JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. G.P. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing for and on behalf of the petitioner as well as Mr. P. Hazarika, learned counsel for the respondent No.1. 2. The petitioner herein took an amount of Rs.2,90,000/-, as advance to sale a plot of land measuring 1 katha 10 lecha, situated at Convoy Road, Niz Kadamoni, Dibrugarh from the respondent/complainant in November, 2009. But however the respondent/complainant after knowing the fact that the land is a disputed one, she demanded return of the advanced amount taken from her as against which the petitioner issued two cheques: one on 11.06.2010, amounting to Rs.1,00,000/-and another on 30.06.2010 amounting to Rs.1,90,000/-, totaling Rs.2,90,000/-. While the complainant deposited the said two cheques in her account at Central Bank, Dibrugarh but the cheques were dishonoured due to insufficient funds. 3. The respondent/complainant issued a legal notice on 19.08.2010, demanding payment of the dishonoured cheques from the petitioner but despite serving of notice, the petitioner did not pay the amount for which she filed a complaint case being Case No.458C/2010, under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 4. The learned Trial Court took cognizance of the offence and proceeded for the trial. The present petitioner being the accused, faced the trial and denied the charge. In course of the trial, the respondent/complainant examined herself as witness and exhibited certain documents in support of her case. The petitioner however adduced no any rebuttal evidence. The learned Trial Court recorded the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the CrPC and after hearing the learned counsel for both the parties, convicted the accused under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and sentenced him to pay the cheque amount of Rs.2,70,000/-, with a fine of Rs.20,000/-as compensation, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two years, through the order dated 04.06.2013. 5. The challenge that was made against the Trial Court’s order dated 04.06.2013, also stands dismissed by the order of the appellate Court dated 09.03.2015. 6. After losing in two forums, the accused/petitioner has preferred the present revision petition challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 09.03.2015, passed by the learned Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No.48(3)/2013, on the ground that the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. 6. After losing in two forums, the accused/petitioner has preferred the present revision petition challenging the impugned judgment and order dated 09.03.2015, passed by the learned Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No.48(3)/2013, on the ground that the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Further ground of challenge is that the complainant/respondent has not proved the matter of dishonour of cheques by adducing the evidence of Bank Officials and also the fact that the case was filed after submission of the cheques before the Bank for the second time which is also bad in law. Another contention that has been raised that the petitioner is deprived of cross-examining the complainant/respondent, which has seriously prejudiced the case of the petitioner. 7. I have heard the submission of learned senior counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for the respondent No.1. Assailing the impugned judgment and order of the Appellate Court on the same very ground that has been incorporated in the petition, a submission has been made that the petitioner ought to have been provided reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and the learned Trial Court has not properly appreciated all the materials on record in proper perspective of law and facts. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has however submitted that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner as he is duly participated in the trial and himself was negligent in attending the Court for which the Court cannot be blamed. It is also contended that the learned Trial Court has given proper opportunity to the defence side (the petitioner herein) to cross-examine the witnesses which has been reflected from the order sheet of the Court and the said aspect has been taken into account by the learned Appellate Court and there is no irregularity as such. Similarly the fact that the Bank Officials were not examined by the respondent cannot be challenged by the petitioner herein as the same was duly approved by the Court on the petition so filed by the respondent that in terms of Section 146 of the N.I. Act, the Court may dispense with the examination of such Bank Officials if the deposit of such cheques is not under challenge. Refuting another contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it has also submitted that legally the respondent/complainant can submit such cheque before the Bank more than one occasion within the validity period and thereafter the case can be filed after due service of notice, which has been done by the respondent/complainant, within the ambit of law. 9. I have considered the rival submission of both the parties and also gone through the LCR. As has been submitted that the petitioner was deprived of his cross-examination, the same cannot be a good ground to challenge the case as the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity by the Trial Court by giving more than three occasions to cross-examine the witnesses but same was not done by the present accused/petitioner of his own and as such he cannot now raise the cause of prejudice. The petitioner never challenged the aforesaid closure of evidence of the complainant side by way of revision, so the same cannot be agitated now. The record also reflects that the accused was given the opportunity to adduce evidence but his defence evidence was also not recorded by the Court for the reasons recorded by the Trial Court itself but the same order is also not challenged by the petitioner that without affording him the opportunity to adduce defence evidence, the Court has closed the defence evidence and post the matter for argument. The said aspect also lost its significance at this stage, as the same was not challenged by way of any revision. 10. The respondent/complainant in his evidence has duly exhibited all the documents regarding the issuance of the cheques by the petitioner, presentation of the same to the concerned Bank and the return memo from the Bank concerned, serving of notice by the complainant upon the petitioner demanding the repayment of notice and the signature of the accused/petitioner acknowledging the receipt of such legal notice but same aspect were not rebutted by the petitioner by way of evidence nor by way of effective cross-examination. The record reveals that the petitioner herein has not challenged the issuance of cheques and his signature thereon, about receipt of the demand notice for return of the money, etc. So it can be safely infer that the petitioner herein failed to rebut the case of the respondent/complainant in any manner. The record reveals that the petitioner herein has not challenged the issuance of cheques and his signature thereon, about receipt of the demand notice for return of the money, etc. So it can be safely infer that the petitioner herein failed to rebut the case of the respondent/complainant in any manner. Law has cast a strong presumption upon the drawar of cheque that such cheque has been issued by the drawee in discharge of his legal liability as per provision of Section 139 of the N.I. Act. The accused petitioner failed to rebut such presumption by any sort of rebuttal evidence. On the other hand, the respondent has duly proved her case that she was the holder of the cheque in due course. 11. As regard the filing of the case, it is found that the cheque was presented for the second time within the validity period and the legal notice was issued on 19.08.2010, which was served upon the petitioner on 21.08.2010 and the case was filed on 04.10.2010, which is within time. 12. Having regard to the materials on record and the appreciation of the evidence by the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court, there appears no any sort of irregularity or illegality in the impugned judgment and order to interfere into. Being a Revisional Court, this Court has limited power to scrutinize the evidence on record, where it is duly appreciated by the Court below and until and unless there is a finding that appreciation of the matter is perverse, the Revisional Court cannot interfere into the evidence of the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court by giving another view on the matter. 13. In State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, reported in 1999 (2) SCC 452 , while considering the scope of revisional jurisdiction, the Apex Court had laid down the following: “5………… In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappriciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinizing the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappriciating the oral evidence………..”. 14. In view of the above, I find no merit in the revision and the same is accordingly dismissed, with a direction to the petitioner to pay the amount as directed, before the Trial Court within a period of two months from today, in default to serve out the sentence accordingly. 15. The revision stands disposed of accordingly. Return back the LCR to the concerned Court with a copy of this order immediately.