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2019 DIGILAW 1204 (JHR)

Steel Authority of India Limited v. Anima Devi

2019-06-25

DEEPAK ROSHAN, H.C.MISHRA

body2019
ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the respondents appellants and learned counsel for the writ petitioner respondent. 2. The appellants are aggrieved by the impugned Judgment dated 28.4.2017, passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge, in W.P. (S) No. 3460 of 2011, whereby, the writ application filed by the petitioner-respondent, challenging the order dated 08.03.2011, passed by the respondent appellant No. 4, rejecting the claim of the petitioner for appointment for her son on compassionate ground, was allowed by the Hon'ble Single Judge, quashing the order rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner, with a direction to consider the case of the writ petitioner afresh for appointment of her son on compassionate ground and further, to issue the appointment letter in his favour within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of the copy of the order. 3. The facts of the case lie in a short compass. The husband of the writ petitioner, Late Ramanand Singh, was working as Mining Sardar, Upper Seam, Department of Mining, Chansnala Colliery, which is managed by IISCO Steel Plant under the Steel Authority of India Ltd. He met an accidental death on 20.3.2008, while he is said to have left his house at about 7.45 A.M., for going to report to his duty in the morning shift, and at around 8.00 A.M., while he was crossing an iron bridge, he slipped and fell down and became senseless. Upon information, his family members reached at the spot and with the help of local people, he was brought to Chasnala Colliery Dispensary, where he was declared dead. During course of enquiry, it was confirmed that said iron bridge had become very old and was in bad shape, which resulted into falling down of the deceased resulting his death. There is also an acknowledgment by the Assistant Manager of IISCO, which is dated 20.3.2008 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition), in which, it was mentioned that the dead body of Ramanand Singh, Sr. Mining Sardar of Upper Seam Project was brought to Chasnala Dispensary on 20.3.2008 at about 9.00 A.M. He was reported to be coming on duty in first shift and it is stated in that letter that the employment against the death shall be given after post-mortem of the deceased as per the Company Rules within a week. Mining Sardar of Upper Seam Project was brought to Chasnala Dispensary on 20.3.2008 at about 9.00 A.M. He was reported to be coming on duty in first shift and it is stated in that letter that the employment against the death shall be given after post-mortem of the deceased as per the Company Rules within a week. The post-mortem examination of the deceased was conducted on 21.1.2008 at about 1.15 P.M. and though the death was confirmed to be due to injuries sustained by him, the post-mortem report revealed that the death had taken place in between 36 to 48 hours prior to the post-mortem examination. No employment was given on compassionate ground to the son of the deceased in spite of representations, which compelled the wife of the deceased employee to move this Court by filing a writ petition, being W.P.(S) No. 5605 of 2010. The said writ petition was disposed of on 13.1.2011 with the liberty to the writ petitioner to file fresh representation, directing to pass appropriate order within six weeks, and if the petitioner's son was found entitled to employment, he be given the employment. Subsequently, by order dated 8.3.2011, the representation filed by the writ petitioner was rejected by the respondent appellant No. 4, stating that the petitioner's husband did not die in course of his employment. 4. The petitioner respondent challenged the said order in this Court again by filing W.P. (S) No. 3460 of 2011, which was allowed by the impugned order dated 28.4.2017, passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge, quashing the order rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner and directing to give employment to her son, as aforesaid. The respondents appellants, being aggrieved by that order, have preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the impugned order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. Learned counsel has raised the point that under the extant agreement between the Workmen Body and the Management, in case of death out of employment, the Company was not under an obligation to provide any compassionate appointment to the dependent of the deceased, and as the petitioner's husband had not died in course of employment, her son is not entitled to any compassionate appointment. Assailing the order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge, learned counsel has placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. vs. Bai Valu Raja and Others, AIR 1958 SC 881 , wherein the law has been laid down as follows:- “8..........It is well settled that when a workman is on a public road or a public place or on a public transport he is there as any other member of the public and is not there in the course of his employment unless the very nature of his employment makes it necessary for him to be there. A workman is not in the course of his employment from the moment he leaves his home and is on his way to his work. He certainly is in the course of his employment if he reaches the place of work or a point or an area which comes within the theory of notional extension, outside of which the employer is not liable to pay compensation for any accident happening to him.” (Emphasis supplied) 6. Learned counsel further placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. Madhusudan Das and Others, (2008) 15 SCC 560 , wherein, the law has been laid down as follows:- “15. This Court is a large number of decisions has held that the appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It must be provided for in the rules. The criteria laid down therefor viz. that the death of the sole bread earner of the family, must be established. It is meant to provide for a minimum relief. When such contentions are raised, the constitutional philosophy of equality behind making such a scheme be taken into consideration. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India mandate that all eligible candidates should be considered for appointment in the posts which have fallen vacant. Appointment on compassionate ground offered to a dependent of a deceased employee is an exception to the said rule. It is a concession, not a right.” 7. Further reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellants upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallikarjuna G. Hiremath vs. Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 2009 SC 2019 , wherein, the decision of Lord Wright in Dover Navigation Co. It is a concession, not a right.” 7. Further reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellants upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallikarjuna G. Hiremath vs. Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 2009 SC 2019 , wherein, the decision of Lord Wright in Dover Navigation Co. Ltd. vs. Isabella Craig, 1940 AC 190, is referred with approval, laying down the law as follows:- “12........Nothing could be simpler than the words arising out of and in the course of the employment. It is clear that there are two conditions to be fulfilled. What arises in the course of the employment is to be distinguished from what arises out of the employment. The former words relate to time conditioned by reference to the man's service, the latter to causality. Not only accident which occurs to a man during the time when he is on his employment that is, directly or indirectly engaged on what he is employed to do -gives a claim to compensation, unless it also arises out of the employment........” 8. Placing reliance on these decisions, learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner's husband had not died in course of his employment while on duty, as it is claimed that he was coming to the Company for reporting on his duty, he met with an accident on a public road. He had neither reached the Company, nor had reported to his duty. In Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co.'s case (supra), it has clearly been laid down that since the workman had died on the way to the Company on a public road, it cannot be said that he died in course of employment. Admittedly, the workman was not coming on any vehicle provided by the Company and he was coming on foot. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants further argued that in the post-mortem report, time elapsed since death was shown to be 36 to 48 hours. This time gap did not match with the alleged time of death, as claimed by the writ petitioner. Even if 36 hours is calculated from the time of post-mortem examination, the time will go somewhere in the night in between 19.3.2008 and 20.3.2008, when there would be no occasion for the workman to have left his house for duty. Learned counsel accordingly, assailed the order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge on both the counts. 10. Even if 36 hours is calculated from the time of post-mortem examination, the time will go somewhere in the night in between 19.3.2008 and 20.3.2008, when there would be no occasion for the workman to have left his house for duty. Learned counsel accordingly, assailed the order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge on both the counts. 10. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner respondent, on the other hand, has opposed the prayer, submitting that the time gap shown in the post-mortem report cannot be the deciding factor about the actual time of death of the deceased. It is submitted that admittedly the deceased had died in the morning and the dead body was brought to Chasnala Colliery Dispensary of the Company at about 9.00 A.M., and this is also acknowledged by the official of the appellant Company by Annexure-2 to the writ petition. It also finds mentioned in that letter that the compassionate appointment was to be provided in accordance with the Company Rules after the post-mortem, but after the post-mortem, the benefit was illegally denied to the son of the writ petitioner. Learned counsel submitted that the husband of the writ petitioner left the house for reporting to his duty and he was in the way to join his duty when he met with an accident, and by all means, it has to be construed that he died in course of employment. Learned counsel accordingly, submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge. 11. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the record, we find that though learned counsel for the appellants has tried to challenge the time of death of the deceased on the basis of post-mortem report, but there is no denial to the fact that by Annexure-2, it was confirmed by the Assistant Manager of IISCO Steel Plant, that the deceased was brought to Chasnala Colliery on 20.3.2008 at about 9.00 A.M, while he was reported to be coming on duty in first shift and it was stated the employment against the death shall be given after post-mortem of the deceased as per the Company Rules within a week. If the Company wanted to dispute this time of death, it could have enquired from the local people, who were accompanying the deceased to the Dispensary, whether the deceased had died, after having met the accidental fall from the bridge or he had died earlier somewhere else, but this was not done by the appellant Company. On the other hand, the appellant Company is disputing the time only on the basis of time gap given in the post-mortem report. It is well settled that time given in the post-mortem report is only an approximate estimation of the time elapsed between the death and the post-mortem examination, and it could not give the actual time of death of the deceased. Accordingly, the claim of the writ petitioner for compassionate appointment of her son on the basis of accidental death of her husband, who admittedly died in harness, could not be denied on this count. 12. The other limb of argument taken by learned counsel for the appellants placing reliance upon Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co.'s case (supra), is also misconceived. The said decision did not relate to providing compassionate appointment, rather it related to the compensation to be granted under the Workmen Compensation Act, and a plain reading of the decision shows that a workman is certainly in the course of his employment if he reaches the place of work or a point or an area which comes within the theory of notional extension. In the present case, there is no discussion about the distance between the said bridge and the place of working of the workman, where the petitioner's husband was to report his duty. Admittedly, the dead body of the deceased was brought to the hospital at about 9.00 A.M., claiming that he had left the house at about 7.45 A.M, and had met the accidental death at about 8.00 A.M., over the bridge. The fact remains that nothing was brought on record to dispute this fact, and it cannot be said that at the time of his accidental death, the deceased was not going to report to his duty, i.e., he was going in course of his employment. There is nothing to say that the deceased had not reached an area which may come within the theory of notional extension, even in terms of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co.'s case (supra). There is nothing to say that the deceased had not reached an area which may come within the theory of notional extension, even in terms of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co.'s case (supra). The entitlement for employment on compassionate basis was even acknowledged in the letter contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application. 13. In the facts of this case, we do not find any illegality in the impugned Judgment passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge, holding that the writ petitioner's son was entitled to appointment on compassionate ground due to his father's death in course of employment, worth any interference in exercise of the L.P.A. jurisdiction. 14. There is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly, dismissed.