JUDGMENT : 1. This petition is directed against the judgment and award dated September 28, 2002, rendered by the Industrial Tribunal, Nadiad, while dealing with Reference (ITN) No.580 of 1998 (old No.11 of 1997). 2. Succinctly put, the material facts giving rise to the present petition are as follows : 2.1 The petitioner is a body corporate established and constituted under the provisions of section 3 of the Gujarat Agriculture University Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). It is an educational institution 100% aided by the State Government. Presently, it has been named as Anand Agricultural University. The University has its own recruitment rules for appointment of its employees. After following due procedure, the selection committee selects and appoints the employees. 2.2 It is the say of the petitioner that on account of administrative exigencies, three temporary posts i.e. two posts of skilled worker and one of the laboratory attendant, on daily wages, were created. The respondent herein had applied on January 18, 1978, for the post of skilled work in the college laboratory. Vide order dated February 02, 1978, she was appointed purely on ad hoc basis against the temporary vacancy and she reported for duty on February 06, 1978. 2.3 The respondent was appointed purely on temporary post as a skilled worker against temporary vacancy when she reported for duty on February 06, 1978. It is the say of the petitioner that she was not appointed on a sanctioned vacant post of a Laboratory Assistant. One Shri Bhaskarbhai B. Patel was temporarily appointed as a Library Attendant (Skilled). At the time of appointment of the respondent herein, she was aged 32 years and was also not possessing requisite qualification for library Assistant as per the recruitment rules. She continued on purely temporary post as a skilled worker on daily rated basis against the temporary vacancy. 2.4 On April 12, 1982, the petitioner invited application for appointment on the post of Junior Library Assistant. Since the respondent was not possessing the requisite qualification under the recruitment rules, the selection committee did not consider her case. She continued on purely temporary post as a skilled worker on daily rated basis against the temporary vacancy. 2.4 On April 12, 1982, the petitioner invited application for appointment on the post of Junior Library Assistant. Since the respondent was not possessing the requisite qualification under the recruitment rules, the selection committee did not consider her case. The service of the respondent came to be terminated on April 30, 1983, which was challenged by her before the Labour Court, whereby by its order dated April 18, 1992, the petitioner was directed to reinstate the respondent in service with continuity of service and back wages and, therefore, the reinstatement order came to be implemented on June 23, 1992 as a temporary worker on daily wage basis and she continued to work as such. It is the say of the petitioner that there was no sanctioned post of a Library Assistant at Anand Campus of the University. 2.5 A circular was issued inviting applications for the post of Library Assistant in the payscale of Rs.1640-2900. As the respondent did not apply for the said post, she was not considered by the selection committee for regular appointment. Hence, the respondent raised an industrial dispute after about 18 years claiming her payscale of Rs.2000-4000 from the date of her entry in service i.e. February 06, 1978 with all the increments and all consequential benefits. She also claimed all the consequential benefits. After availing the opportunities to both the sides, the Industrial Tribunal passed an judgment and award dated September 28, 2002, directing the petitioner University to appoint the petitioner with all the consequential benefits with effect from dated December 28, 1996 i.e. from the date of filing of the Reference. 2.6 The petitioner has challenged this award on the ground of the same being perverse and illegal. The main plank of averment in the petition is that the respondent had worked as a daily rated employee for a number of years, which would not entitle her any permanent status much less when there was no sanctioned post. It is also their say that she was not having requisite qualification for the post of a Library Assistant and, therefore, was not considered for being appointed on regular basis. It is the say of petitioner that especially absence of eligibility despite continuous work, would not overreach the law. It is also their say that she was not having requisite qualification for the post of a Library Assistant and, therefore, was not considered for being appointed on regular basis. It is the say of petitioner that especially absence of eligibility despite continuous work, would not overreach the law. No permanent post can be filled in de hors the rules. The prayers sought for are as follows : “15(a) That Your Lordships will be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari and/or writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the like nature for quashing and setting aside the impugned Award dated 28.09.2002 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Nadiad in Reference (ITN) No.580/98 (old No.11/97) at Annexure-J.” (b) that pending the hearing and final disposal of this petition, Your Lordships be pleased to stay the operation, execution and implementation of the impugned Award dated 28.09.2002 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Nadiad in Reference (ITN) No.580 (old NO.11/97) at Annexure J. (c) Any other appropriate relief deemed just, fit and proper may please be granted in the interest of justice.” 3. Further, additional affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the petitioner through Shri P.R. Vaishnav, Registrar of the Anand Agricultural University, on February 06, 2013, stating inter alia therein that during the pendency of the petition, vide order dated June 12, 2001, the respondent was granted the benefit of Clause 2 of the Regularisation Scheme as provided in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar and others, reported in (2001) 3 SCC 574 . She has not only accepted the benefit of the said scheme, but eventually had attained the age of superannuation on November 30, 2004. Further, vide order dated January 31, 2003, the respondent was appointed as a Clerk/Typist on the regular basis in the payscale of Rs.3050-4590 with effect from April 01, 2002 and she also got retired from the service thereafter. 4. An affidavit-in-reply has been filed by the respondent, wherein the respondent has stated that she had cleared the Course of Library Assistant (Science) at the time when she applied for the post of Library Assistant, which was vacant. She was also selected for the very post. However, she was not given appointment as she was overaged. 4. An affidavit-in-reply has been filed by the respondent, wherein the respondent has stated that she had cleared the Course of Library Assistant (Science) at the time when she applied for the post of Library Assistant, which was vacant. She was also selected for the very post. However, she was not given appointment as she was overaged. She continued to perform the same duty as a permanent worker and eventually, she was required to challenge her order of termination. It is her say that before the Labour Court also, her entitlement has been accepted even by the witnesses of the petitioner and, therefore, this Court may not interfere with the impugned award. 5. Shri D.G. Chauhan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-University has made his submissions very forcefully. According to him, the respondent has after so many years and that too, when she was not possessing the requisite qualification as prescribed under the Rules, regularised the service of the respondent. He has also urged that the respondent continued to work as a daily wager employee and, therefore, after once having availed the benefit of scheme of regularisation as a clerk, the Tribunal could not have directed her appointment as a Library Assistant from the date of her Reference i.e. December 26, 1996. he has also sought to rely upon the recruitment rules of the petitionerUniversity and also the number of sanctioned posts to bring home the point that neither the respondent had requisite qualification nor was she having requisite age, which would entitle her to be considered even against the temporary post. Subsequently, when the permanent posts were created, she never applied for the same and, therefore, the selection committee had no occasion to consider her case. In support of his submissions, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court (Coram : Jayant Patel and R.M. Chhaya, JJ.) rendered on October 03, 2011 in the case of Anand Agricultural University v. Kiritbhai H. Bhatt, while dealing with Letters Patent Appeal No.261 of 2011 in Special Civil Application No.1201 of 1999. 6. According to Shri Mukesh Rathod, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, the respondent was appointed after she cleared the selection process by topping the same. According to him, she ought not to have been appointed if she was overaged and the recruitment rules forbade such appointment. 6. According to Shri Mukesh Rathod, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, the respondent was appointed after she cleared the selection process by topping the same. According to him, she ought not to have been appointed if she was overaged and the recruitment rules forbade such appointment. Consistently for a long time, work had been taken from her as a Library Assistant and no benefit of permanent employee had been granted to her. This is nothing but an unfair labour practice adopted by the petitioner. It is also urged that thereafter, the respondent was reinstated in service in the year 1992. The respondent worked all throughout till the date of her superannuation as a Library Assistant. He has, therefore, urged that regularising her service on the post of a Clerk may not serve the purpose as the benefit granted by the Labour Court relates back to December 26, 1996. He has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Umrala Gram Panchayat v. Secretary, Municipal Employees Union and others, reported in 2015(0)AIJELSC 56358, wherein the question was with regard to the grant of permanency in service to workers. Yet another decision is sought to rely upon the decision of this Court (Coram : S.R. Brahmbhatt, J.) rendered on August 13, 2015, while dealing with Civil Application No.3131 of 2015 and allied matters in the case of Zaverbhai Dahyabhai Vaghela v. Talaja Municipality, wherein the Municipality assailed judgment and award passed by the concerned Labour Court, wherein the employer was directed to treat the workman as regular employee and granted all the benefits including arrears and difference of wages. The said judgment of the learned Single Judge has been confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court (Coram : Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice Mr.Jayant Patel and Hon'ble Mr.Justice Vipul Pancholi), while dealing with Letters Patent Appeal No.1463 of 2015 and allied matters in the case of Talaja Municipality v. Velji Premji Vaghela. According to him, later on, when the said decision was challenged before the Apex Court, even the petition before the Apex Court came to be dismissed. 7. According to him, later on, when the said decision was challenged before the Apex Court, even the petition before the Apex Court came to be dismissed. 7. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, which have been placed on record, some of the authorities relied upon by learned counsel appearing for both the sides deserve consideration at this stage : 7.1 The Apex Court in the case of Umrala Gram Panchayat (supra) was considering the case of the workmen working under the Panchayat who raised the Industrial Dispute before the Conciliation Officer stating that they were rendering service with the Panchayat for the last many years and were entitled to the benefit of permanency under the establishment of the Panchayat. No settlement could be arrived at between the workmen and the panchayat and, therefore, the failure report was sent to the Deputy Commissioner, who referred the matter to the Labour Court for adjudication. The Labour Court held the workers entitled to be made permanent employees as Safai Kamdars in the body of the Panchayat. They were also directed to be paid wages, allowances and other monetary benefits. 7.2 Such an award was challenged before the High Court, which too was dismissed. 7.3 The Letters Patent Appeal Bench also did not entertain the plea of the employer and, thereafter, the employer had approached the Apex Court on the ground that it was an admitted fact that the work which was being done by the concerned workmen was the same as that of the permanent workmen of the Panchayat. They have also been working for similar number of hours, however, the discrepancy in the payment of wages/ salary between the permanent and the nonpermanent workmen was found to be alarming by the Court and the same was construed to be an unfair labour practice as defined under section 2(ra) of the I.D. Act read with Entry No.10 of the Fifth Schedule to the I.D. Act which is prohibited under section 25T of the I.A. Act. Further, no documentary evidence was produced on record before the Labour Court which shows that the present workmen were working less or for lesser number of hours than the permanent employees of the Panchayat. Further, no documentary evidence was produced on record before the Labour Court which shows that the present workmen were working less or for lesser number of hours than the permanent employees of the Panchayat. Since the principle of 'equal work, equal pay' has been violated by the Panchayat as they have been treating the concerned workmen unfairly and, therefore, with the following findings, the Apex Court dismissed the petition : “9. On a perusal of the same, we have come to the conclusion that the High Court has rightly dismissed the case of the appellant as the labour Court has dealt with the same in detail in its reasoning portion of the Award in support of its findings of fact while answering the points of dispute and the same cannot be said to be either erroneous or error in law. 10.In support of the above said conclusions arrived at by us, we record our reasons hereunder: it is an admitted fact that the work which was being done by the concerned workmen was the same as that of the permanent workmen of the appellant-Panchayat. They have also been working for similar number of hours, however, the discrepancy in the payment of wages/salary between the permanent and the nonpermanent workmen is alarming and the same has to be construed as being an unfair labour practice as defined under Section 2(ra) of the ID Act r/w Entry No.10 of the Fifth Schedule to the ID Act, which is prohibited under Section 25(T) of the ID Act. Further, there is no documentary evidence produced on record before the Labour Court which shows that the present workmen are working less or for lesser number of hours than the permanent employees of the appellant-Panchayat. Thus, on the face of it, the work being done by the concerned workmen has been permanent in nature and the Labour Court as well as the High Court have come to the right conclusion on the points of dispute and have rightly rejected the contention of the appellant-Panchayat as the same amounts to unfair labour practice by the appellant-Panchayat which is prohibited under Section 25(T) of the ID Act and it also amounts to statutory offence on the part of the appellant under Section 25(U) of the ID Act for which it is liable to be prosecuted. 11. 11. Further, the Labour Court has rightly held that there is no restriction for the recruitment of the workmen in the Panchayat's setup as there is evidence to show that by making a proposal, the District Panchayat has increased the work force in the establishment of the appellant-Panchayat and therefore, the contention urged by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant-Panchayat that there are only limited number of permanent vacancies for the workmen in the Panchayat of the appellant is not tenable in law. 12. Further, we have also taken note of the fact that the financial position of the Panchayat is not so unsound as no activity of the Panchayat has been discontinued, as all the other workers of the appellant-Panchayat are being paid their wages regularly. Thus, there would be no difficulty for the appellant-Panchayat to bear the extra cost for the payment of the wages/salary and other monetary benefits to the concerned workmen if they are made permanent. 13. Further, Section 25(T) of the ID Act clearly states that unfair labour practice should not be encouraged and the same should be discontinued. In the present case, the principle "equal work, equal pay" has been violated by the appellant-Panchayat as they have been treating the concerned workmen unfairly and therefore, the demand raised by the respondent-Union needs to be accepted. The High Court has thus, rightly not interfered with the Award of the Labour Court as the same is legal and supported with cogent and valid reasons. 14. Therefore, the learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court have exercised the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and have rightly held that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to decide the industrial dispute that has been referred to it by the Dy. Commissioner of Labour, Ahmedabad. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Casteribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana[1], wherein it has been held thus: "32.The power given to the Industrial and Labour Courts under Section 30 is very wide and the affirmative action mentioned therein is inclusive and not exhaustive. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Casteribe Rajya P. Karmchari Sanghatana[1], wherein it has been held thus: "32.The power given to the Industrial and Labour Courts under Section 30 is very wide and the affirmative action mentioned therein is inclusive and not exhaustive. Employing badlis, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees is an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under item 6 of Schedule IV. Once such unfair labour practice on the part of the employer is established in the complaint, the Industrial and Labour Courts are empowered to issue preventive as well as positive direction to an erring employer." 15. Further, reliance has been placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Durgapur Casual Workers Union v. Food Corporation of India, [2] wherein it has been held thus: "19. Almost similar issue relating to unfair trade practice by employer and the effect of decision of Umadevi (3) in the grant of relief was considered by this Court in Ajaypal Singh v. Haryana Warehousing Corporation in Civil Appeal No. 6327 of 2014 decided on 9th July, 2014. In the said case, this Court observed and held as follows: 20. The provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts provided therein were not at all under consideration in Umadevi's case. The issue pertaining to unfair labour practice was neither the subject matter for decision nor was it decided in Umadevi's case. 21. We have noticed that Industrial Disputes Act is made for settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes as mentioned therein. It prohibits unfair labour practice on the part of the employer in engaging employees as casual or temporary employees for a long period without giving them the status and privileges of permanent employees...."" 16. Thus, in the light of the above referred cases of this Court, it is amply clear that the judgments and orders of the High Court and the Award passed by the Labour Court are reasonable and the same have been arrived at in a just and fair manner. Thus, in the light of the above referred cases of this Court, it is amply clear that the judgments and orders of the High Court and the Award passed by the Labour Court are reasonable and the same have been arrived at in a just and fair manner. 17.The reliance placed by the learned senior counsel for the appellant upon the decision of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi & Ors.[3], does not apply to the fact situation of the present case and the same cannot be accepted by us in the light of the cogent reasons arrived at by the courts below. 18. In view of the reasons stated supra and in the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we hold that the services of the concerned workmen are permanent in nature, since they have worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year from the date of their initial appointment, which is clear from the evidence on record. Therefore, not making their services permanent by the appellant-Panchayat is erroneous and also amounts to error in law. Hence, the same cannot be allowed to sustain in law. 19.For the reasons stated supra, we dismiss the appeals and direct the appellants to treat the services of the concerned workmen as permanent employees, after five years of their initial appointment as daily wage workmen till they attain the age of superannuation for the purpose of granting terminal benefits to them. 20. The appellant is further directed to pay the regular payscale as per the revised pay scale fixed to the post of permanent safai kamdars for a total period of 15 years to the concerned workmen and the legal representatives of the deceased workmen. The same shall be implemented within six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment and compliance report of the same shall be submitted for the perusal of this Court. No Costs.” 7.4 The Apex Court in the case of Ajaypal Singh v. Haryana Warehousing Corporation, (2007) 9 SCC 748 was considering the case of the workman who was working with the respondent-Haryana Warehousing Corporation, whose service came to be terminated though he had completed 240 days of service in the preceding year of his termination without prior notice or pay in terms of section 25F of the Act. On a Reference, the termination of service was held to be not justified and he was reinstated in service with full back wages by the Labour Court. This was when challenged before the High Court, the learned Single Judge held that the appointment was made in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the said order was even confirmed by the Division Bench in the intraCourt appeal. This since had aggrieved the employee, he approached the Apex Court on the ground that the Industrial Disputes Act is a beneficial legislation and the employer of an industry cannot escape from the mandatory provisions of sections 25F and 25H of the Act and on the nonest ground that the appointment was illegal and also taking a ground that those who were appointed through back door, were not entitled to reinstatement. The Apex Court considered the decision of M.P. Administration v. Tribhuban, (2007) 9 SCC 748 , which laid down that while taking into account the doctrine of public employment involving public money and several other facts, the question that would arise is as to whether the Court should direct the reinstatement with full back wages. Apt it would be to reproduce the relevant observations of the said decision in the case of Ajaypal Singh (supra), which read as under : “16. This Court in the case of M.P. Administration v. Tribhuban, (2007) 9 SCC 748 while taking into account the doctrine of public employment involving public money and several other facts observed as follows: "6. The question, however, which arises for consideration is as to whether in a situation of this nature, the learned Single Judge and consequently the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court should have directed reinstatement of the respondent with full back wages. Whereas at one point of time, such a relief used to be automatically granted, but keeping in view several other factors and in particular the doctrine of public employment and involvement of the public money, a change in the said trend is now found in the recent decisions of this Court. This Court in a large number of decisions in the matter of grant of relief of the kind distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. This Court in a large number of decisions in the matter of grant of relief of the kind distinguished between a daily wager who does not hold a post and a permanent employee. It may be that the definition of "workman" as contained in Section 2(s) of the Act is wide and takes within its embrace all categories of workmen specified therein, but the same would not mean that even for the purpose of grant of relief in an industrial dispute referred for adjudication, application of constitutional scheme of equality adumbrated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, in the light of a decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Secy., State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) and other relevant factors pointed out by the Court in a catena of decisions shall not be taken into consideration. 7. The nature of appointment, whether there existed any sanctioned post or whether the officer concerned had any authority to make appointment are relevant factors. (See M.P. Housing Board v. Manoj Shrivastava (2006)2 SCC 702 , State of M.P. v. Arjunlal Rajak (2006)2 SCC 711 and M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. S.C. Pandey, 2006 (2) SCC 716 .)” 7.5 The Apex Court has, thus, held that the decision in the case of State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , is an authoritative pronouncement for the proposition that the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not issue directions of absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or ad hoc employees unless the recruitment itself was made regularly in terms of the constitutional scheme. It is further held that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Apt it would be reproduce relevant observations of the Apex Court in the said decision, which read as under : “46. Apt it would be reproduce relevant observations of the Apex Court in the said decision, which read as under : “46. Learned Senior Counsel for some of the respondents argued that on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the employees, especially of the Commercial Taxes Department, should be directed to be regularized since the decisions in Dharwad (supra), Piara Singh (supra), Jacob, and Gujarat Agricultural University and the like, have given rise to an expectation in them that their services would also be regularized. The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the Administrative Authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn {See Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions V. Minister for the Civil Service (1985 Appeal Cases 374), National Buildings Construction Corpn. Vs. S. Raghunathan, ( 1998 (7) SCC 66 ) and Dr. Chanchal Goyal Vs. State of Rajasthan ( 2003 (3) SCC 485 ). There is no case that any assurance was given by the Government or the concerned department while making the appointment on daily wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing it. The very engagement was against the constitutional scheme. Though, the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes Department sought to get the appointments made permanent, there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was held out. No such promise could also have been held out in view of the circulars and directives issued by the Government after the Dharwad decision. Though, there is a case that the State had made regularizations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularizations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in some case by this Court. Though, there is a case that the State had made regularizations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularizations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in some case by this Court. Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularized in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. The fact that in certain cases the court had directed regularization of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. The argument if accepted would also run counter to the constitutional mandate. The argument in that behalf has therefore to be rejected. 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. 48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the concerned department on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and made permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled. xxx xxx xxx 53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. NARAYANAPPA (supra), R.N. NANJUNDAPPA (supra), and B.N. NAGARAJAN (supra), and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not subjudice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. 54. It is also clarified that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in this decision, or in which directions running counter to what we have held herein, will stand denuded of their status as precedents.” 7.6 In yet another decision in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 , the Apex Court has held that the provisions of MRTU Act (Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971) have not been denuded of their statutory status by the Constitution Bench decision in Umadevi (supra). Power given to Industrial and Labour Courts under section 30 is very wide and affirmative action mentioned therein is inclusive and not exhaustive. Employing badlis, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of status and privileges of permanent employees is an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV and power of Industrial and Labour Courts under section 30 of the Act did not fall for adjudication or consideration before the Constitution Bench. The Court, of course, has held that there cannot be equilibrium with proposition that the Court cannot direct for creation of posts. The Court, of course, has held that there cannot be equilibrium with proposition that the Court cannot direct for creation of posts. The Apex Court also held further that the status of permanency cannot be granted by the Court where the post does not exist. The Court cannot create posts where none exists. It further held that it cannot direct absorption of the respondent or continue him in service, or pay him salaries of regular employee, as these are purely executive functions. It also held that the Court cannot arrogate to itself the powers of the executive or legislature. There is broad separation of powers under the Constitution, and the judiciary, too, must act within its limits. Apt it would be reproduce relevant observations of the Apex Court in the said decision, which read as under : “37. There cannot be any quarrel to the proposition that courts cannot direct creation of posts. In Mahatma Phule Agricultural University and others vs. Nasik Zilla Sheth Kamgar Union and others (2001 AIR SCW 3105), this Court held : "12. Mrs. Jaising, in support of Civil Appeal Nos. 4461-70 and 4457-60 [arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 418-21 of 1999 and SLPs (C) Nos. 9023-32 of 1998] submitted that the workmen were entitled to be made permanent. She, however, fairly conceded that there were no sanctioned posts available to absorb all the workmen. In view of the law laid down by this Court the status of permanency cannot be granted when there are no posts. She, however, submitted that this Court should direct the Universities and the State Governments to frame a scheme by which, over a course of time, posts are created and the workmen employed on permanent basis. It was, however, fairly pointed out to the Court that many of these workmen have died and that the Universities have by now retrenched most of these workmen. In this view of the matter no useful purpose would be served in undergoing any such exercise. 13. To be seen that, in the impugned judgment, the High Court notes that, as per the law laid down by this Court, status of permanency could not be granted. In spite of this the High Court indirectly does what it could not do directly. 13. To be seen that, in the impugned judgment, the High Court notes that, as per the law laid down by this Court, status of permanency could not be granted. In spite of this the High Court indirectly does what it could not do directly. The High Court, without granting the status of permanency, grants wages and other benefits applicable to permanent employees on the specious reasoning that inaction on the part of the Government in not creating posts amounted to unfair labour practice under Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act. In so doing the High Court erroneously ignores the fact that approximately 2000 workmen had not even made a claim for permanency before it. Their claim for permanency had been rejected by the award dated 20.2.1985. These workmen were only seeking quantification of amounts as per this award. The challenge, before the High Court, was only to the quantification of the amounts. Yet by this sweeping order the High Court grants, even to these workmen, the wages and benefits payable to other permanent workmen. 14. Further, Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act reads as follows : "6. To employ employees as 'badlis', casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees." The complaint was against the Universities. The High Court notes that as there were no posts the employees could not be made permanent. Once it comes to the conclusion that for lack of posts the employees could not be made permanent, how could it then go on to hold that they were continued as "badlis", casuals or temporaries with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees? To be noted that the complaint was not against the State Government. The complaint was against the Universities. The inaction on the part of the State Government to create posts would not mean that an unfair labour practice had been committed by the Universities. The reasoning given by the High Court to conclude that the case was squarely covered by Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act cannot be sustained at all and the impugned judgment has to be and is set aside. The reasoning given by the High Court to conclude that the case was squarely covered by Item 6 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act cannot be sustained at all and the impugned judgment has to be and is set aside. It is, however, clarified that the High Court was right in concluding that, as per the law laid down by this Court, status of permanency could not be granted. Thus all orders wherein permanency has been granted (except award dated 1.4.1985 in IT No. 27 of 1984) also stand set aside." 38. In the case of State of Maharashtra and another vs. R.S.Bhonde and Ors. (2005 AIR SCW 4497), this Court relied upon earlier judgment in the case of Mahatma Phule Agricultural University (2001 AIR SCW 3105) and reiterated the legal position thus : "Additionally, as observed by this Court in Mahatma Phule Agricultural University v. Nasik Zilla Sheth Kamgar Union (2001) 7 SCC 346 , the status of permanency cannot be granted when there is no post. Again in Gram Sevak Prashikshan Kendra v. Workmen (2001) 7 SCC 356 , it was held that mere continuance every year of seasonal work obviously during the period when the work was available does not constitute a permanent status unless there exists post and regularisation is done." 39. In the case of Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Workmen, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2006 AIR SCW 5994), this Court stated that courts cannot create a post where none exists. In paragraph 37 of the report, this Court held: "37. Creation and abolition of posts and regularisation are purely executive functions vide P.U. Joshi v. Accountant General (2003) 2 SCC 632. Hence, the court cannot create a post where none exists. Also, we cannot issue any direction to absorb the respondents or continue them in service, or pay them salaries of regular employees, as these are purely executive functions. This Court cannot arrogate to itself the powers of the executive or legislature. There is broad separation of powers under the Constitution, and the judiciary, too, must know its limits." 40. In yet another case of Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club and another vs. Chander Hass and another(2008 AIR SCW 406), this Court said : "15. The court cannot direct the creation of posts. There is broad separation of powers under the Constitution, and the judiciary, too, must know its limits." 40. In yet another case of Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club and another vs. Chander Hass and another(2008 AIR SCW 406), this Court said : "15. The court cannot direct the creation of posts. Creation and sanction of posts is a prerogative of the executive or legislative authorities and the court cannot arrogate to itself this purely executive or legislative function, and direct creation of posts in any organisation. This Court has time and again pointed out that the creation of a post is an executive or legislative function and it involves economic factors. Hence the courts cannot take upon themselves the power of creation of a post. Therefore, the directions given by the High Court and the first appellate court to create the posts of tractor driver and regularise the services of the respondents against the said posts cannot be sustained and are hereby set aside." 41. Thus, there is no doubt that creation of posts is not within the domain of judicial functions which obviously pertains to the executive. It is also true that the status of permanency cannot be granted by the Court where no such posts exist and that executive functions and powers with regard to the creation of posts cannot be arrogated by the Courts.” 7.7 In the case of Durgapur Casual Workers Union and others v. Food Corporation of India and others, AIR 2015 SC (Supp) 574, the Apex Court held that in absence of any plea taken by the respondent-Corporation either before the State Government or before the Tribunal that the initial appointments of workmen were illegal or they were appointed through back door means, it was not open to the Division Bench to come to a finding of fact that initial appointments of workmen were in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Court further held that it was open to the High Court to deny the benefit to which the workmen were entitled under Item 10 of Part I of the Fifth Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act. Having accepted that there was unfair trade practice, it was not open to the Division Bench of the High Court to interfere with the impugned award. Having accepted that there was unfair trade practice, it was not open to the Division Bench of the High Court to interfere with the impugned award. This Court notices that the award which is impugned in this case is of June, 2005. The decision in the case of Uma Devi (supra) was not available at the relevant point of time, which came to be delivered on April 10, 2006. 7.8 Reliance is also placed on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court (Coram : Ravi R. Tripathi and K.M. Thaker, JJ.) in the case of Gujarat Maritime Board and others v. Ashokkumar Ijjatrai Anjaria and another, 2008 (3) GLH 767, wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held that the Apex Court delivered the judgment in the case of Uma Devi (supra) on April 10, 2006, which would not be available for consideration to the concerned Court and ruling would be prospective in nature unless it is otherwise provided that after the initial termination of service in the year 1985, it was challenged by way of a Reference, which resulted in favour of the respondent-workman before the Labour Court and also before this Court. 7.9 In the case of State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 , the Apex Court held that the true effect of the direction given in the case of Umadevi (supra) is that all persons who have worked for more than ten years as on April 10, 2006 [i.e. the date of decision in Umadevi (supra)] without the protection of any interim order of any court or tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing the requisite qualification, are entitled to be considered for regularization. The Apex Court further observed that the fact that the employer has not undertaken such exercise of regularization within six months of the decision in Umadevi (supra) or that such exercise was undertaken only in regard to a limited few, will not disentitle such employees, to be considered for regularization in terms of the above directions in Umadevi (supra) as a onetime measure. 8. In light of the above discussed legal position, the factual matrix of the present case needs to be reverted to, with a specific reference of appreciation of evidence by the Tribunal. 8. In light of the above discussed legal position, the factual matrix of the present case needs to be reverted to, with a specific reference of appreciation of evidence by the Tribunal. The respondent initially joined the Library from 1976 and continued to work till 1978 From 1976, she worked as the Library Assistant after having undergone, the requisite selection process, she stood first in the select list. She was still appointed as a daily wager for being overage. Her services came to be terminated on 30.04.1983. thereafter, the termination was challenged by her by a reference under the labour Laws being Reference No.109 of 1983. The Labour Court reinstated her into service on 17.04.1992. Thereafter instead of reinstating her as a Library Assistant category on 29.06.1992, she was reinstated as a skilled labourer. The Court notices that it was on vacant sanctioned post that she was selected as a Library Assistant and in the select list, she stood first, the second was one Mr.Bhathibhai Waghela. Yet Mr.Bhathibhai Waghela has been appointed and was made permanent, whereas on the ground that she was overage at the time of selection, she was not given appointment on the sanctioned post and work was taken from her and her services came to be terminated after nearly 05 years. The selection committee had examined the documents, which included certificate of her birth date and her services were taken continuously for 05 years. Her form had not been rejected nor on the ground of overage she was disqualified. She continued to discharge the duty for all those years and afterwards, at the sweetwill of the petitioner, she was terminated. It is a matter of record that on the ground of overage and for want of degree in Library Science at the initiate stage, Mr.Bhathbhai Waghela had been appointed in her place. The payscale of the said post was Rs.640-3200. There were in all 08 employees working, which consisted of one Librarian, two clerks, one peon and others. 9. It is thus clear that the respondent was selected in the process of selection of a Library Assistant, in the year 1978. She was permitted to appear despite the limitation of age as well as qualification and was rated first in the select list after the interview. 9. It is thus clear that the respondent was selected in the process of selection of a Library Assistant, in the year 1978. She was permitted to appear despite the limitation of age as well as qualification and was rated first in the select list after the interview. Her non-appointment on the ground that she was overaged at the time of her selection, resulted into the termination on 30.04.1983. She challenged the same before the Labour Court, Nadiad in Reference No.169 of 1983, which culminated in her favour on 17.04.1992. She was not reinstated by the petitioner as a Library Assistant, but, instead was reinstated by the petitioner on 29.06.1992 as a skilled labourer. This was a pure unfair labour practice. She continued to work for 19 years as Library Assistant and the Tribunal, after a detailed examination of the material on the record held that no discrimination is permissible qua the employee, who had requisite qualification. The respondent possessed, the degree of Library Science, which she had cleared in the year 1983 and prior thereto, she had diploma certificate of Library Science. She was not, at any point of time given the notice, nor was she, in any manner subjected to any kind of inquiry. 10. From 1978, the pay scale on the post of Library Assistant was Rs.16,400-23,200. Minimum wages only were received by her as a skilled worker. 11. As mentioned above, her reinstatement after a long process of litigation was as a skilled worker. There is no material, according to the Court, which had indicated that she had not worked continuously, after she was reinstated. She worked for 08 hours everyday. The work, she performed, and the regular Librarian performed had no difference. 12. It is needed to be mentioned at this stage that the person, who had been appointed as a Library Assistant Shri Rameshbhai Dabhi, was examined for and on behalf of the petitioner University he had stated on oath that there were two posts sanctioned in the year 1980. Shri Rameshbhai Dabhi and Smt. Shailaben Dave were appointed on these two posts. Smt. Shailaben Dave had left the place and at the time of selection process in 1978 when the advertisement had been issued, the respondent also had made an application. Shri Rameshbhai Dabhi and Smt. Shailaben Dave were appointed on these two posts. Smt. Shailaben Dave had left the place and at the time of selection process in 1978 when the advertisement had been issued, the respondent also had made an application. 12.1 Her interview was taken, however, the requirement of the post was between 18 to 25 years so far as age is concerned. But, since she was 31 years, at that stage, she was not given the appointment and in the year 1983, her services had been terminated. 12.2 According to this witness, the post of Library Assistant had been abolished or discontinued in the year 1989. He agreed that the Library starts at 8:00 a.m. and closes at 10:00 p.m. in two shifts and the Junior Library Assistants' work had been divided. It was agreed that the respondent had continued to work what had been the work of the Library Assistant. This witness also had stated that there was a third post also created of the Library Assistant and the interview had been taken. The third post was occupied by one Smt. Pushpaben Rajput. He also had agreed that in the year 1982, she had cleared it as a topper in an interview of the Junior Library Assistant where Mr. Bhatibhai Waghela, was appointed in the 1982 itself. It is quite clear that though she continued to work as Library Assistant, there were two shifts, one from 8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. and the other was from 2:00 p.m. onwards. The payscale in the year 1982 was Rs.950-1500 and the old payscale was Rs.260-400, which thereafter had been raised to Rs. 1640-2900. The main emphasis on the part of the petitioner was that she was since overaged, she had not been given the selection before cancelling her name. She had not been heard and in the year 1989, the post was automatically abolished. There was no order as such passed by the Board. 12.3 The trial Court was right when it held that if the work had been taken from the work of Library Assistant all throughout, the petitioner cannot take shelter behind either over age or the subsequent abolition of the post. The petitioner University had needed services of this respondent and it continued to take the work from her. 12.3 The trial Court was right when it held that if the work had been taken from the work of Library Assistant all throughout, the petitioner cannot take shelter behind either over age or the subsequent abolition of the post. The petitioner University had needed services of this respondent and it continued to take the work from her. Surprisingly, even after the Labour Court in reference when had directed her reinstatement, she was not taken back as Library Assistant, where she was working but as a skilled worker. This also amounts to unfair labour practice adopted by the petitioner. She also as an employee or as a workman has proved that she continued to work for 240 days per year. There was a sufficient work with the petitioner and there is nothing to indicate that in any given year, there as less work. She worked for the entire year and thus initially, without the Court's order, she has worked for 05 years on the very post of Library Assistant. Nothing is emerging as to why she was not given the post of Library Assistant, more so, after she acquired degree in the year 1983. 13. She had possessed the qualification of diploma in Library Science and later, she challenged her termination and was reinstated. She was taken back on the post of daily wager since, according to the petitioner, the post of Library Assistant was abolished. However, it also emerges that the third post also was created later where Smt. Pushpa Rajput was also selected and appointed. Required qualification if the respondent did not possess and if she had not qualified because of overage, there was no reason at all to call her for the interview. Once called for the said purpose, she could not have been allowed to continue to work. After declaring her as a topper or it could have been communicated that she was not entitled to continue on this post because of the overage. If there were two posts sanctioned and Shri Rameshbhai Dabhi was appointed, who was No.2 in the select list and when Smt. Shailaben Dave had not opted to join, the present respondent for the very post raised her claim as the University continued to draw the work from her and she continued to discharge the duties. 14. If there were two posts sanctioned and Shri Rameshbhai Dabhi was appointed, who was No.2 in the select list and when Smt. Shailaben Dave had not opted to join, the present respondent for the very post raised her claim as the University continued to draw the work from her and she continued to discharge the duties. 14. It is trite that the Court cannot direct the permanency in absence of post nor can the Court create the post as that is an administrative function and the Courts ordinarily should not enter into that arena, but, at the same time, if there exists the post and when the Court finds that discriminatory or unfair labour practice has been adopted by the employer, the Court certainly can intervene. 15. In the year 1982, for the Junior Labour Assistant, the payscale was from Rs.950-1500, the old scale was Rs.260-400. When Bhatibhai Waghela was selected in the interview, the payscale was Rs.1640-2900. 16. In the identity card and the certificate issued by the University, the respondent had been termed a skilled Library Assistant temporarily. There was no specific order of this post of Library Assistant to be abolished. Office order under the signature of Vice Chancellor shows that the set up of Library Assistant had payscale of Rs.1640-2900. There were two posts. University had in the year 1982 considered the respondent on the post of Junior Library Assistant. The communication dated 27.11.1982 indicates that even if she is given concession in the age since she had started work in the 1978 on the post of Junior Library Assistant on a daily wage basis, her age was more than 25 years. She was nearly 32 years at that stage and in the year 1982, she was 36 years old. Therefore also, she could not have been posted on the said post as the age has been fixed by the university before the posts were advertised. As her date of birth is 28.11.1946, when she joined services, in the very department prior to the post being advertised from 1976, she was 30 years old at that stage. She made an application on 08.06.1981 that after resignation of Ms. Shaila Dave, the post of Junior Library Assistant had fallen vacant and therefore, she be appointed on her post, sympathetically considering her practical experience and giving exemption in her age. She made an application on 08.06.1981 that after resignation of Ms. Shaila Dave, the post of Junior Library Assistant had fallen vacant and therefore, she be appointed on her post, sympathetically considering her practical experience and giving exemption in her age. 16.1 The Central Library gave certificate on 23.05.1980 stating therein that the respondent had been working on temporary basis from 1976 to 1978. She handled the work relating to current periodicals section, order of journal post, all bills for subscription, daily entry of journals, reminders for remission, missing issues, preparation of annual binding etc. She also worked on library counter. She also got experience of arranging of books and reports and had been handling day to day experience regarding journals. She also was stated to be cooperative with Library staff and helpful to the readers. She was addressed as being sincere to her duties and obedient to her superiors. Person incharge as Librarian also had issued certificate in her favour on 12.10.1972. There are other testimonial also praising her work. 16.2 It can be noticed that what is being emphasised is regularisation and also request is made for equal pay for equal work. There is no difference, according to her, in her work and that all through out, as Library Assistant, she continued to work for 22 years and that is nothing but economic exploitation. Two posts as mentioned above which were created in 1980, one was occupied by Rameshbhai Dabhi and the second was not given to the respondent on account of overage. Post had been abolished in 1989 as stated by the witness of the petitioner and thereafter, once again, it had been converted and three Assistant Librarians' Posts had been created, although there are no documents to substantiate the aspect of abolition of the post in the year 1989. 17. In wake of her reinstatement, granting her the daily wage of Rs.15/is found to be contrary to the settled canon of law and also in breach of the ratio of the Apex Court. This also would tantamount to unfair labour practice, as rightly pointed out by Labour court is entitled to the minimum payscale, equal pay for equal work is her entitlement. The university cannot exploit, more particularly, when her reinstatement was made after bipartite hearing and by a reasoned order. This also would tantamount to unfair labour practice, as rightly pointed out by Labour court is entitled to the minimum payscale, equal pay for equal work is her entitlement. The university cannot exploit, more particularly, when her reinstatement was made after bipartite hearing and by a reasoned order. Instead of challenging the same before the Higher forum when she had been reinstated and continued the work, the Court was right that she cannot be denied equal pay for equal work. She had continued the work every year for 240 days. She made her reference lodged in the year 1996. Therefore, the Court had treated that period upto 1996 as dies non and had chosen not to give her benefits upto 1996. Treating the same as notional and directed all benefits to her as Library Assistant from 26.12.1996. 18. In the opinion of this Court, status of permanency cannot be granted by the Court as such post which existed as in the instant case, could not have been filled in dehores the rules. She continued to work as daily rated skilled employee for number of years. She would be entitled for all benefits because of the unfair labour practice continued by the petitioner. However, in absence of requisite qualification available for the sanctioned post at the time of her interview, she, at the best, can be made available equal pay for equal work. 19. This Court is conscious of the fact that she was given permanency so far as the cadre of clerk is concerned. Eventually, however, she had not been made permanent on the post of Library Assistant. The law is since amply clear the authority also could not accommodate her as she was already 05 years older to the outer age limit set out by the rules. She, of course, had worked for 02 years in the very Department prior to the process of selection on the post of Junior Library Assistant, but, that was as a skilled daily wager that she discharged the duties. The work from her was taken, which was similar to what the Library Assistant would perform and at that stage when in the year 1978, the advertisement was out, she had also been permitted to appear in the interview. The work from her was taken, which was similar to what the Library Assistant would perform and at that stage when in the year 1978, the advertisement was out, she had also been permitted to appear in the interview. The Court notices that despite being fully aware that she was overaged and having less qualified than desired and therefore, could not have been absorbed on the post, which was meant for Library Assistant, the fact remains that the petitioner also continued to draw the work from her, which it could not have done and when reinstated, it was as a daily waged skilled worker that she was reinstated by virtue of the Court's order when her services came to be terminated after realising that she would not be eligible to be posted on the permanent post. In such circumstances, without making her regular on the permanent post, she could have been given all benefits of equal pay for equal work and, therefore, since her challenge had been made in the year 1996, treating the interregnum period as dies non, she would be entitled to all benefits except the permanency. 20. It is being noticed that the petitioner has been made permanent from 01.01.2001 in the category of clerk working in the library. Her pay scale was Rs.3050-4590, whereas the payscale at the relevant time of the Library Assistant was Rs.5500-9000. It is also the matter of record that she attained the age of superannuation on 30.11.2004 and the payscale and all retiral benefits given to her was in the payscale of Rs.3050-4090. As stated hereinabove, the reinstatement of hers after the order of the labour Court was on 23.06.1992. However, she took the challenge on 26.12.1996, that period will have to be treated as dies non. 20.1 For the reasons given hereinabove, she should be given the benefit of equal pay for equal work for which the difference in the payscale she would be entitled to. 21. Resultantly, the petition is partly allowed quashing and setting aside the order of the Industrial Tribunal, Nadiad in Reference Case No.580 of 1998 of making her permanent and granting the benefit as a permanent employee. 22. 21. Resultantly, the petition is partly allowed quashing and setting aside the order of the Industrial Tribunal, Nadiad in Reference Case No.580 of 1998 of making her permanent and granting the benefit as a permanent employee. 22. However, in wake of the discussion above, she would be entitled to equal pay for equal work and she would get the said benefit from 26.12.1996 and she would get the said benefit with other benefits except permanency. The period upto 26.12.1996 shall be treated as dies non. All benefits available to the Library Assistant in the pay scale of Rs.5500-9000, shall be made available to the petitioner from 26.12.1996. While so doing, the pay scale and benefits already given to her as a permanent clerk shall be taken into consideration for deduction. The entire amount shall be paid within 08 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order. 23. Petition stands allowed and disposed of accordingly, with cost. Original record and proceedings be sent back to the trial Court.