JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the demand as contained in letter dated 11.10.2012 issued by the Revenue Officer, Bihar State Housing Board, Patna whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been asked to deposit a sum of Rs. 66,76,499/-, as premium for the purposes of transfer of the lease. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the father of the petitioner no. 1, namely, late Brahm Dayal Rai, was allotted plot no. 2H/63 in Bahadurpur, Patna (hereinafter referred to as the Board) vide allotment letter no. 6698 dated 31.8.1981. The father of the petitioner no. 1 had paid the requisite amount, whereafter, the hire purchase agreement for the aforesaid plot in question was executed vide deed dated 14.10.2005 and the possession of the plot in question was handed over to the allottee on 20.03.2006. Subsequently, upon the death of the father of the petitioner no. 1, the petitioner no. 1 came in possession of the said plot, whereafter, the petitioner no. 1 requested the Respondents-Board to transfer the plot in question in favour of the petitioner no. 2 by a letter dated 18.3.2008, however, the Respondents-Board belatedly vide letter dated 12.5.2009 responded and asked the petitioner no. 1 to deposit certain documents, which were promptly deposited by the petitioner no. 1. Thereafter, the Respondents-Board vide letter dated 24.11.2009 demanded a sum of Rs. 4,88,136/-towards cost of the land and also a sum of Rs. 2,82,225/-on the head of “Labhaansh” (premium) as per Clause 15 of the agreement. The petitioner no. 1 had then deposited a sum of Rs. 5,22,000/-on 24.5.2010, whereafter, a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/-was deposited on 28.9.2011. Thereafter, the Executive Engineer of the Board had written to the Revenue Officer of the Board vide letter dated 06.02.2012, confirming deposit of the aforesaid amount by the petitioner, however, to the utter surprise of the petitioner, the respondents by the impugned demand notice dated 10.11.2012 had demanded a further sum of Rs. 66,76,499/-by way of premium, however, no details thereof was furnished to the petitioner no. 1 nor any calculation was furnished to the petitioner no. 1. 3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that as per Clause 15 of the agreement entered into between the father of the petitioner no. 66,76,499/-by way of premium, however, no details thereof was furnished to the petitioner no. 1 nor any calculation was furnished to the petitioner no. 1. 3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that as per Clause 15 of the agreement entered into between the father of the petitioner no. 1 and the Board dated 14.10.2005, the decision of the Board regarding the market value of the land / premises is to be regarded as final and therefore, the demand made by the Revenue Officer of the Board is bad in law inasmuch as the same is not backed by any decision taken by the Board. It is further submitted that the delay was on the part of the Respondents-Board, hence, they can not make out premium, on account of their own delay and apply the price of the year 2012-13 for the purposes of calculation of premium. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the Respondents-Board, referring to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Board, has submitted that the deposit made by the petitioner no. 1 was not within time, hence, the petitioner was informed by the impugned letter dated 11.10.2012 that since he has not deposited the entire amount of Labhaansh, hence, according to the market value of the year 2012-13 and after adjusting the deposit made by him, the balance amount of Labhaansh is a sum of Rs. 66,76,499/-. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and I find that the Respondent-Board has not been able to show that the additional amount of Labhaansh directed to be recovered from the petitioner was backed by any decision of the Board in terms of Clause 15 of the agreement entered into between the father of the petitioner no. 1 and the Board dated 14.10.2005. The calculation of the balance amount of Labhaansh, considering the market value of the plot in question to be of the year 2012-13, is also irrational inasmuch as the petitioner had made a request for transfer of the plot on 18.3.2008, whereafter, the Respondents-Board had belatedly sent a letter dated 12.5.2009, requiring the petitioner to deposit certain documents, which was submitted promptly by the petitioner on 16.6.2009, however, again, after some delay, the demand was raised vide letter dated 24.11.2009, which was deposited by the petitioner on 24.5.2010 and 28.9.2011. Thus, this Court finds that the Respondents-Board is also guilty of committing delay and the petitioner cannot be solely blamed. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a judgment dated 4.7.2014 passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in CWJC No. 338 of 2013 Reported in 2014(3) PLJR 808 , relevant paragraphs whereof are reproduced hereinbelow:- Considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel, the only issue which crops up for consideration is whether the petitioner would be required to pay the re-assessed amount of Rs. 41,41, 235/- and whether there was any occasion for the Board to raise such demand. The certified copy of the agreement as well as a typed copy was placed by learned counsel during the course of hearing and the opening paragraph and paragraph 10 of the agreement reads as follows: “This agreement is made the....of.....19 between Shri Paras Nath Sinha son of Late Shri Radha Mohan Prasad Srivastava resident of village/P.O. Naya Mohammadpur P.S. Kotwali District Shahabad at present residing at Jakkanpur (New Area)(hereinafter referred to as the Settlee, which expression shall, unless the context does not so admit, include his heirs, executors, administrators and permitted assigns) of the one part and the Governor of Bihar (hereinafter referred to as the Government, which expression shall unless the context does not so admit, include his successors and assigns) of the other part.” “10. The settlee shall have no right to transfer his interest to a third party in the land without the previous sanction in writing of government” It is manifest from the aforementioned paragraphs of the agreement that the term “settlee” would include his “legal heirs”. Paragraph 10 of the agreement restrains the settlee from effecting any transfer to a third party without previous sanction of the Board to be obtained in writing. It is not in dispute that a permission indeed was taken by the original settlee in terms of Clause 10 of the agreement. In fact acting on the request, the permission was granted to the original settlee who is the father of the petitioner and who was required to make payment of “Labhansh” of Rs. 5,17,545/-. It is not in dispute that a permission indeed was taken by the original settlee in terms of Clause 10 of the agreement. In fact acting on the request, the permission was granted to the original settlee who is the father of the petitioner and who was required to make payment of “Labhansh” of Rs. 5,17,545/-. It is an unfortunate circumstance that within two days of issuance of such letter on 26.5.2009 the original settlee died on 28.5.2009 and the petitioner acting pursuant to the demand dated 26.5.2009 deposited the said amount on 10.6.2009 which is reflected from Annexure-5andwithin two days thereafter, the petitioner also made a request for transfer of his name in the relevant records and also sought permission to proceed with the transfer for which a request had already been placed by his father the original settlee. It is a matter of record that in the completion of formalities, a period of two years lapsed and finally the name of the legal heir stood transferred on 26.7.2011. The issue is whether this passage of time would ves tany right in the Board to reassess the “Labhansh”. In the opinion of this Court the Board could not raise a second demand and my reasons for holding as such is as follows: (a) The definition of the term ‘settlee’ as found in the original agreement includes his “legal heirs”. Thus by operation of law and following the death of the original settlee his “legal heirs” i.e. the petitioner and other children stepped into the shoes of the original settlee and were within their jurisdiction to deposit the ‘Labhansh’ as required under the demand dated 26.5.2009 which indeed was deposited on 10.6.2009. (b) The term ‘settlee’ as defined in the agreement is inclusive of ‘legal heirs’ and thus the distinction sought to be created by the Board for raising a fresh demand of ‘Labhansh’, is on complete misconception of the legal position. (c) Considering the matter from another angle, the demand for ‘Labhansh’ was raised on 26.5.2009. (b) The term ‘settlee’ as defined in the agreement is inclusive of ‘legal heirs’ and thus the distinction sought to be created by the Board for raising a fresh demand of ‘Labhansh’, is on complete misconception of the legal position. (c) Considering the matter from another angle, the demand for ‘Labhansh’ was raised on 26.5.2009. The original settlee expired on 28.5.2009.The amount in terms of the demand was deposited on 10.6.2009 and an application for transfer of name and for permission to effect the transfer in terms of the request made by the original settlee, was placed before the Board on 12.6.2009 meaning thereby there was no delay on the part of the petitioner in seeking transfer of the name of the heirs. A passage of two years in completion of formalities would not vest jurisdiction in the Board to enhance the ‘Labhansh’ which already stood assessed by the Board in terms of the permission sought. There being no delay on the part of the petitioner in seeking transfer of the name of legal heirs which is more in the nature of ministerial act, the delay which has occasioned for whatever reason, certainly did not give a reason to the Board to reassess the ‘Labhansh’. 6. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, this Court finds that the demand made by the Revenue Officer of the Board vide letter dated 11.10.2012 to the tune of Rs. 66,76,799/- is illegal, perverse, contrary to the terms of the agreement, as aforesaid, and could not have been made in view of the fact that there was substantial delay on the part of the Board, as well, resulting in the matter being lingered from the month of March, 2008, the date on which the petitioner no. 1 had requested the Board to transfer the plot in question in favour of the petitioner no. 2, to the year 2011-12 and moreover, the Respondent-Board has also failed to show that the demand raised by the Revenue Officer is backed by the decision of the Board, hence, the impugned demand dated 11.10.2012 issued by the Revenue Officer, Bihar State Housing Board is quashed. 2, to the year 2011-12 and moreover, the Respondent-Board has also failed to show that the demand raised by the Revenue Officer is backed by the decision of the Board, hence, the impugned demand dated 11.10.2012 issued by the Revenue Officer, Bihar State Housing Board is quashed. On account of quashing of the impugned demand dated 11.10.2012, the subsequent rejection of the representation of the petitioner by the Deputy Revenue Officer of the Respondents-Board vide letter dated 10.7.2014 is also bound to fall and is accordingly set aside. 7. The Respondents-Board is directed to transfer the plot in question in favour of the petitioner no. 2 forthwith. 8. The writ petition stands allowed.