JUDGMENT : The instant application is directed against the judgment dated 12.06.2014 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge-1st at Hazaribag in Criminal Appeal No.189 of 2008 whereby the learned Appellate Court has confirmed the judgment dated 06.12.2008 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Hazaribag in G. Case No.01 of 2006 (T.R. No.1209/08) whereby the petitioners have been convicted under Section 92 of the Factory Act and were sentenced to deposit a fine of Rs. 30,000/-each and in the event of non-payment of fine, S.I of one year shall be served by the petitioners. 2. The brief facts of the case is that the Factory Inspector, Hazaribag gave a report on 19.08.2005 to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribag regarding the occurrence of death of late Maninath Sao who expired in Patratu Thermal Power Station on the night of 11.07.2005 and the said occurrence was reported by the management of Patratu Thermal Power Station on 13.07.2005 at about 12:15 a.m. that the deceased-Maninath Sao who was working in Patratu Thermal Power Station had expired on 11.07.2005 during night shift while he was handling in coal wagon. He was injured on the left hand and while he was taken to hospital, he died. On 14.07.2005 a preliminary inquiry was conducted by the Factory Inspector during which he took statement of several persons. On the basis of said inquiry, the Factory Inspector had lodged the case against both the petitioners who are occupiers and manager of the factory. 3. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribag took cognizance under Section 92 of the Factory Act, 1948, and thereafter the said case was transferred to the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribag. The charge was framed against the petitioners and they are sent up for trial. 4. In order to substantiate its case the prosecution has examined sole witness namely, Bharat Bhushan Prasad, Factory Inspector, Hazaribag and the informant of this case. The said witness at para-16 of his cross-examination has clearly admitted that he has not filed the complaint case within 3 months as stipulated under the Act and the same has been filed beyond the statutory period. 5. On the basis of evidence and documents available on record, the learned trial court found the petitioners’ guilty for offence committed under Section 92 of the Factory Act and sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs. 5. On the basis of evidence and documents available on record, the learned trial court found the petitioners’ guilty for offence committed under Section 92 of the Factory Act and sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs. 30,000/-each and in the event of non-payment, to serve S.I for one year. Being aggrieved, the petitioners challenged the order of the learned trial court before the learned District & Additional Sessions Judge-1st, Hazaribag. The learned appellate court after concurring with the finding of the learned trial court dismissed the appeal of the petitioners vide its order dated 12.06.2014. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties. The counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the instant complaint application has been filed beyond the period of 3 months as stipulated under Section 106 of the Factories Act and as such the same was not maintainable. The appellate court has not considered the said submission and simply rejected the plea on the ground that the appellants have not challenged the cognizance order on the ground of limitation. 7. For the purpose of appreciating this argument Section 106 is quoted hereinbelow: “106. Limitation of prosecutions.-No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector: Provided that where the offence consists of disobeying a written order made by an Inspector, complaint thereof may be made within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. [Explanation.-For the purposes of this Section,- (a) in the case of a continuing offence, the period of limitation shall be computed with reference to every point of time during which the offence continues; (b) where for the performance of any act time is granted or extended on an application made by the occupier or manager of a factory, the period of limitation shall be computed from the date on which the time so granted or extended expired.]” 8. From the bare reading of Section 106 it is clear that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless the complaint is made within a period of 3 months from the date on which the alleged commission of offence came to the knowledge of Inspector. From the bare reading of Section 106 it is clear that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless the complaint is made within a period of 3 months from the date on which the alleged commission of offence came to the knowledge of Inspector. In the instant case, the Factory Inspector who is the sole prosecution witness has categorically admitted in paragraph-16 of its examination that the complaint case has been filed beyond a period of 3 months. Now a question arise as to whether the learned appellate court was correct in brushing aside a ground of limitation by holding that the same is not maintainable at this belated stage as the petitioners have not challenged the order of cognizance. In this regard in catena of judgments it has been held that a point of law can be raised at any stage. This issue came for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court way back in 1965 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chittoori Subbanna Vs. Kudappa Subbanna and others reported in 1965 (2) SCR 661 at paragraph-4 has held as under: “4. Chittoori Subbanna, appellant, applied to the High Court for permission to raise an additional ground of appeal to the effect that the trial Court was not entitled to grant mesne profits for more than 3 years from the date of the decree of the High Court. The High Court disallowed that prayer for the reasons that he had not taken such a ground in the memorandum of appeal and had, on the other hand, conceded before the commissioner and the trial Court that accounts could be taken upto 1943 in respect of A and C schedule properties, that he had elected to have the profits determined by the trial Court upto the date of delivery of possession and that if he had taken the objection earlier, it would have been open to the second plaintiff-respondent to file a suit for the recovery of mesne profits beyond the three years upto the date of delivery of possession. It is urged before us for the appellant that the High Court was in error in not a lowing the appellant to have raised the objection based on the provisions of O.20, R.12, C.P.C. We agree with this contention. It is urged before us for the appellant that the High Court was in error in not a lowing the appellant to have raised the objection based on the provisions of O.20, R.12, C.P.C. We agree with this contention. The question sought to be raised was pure question of law and was not dependent on the determination of any question of fact. The first appellate Court ought to have allowed it. Such pure questions of law are allowed for the first time at later stages too and recently in the case of Shehla Burney (DR.) And Others Vs. Syed Ali Mossa Raza (Dead) By Lrs. And Others reported in (2011) 6 SCC 529 at paragraph-23 has held as under: 23. The aforesaid propositions have been quoted with approval by this Court in Badri Prasad v. Nagarmal, AIR at p. 562, para 7. Similar views have been expressed by this Court again in Tarini Kamal Pandit v. Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee. After considering several decisions, including the one rendered in Badri Prasad this Court held as follows: (Tarini Kamal Pandit case, SCC p. 288, para 14) “14. … As the point raised is a pure question of law not involving any investigation of the facts, we permitted the learned counsel to raise the question.” (AIR para 15 at p. 1172)” 9. So there is no confusion on this settled proposition of law that question of law can be raised at any stage. Admittedly the instant complaint case has been filed beyond a period of 3 months in contravention to Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948 as such the same is not maintainable and the learned appellate court has committed a gross error in not appreciating this ground at appellate stage simply on the ground that the petitioners failed to challenge the order of cognizance. 10. It is true that in revision application there is a limited scope of interference and the same may be exercised only when there is a glaring defect in procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law resulting in a flagrant miscarriage of justice. 10. It is true that in revision application there is a limited scope of interference and the same may be exercised only when there is a glaring defect in procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law resulting in a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Here is the case where there is an error on a point of law and in view of the same, I am of the considered opinion that the judgment dated 12.06.2014 passed by the appellate court and the judgment dated 06.12.2008 passed by the learned trial court are not in accordance with law and the same are, therefore, liable to be set aside. 11. Ordered accordingly. 12. Let the lower court record be sent to the concerned court forthwith. Ordered accordingly