contributions to the market committee were not given licenses. There was no proper verification and documentation while accepting applications for licenses. Even if this circumstance isn’t taken as a grave circumstance together with the other issues it certainly is something that merits an order under Section 46 of the Act. There was no proper verification and documentation while accepting applications for licenses. Even if this circumstance isn’t taken as a grave circumstance together with the other issues it certainly is something that merits an order under Section 46 of the Act. The Learned Advocate General has drawn my attention to the list at pages 599 to 613 of the Affidavit in Reply and the list to demonstrate the irregularities in issuance of licenses. He submitted that the Committee cannot be certainly acting as a Monarch. Charge – 7: With regard to this charge Mr. Kamal Trivedi Learned Advocate General would submit that though on the first blush reading of this charge as the others would give an impression that the charge isn’t that serious to warrant a Section 46 action, but the fact that a Chairman of the Committee is involved in such an act of crime shows the Committee’s mindset when viewed in the context of other charges. The Committee has shielded such a Chairman rather than take any action and therefore though this ground alone may not be sufficient enough but when viewed in an overall picture of the nature of allegations, it does deserve to be considered as a ground germane for considering supersession of the Committee. 6.3 Mr. Kamal Trivedi, learned Advocate General defended the observations in the impugned order regarding the rejection of the request for time for cross-examination of the complainants Shri Babaldas V. Patel and Shri Manojkumar K. Patel. The request of the Petitioners to cross-examine these complainants was unjustified. The complainants have not been examined as witnesses in the inquiry or in the proceedings under Section 46 of the Act and therefore there is no question of cross-examination. Merely because they had made complaints which were forwarded and the allegations therein have been a part of the Inquiry under Section 44 of the Act does not suggest that they need to be cross examined. The impugned order, based on the Show-Cause Notice is sufficiently strong enough based on the nature of allegations and based on the material and cannot have any relation or support on the statements made by the complainants. The charges stand on their own strength. The impugned order, based on the Show-Cause Notice is sufficiently strong enough based on the nature of allegations and based on the material and cannot have any relation or support on the statements made by the complainants. The charges stand on their own strength. 6.4 The Petitioners’ request for time on 19/11/2019 was only with a view to kill time and that the request was made for the first time after the hearing was concluded on 7/11/2019 and when the issue was pending for consideration with the State Government. Since the Show Cause Notice was issued on 6/8/2019, it would obviously suggests that the request which was made as late as on 19/11/2019 was a gambit to ask for more time. 6.5 In context of submissions made by Shri Prakash Jani, Learned Senior Advocate that the order of 21/11/2019 was bad as there was gross violation of principles of natural justice, the Learned Advocate General would submit that a lot is unnecessarily said about the fact that no sufficient time was granted. He said that in fact it was not so. The Show Cause notice was dated 06.08.2019 and based on the challenge to the notice in the Petition filed, the State did not, though could have in absence of any stay, take action on the notice. The Petition was heard and the judgment was dictated in the open court where the Court granted time for 4 weeks to file their reply. That was on 7-9/10/2019. Pursuant to the time of 4 weeks granted, the Petitioners filed their reply and participated in the hearing and the hearing as concluded and in the confirmation thereof the Rojkam was signed by the Advocate of the Petitioners. 6.6 When the Order of the High Court was uploaded on the website the time granted in the order was 6 weeks instead of 4 weeks and therefore under that pretext though the hearing was concluded, the Petitioners asked for 12 days time, which was granted and the hearing was adjourned to 19/11/2019. The Petitioners had played out their innings on 7/11/2019 after arguing their case and the hearing was admittedly concluded and therefore to cry foul and say that they weren’t granted sufficient time though on their request 12 days time was granted is unjustified on behalf of the Petitioners to so contend. The Petitioners had played out their innings on 7/11/2019 after arguing their case and the hearing was admittedly concluded and therefore to cry foul and say that they weren’t granted sufficient time though on their request 12 days time was granted is unjustified on behalf of the Petitioners to so contend. 6.7 Merely to ask for more time on the LPA being dismissed on 18/11/2019 as they were wanting to prefer an SLP and which request for time was rejected cannot go against the State and be said that the order was passed in violation of principles of natural justice. 6.8 Mere denial of cross-examination, in the submission of the Learned Advocate General would not amount to denial of principles of natural justice unless the edifice of prejudice is laid out in the petition. Such a premise is absent in the entire petition. There is no suggestion or a pleading to suggest what prejudice is caused to the petitioners by denying them the benefit of cross-examination of the complainant. 6.9 In context of the language of the letters dated 09.09.2019; 18.09.2019 and 24.09.2019, in answer to the submission of Shri P.K. Jani that the language of the letters reflected the mind-set to the predetermination of the issue of supercession, the learned Advocate General would submit that the State had stayed its hands on the basis of the statement made before the Court by him on behalf of the Government that no action shall be taken unless the Petition is heard and therefore the submission that there was a pre-determination on the basis of the language of the letters is without merit. 6.10 Mr. Trivedi invited my attention to Para 3.5. at Page 327 of the affidavit in reply wherein the aspect relating to the language of the letters was explained by the deponent in the affidavit-in-reply. Before the Learned Single Judge while expressing regret that the said notices fixing date of hearing were issued in a mechanical manner, the issue in fact was put to rest and there was an assurance in addition to expressing regret, that in future care shall be taken. The issue had already been given quietus and therefore it was not open for the petitioners to raise the same issue once again. 6.11 On the issue of the hearing being pre-poned as alleged it was pointed out by Mr. The issue had already been given quietus and therefore it was not open for the petitioners to raise the same issue once again. 6.11 On the issue of the hearing being pre-poned as alleged it was pointed out by Mr. Trivedi, learned Advoate General that there was a typographical error where instead of the date of 19.11.2019 it was typed as 19.12.2019 which was corrected and therefore there was no pre-poning of hearing but a correction of the date which error was typographical. 6.12 Extensive reference was made to various case laws on the subject and in support of the submissions made by the Learned Advocate General, he relied on the following authorities in support of his submissions. (1) Maganbhai Godadlal Patel and others v. State of Gujarat and Others [AIR 1998 SC Gujarat 229]: This was relied in support of his submission that the Office bearers of a Committee are in a fiduciary capacity and are trustees. They are permitted to use funds for the betterment of agriculturists and to their advantage and not for their personal gain or mismanage the funds as was the case on hand. He read out Paras 18 and 19 of the judgement in this context. (2) Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No.1712/2010 and 1713/2010 in the case of Jagdishbhai Narsinhbhai Madhvani v. State of Gujarat decided on 23/2/2010. Paras 8 and 9 of the judgement were read to submit that the status of elected representatives is that of trustees and in the affairs of administration of the Committee they are accountable. They are in the fiduciary capacity and are trustees of the property and cannot therefore flout away the finances of the society/committee in an irresponsible manner. (3) Several case laws were relied upon regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court in context of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution Of India with regard its scope to adjudicate in reference to orders passed under Section 46 of the Act. (a) The State of Maharshtra v Babulal Kriparam Takkamore and ors. (3) Several case laws were relied upon regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court in context of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution Of India with regard its scope to adjudicate in reference to orders passed under Section 46 of the Act. (a) The State of Maharshtra v Babulal Kriparam Takkamore and ors. [ AIR 1967 SC 1353 ] Paras 3 to 12 and 14 and 16 were read out to submit that if the reading of the order would suggest that formation of the opinion of the State Government was such that no reasonable person on a proper consideration of the materials before the State Government could form an opinion, only then an order was liable to be interfered with. The Court would not sit as an appellate authority. Relying upon the above decision, Mr. Trivedi submitted that it was wrong on behalf of the Petitioners that the State did not form an opinion. There was sufficient material to back its decision and the powers under Section 46 were therefore validly exercised. The Order of the State Government can stand if any one of the grounds of the several raised are held to be valid in exercise of its powers under Section 46 of the Act. (b) Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras and others v. P.S. Rajagopal Naidu Govindarajulu and others [ AIR 1970 SC 992 ] Paras 2 to 5 and 8 to 10 were read to submit that the submission that the State could have taken recourse to provisions of Section 27(4), 44 and 48 was unjustified. He submitted that reading of this judgement was sufficient to indicate that notwithstanding these provisions an act of supersession can be done or passed. An opinion has to be formed after following the procedure and it is not necessary that before passing an order under Section 46 of the Act he has an obligation to consider the report under Section 44 of the Act. While construing the provisions regarding supersession the aspect of prejudice caused to the elected body cannot be a consideration that should weigh with the Court. While construing the provisions regarding supersession the aspect of prejudice caused to the elected body cannot be a consideration that should weigh with the Court. (c) Judgement dated 6.11.2011 in SCA 7443 of 2001 in the case of Varvabhai Nathabhai Rabari v. State Of Gujarat was relied upon and it was submitted that it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to weigh materials on which the order of supersession is made and to substitute its own findings for the findings recorded by the competent authority. (d) Varvabhai Nathabhai Rabarai v. State of Gujarat [ 2003(1) GLR 97 ] where the Division bench confirmed the order of the Learned Single Judge. Reliance was placed on Paras 2.1. to 2.15,8 to 11 and 15 to 20 and it was submitted that the scope of judicial review in a petition under Article226 was restricted. That non-supply of the inquiry report under Section 44 would not invalidate the order under Section 46 of the Act. That the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Tarlochan Sharma (supra) would not apply to the facts of the case. The office-bearers of the Market Committee while dealing with the funds ought to act with prudence and be wise and responsible in dealing with the funds and therefore in the facts of the case it was evident that they had not done so. (e) Judgement dated 17.10.2003 and 7.11.2003 in SCA 14317 of 2003 in the case of Gautambhai Devshankar Dave v. State of Gujarat. Paras 4 to 8, 12, 15 to 18 and 19 were read to submit that unless prejudice is shown mere breach of principles of natural justice is not sufficient to attack the order of the State. Similarly without showing how the petitioners were prejudiced merely because the petitioners have not been permitted to cross-examine the witnesses will not vitiate the Order. The allegations of malafides need to be established and in absence of any concrete evidence the same cannot be interfered. (f) Gautambhai Devshankar Dave v State of Gujarat [ 2004 (1) GLH 603 ] wherein the Division Bench in the case of confirmed the decision of the Learned Single Judge. Paras 2, 4, 6, 8 to 10 and 15 to 20 were read out to submit that it is not necessary to take recourse to Sections 44, 45 and 47 of the Act. Paras 2, 4, 6, 8 to 10 and 15 to 20 were read out to submit that it is not necessary to take recourse to Sections 44, 45 and 47 of the Act. It is not a condition precedent for initiation of the proceedings under Section 46 of the Act. The order under challenge need not be examined threadbare as if sitting as an appellate court. (4) In context of the arguments of the Petitioner on the aspect of violation of principles of natural justice and that the same would itself not invalidate the order unless de facto prejudice is proved, the following decisions were relied upon by the Learned Advocate General for the State: (a) Aligarh Muslim University and Others vs. Mansoor Ali Khan, [ (2000) 7 SCC 529 ] Relevant paras 20 to 27 were relied upon. (b) Transmission Corpn. of A.P. Ltd. and Ors. v. Sri Rama Krishna Rice Mill [ (2006) 3 SCC 74 ]. Para 9 was pressed into service to submit that in absence to show any prejudice, mere violation of principles of natural justice for not being permitted to cross-examine, it would not amount to the order being bad on violation of principles of natural justice. (5) In context of the controversy whether subsidy can be termed/considered as donation, following two judgements were relied upon to submit that any gratuitous payment in any form is donation. (a) Ambica Mills vs. Textile Labour Association [(1973) 3 SCC 529] Paras 11 to 13 and 19 were read in context of the word “subsidy” and submitted that it is the same as donation because it is something given as indirect assistance. (b) The Commissioner of Expenditure Tax Andhra Pradesh versus Shri P.V. Raju Rajah of Vizianagaram; (1976) 1 SCC 241 . Para 8 and 9 were relied upon to submit that a gift or a gratuitous payment is a donation in whatever name called. (6) In context of the CVC Circular, it was submitted by the Learned Advocate General by relying on the following decisions that there can be no negotiation in the tender inquiry. (a) Zee Telefilms Limited v. Board of Control for Cricket in India [ 2005 (2) CTC 525 ] –Para 94. This was cited in support of his submission that the negotiation must be broad based and not restricted only to one bidder. (a) Zee Telefilms Limited v. Board of Control for Cricket in India [ 2005 (2) CTC 525 ] –Para 94. This was cited in support of his submission that the negotiation must be broad based and not restricted only to one bidder. (b) Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Zee Telefilms Limited; [ 2005 (2) LW 567 ]-Para 100. The order of the MADRAS HIGH COURT was confirmed by the Supreme Court as the SLP was dismissed by an order dated 13.5.2005. (c) Food Corporation of India vs. M/s Kamdhenu Cattlefeed Industries [ (1993) 1 SCC 71 ] - Para 10 was relied upon. (d) Dutta Associates Pvt. Ltd. vs. Indo Merchantiles Pvt Ltd. [ (1997)1 SCC 53 ] - Para 4 was relied upon. (e) Hindustan Door Oliver Limited v. Vadodara Municipal Corporation and Another [1998 SCC Online Guj. 159] - Para 8 was relied upon. (7) In support of his submission that the order of supersession cannot be adjudged on the touchstone of negative equality in context of submission that it was never done in similar case of Unjha Market Committee, reliance was placed on the following decisions. (a) Union of India and Another vs. International Trading Co. And Another [ (2003) 5 SCC 437 ] – Reliance was placed on Para 13 of the judgement to submit that the concept of equal treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be pressed into service for repetition of a wrong action. (b) State of Bihar vs Upendra Narayan Singh and Others [ (2009) 5 SCC 65 ] - Reliance was placed on Para 67 of the Judgement to submit that if an illegality is committed in favour of any individual or a group others cannot invoke Article 14 for passing such wrong orders. (8) The Learned Advocate General Mr. Kamal Trivedi in support of his submission that merely because the actions are taken in haste cannot be declared to be invalid because they are taken promptly. (a) K. Nagaraj and Others vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh and Another [ (1985) 1 SCC 523 ] – Reliance was placed on Para 13 thereof to submit that reasonableness of any decision does not depend upon the time it takes to decide. It cannot be assumed that if the decisions are taken promptly they are bad. (a) K. Nagaraj and Others vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh and Another [ (1985) 1 SCC 523 ] – Reliance was placed on Para 13 thereof to submit that reasonableness of any decision does not depend upon the time it takes to decide. It cannot be assumed that if the decisions are taken promptly they are bad. (b) Chairman & MD BPL Ltd. vs. S.P. Gururaja and Others [ (2003) 8 SCC 567 ] – Reliance was placed on Paras 3, 4 and 35 to submit that a decision which has been taken after due deliberation and upon application of mind cannot be held to be suffering from malice in law on the ground that there has been undue haste on the part of the State. (9) On the question that it is difficult to prove political mala fides the Learned Advocate General relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions; (a) M. Gangappa and Others v The State of A.P. and Others [ AIR 1964 SC 962 ] - Para 20 was relied upon to submit that allegations of mala fides and improper motives are attributed on the part of those who are in power and the burden to discharge is heavy on the one who makes it and the Petitioners have not been able to discharge that burden. (b) E.P. Royappa v State of T.N. [ AIR 1974 SC 555 ] - Para 92 was relied upon. (c) State of Maharshtra vs. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao [ (1993) 3 SCC 71 ] – Reliance was placed on Para 7 of the judgement to submit that malafides can never be readily assumed. It requires unimpeachable proof and strong evidence. 6.13 Summarising his arguments, Mr. Kamal Trivedi, learned Advocate General would submit that: (1) There has been no violation of principles of natural justice. Adequate hearing was given which is evident from the fact that the petitioners have filed a reply running into several pages. Time as prayed for and as directed by the Court was granted. Hearing was concluded on 07.11.2019 however taking a cue from the direction that instead of 4 weeks the directions in the order read 6 weeks further time was sought of 12 days and was accordingly granted. (2) It is wrong to allege that it was physically impossible for the State to pass an order within two days from 19.11.2019. Hearing was concluded on 07.11.2019 however taking a cue from the direction that instead of 4 weeks the directions in the order read 6 weeks further time was sought of 12 days and was accordingly granted. (2) It is wrong to allege that it was physically impossible for the State to pass an order within two days from 19.11.2019. The matter has been under consideration of the State since the issuance of the show cause notice on 06.08.2019. (3) The contention that time was not granted even when the Petitioners wanted to prefer an SLP cannot be considered. (4) There was no need for a cross-examination as there was no examination of witnesses. Even otherwise the charges were to be proved on their own strength and assertions. (5) Regarding the language of the letters care was taken. (6) Dealing with the judgements cited by Mr. P.K. Jani, Mr. Kamal Trivedi submitted that (a) The judgement in Tarlochan (supra) cited by Mr. Jani was not applicable. It dealt with removal and the facts and the charges therein are apparently flimsy and facts otherwise suggested that such a charge was not warranted. It was in that context that the judgement was rendered. (b) The judgements of Sharad Mittal (supra) Yashwant Bhoir (supra) were distinguished by Shri Trivedi on facts and also submitted that the division bench judgments in the case of Varabhai Rabari and Gautambhai Dave (supra) squarely applied. (7) With regard to the formation of opinion Mr. Trivedi submitted that there was a valid subjective satisfaction arrived at by the State. The standard of judging was as to how a common man of ordinary prudence would deal with his assets/money. The case on hand showed complete sense of responsibility and reasonableness. (9) Courts in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be slow in interfering with such decisions. The Court should not act as an Appellate Authority. There is no perversity and the order cannot be said to be outrageous to warrant interference. (10) Even if the two charges on Tarpaulin and Canteen stand, alone are viewed, they itself are serious enough to warrant supersession. (11) Facts of removal cannot be brought in while considering the question of supersession. 7. Mr. Rashesh Sanjanwala, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. (10) Even if the two charges on Tarpaulin and Canteen stand, alone are viewed, they itself are serious enough to warrant supersession. (11) Facts of removal cannot be brought in while considering the question of supersession. 7. Mr. Rashesh Sanjanwala, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. Dipen Desai, learned advocate has appeared for the Civil Applicant – original complainant and in addition made a few submissions as under: (1) Inviting my attention to the photographs of the Directors, he would submit that the beneficiaries of the tender are persons within the Committee. (2) There has been a contradiction in the stand of the Committee when it comes to award of tender for Tarpaulin and Canteen Construction. (3) Inviting my attention to the chronology of dates Mr Sanjanwala would submit that the first resolution for canteen construction was of 16.2.2018. (4) On 23.06.2018 the Committee resolves for purchase of Tarpaulin. After a few days on 26.7.2018 it calls for tenders of Canteen. On 5.08.2018 it calls for tenders of Tarpaulin. Tarpaulin tenders are opened on 11.08.2018 of the 28, 4 bidders are called on 25.08.2018. Same day Canteen tenders are opened. On 27.08.2018 L/1 is called. Be it noted that the prices for canteen are quoted nearer and therefore in their reply to the allegation that all 5 were not invited for negotiation is brushed aside that such a practice is unheard of and for the Tarpaulin they call 4 bidders. Entire chain shows that there has been a design to award contracts to the closely knit people. Manoj and Chairman caught in gambling together vindicates that there has been an obvious proximity in awarding tenders. (5) From the charges it is evident that the propensity of the Committee to deal with the assets and resources of the APMC and indulge in activities that are not in consonance with the principle of trusteeship. (6) Further, Mr. R.S. Sanjanwala learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Dipen Desai submitted that when the findings arrived at in the impugned order are read, it is evident that for the three different tender processes, different procedures have been conveniently followed. The Committee has been consistently aware of the deviations. Lack of consistency is not an error but an obvious act of non-compliance with Government Resolutions. This abuse is all pervasive. The Committee has been consistently aware of the deviations. Lack of consistency is not an error but an obvious act of non-compliance with Government Resolutions. This abuse is all pervasive. The Committee has been seen to defy and non-comply with the Government Resolution as in the case of the tender for tarpaulin. In the context of canteen construction, the Nagarpalika’s stay orders have been flouted. This shows the abuse of Government directives by an elected body which does not want to comply with such directives. (7) He further submitted that for the tender of tarpaulin, it was not preceded by any inquiry or there was no prior assessment of figures. As far as taking permission of the local authority under Section 26 of the Town Planning Act, a convenient interpretation was made by the authorities. (8) With regard to the issue of licenses, it is evident that there has been an omission. From the tender process, it is evident that there is proximity of the beneficiaries of the tenders awardees to the office bearers of the Committee. He further submitted that this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 as a limited scope and should not interfere in such valid exercise of powers of the Government under Section 46 of the Act. (9) In support of his Civil Application for being joined as a party, he submitted that if the reply of the petitioners before the authority is seen, it is evident that it is loaded with allegations and submissions against the complainants. He submitted that it is the complainant who set the ball rolling and therefore, he is a necessary party in the petition. In support of his submission, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in case of Kuvrabhai Bharabhai Bharvad v. State of Gujarat reported in 2016 JX (Guj) 1098. 8. Mr. Percy Kavina, learned Senior Advocate appeared with Mr. Dhaval D. Vyas appeared for the administrator. He submitted that the administrator has come to know of the events after assuming charge which vindicate the stand that the Government has taken in exercise of powers under Section 46 of the Act. The Writ Court ought not to hold in favour of the petitioners because they cannot be entrusted with the functioning of the Market Committee. 8.1 Mr. Kavina relied on the affidavit filed by the Administrator. The Writ Court ought not to hold in favour of the petitioners because they cannot be entrusted with the functioning of the Market Committee. 8.1 Mr. Kavina relied on the affidavit filed by the Administrator. Drawing my attention to para 4 of the reply Mr. Kavina would submit that there is no record to show that Mr. Haresh Patel made a report on 04.07.2018. In the pleadings and in the memo of the LPA, there is no mention of the report. He relies on the contents of the affidavit wherein it is stated that he received a confidential letter dated 05.08.2019 addressed by Mr. Haresh Patel stating that the report was concocted and he was compelled in his capacity as an employee to sign thereon. Shri Kavina relied on an affidavit of Shri Haresh Patel dated 25.11.2019 and therefore submitted that reliance on the report is nothing but a cover-up. 8.2 He drew my attention to the contents of the affidavit to show that even with regard to the construction though there was a stay granted by the Nagarpalika, the contractor was paid an amount of Rs.48,23,745/-. He relied on a chart by which it was stated that all activities for extension, construction and renovation work was carried out after the grant of injunction. 8.3 With regard to issuance of licenses, he supported the impugned order by stating that as many as 112 traders and 18 Cooperative Marketing Societies which had not done any business of whatsoever nature, have been issued licenses with a view to make them voters in the future elections. Statements were relied upon which were annexed to the affidavit. 8.4 On the contention of the petitioner that since in his capacity as a District Registrar, he was a member in a party and therefore, he disqualified and cannot now take support of the State, Mr. Kavina relied on the decision in case of Waman Shriniwas Kini v. Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co. reported in AIR 1959 (SC) 689 . Para 13 was pressed into service and the maxim Ex dolo malo non oritur actio was pressed into service. Reliance was also placed on a decision in case of Immani Appa Rao and Anr. v. Gollaplli Ramalingammurthi and Ors. reported in AIR 1962 (SC) 370 and submit that no Court will lend its’ aid to a man who founds his cause of action on an immoral act. Reliance was also placed on a decision in case of Immani Appa Rao and Anr. v. Gollaplli Ramalingammurthi and Ors. reported in AIR 1962 (SC) 370 and submit that no Court will lend its’ aid to a man who founds his cause of action on an immoral act. The Administrator therefore has a right to assist the Court in bringing out the illegalities. 8.5 In context of the impugned order, Mr. Kavina would submit that the impugned order has been rightly passed in exercise of powers under Section 46 of the APMC Act and therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 9. Mr. P.K. Jani, learned Senior Advocate, extensively argued in rejoinder. Attacking the submissions made by Shri Percy Kavina, learned Senior Advocate for the administrator, Shri Jani submitted that it is not open for the officer to file such an affidavit. The administrator as an Officer has been a part of the setup of the APMC and therefore, he himself was a party to the proceedings of the Committee. On the submissions made by the Administrator, the Court should take a serious view on the changed stance taken by the Administrator. 9.1 Answering the submissions made by the Advocate General, Mr. Jani would submit that reading the impugned order makes it clear that it is a case of no evidence. The State has created and colured and brought out a situation by which records have been created to bring out a case for justifying their action under Section 46 of the Act. 9.2 Since the petitioner is not a politically favourite Committee as extensively pleaded in the petition, the action is taken in mala fide exercise of power. Relying on section 11 (1) (v) of the Act, he submitted that the District Registrar was a part of the Committee and was a State Representative in the decision making process. 9.3 Mr. Jani further submitted that there was no mandate to hold inquiry under Section 44 of the Act and the Director did not apply his mind but only acted on the instructions of the District Registrar, and thereafter, appointed an Inquiry Officer. In the inquiry, the authority has not considered any documentary evidence and therefore, in the decision making process, relevant factors have been missed out and irrelevant factors have been considered. In the inquiry, the authority has not considered any documentary evidence and therefore, in the decision making process, relevant factors have been missed out and irrelevant factors have been considered. There is no dispute that though same procedure was followed in the Unjha Market Committee, no action has been taken against the Committee. t best, the State could have resorted to the provisions under Section 27(5), 47 & 48 rather than take action under Section 46. 9.4 Referring to the decision in the case of Gautam Dave (supra), relied by the State, Shri Jani would contend that in that case, only a submission was recorded regarding alternative options except Section 46 and the Court did not opine on it. 9.5 Mr. Jani submitted that the authority ought not to have been guided by the reports under Section 44 of the Co-operative Societies Act. 9.6 With regard to the canteen issue, Mr. Jani placed reliance on the document produced with his reply of 06.11.2019, which is a part of the record at page 438/66 and submitted that Mansukh Patel was not an engineer of an unknown kind. He was appointed and empaneled by the Director himself and has been working since last 35 years. It is the Director, who has selected him. Only selective details are produced by the State in its impugned order. In fact, wide publicity was given to the tenders in not newspapers restricted to Patan but even such newspapers as Gujarat Samachar and of Ahmedabad edition. The contract work was item based. Though the initial estimate was Rs.95 lakhs, it was completed in fact by much a lower value and the payment made to the engineer was processed and the bills were authenticated by the Director’s Office. 9.7 Mr. Jani, submitted that facts are eloquent to suggest mala fide on the part of the State. Patan had seen mushrooming growth of illegal constructions and when the Committee discouraged such actions, it has not gone down well with the State authorities. The allegations of mala fide have not been denied by the State. Unnecessary emphasis is being made on the issue of unauthorized construction. A duplicacy of treatment is evident that where illegal construction by the Committee were sought to be razed, the Director granted stay and the petitioner is being victimized only for carrying out construction which is legal. The allegations of mala fide have not been denied by the State. Unnecessary emphasis is being made on the issue of unauthorized construction. A duplicacy of treatment is evident that where illegal construction by the Committee were sought to be razed, the Director granted stay and the petitioner is being victimized only for carrying out construction which is legal. 9.8 There has been no abuse of the tender process as four tenderers who have been invited are recognized contractors of the State. The incidental gambling is of 01.09.2018 prior to the contract. Petitions / Letters Patent Appeal with regard to the validity of the Nagarpalika in asking the petitioner to demolish constructions is still pending. It is not a case to suggest abuse of process. With regard to the kitchen equipment, the advertisement was given prior to 02.04.2019 and was completed before that. 9.9 The learned Advocate General should not have highlighted the aspect of advocates fees when the charge was specifically dropped. 9.10 Mr. Jani, further submitted that the petitioner was not claiming as canvassed by the State, negative equality, though it was only pointing out that the State was adopting a discriminatory approach by not taking action against the similar conduct by Unjha. It was not claiming parity, but it was stating that no action was taken against Unjha. Reiterating the principles in the case of Tarlochan Sharma (supra), Mr. Jani would submit that the officers cannot be a mouthpiece. 9.11 Mr. Jani defended the contract of Tarpaulin and submitted that offers were invited and not tender. It was the intent of the Committee to see that proper quality of material is procured. Unjha carried out a similar exercise. He would then proceed to dispute the submission of the Advocate General that subsidy and donation is one and the same. Relying on Section 33 (11A) Mr. Jani would submit that except donations which would fall under Section 2 of the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, no other mode of payment can be termed as donation. The Committee exercise its powers in furtherance of Rule 39 and Rule 73. According to Mr. Jani, it is an incentive. Reliance was placed on legal definitions as in Lex Law. Mr. Jani would submit that except donations which would fall under Section 2 of the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, no other mode of payment can be termed as donation. The Committee exercise its powers in furtherance of Rule 39 and Rule 73. According to Mr. Jani, it is an incentive. Reliance was placed on legal definitions as in Lex Law. Mr. Jani would then invite the attention of the Court to pages 438/32 – 34 and 35 to submit that it was the District Registrar who had chaired a E-naam shibir, where incentives were decided to be given as per the Central Government’s Scheme. There was therefore no colour of donation. He further submitted that such a case would not fall to be one as abuse of process especially when it was outside the purview of Section 33(11A) of the Act. 9.12 Mr. Jani further submitted that there was nothing to show that the CVC Circular did not apply to the Market Committee and nothing was placed on record by the State in support of such submission. 9.13 Drawing a comparison with Section 156A of the Co-operative Societies Act, where the government has power to give directions for e-tender process, he submitted that unlike the State Government’s power there is no such provision for the State to call for tenders. 9.14 Grounds of abuse are created and concocted. Licenses is an issue wherein it cannot be said that the Committee had committed any gross illegality or irregularity. Such a concept cannot be connected with voters list. From the record, Mr. Jani submitted by relying on pages 438/78 and 438/89 that the appeals were filed by aggrieved parties. 9.15 With regard to the allegations of gambling he submitted that Section 13 proceedings could have been initiated which even otherwise were not without prejudice to the contention that for the act of gambling no such proceedings even under Section 13 could commence. 9.16 Mr. Jani then, distinguished the judgments cited by the Advocate General. With regard to the decision in the case of Maganbhai Godadlal Patel (supra), it was his case that the charge was in context of office bearers who went on a trip despite bad financial condition. The judgment does not deal with the contingency under Section 46. With regard to the judgments in Special Civil Application No. 1712 of 2010, Mr. With regard to the decision in the case of Maganbhai Godadlal Patel (supra), it was his case that the charge was in context of office bearers who went on a trip despite bad financial condition. The judgment does not deal with the contingency under Section 46. With regard to the judgments in Special Civil Application No. 1712 of 2010, Mr. Jani would submit that, the said decision was in the context of illegal recruitment. Mr. Jani also distinguished the decision relied by learned Advocate General in the case of Babulal Kriparam Takkamore (supra) by submitting that the said decision was in the context of Municipalities Act and the State Government had formed an opinion which was a condition precedent. So far as the cases of Special Civil Application No. 7443 of 2001, and that of Gautam Dave (supra) are concerned, Mr. Jani would submit that those were cases where there were serious financial irregularities. With regard to the decision cited on the question of denial of cross examination and prejudice, in the case of Transmission (supra), Mr. Jani submitted that the same would not be applicable, as evident from para 9 of the judgment, the application had been rejected by a reasoned order. 9.17 In context of the decisions with regard to negotiations relied upon the Advocate General, Mr. Jani distinguished these judgments on facts. He submitted that all these decisions were in case of individual bidders inter se and not of a Committee. Dealing with the decisions of regarding undue haste in the decision making process, Mr. Jani would submit that from the chain of events narrated in the petition, it was a case of apparent political vendetta. The point of consideration before this Court is whether in the facts of this case, powers under Section 46 of the Act would have been exercised when there was no case made out. The petitioners are targeted and subjected to the order and admittedly there is no denial of allegations. 10. Mr. Kamal Trivedi, learned Advocate General added by submitting that the formation of the opinion has to be after the show cause notice and after receiving a response. In support thereof, he reiterated by relying on the decision in the case of Babulal Kriparam Takkamore (supra). According to Mr. 10. Mr. Kamal Trivedi, learned Advocate General added by submitting that the formation of the opinion has to be after the show cause notice and after receiving a response. In support thereof, he reiterated by relying on the decision in the case of Babulal Kriparam Takkamore (supra). According to Mr. Trivedi, reading the judgement in the case of Gautam Dave (supra) with the judgement in the case of P.S. Rajagopal Naidu, Govindarajulu (supra), it is clear that the said judgements apply on all force. He further submitted that the judgement of ZEE telefilms is only overruled on malafides but it has clearly held the position of law that negotiation is a matter of requirement in all cases. 10.1 Mr. Trivedi submitted that there is a formation of opinion on the questions and issues raised in the show cause notice and the impugned order. The order may not be read and re-read, however, it makes it amply clear that the state was within its right to invoke the provisions of Section 46 of the APMC Act. He submitted that the petition therefore must be dismissed. 11. Having considered the respective submissions of the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners and the respondents respectively, it needs to be considered whether the State, in context of the facts was justified in invoking the provisions of Section 46 of the APMC Act and supersede the Patan Market Committee. A brief resume of facts at this stage may be appropriate. 11.1 It appears that a few individuals made a complaint on 02.04.2019, to the Hon’ble Chief Minister and the Deputy Chief Minister on 11 issues citing instances of maladministration at the hands of the Patan Market Committee. In pursuance thereof, the Office of the Chief Minister addressed a letter to the Additional Chief Secretary (Agriculture), Agriculture and Co-operation Department to look into the grievances raised by the authors of the complaint, including one Mr. Babaldas Virchand Patel. The Director also on 05.04.2019, addressed a letter to the Deputy Director, Agriculture and Rural Finance and the Deputy Registrar, forwarding the complaint and requesting that necessary inquiry be made on a visit of the Committee and an opinion be forwarded. Copies of these communications were marked to the complainant for information. 11.2 On 28.05.2019, the District Registrar, Co-operative Societies sent a report to the Director of A.P.M.C. That report is at page 99 of the paper book. Copies of these communications were marked to the complainant for information. 11.2 On 28.05.2019, the District Registrar, Co-operative Societies sent a report to the Director of A.P.M.C. That report is at page 99 of the paper book. The District Registrar on 11 issues recommended initiation of an inquiry under Section 44 of the APMC Act. On 07.06.2019, the Director, appointed one Mr. R.M. Asodia, Joint Registrar (Audit), as an Inquiry Officer to conduct an inquiry. On a representation made on 18.06.2019 by the complainants, three more allegations were added. The members filed a detailed reply on 24.07.2019 on the issues raised. The Joint Registrar on 29.07.2019 submitted a report to the Director, APMC on the 13 issues and recommended initiation of proceedings under Section 46 of the Act on 6 issues which ultimately have formed a part of the impugned order. On receipt of the Report, a show cause notice was issued to the Patan Market Committee on 06.08.2019. The show cause notice was a subject matter of challenge by the APMC, Patan, by filing Special Civil Application No. 14362 of 2019. The Court by a judgment and order dated 7-9/10/2019 dismissed the petition and granted time to the petitioner to file a reply. The Committee and petitioners filed their replies on 07.11.2019 and 19.11.2019. By the impugned order of 21.11.2019, the State Government has superseded the Committee and appointed an Administrator. 11.3 This petition was moved on 22.11.2019 and notice was issued making it returnable on 27.11.2019. Thereafter, it was adjourned to 04.12.2019. On 04.12.2019, it was adjourned to 05.12.2019. Arguments were heard on 05.12.2019, 09.12.2019 and 10.12.2019. 12. Before going to the peripheral issues of political malafides, undue haste in the decision making process, violation of principles of natural justice, arbitrary and colorable exercise of power etc., the merits of the order needs to be examined in context of exercise of powers under Section 46 of the Act. The relevant provisions i.e. Section 44 and Section 46 of the APMC Act are reproduced herein below: “44. Power to hold inquiry: (1) The Director may of his own motion, himself or by an officer authorised by him, inspect or cause to be inspected the accounts of a market committee or hold an inquiry into the affairs of a market committee. Power to hold inquiry: (1) The Director may of his own motion, himself or by an officer authorised by him, inspect or cause to be inspected the accounts of a market committee or hold an inquiry into the affairs of a market committee. (2) When the affairs of a market committee are inquired into, all members, officers and servants of the committee shall furnish such information and produce such documents in their possession, relating to the affairs of the committee, as the Director or the officer may inquire. (3) The Director and the officer shall have the power to summon and enforce the attendance of members and officers of the market committee and to compel them to give evidence and to produce documents by the same means and as far as possible in the same manner as is provided in the case of a Civil Court by the Code of civil Procedure, 1908 (v of 1908). (4) The Director or, as the case may be, the officer may require the market committee either as a result of the inquiry or otherwise to do a thing or to abstain from doing a thing which the Director or the officer considers necessary for the purposes of this Act, and to send a written reply to him within a reasonable time stating whether the aforesaid requisition is complied and in case it is not complied, stating its reason for not complying with the requisition. XXX XXX XXXX 46. Supersession of Market Committee :-(1) If the opinion of the State Government a market committee is not competent to perform or persistently makes default in performing the duties imposed on it by or under this Act or abuses its powers, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, supersede such market committee: Provided that before issuing a notification under this sub-section, the State Government shall give a reasonable opportunity to the market committee for showing cause why it should not be superseded and shall consider the explanation and objections, if any, of the market committee. (2) Upon the publication of a notification under sub-section (1) superseding a market committee the following consequences shall ensue, namely: (i) all the members as well as the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the market committee shall as from the date of such publication be deemed to have vacated their respective offices. (2) Upon the publication of a notification under sub-section (1) superseding a market committee the following consequences shall ensue, namely: (i) all the members as well as the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the market committee shall as from the date of such publication be deemed to have vacated their respective offices. (ii) The State Government may at its discretion, either order that a new market committee be constituted under Section 11 or make such arrangements for carrying out the functions of the market committee, as it may think fit; and (iii) all the assets vesting in the market committee shall, subject to all its liabilities vest in the State Government. (3) If the State Government makes an order under Clause (ii) of sub-section (2), it shall transfer the assets and liabilities of the market committee as on the date of such transfer, to the new market committee constituted under Section 11 or to the person or persons, if any, appointed for carrying out the functions of the market committee, as the case may be. (4) If the State Government does not make such an order, it shall transfer all the assets of the market committee which remain after the satisfaction of all its liabilities, to the State Agricultural Produce Markets Fund constituted under Section 34. The Director shall utilise such assets for such object in the area as he considers to be for the benefit of the agriculturists in that area. [46A. Powers and duties of market committee not validly constituted to be performed by Administrator appointed by Government:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or rules or by-laws made thereunder, if at any time it appears to the State Government that a market committee has not been validly constituted under this Act, the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, make a declaration to that effect and thereupon exercise the powers conferred on it under sub-section (5) of section 11 as if the term of the market committee had expired on the date of such declaration. (2) On the issue of such notification, all the members as well as the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the market committee shall be deemed to have vacated their respective, offices and the market committee shall be reconstituted before the expiry of period specified in the order under clause (a) of sub-section (5) of section 11. (2) On the issue of such notification, all the members as well as the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the market committee shall be deemed to have vacated their respective, offices and the market committee shall be reconstituted before the expiry of period specified in the order under clause (a) of sub-section (5) of section 11. (3) Where a market committee, after it’s being liable to be reconstituted by reason of the expiry of its term or otherwise under the provisions of this Act continues to function as before and the members as well as the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the market committee continue to hold their office, it shall be lawful for the State Government to take action under sub-section (1) in respect of such market committee as if it were the market committee not validly constituted under this Act.]” 13. The order dated 21.11.2019 is based on six instances, which according to the State are germane and warranted of invoking powers under Section 46 of the Act. 14. Each charge was extensively dealt with by the respective counsels and therefore shall be discussed and appreciated hereinafter. 1. Charge pertaining to purchase of Tarpaulin: (a) As per the report of the Preliminary Inquiry dated 28.05.2019, it was alleged that the Committee on 23.06.2018 by resolution no.27 resolved that tarpaulin sheets be distributed to the agriculturists so to protect their products during monsoon. It was decided to do so in accordance with the government resolution dated 10.04.2017. The decision was to call for offers by advertisement and order tarpaulin sheets based on the needs. An advertisement was published on 26.07.2018 and tenders/offers were opened on 11.08.2018. On 05.09.2018, a resolution was passed to call four bidders for negotiations. Though Sarthi Agro had a lowest bid of Rs.1,750/-, after negotiations, the bid for 5000 Tarpaulins was awarded to Kushal Polymers for Rs.1,850/- per piece. Subsequently, by a resolution of 05.09.2018, the APMC resolved that in accordance with the provisions of Section 33(12) of the APMC Act, a subsidy of Rs.450/- be given on each Tarpaulin so that the end price for the agriculturist was Rs.1,450/-. (b) The preliminary report of 28.05.2019 and final report of 29.07.2019, under Section 44 found that the APMC had committed abuse of process. (b) The preliminary report of 28.05.2019 and final report of 29.07.2019, under Section 44 found that the APMC had committed abuse of process. It was observed in the inquiry that, though, the Government Resolution dated 10.04.2017 referred to provisions of Section 33(11A), no previous permission to incur expenditure exceeding Rs.25,00,000/- in this case estimated to be Rs.92,50,000/- was taken. Pursuant to offer invited, 28 tenders were received, however, only 4 were called for negotiations and though Kushal was most expensive, however, he then lowered his price to Rs.1,850/-. The inquiry further revealed that the agriculturists were given two sheets each hence 1356 Tarpaulins were distributed and on 11.03.2019 there was an undistributed stock of 3644 Tarpaulin. Further, though the Tarpaulins were meant for agriculturists, 2 pieces each were distributed to traders also totalling 442 pieces with a donation of Rs.1,98,900/-. Payment to Kushal Polymers was made through Ranuj Nagrik Co-operative Bank, a Bank where the Chairman was an office bearer. (c) Further, 5000 Tarpaulins were ordered without any assessment of requirement. Of the Tarpaulins ordered worth Rs.92,50,000/-, Tarpaulins worth Rs.67,41,400/- were unsold. Based on the findings, action under Section 46 of the Act was recommended. The show-cause notice extensively reiterated the charge as hereinabove. It was also alleged in the show cause notice that in the daily newspaper ‘Sandesh’ the tender was regarding ISI mark 7903 only however, the market committee unilaterally changed the requirement to ISI mark number 7903/2017 as a result of the said unilateral change, the four parties including M/s. Sarthi Agro Inputs which otherwise had quoted lower rates was not prepared to supply tarpaulins with changed specifications and therefore Kushal Polymers automatically became the lowest tenderer. (c) The defence of the Committee to the Notice was that the reference to the Government Resolution of 10.04.2017 was only incidental in their resolution of 23.06.2018. Section 33(11A) was not applicable. What was given was a subsidy which was in accordance with the provisions of Section 33(12) of the APMC Act, and therefore, no previous/prior permission of the State was necessary in view of the APMC’s Resolution dated 05.09.2018. The traders have refunded the amounts received as subsidy. The change in the ISI specifications and variation from the specification advertised was for better quality of Tarpaulins. The traders have refunded the amounts received as subsidy. The change in the ISI specifications and variation from the specification advertised was for better quality of Tarpaulins. An assessment of requirement was made, based on the report of 04.07.2018 where the Inspector had recommended 6,500/- sheets whereas the Committee only ordered 5,000/- sheets of Tarpaulins. There is, therefore, no breach of provisions of Section 33(11A) of the Act and the Government Resolution dated 10.04.2017. There has been no irregularity in the tender process by just inviting 4 negotiators of the 28 and there is no finding on how Kushal Polymers was intended to be benefitted. (d) When the Inquiry Report dated 29.07.2019 and the order dated 21.11.2019 are read in context of the charge regarding Tarpaulin and whether the Committee has abused its powers, the following factors have been noted by the State. In other words, the State has formed its opinion and held as under: (i) Though the resolution No. 27 of the APMC dated 23.06.2018 referred to purchase and distribution of Tarpaulin in consonance with the Government Resolution dated 10.04.2017 and reading such resolution produced indicates that it talks of provision of Section 33(11A), which envisages prior permission of the State when expenses exceed Rs.25,00,000/-, no such permission was taken for spending an amount of Rs.92,50,000/-. (ii) Before ordering 5000 sheets of Tarpaulin, there was no pre-assessment of the requirements. Though in the Inquiry under Section 44 of the Act, no report of 04.07.2018 (which is now sought to be relied upon to submit that there was an assessment, neither in response to the show cause notice, nor in the proceedings before this Court in challenge to the show cause notice) was produced. The report, therefore, is subsequently produced. This finding of the State has been reiterated in the affidavit-in-reply filed in the present petition where it has come on record that the author of the report has stated that he has been asked to prepare such a report under compulsion. The defence of the petitioners’ counsel that, though, the assessed requirement was 6,500 Tarpaulins, even the APMC ordered 5,000, would not in any manner vindicate the stand of the Committee to assail the finding of the State. The defence of the petitioners’ counsel that, though, the assessed requirement was 6,500 Tarpaulins, even the APMC ordered 5,000, would not in any manner vindicate the stand of the Committee to assail the finding of the State. This is because throughout the proceedings in response to the inquiry under Section 44 of the Act or in reply to the show-cause notice had the Committee produced the report of 04.07.2018. It is only for the first time on 06.11.2019 that a so called report of 04.07.2018 is produced. This is clearly an after-thought. (iii) Of the 28 tenders that were received, only 4 bidders were called for negotiations. The terms of tender were varied. Kushal Polymers became the lowest as the other three revised their bid on addition of a stringent altered condition. According to the State, no explanation was forthcoming from the Committee that why it had called only 4 of the 28 bidders for negotiation. The reason to believe that Kushal Polymers was to be the favoured bidder seems apparent. For the petitioners to contend that the inquiry nowhere proves the Committee’s complicity with Kushal Polymers is a burden which has not been discharged by the office bearers of the Committee / petitioners. (iv) A stock of 3674 Tarpaulin sheets as on 15.05.2019 have been lying unutilized. 221 Tarpaulins were distributed to traders which could not have been done as Tarpaulins were meant for agriculturists. The Committee cannot exonerate itself by now stating that the subsidy at Rs.450/- has been refunded. On the date of the proceedings, 2167 Tarpaulins worth Rs.50,00,000/- were lying unutilized. 14.1 Taking a conjoint reading vis-a-vis this charge, the State has found that the Committee committed a breach of Section 33(11A) of the Act and Government Resolution dated 10.04.2017. That the entire process of awarding of tender was not above board by varying of tender conditions and Kushal Polymers being made the lowest bidder. 14.2 Against the above, the argument of learned Senior Advocate Shri P.K.Jani that there is no violation or abuse of the powers as the powers were exercised for any other purpose as envisaged under Section 33(12) and Rules 39 and Rule 73, doesn’t convince the Court. Secondly, merely because what falls under “donation” is only that defined under Section 2 of the Charitable Endowment Act, also does not hold good. Secondly, merely because what falls under “donation” is only that defined under Section 2 of the Charitable Endowment Act, also does not hold good. When read in context of the resolution of the Committee itself dated 23.06.2018, reading the same makes it clear that Tarpaulins were to be distributed in consonance with the Government Resolution dated 10.04.2017. Admittedly for a expenditure to the tune of Rs.92,00,000/- the State Government ought to have been informed and prior permission should have been taken. It is not a plausible explanation that since the Committee passed a resolution on 05.09.2018 referring to Section 33(12), the same justified its omission. 14.3 The niceties of the terms “donation” as distinguished from “subsidy” have been argued by the learned counsels for the respective parties. The petitioners have pressed into service Lex Law, whereas the State has pressed into service the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Ambica Mills (supra) and Shri P.V.G. Raju Rajah (supra), para 11 to 13 of the decisions in Ambica (supra), and paras 8 & 9 in the case of Shri P.V.G. Rajah, (supra) reads as under respectively: “11. The dispute 'thus centres round the meaning of the word 'Subsidy' found in item 6(g) of the Second Schedule to the Payment of Bonus Act. Another incidental question is whether the Joint Plant Committee or the Indian Cotton Mills Federation is a "Body Corporate established by any law for the time being in force". 12. The word 'Subsidy' is not defined in the Act. The Industrial Court took into consideration the meanings of the word 'Subsidy' given in the (i) Webster's New World Dictionary, 1962, (ii) Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 11, Third Edition, (iii) Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, Revised Edition, and (iv) The Reader's Digest Great Encyclopaedia Dictionary, Vol. 11 (M-Z), and came to the conclusion that the word 'subsidy' cannot be confined only to those cases where cash payment is made by Government in order that an industry may survive, that even if assistance is given by way of an incentive it would not cease to be a subsidy provided it is a cash payment given by way of assistance and that certain types of assistance particularly those which are only indirect like rebates etc. should be excluded. 13. We find ourselves in agreement with this view. should be excluded. 13. We find ourselves in agreement with this view. The various definitions given in the dictionaries in so far as they are relevant, are as follows : Webster's New World Dictionary, 1962 ".....a grant of money, specifically (a) ... (b) a: government grant to a private enterprise considered of benefit to the public." Shorter Oxford English Dictionary “Help, aid, assistance N. Financial aid furnished by a state or a public corporation in furthering of an undertaking or the upkeep of a thing " Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, Revised Edn. "Assistance and in money ... a I grant of public money in aid of some enterprise, industry etc., or to keep down the price of a commodity. . . " The Reader's Digest Great Encyclopaedic Dictionary, Vol. II (M-Z) "2. Financial aid given by government towards expenses of an undertaking or institution held to 128 be of public utility; money paid by government to producers of a commodity so that it can be sold to consumers at a low price " In addition our attention has been drawn to the definition given in 'Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Col. 40" where subsidy is described as follows : "A subsidy is a grant of funds or property from a government as of the state or municipal corporation to a private person or company to assist to the establishment or support of an enterprise deemed advantageous to the public; a subvention." Reference is made to 60 Corpus Juris. Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 83, page 760 gives the following under the heading of Subsidy : "Something, usually money, donated or given or appropriated by the government through its proper agencies; a grant of funds or property from a government, as of the state or, a municipal corporation, to a private person or company to assist in the establishment or support of an enterprise deemed advantageous to the public; a subvention. Pecuniary premiums offered by the government to persons enlisting in the public service, or engaging in particular industries, or performing specified services for the public benefit are treated in Bounties." The emphasis in every one of these definitions is on something given or donated; indirect assistance is not mentioned.” Paras 8 and 9 of Shri P.V.G. Raju (supra) read as under: “8. The next question is whether the expenditure incurred by the assessee for the election of candidates set up by him as Chairman of his party can be legitimately regarded as incurred 'wholly and exclusively' for the purpose of his profession or occupation. We have grave doubts whether meeting the expenses of other candidates can be fulfilment of his professional expenses, but this question deserves no deeper probe for the simple reason that s. 5(j) embraces the expenditure as it does answer the description of a donation. When a person gives money to another without any material return, he donates that sum. An act by which the owner of a thing voluntarily transfers the title and possession of the same from himself to another, without any consideration, is a donation. A gift or gratuitous payment is, in simple English, a donation. We do not require lexicographic learning nor precedential erudition to understand the meaning of what many people do every day, viz., giving donations to some fund or other, or to some person or other. Political donations are not only common, but are assuming deleterious dimensions in the public life of our country. It is therefore clear that when this Raja assessee gave money to the candidates of his Party for them to meet their election expenses, he made donations. Even if he met their election expenditure, it was money gratuitously given on their behalf and therefore amounted to donation. Without straining language, we reach the natural conclusion that what the respondent expended for the other candidates during the elections was 'donation' in the language of the law. There is no suggestion nor evidence that any material return was in contemplation when he spent these sums. Being a politically important man with plenty of money and vitally interested in boosting his Party's standing in the State, he donated liberally for candidates set up by the party. In this view s. 5(j) aplies to these donations which earn exemption from the expenditure tax. 9. The next item relates to sums gives to the Socialist Party. It is reasonable to assume that the amounts paid to the office-bearers 1021 of the party were without an eye on any material return other than loyalty or gratitude. They were outright gifts. Indeed, many rich people out of diverse motives make donations to political parties. 9. The next item relates to sums gives to the Socialist Party. It is reasonable to assume that the amounts paid to the office-bearers 1021 of the party were without an eye on any material return other than loyalty or gratitude. They were outright gifts. Indeed, many rich people out of diverse motives make donations to political parties. The hope of spiritual benefit or political goodwill, the spontaneous affection that benefaction brings, the popularisation of a good cause or the prestige that publicised bounty fetches-these and other myriad consequences or feelings may not mar a donation to make it a grant for a quid pro quo. Wholly motiveless donation is rare, but material return alone negates a gift or donation. We need not investigate the propriety or political donations 'unlimited' and often invisible. All that we need consider is whether such sums are gifts and donations or are non-gratuitous payments with a tag of return. We have no doubt that on the question as framed, and on the facts and circumstances present, these sums were paid purely as gifts and donations to his Party by the respondent. It is not surprising either, because he was the Chairman of the said party, had a long and liberal purse from which to draw and a large circle of support to build up in the long run.” 14.4 That the Committee resolved to act in consonance with the government resolution dated 10.04.2017 would suggest that the expense of Rs.450/- per Tarpaulin sheet by the Committee was in the spirit of a gratuitous payment in one kind and merely because it is termed as “subsidy”, it does not absolve the Committee. It was rightly perceived by the State as ‘donation’ and therefore the breach of provisions of Section 33(11A) read with the resolution dated 10.04.2017 was apparent. 14.5 Even on the question of awarding the contract to Kushal Polymers, what is revealed is that, pursuant to the public advertisement dated 27.06.2018, 28 bids came forth, of which only 5 were called for negotiation. No clarification or explanation has come forth that why when negotiations were held and Sarthi Agro had the lowest bid in terms of the advertisement and tender/offer conditions, the tender conditions were unilaterally changed resulting in 4 others to raise their bids except Kushal Polymers, who, then became the lowest bidder. No clarification or explanation has come forth that why when negotiations were held and Sarthi Agro had the lowest bid in terms of the advertisement and tender/offer conditions, the tender conditions were unilaterally changed resulting in 4 others to raise their bids except Kushal Polymers, who, then became the lowest bidder. These circumstances point to an irregularity in the award of the tender. The Committee’s contradictory stand is recorded by the State Government when it records that when this tender was considered, 4 out of 28 were invited for negotiation whereas when the canteen tender was considered only one was invited for negotiation. 14.6 From the State Government’s decision read in context of the allegations, what is apparent is that of the 5000 pieces of Tarpaulin ordered, 2167 pieces are lying unsold which is worth Rs.40,08,950/- and cash subsidy awarded with respect to 2339 pieces to the tune of Rs.10,52,500/- has been used. Misuse of funds is therefore to the extent of Rs.50,61,500/-. 14.7 Taking an overall view of the matter, the case of the State that the Committee has abused its powers is made out. II. Charge pertaining to extension, construction and renovation work of the canteen building: (a) From reading the Inquiry Report dated 29.7.2019 and the impugned order, the facts that unfold are that the Committee on 16.02.2018 resolved to renovate and also construct a new building on the land allotted for the parking space. The allegation is that one Mansukhbhai Patel was awarded a contract on 23.06.2018. Thereafter, based on the resolution, an opinion of the Panel Engineer was sought who opined that no permission of the Nagarpalika is required for renovation and construction of the canteen premises. The State’s stand is that the body has violated this pre-condition by carrying out construction without obtaining the permission of the Nagarpalika. (b) Here too as the records reveal an advertisement was given for renovation of canteen and 4 offers were received. Four tenders were received from which the contract was awarded to one Manoj Chaturbhai Patel at an estimated higher price of 18% of Rs.1,20,52,013/-. The work order was awarded on 12.09.2018. On 05.11.2018, it was resolved to carry out construction in the open land. Running bills were sanctioned on 06.11.2018, 19.02.2019 and 05.04.2019 and payments made through Ranuj Nagrik Bank. The Nagarpalika issued a notice on 02.04.2019 asking the APMC to stop construction. The work order was awarded on 12.09.2018. On 05.11.2018, it was resolved to carry out construction in the open land. Running bills were sanctioned on 06.11.2018, 19.02.2019 and 05.04.2019 and payments made through Ranuj Nagrik Bank. The Nagarpalika issued a notice on 02.04.2019 asking the APMC to stop construction. The stand of the Committee was that no permission was necessary. This stand was taken based on the empaneled engineer who opined that it was not necessary for a local authority to take permission under Section 26 of the Town Planning Act. The City Survey Superintendent by his letter dated 14.05.2019 reported to the Collector that the constructions / renovations were carried out without permissions and sanctioning of revised plans by the Committee. Even the Collector was informed on 16.07.2019 about the constructions carried out without permission. The reading of the Inquiry Report would reveal that of all four tender agencies, Mr. Mukesh Salvi and Mr. Babubhai Patel were Directors, whereas Manojkumar’s proximity to the Chairman got exposed due to their involvement in a gambling case on the same day. The tender process and procedure therefore stood vitiated. (c) Similar was the case in the award of contracts for kitchen equipment, electrification of canteen, sanitary works and storm water drains. The State has in the impugned order found that though permission was necessary, the same was not obtained. Reading of the conditions in the N.A of 1995, specifically provide that if construction has to be carried out on the land in question, then the permission of the competent authority will have to be taken. Despite a stay order by the Nagarpalika, the Committee resolved and released all payments to the Contractor after continuing with the construction. (d) To the challenge made by the Committee to the Nagarpalika’s injunction, the writ petition was dismissed and the LPA is pending. Since there was a stay on the construction of canteen, the APMC couldn’t have proceeded further with the ancillary projects like kitchen renovation, etc. What was also objectionable in the award of the contract for sanitary works was that three tenders were received in the range of Rs.15 lakhs to Rs.17 lakhs. Dipak Construction, the lowest bidder was only called when all three bidders had bids quoting nearer prices. What was also objectionable in the award of the contract for sanitary works was that three tenders were received in the range of Rs.15 lakhs to Rs.17 lakhs. Dipak Construction, the lowest bidder was only called when all three bidders had bids quoting nearer prices. The contract was awarded to Dipak Constructions whose proprietor happens to be the son of the Director of Patan Taluka Vechan Sangh, where the Chairman of the Market Committee is also an office bearer. Therefore the tender process has been vitiated and obviously shows abuse of process. What is seen from the entire sequence of events is that, to begin with, despite a specific condition in the N.A permission that for carrying out construction, the Nagarpalika’s or competent authority’s permission is necessary, the same was not obtained. The pretext of it being a local authority and backed by an opinion from an empaneled engineer is of no importance. Merely because the Engineer’s appointment is at the hands of the Director, would not sanctify the Committee’s misdemeanour. The Nagarpalika, ordered stay on construction. The City survey Superintendent and the Collector have been apprised of the breach. On the face of such facts, the construction is carried out and completed. Bills are raised and amounts are paid by cheques to Manojkumar Patel, the Contractor. In the face of a stay order, the committee on 24.04.2019, resolves to make full payments. A challenge to the notice of the Nagarpalika is not successful. These circumstances cannot be said to be honest and innocent aberrations in discharge of the Committee’s functions and are nothing but an abuse of process. Similar irregularities have also been found in the tender process connected to the storm water works. Only one person was called and work for an amount of Rs.58,00,000/- was awarded. The process of awarding the contract has not been transparent. III Re. Legal fees being dropped: Though the State argued in support to show how the Committee was acting, since the charge was ultimately dropped, no purpose is served in considering the charge while adjudicating the validity of the order dated 21.11.2019. IV Re. Issuance of licenses: The case of the State is that traders who are depositing only nominal fees are given licenses and those who are trading in the market since many years would not have their licenses renewed. IV Re. Issuance of licenses: The case of the State is that traders who are depositing only nominal fees are given licenses and those who are trading in the market since many years would not have their licenses renewed. Perusal of the show cause notice and the allegation indicate that at best the case of the State is that the Committee has not followed proper procedures. The allegation and the affidavit of the Administrator that this is done to influence voters’ registration is a bit far fetched. Such a stand alone charge can certainly not be a ground to supersede a market committee when a hierarchical mechanism for redressal of grievances for rejection of applications is so provided under the Act. V Re : The Chairman having a case registered under the Gambling Act. This charge, without prejudice to the State’s right to take appropriate steps against the individual would not warrant supersession on the ipse-dixit that the Committee is harbouring and protecting the Chairman. 15. The petitioners have laid great emphasis of the aspect of being discriminated. It is their submission that in a similar disbursement of Tarpaulins at the hands of the Committee at Market committee, Unjha, no decision was taken to supersede the Committee. Even accepting that they are not claiming or there is a question of negative equality nothing has been placed on record to support their stand of discrimination. When the petitioners have extensively tried to make out a case of political malafide, the burden heavily rested on them to show how Unjha Committee had carried out Tarpaulin distribution by putting on record the facts. Mere assertions and bald allegations without factual data would not compel this Court to enter into a roving inquiry into such aspects. 16. The case laws on the powers of this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 and whether in facts the Court should substitute the view of the State, have been relied upon by both the sides. Relying on the decision of Sanjay Nagayach (supra), Mr. Jani would contend that at best these are deficiencies mostly relating to systems and procedures and are of a general nature and not grave enough to overthrow a democratically elected Committee. The statutory functionaries have acted like mouth pieces and there is no formation of opinion of its own. 17. Relying on the decision of Sanjay Nagayach (supra), Mr. Jani would contend that at best these are deficiencies mostly relating to systems and procedures and are of a general nature and not grave enough to overthrow a democratically elected Committee. The statutory functionaries have acted like mouth pieces and there is no formation of opinion of its own. 17. When resort can be had to provisions like the ones under Section 44(4) and Section 48, the remedy and drastic step of supersession under Section 46 cannot be supported. Also pressed into service was a decision in the case of Tarlochan Sharma (supra). In the facts of Tarlochan Sharma (supra), the charge was not justified on facts. It was an innocuous act not implicit of dishonesty. In the facts of case on hand, if the charge of contract of Tarpaulin and Canteen are taken stand alone together, the conduct would indicate an implied willful abuse. In both cases, the State’s or the Nagarpalika’s guidelines have been violated with full awareness and knowledge. It is not a case where the State can be said to have formed an opinion on the basis of non-existent or perverse grounds. This Court would, therefore, not sit over the decision of the State as an Appellate Authority. Acts as alleged are not mere negligent acts to be such that the impugned order can even fail on the test of proportionality. 18. Much was argued by the petitioners’ counsel on the three ingredients of Section 46 of the Act not being fulfilled to warrant supercession and that the formation of the opinion of the State was not its own. Based on the show cause notice given on the material before the authority in terms of the report and after receiving and considering the reply of the committee members, the State has taken an informed decision based on the material on hand. As held in the case of Babulal Kriparam Takkamore (supra), the State had sufficient material on the basis which it formed the opinion. Even as recorded in the aforesaid judgment, even if one of the grounds in the order is not found to exist, the order would not become bad. 19. As held in the case of Babulal Kriparam Takkamore (supra), the State had sufficient material on the basis which it formed the opinion. Even as recorded in the aforesaid judgment, even if one of the grounds in the order is not found to exist, the order would not become bad. 19. As regards the contention that alternative options under Section 44(4) or Section 48 of the Act could have been resorted to, it will be relevant to reproduce the relevant paras in the case of Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras & Ors. vs. P.S. Rajagopal Naidu, Govindarajulu & Ors., reported in AIR 1970 SC 992 , the relevant paragraph of which read as under: “8. It is significant that Section 72(1) does not contain any mention of Sections 64 to 67 which appear in Sec.70(1) and of Sections 65, 66 and 67 which are expressly mentioned in Section 85(1). If the intention of the Legislature was that the supersession of the Committee under Section 72 can be ordered by the Registrar only after recourse to Sections 64, 65, 66 and 67, there is no reason why language analogous to Section 70(1) of Section 85 (1) containing an express mention of the aforesaid sections, should not have been employed. An audit under Section 64 has to be done every year in view of the mandatory form of the language of that Section 64. But as regards Sections 65 and 66 the Registrar has been given the discretionary powers to make an inquiry or an inspection in accordance with those sections, there is no duty or obligation cast on him for doing so before he proceeds to take action u/s. 72. All that is required by Section 72(1) (a) is that the Registrar should form an opinion that the Committee of any Registered society is not functioning properly or has wilfully disobeyed or failed to comply with any lawful order or direction issued by him. So far as the question of the society not functioning properly is concerned, that may depend on what the Registrar discovers after a proper audit, enquiry and inspection. But he can form that opinion even on material aliunde and the language of the section does not warrant by necessary implication the taking of the view that he is bound to form that opinion after following the entire procedure prescribed by the other sections under discussion. But he can form that opinion even on material aliunde and the language of the section does not warrant by necessary implication the taking of the view that he is bound to form that opinion after following the entire procedure prescribed by the other sections under discussion. At any rate is is not possible to read a requirement while taking action u/s.72 of satisfying the provisions in the aforesaid sections by making a direction in the first instance to remedy the defects disclosed as a result of the audit, inquiry or inspection. The functioning of the society may be so irregular and the defects disclosed so blatant and prejudicial to the society that no question can arise of any direction being made in the first instance for their being remedied by the persons or officers concerned. It may be that when the Registrar acts under the second limb of section 72 (1)(a) and proposes to supersede the committee for wilful disobedience or wilful failure to comply with any lawful order or direction issued by the Registrar under the Act or the rule that the provisions contained in Sections 64, and 66 may become relevant. But that does not and cannot mean that the Registrar must as a condition precedent give a direction under those sections for the defects or the irregularities to be remedied and should take action only under the second limb i.e. when there is a wilful disobedience or wilful failure to comply with those orders or directions. It may be that the opinion which the Registrar has to form must be based on some objective facts but those objective facts in the absence of any clear indications u/s 72 cannot be confined to what may be disclosed after the Registrar has exercised powers in the matter of audit, inquiry and inspection under the provisions of Sections 64, 65 and 66. Thus even though the opinion may be a purely subjective process, there must be cogent material on which the Registrar has to form his opinion that the society is not functioning properly in order to sustain the issuance of a notice u/s.72 (1)(a) and subsequent supersession of the Committee after considering its representation on that ground. Thus even though the opinion may be a purely subjective process, there must be cogent material on which the Registrar has to form his opinion that the society is not functioning properly in order to sustain the issuance of a notice u/s.72 (1)(a) and subsequent supersession of the Committee after considering its representation on that ground. The requisite opinion has indisputably to be formed honestly and after applying his mind by the Registrar to the relevant materials before him the only condition precedent for taking action u/s. 72(1) is that the Registrar must consult the financing bank to which the society is indebted (vide sub-section 96). There is no other requirement or condition precedent laid down by the Legislature which the Registrar must fulfil before he acts in the matter of supersession of the Committee. We are unable to concur in the view of the High Court that an action taken u/s.72 without giving an opportunity to the member, officer or the society to rectify the defects found after an audit, inquiry or inspection held under Sections 64, 65 and 66 would constitute an exercise of power without jurisdiction.” 20. Coming to the contention that the order dated 21.11.2019 suffers from violation of principles of natural justice on two counts i.e. the petitioners were not permitted to cross-examine the complainants and there was undue haste in taking a decision and sufficient time was not granted, I shall first deal with the issue of not permitting cross-examination of the complainant. From the impugned order, it comes out that the request of cross-examination was not accepted on the ground that if there has been no examination then there is no need for them to be cross-examined. Even otherwise, on the principles of law enunciated in the case of Aligarh Muslim University (supra), the petitioners have not shown how such denial has caused them prejudice. In the exercise of arriving at a decision, the complainants only gave a written statement in support of their representation. In the formation of the opinion there was no leading of any evidence on exchange of views so as to warrant a finding. The formation of opinion was based on material that came up for inquiry under Section 44 and not as evidence of the complainants. In the formation of the opinion there was no leading of any evidence on exchange of views so as to warrant a finding. The formation of opinion was based on material that came up for inquiry under Section 44 and not as evidence of the complainants. What is evident from the facts is that the complainants addressed a letter based on which the Deputy Registrar and then the Joint Registrar (Audit), conducted preliminary inquiry and then a full-fledged inquiry in consonance with Section 44 of the Act. The complaint only initiated the mechanism and their role was to that extent. The decision making process has not been guided by what was given by them and therefore the petitioners had no right of cross-examination. 21. As regards the haste in the decision making, Mr. Jani, had invited the attention of this Court to para 3.19 of the petition at page 15. The time line so reads as under: “3.19 The petitioners were aware about the pre-determination approach of the respondents. Therefore, the petitioners filed writ petition being Special Civil Application No.14362 of 2019 before this Hon’ble Court challenging the aforesaid show cause notice on various factual as well as legal grounds on 19.08.2019. During the pendency of the writ petition, following events took place: 26.8.2019 Hearing of the show cause notice proceedings is fixed before the Deputy Secretary working under respondent No.1. 26.08.2019 At the time of hearing, the Deputy Secretary is intimated about filing of the petition and also that the same is listed before this Hon’ble Court on 27.08.2019 for admission hearing. The matter is then kept on 09.09.2019. 27.08.2019 Learned Assistant Government Pleader appeared on advance copy and sought adjournment on the ground that the learned Advocate General may remain present. Hence, the matter is kept on 29.08.2019 before this Hon’ble Court. 29.08.2019 Once again similar request is made by the learned Assistant Government Pleader and the matter is kept on 5.9.2019. 5.9.2019 As the learned Single Judge taking up the writ petition was not available, the roster was assigned to another Hon’ble Single Judge. Hence, both the advocates jointly mentioned and the matter has been adjourned to 16.09.2019 with a specific understanding that the matter shall not be heard by respondent No.1 on 9.9.2019. 9.9.2019 Deputy Secretary adjourned the proceedings to 18.9.2019. Hence, both the advocates jointly mentioned and the matter has been adjourned to 16.09.2019 with a specific understanding that the matter shall not be heard by respondent No.1 on 9.9.2019. 9.9.2019 Deputy Secretary adjourned the proceedings to 18.9.2019. It is shocking to read the language of the said notice which records that further / next hearing for removal of elected members of the Committee and for appointment of Administrator at 12.00 hours on 18.9.2019. 15.9.2019 An affidavit is filed in this regard before the Hon’ble Court. 16.9.2019 The matter is heard extensively by this Hon’ble Court. The arguments are concluded, and the matter is ordered to be listed for dictation of judgment on 20.09.2019. 18.9.2019 Despite the aforesaid petition, the Deputy Secretary insists that the advocate of the appellants seeks time for 4 weeks. The Deputy Secretary also records that the Directors are trying to waste time and the matter is fixed on 21.9.2019 as a last chance to remain present and file reply. 20.9.2019 This Hon’ble Court passed an order directing the Registry to place the matter before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders as the roster had changed. 21.9.2019 In the proceedings before the authorities, the aforesaid difficulties are pointed out and the matter is kept on 24.9.2019. 24.9.2019 Once again, the Deputy Secretary fixed the hearing on 26.9.2019, holding that if the appellants do not remain present, the proceedings would be conducted ex parte. These facts are brought on record by filing an affidavit dated 26.9.2019. It is only after necessary instructions issued to respondent No.1 that the proceedings are adjourned and the decision of this Hon’ble Court is awaited.” 22. As held in the case of N. Nagaraj (supra), merely because decision is taken on haste would not make it bad. So also held by the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Gururaja (supra). Relevant para 13 of the said judgment i.e. N. Nagaraj and paras 34 & 35 in S.P. Gururaja, respectively read as under: “13. As held in the case of N. Nagaraj (supra), merely because decision is taken on haste would not make it bad. So also held by the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Gururaja (supra). Relevant para 13 of the said judgment i.e. N. Nagaraj and paras 34 & 35 in S.P. Gururaja, respectively read as under: “13. As regards Shri Venugopal’s argument at (b) above, the fact that the decision to reduce the age of retirement from 58 to 55 was taken by the State Government within one month of the assumption of office by it, cannot justify the conclusion that the decision is arbitrary because it is unscientific in the sense that it is not backed by due investigation or by compilation of relevant data on the subject. Were this so, every decision taken by a new Government soon after assumption of office shall have to be regarded as arbitrary. The reasonableness of a decision, in any jurisdiction, does not depend upon the time which it takes. A delayed decision of the executive can also be bad as offending against the provisions of the Constitution and it can be no defence to the charge of unconstitutionality that the decision was taken after the lapse of a long time. Conversely, decisions which are taken promptly cannot be assumed to be bad because they are taken promptly. Every decision has to be examined on its own merits in order to determined whether it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Besides, we have to consider the validity of a law regulating the age of retirement. It is untenable to contend that a law is bad because it is passed immediately on the assumption of office by a new Government. It must also be borne in mind that the question as to what should be the proper age of retirement is not a novel or unprecedented question which the State Legislature had to consider. There is a wealth of material on that subject and many a Pay Commission has dealt with it comprehensively. The State Government had the relevant facts as also the reports of the various Central and State Pay Commissions before it, on the basis of which it had to take a reasonable decision. There is a wealth of material on that subject and many a Pay Commission has dealt with it comprehensively. The State Government had the relevant facts as also the reports of the various Central and State Pay Commissions before it, on the basis of which it had to take a reasonable decision. The aid and assistance of a well-trained bureaucracy which, notoriously, plays an important part not only in the implementation of policies but in their making, was also available to the Government. Therefore, the speed with which the decision was taken cannot, without more, invalidate it on the ground of arbitrariness.” “34. Undue haste also is a matter which by itself would not have been a ground for exercise of the power of judicial review unless it is held to be mala fide. What is necessary in such matters is not the time taken for allotment but the manner in which the action had been taken. The Court, it is trite, is not concerned with the merit of the decision but the decision-making process. In the absence of any finding that any legal malice was committed, the impugned allotment of land could not have been interfered with. What was only necessary to be seen was as to whether there had been fair play in action. 35. The question as to whether any undue haste has been shown in taking an administrative decision is essentially a question of fact. The State had developed a policy of single-window system with a view to get rid of red tapism generally prevailing in the bureaucracy. A decision which has been taken after due deliberations and upon due application of mind cannot be held to be suffering from malice in law on the ground that there had been undue haste on the part of the State and the Board.” 23. The decision of the State to supersede the Committee records that in two cases the tender process was not fully transparent. Proximity of the bidders overshadowed the award of tender. Moreover negotiations were not held with all. This was not in consonance with the fairness of procedure. In the case of Tarpaulin, tender conditions were unilaterally modified. In the case of Kamdhenu (supra), the Supreme Court has held as under: “10. Proximity of the bidders overshadowed the award of tender. Moreover negotiations were not held with all. This was not in consonance with the fairness of procedure. In the case of Tarpaulin, tender conditions were unilaterally modified. In the case of Kamdhenu (supra), the Supreme Court has held as under: “10. From the above, it is clear that even though the highest tenderer can claim no right to have his tender accepted, there being a power while inviting tenders to reject all the tenders, yet the power to reject all the tenders cannot be exercised arbitrarily and must depend for its validity on the existence of cogent reasons for such action. The object of inviting tenders for disposal of a commodity is to procure the highest price while giving equal opportunity to all the intending bidders to compete. Procuring the highest price for the commodity is undoubtedly in public interest since the amount so collected goes to the public fund. Accordingly, inadequacy of the price offered in the highest tender would be a cogent ground for negotiating with the tenderers giving them equal opportunity to revise their bids with a view to obtain the highest available price. The inadequacy may be for several reasons known in the commercial field. Inadequacy of the price quoted in the highest tender would be a question of fact in each case. Retaining the option to accept the highest tender, in case the negotiations do not yield a significantly higher offer would be fair to the tenderers besides protecting the public interest. A procedure wherein resort is had to negotiations with the tenderers for obtaining a significantly higher bid during the period when the offers in the tenders remain open for acceptance and rejection of the tenders only in the event of a significant higher bid being obtained during negotiations would ordinarily satisfy this requirement. This procedure involves giving due weight to the legitimate expectation of the highest bidder to have his tender accepted unless outbid by a higher offer, in which case acceptance of the highest offer within the time the offers remain open would be a reasonable exercise of power for public good.” 24. Even reliance by the Committee to rely upon the CVC circular was misplaced as the same was not applicable. Even reliance by the Committee to rely upon the CVC circular was misplaced as the same was not applicable. In context of political mala fides, instances have been cited in the body of the petition to show that since the newly elected Committee enforced the law in demolishing illegal constructions, recovery of market cess etc from the complainants who are not proximate to the party in power, the State has in mala fide exercise of power superseded the Committee and appointed the administrator. In these facts, it will be in the fitness of things to quote the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of M.Gangappa (supra). Relevant para 20 of the said judgment reads as under: “20. It is, no doubt, true that allegations of mala fides and of improper motives on the part of those in power are frequently made and their frequency has increased in recent times. It is also somewhat unfortunate that allegations of this nature which have no foundation in fact, are made in several of the cases which have come up before this and other Courts and it is found that they have been made merely with a view to cause prejudice or in the hope that whether they have basis in fact or not some of it at least might stick. Consequently it has become the duty of the Court to scrutinise these allegations with care so as to avoid being in any manner influenced by them, in cases where they have no foundation in fact. In this task which is thus cast on the courts it would conduce to a more satisfactory disposal and consideration of them, if those against whom allegations are made came forward to place before the Court either their denials or their version of the matter, so that the Court may be in a position to judge as to whether the onus that lies upon those who make allegations of mala fides on the part of authorities of the status of those with which this appeal is concerned, have discharged their burden of proving it. In the absence of such affidavits or of materials placed before the Court by these authorities, the Court is left to judge of the veracity of the allegations merely on tests of probability with nothing more substantial by way of answer. In the absence of such affidavits or of materials placed before the Court by these authorities, the Court is left to judge of the veracity of the allegations merely on tests of probability with nothing more substantial by way of answer. This is precisely the situation in which we find ourselves in the present case.” 25. So also in the case of E.P. Royappa (supra), the Supreme Court has held as under: “92. Secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. Here the petitioner, who was himself once the Chief Secretary, has flung a series of charges of oblique conduct against the Chief Minister. That is in itself a rather extraordinary and unusual occurrence and if these charges are true, they are bound to shake the confidence of the people in the political custodians of power in the State, and therefore, the anxiety of the Court should be all the greater to insist on a high degree of proof. In this context it may be noted that top administrators were often required to do acts which affect others adversely but which are necessary in the execution of their duties. These acts may lend themselves to misconstruction and suspicion as to the bona fides of their author when the full facts and surrounding circumstances are not known. The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charges of unworthy conduct against ministers and other high authorities, not because of any special status which they are supposed to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life or administrative setup – these considerations are wholly irrelevant in judicial approach – but because otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult in a democracy. It is from this stand-point that we must assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made by the petitioner against the second respondent.” 26. It is from this stand-point that we must assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made by the petitioner against the second respondent.” 26. Malafides cannot be readily assumed and merely the petitioners making such assertions and finding support from the time line and letters by which, the proceedings were adjourned from time to time, would not indicate a pre-determined mind set. The Court cannot presume such a fact. The language of the letters has been explained by the State’s affidavit. 27. The petitioners’ contention that sufficient time was not given even after the petition was dismissed is not correct. The show cause notice was dated 06.8.2019. The hearing took place on 7.11.2019. Till such time, the State did not act. Then the Court when orally pronounced that the petitioners would get 4 weeks’ time, the State kept the hearing on 7/11/2019, where the petitioners participated and the matter was heard. When on availability of the copy of the order of the High Court time was granted as to read as six weeks, on a request made by the petitioners for 12 days’ time, the time was granted till 19/11/2019. These chain of events would indicate that no fault can be found for the petitioners to say that the State has scuttled their process of hearing and violated the principles of natural justice. The stand of the petitioners on this count must be rejected. 28. Having considered the matter in the entire perspective and keeping in view the parameters of a writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, though not agreeing with the State on the charge of issuance of licenses and the allegations of gambling, I do not see reason to interfere with the order of the State in superseding the A.P.M.C, Patan on the charges regarding the issues of Tarpaulin and canteen construction and charges ancillary thereto. The order does not suffer from mala fides or is passed in violation of principles of natural justice. 29. The petition is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. In view of the order passed in the main petition, no orders are passed in the Civil Application and the same is disposed of accordingly.