JUDGMENT : Ramesh Ranganathan, J. Delay in preferring Special Appeal No. 691 of 2017 is not opposed and is, therefore, condoned. 2. This batch of special appeals are preferred by the State of Uttarakhand against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.495 of 2014 (S/S) dated 23.03.2017. 3. The respondents-writ petitioners are all working, on daily wages, in the Forest Department of the State of Uttarakhand i.e. as Forest Guards, Gatemen, Chowkidars, Drivers etc. They filed this batch of writ petitions seeking payment of dearness allowance (hereinafter referred to as “DA”) on the minimum scale of pay being paid to them. 4. This case has had a chequered history which dates back to a period long before the State of Uttarakhand came into being on 09.11.2000. The Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh filed Writ Petition No.15627 of 1988, before the Allahabad High Court, claiming pay-scales similar to those paid to Class IV employees working in various departments of the Government of U.P., along with DA. The Allahabad High Court, by its order in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 dated 25.02.1993, directed the Forest Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh to pay, members of Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh, the minimum scale of pay without increment, but with corresponding DA. Aggrieved thereby, the erstwhile Government of Uttar Pradesh filed Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.25422 of 1994 which was dismissed by the Supreme Court by its order dated 01.12.1994. Consequently, all the members of the Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh, who were members of the Sangh when Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 was filed and were working on daily wages, were paid the minimum scale of pay applicable to Class IV posts in the Government of U.P, along with DA. 5. While matters stood thus, the Uttaranchal Van Shramik Sangh (another Union whose members were also working in the Forest Department on daily wages) filed Writ Petition No.33062 of 1995 before the Allahabad High Court seeking parity for its members with the members of the Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh, and for them also to be paid the minimum scales of pay with DA. An interim order was passed by the Allahabad High Court on 15.05.1999 directing payment, to the members of the Uttarakhand Van Shramik Sangh, the minimum of the pay-scale of employees holding Class IV posts. An interim order was passed by the Allahabad High Court on 15.05.1999 directing payment, to the members of the Uttarakhand Van Shramik Sangh, the minimum of the pay-scale of employees holding Class IV posts. The said interim order made no mention of payment of DA. 6. Writ Petition No. 33062 of 1995 was still pending, on the file of the Allahabad High Court, when the State of Uttarakhand was created on 09.11.2000. The said Writ Petition was transferred from the Allahabad High Court to this High Court, and was re-numbered as Writ Petition (S/S) No.1664 of 2001. The said writ petition was dismissed as infructuous by order dated 01.06.2009. On a restoration application being filed, Writ Petition (S/S) No.1664 of 2001 was restored to file on 29.06.2010, along with the earlier interim order dated 15.05.1999. 7. During the pendency of Writ Petition (S/S) No. 1664 of 2001 on the file of this Court, the Supreme Court, in Putti Lal, (2006) 9 SCC 337 (order in Civil Appeal No.3634 of 1998 dated 21.02.2002), directed payment of the minimum of the pay-scale to daily rated workers as was being received by their counterparts in the Government, making it clear that they would not be entitled to any other allowance or increment as long as they continued as daily wagers. Thereafter, Writ Petition (S/S) No. 1664 of 2001 was disposed of by order dated 05.03.2011, and the Principal Conservator of Forests was directed to consider the case of the petitioners in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court (in Putti Lal (supra)) as well as in the light of the regularization rules applicable in the State for the Forest Department. 8. While the respondents-writ petitioners appear to have been paid the minimum scale of pay (at least till when they filed the present batch of writ petitions), they were not extended the benefit of payment of DA. Aggrieved by non-payment of D.A, they again invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by way of Writ Petition (S/S) No.495 of 2014 and batch, which resulted in the order under appeal being passed on 23.03.2017. 9. Aggrieved by non-payment of D.A, they again invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by way of Writ Petition (S/S) No.495 of 2014 and batch, which resulted in the order under appeal being passed on 23.03.2017. 9. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge traced the history of the litigation and, after referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra), held that members of the Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh were being paid DA on a regular basis as per the judgment rendered by the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No.15627 of 1988, which was upheld by the Supreme Court on 01.12.1994; the State Government ought to have at least maintained parity in payment of DA to its employees, instead of discriminating them; the respondent-State Government was paying DA to the members of the Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh, but had deprived the petitioners of the same; it was a case of invidious discrimination; there was no intelligible differentia, so as to distinguish the petitioners vis-a-vis members of the Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh regarding payment of DA; the State had created an artificial classification, which was not permissible under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, whereby similarly situated persons, working under the same employer, had been discriminated against; there was no mention of denial of DA in the order of the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra) ; a similar question had arisen for consideration before the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Ram Kishore, 2013 (3) UPLBEC 2349 , and it was held that DA should be paid to employees to offset inflation; the judgment rendered by the Allahabad High Court, in Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh, was in rem; the respondent-State should have extended the same relief which they had granted to the members of the Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh; and the Supreme Court, in Harihar Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 114 has held that it was the duty of Constitutional Courts to ensure that all should be paid their due. 10. The Writ Petitions were allowed, and the respondents (appellants herein) were directed to pay and release DA to the petitioners, at par with the members of the Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh, w.e.f. 21.03.2002 within a period of ten weeks from the date of the order, along with arrears. 10. The Writ Petitions were allowed, and the respondents (appellants herein) were directed to pay and release DA to the petitioners, at par with the members of the Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh, w.e.f. 21.03.2002 within a period of ten weeks from the date of the order, along with arrears. The petitioners were held entitled to interest @12% per annum and, if the amount was not released, they would be entitled to 18% interest per annum till payment was made to them. Aggrieved thereby, the State of Uttarakhand has preferred these appeals. 11. Mr. The petitioners were held entitled to interest @12% per annum and, if the amount was not released, they would be entitled to 18% interest per annum till payment was made to them. Aggrieved thereby, the State of Uttarakhand has preferred these appeals. 11. Mr. Pradeep Joshi, learned Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand, would submit that, since the order of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No.15627 of 1988 dated 25.02.1993 is a judgment inter-parties which had attained finality, on Special Leave to Appeal No.25422 of 1994 preferred there against being dismissed on 01.12.1994, the State Government was obligated in law to pay all employees of the said Sangh, who were its members when Writ Petition No.15627 of 1988 was filed, the minimum scale of pay along with D.A; the State has not been paying DA, even to those members of the Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh who were either appointed by the State Government on daily wages after Writ Petition No.15627 of 1988 was filed, or those who were not members of the said Sangh as on that date, and had become its members later; the law, declared in the judgment of the Supreme Court, in Putti Lal (supra), is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India; consequently, all other employees (apart from those who were the members of the Kumaun Ban Shramik Sangh when Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 was filed) are only entitled to the minimum scale of pay as directed by the Supreme Court in the said judgment; they are not entitled to any other allowances, including DA; the claim of parity is wholly unfounded since Writ Petition No.33062 of 1995 filed by the Uttaranchal Van Shramik Sangh, which was later re-numbered as Writ Petition (S/S) No.1664 of 2001, was disposed by the learned Single Judge, by his order dated 05.03.2011, directing that the case of the petitioners therein be considered in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court (in Putti Lal (supra), ); since the very expression “Dearness Allowance” would show that it is an allowance distinct from that of the minimum scale of pay, the order of the Supreme Court in Putti Lal, (2006) 9 SCC 337 would require the State Government only to pay the minimum of the pay-scales, without DA, to the respondent-writ petitioners; the judgment in Putti Lal (supra), was referred by the Supreme Court in its later judgment in Jagjit Singh, (2017) 1 SCC 148 wherein it was reiterated that a daily wager was only entitled, on application of the doctrine of “Equal Pay for Equal Work”, to the minimum of the pay-scale, and not for DA. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondents-writ petitioners, would submit that DA is a part of pay, and is paid to protect employees from the adverse effect of inflation; this allowance has always been construed as a part of pay itself; in any event, dearness allowance is distinct from all other allowances; the judgment of the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra), was considered by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Ram kishore (supra), and it was held that DA was payable to employees along with the minimum scales of pay; no finding has been recorded by the Supreme Court, in Putti Lal (supra), that DA is not a part of pay; the Principal Conservator of Forests (HR), in his letter addressed to the Chief Conservator of Forests on 01.10.2005, has observed that the employees were entitled to DA also; similarly placed persons, in the very same department, are being paid DA; since all daily wagers working in the Forest Department constitute one homogenous class, payment of DA to one set of these employees, and in denying payment of DA to others, is discriminatory, and falls foul of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India; all other daily wage employees are also entitled to be treated at par with the members of the Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh who had filed Writ Petition No.15627 of 1988 before the Allahabad High Court; the letter of the Principal Secretary, Forest Department dated 12.03.2014 states that all daily wage employees are entitled to a minimum scale of pay, and cannot be discriminated against; all employees, working in the same department, should be similarly treated; and a differential treatment to some of them, with regards denial of DA, has resulted in discrimination. 13. As noted hereinabove, the order passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Writ Petition No.15627 of 1988 dated 25.02.1993, attained finality on SLP No.25422 of 1993, preferred by the State of Uttar Pradesh against the said order, being dismissed by the Supreme Court on 01.12.1994. An order or judgment of a Court/Tribunal, even if erroneous, is binding inter-parties. The binding character of judgments, of Courts of competent jurisdiction, is in essence a part of the rule of law on which administration of justice is founded. An order or judgment of a Court/Tribunal, even if erroneous, is binding inter-parties. The binding character of judgments, of Courts of competent jurisdiction, is in essence a part of the rule of law on which administration of justice is founded. (Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association, (1990) 2 SCC 715 ; U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, (2005) 1 SCC 444 ). Matters in controversy, in writ proceedings under Article 226, decided after full contest, after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case, by a Court competent to decide it and which proceedings have attained finality, is binding inter-parties. (Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh, AIR 1965 SC 1153 ; Bua Das Kaushal, AIR 1971 SC 1676 ). Once a matter, which was the subject-matter of a lis, stood determined by a competent Court, no party can thereafter be permitted to reopen it in a subsequent litigation. (Swamy Atmananda, AIR 2005 SC 2392 ; Iswar Dath, (2005) 7 SCC 190 ). Issues which have been concluded inter-parties cannot be raised again in proceedings inter-parties. (State of Haryana, (2004) 12 SCC 673 ). Consequently, the order in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 dated 25.02.1993 (a judgment inter-parties which has attained finality) obligated the State Government to continue paying DA to all those daily wage employees who were members of the Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh when Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 was filed. 14. The very fact that the Uttaranchal Van Shramik Sangh invoked the jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court by way of Writ Petition No.33062 of 1995, claiming parity with the members of the Kumaun Ban Shramik Sangh (the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988) would show that even they were conscious that the judgment in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 dated 25.02.1993 was not a judgment in rem for, otherwise, it was wholly unnecessary for them to file a separate writ petition seeking parity. As noted hereinabove, Writ Petition No. 33062 of 1995, on its being transferred from the Allahabad High Court to the Uttarakhand High Court, was re-numbered as Writ Petition (S/S) No.1664 of 2001 which was disposed of by order dated 05.03.2011, whereby the State Government was directed to consider the case of the petitioners therein in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra). No direction was issued to the State Government, in Writ Petition No. 1664 of 2001 dated 05.03.2011, to pay the petitioners D.A. 15. In Putti Lal (supra), the Supreme Court observed : “………. In several cases, this Court, applying the principle of equal pay for equal work has held that a daily-wager, if he is discharging the similar duties as those in the regular employment of the Government, should at least be entitled to receive the minimum of the pay-scale though he might not be entitled to any increment or any other allowance that is permissible to his counterpart in the Government. In our opinion, that would be the correct position and we, therefore, direct that these daily-wagers would be entitled to draw at the minimum of the pay-scale being received by their counter-part in the Government and would not be entitled to any other allowances or increment so long as they continue as daily-wager. The question of their regular absorption will obviously be dealt with in accordance with the statutory rule already referred to. So far as the State of Uttaranchal is concerned, a scheme for regularisation of daily workers has been produced before us which prima facie does not appear to be objectionable excepting the provision regarding qualification for regularisation. Be it stated that the qualification essential for being regularised would be the qualification as was relevant on the date a particular employee was taken in as a daily-wager and not the qualification which is being fixed under the scheme. The fact that the employees have been allowed to continue for so many years indicates the existence or the necessity for having such posts. But still, it would not be open for the Court to indicate as to how many posts would be created for the absorption of these daily-wages workers. Needless to mention that the appropriate authority will consider the case of these daily-wagers sympathetically who have discharged the duties for all these years to the satisfaction of their authority concerned. So far as the salary is concerned, as we have stated in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh, a daily-wager in the State of Uttaranchal would be also entitled to the minimum of the pay-scale as is available to his counter-part in the Government until his services are regularised and he is given regular scale of pay…….” (emphasis supplied) 16. The appeal, before the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra), was preferred by the State of Uttar Pradesh against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court which had directed that daily rated workers should be paid the minimum of the pay-scale as was available to a regularly employed worker in the corresponding post in the Government. It is in this context, that the Supreme Court held that daily wagers, if they are discharging similar duties as those in the regular employment of the Government, should at least be entitled to receive the minimum of the pay-scale though they might not be entitled to “any increment” or “any other allowance” that is permissible to their counter-part in the Government, as long as they continued as daily wagers. 17. While issuing these directions with respect to daily wage workers employed in the Forest Department of the Government of U.P, the Supreme Court, in Putti Lal (supra), also considered the scheme, relating to regularization of daily wage employees, placed by the State of Uttarakhand, and reiterated that in so far as salary is concerned, as in the case of State of U.P, the daily wager in the State of Uttaranchal would also be entitled to the minimum of the pay-scale as was available to his counter-part in the Government, until his services were regularized and he was given regular scale of pay. 18. The directions, issued with respect to daily wage workers employed with the State of U.P., were also made applicable to daily wage workers in the State of Uttarakhand. The judgment in Putti Lal (supra), was referred in Jagjit Singh (supra), wherein the Supreme Court observed that the employees concerned would be entitled to the minimum of the pay-scale, of the category to which they belong, but would not be entitled to allowances attached to the posts held by them. 19. While the submission, urged on behalf of the respondents-writ petitioners, that DA is paid to an employee to meet the adverse effect of inflation has considerable force, the law declared by the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra), is binding. 19. While the submission, urged on behalf of the respondents-writ petitioners, that DA is paid to an employee to meet the adverse effect of inflation has considerable force, the law declared by the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra), is binding. The decisions of the Supreme Court are of significance not merely because they constitute an adjudication on the rights of the parties, and resolve the disputes between them, but also because in doing so they embody a declaration of law operating as a binding principle in future cases. The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. (Chandra Prakash, AIR 2002 SC 1652 ). Article 141 of the Constitution unequivocally indicates that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. (M.R. Apparao, (2002) 4 SCC 638; Rajeswar Prasad Misra AIR 1965 SC 1887 ). The law, which is binding, under Article 141, extends to all observations on points raised and decided by the Supreme Court in a given case. (M.R. Apparao (supra)). On the law having been declared by the Supreme Court, it is the duty of the High Court, whatever be its view, to act in accordance with Article 141 of the Constitution of India and to apply the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Judicial discipline to abide by the declaration of law, of the Supreme Court, cannot be forsaken by any Court, be it even the highest Court in a State, oblivious of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. (Chandra Prakash (supra), ; Dhaniram Luhar, (2004) 5 SCC 568 ). 20. Judicial discipline requires, and decorum known to law warrants, that the directions of the Supreme Court should be followed. In the hierarchical system of courts which exists in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tier. The judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the last word and if that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted. (Kausalya Devi Bogra, (1984) 2 SCC 324 ; Cassell & Co. Ltd. (1972) 1 ALL ER 801). The judicial system only works if someone is allowed to have the last word and if that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted. (Kausalya Devi Bogra, (1984) 2 SCC 324 ; Cassell & Co. Ltd. (1972) 1 ALL ER 801). While the High Court is independent, and is a co-equal institution, the Constitutional scheme and judicial discipline requires that the High Court should give due regard to the orders of the Supreme Court which are binding on all courts within the territory of India. (Spencer & Co. Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 259 ; Bayer India Ltd. (1993) 3 SCC 29 ; E.S.P. Rajaram, AIR 2001 SC 581 ). A judgment of the High Court which refuses to follow the decision and directions of the Supreme Court, or seeks to revive a decision of the High Court which had been set aside by the Supreme Court, is a nullity. (Narinder Singh, (1984) 2 SCC 402 ); Kausalya Devi Bogra (supra); (M.R. Apparao, (supra),). No direction can, therefore, be issued by a High Court contrary to the law declared by the Supreme Court. 21. In Ram kishore (supra), on which reliance is placed on behalf of the respondents-writ petitioners, the special appeals before the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court were preferred by the State Government against the order of the learned Single Judge granting minimum of the pay-scales to daily wage employees, along with DA. While the State Government had filed a batch of special appeals against the said order, one daily rated employee, who was not granted a similar relief, had also preferred a special appeal. 22. After noticing the judgment of the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra), the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Ram kishore (supra), observed that the Supreme Court, in Putti Lal (supra), had held that a daily wager, if he was discharging similar duties as those in regular employment of the Government, should at least be entitled to receive the minimum of the pay-scale, though he might not be entitled to any increment or any other allowance that is permissible to his counter-part in the Government. Thereafter, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed:- “………..Needless to mention that the dearness allowance is applicable to the minimum of the pay-scale for which the daily-wager are entitled, of course, they are not entitled for the other allowances like washing, medical etc. as mentioned by the Apex Court (supra). The purpose of paying dearness allowance is to meet the inflation. So, the dearness allowance is to be determined as per price index from time to time. Everybody is suffering with the inflation. It may be mentioned that in India, the Dearness Allowance has a history dating back of World War II. At that time, many of the lower-paid employees received Dearness Allowance Based on their wages or salaries. Many changes to Dearness Allowance and its computations have occurred over the last so many years, according to both private and Government studies. For example, now a days, to calculate the D.A., 12 months average of pay and a set index level is considered to get the percentage increase in price/cost of living. Dearness Allowance is paid on a range of base-pay levels. At the time of revision of the pay-scale, the Pay Commission always merged D.A. with the new pay band. Thus, the rising cost affects the daily wager too. So, we are of the view that the daily-wagers, who are getting the minimum pay-scale, are also entitled for getting the dearness allowances only. Except it, no other allowance or increment is allowable to them as observed by Hon'ble Apex Court (supra). In view of above, to meet the inflation, dearness allowance is admissible to daily wagers who are getting minimum of the pay-scale admissible to them. To this effect, the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1500 (S/S) of 2009 is modified to this extent. In other special appeals, orders passed by the learned Single Judge are hereby sustained alongwith the reasons mentioned therein and the special appeals filed by the State are hereby dismissed………” (emphasis supplied) 23. To this effect, the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1500 (S/S) of 2009 is modified to this extent. In other special appeals, orders passed by the learned Single Judge are hereby sustained alongwith the reasons mentioned therein and the special appeals filed by the State are hereby dismissed………” (emphasis supplied) 23. The question is not whether DA should be paid to daily wage employees to meet the adverse effect of inflation, but whether the Supreme Court, in Putti Lal (supra), had directed payment of such an allowance to them; and whether the directions of the Supreme Court to extend daily wagers, working in similar posts to those held by regular employees in the Government, the minimum of the pay scale included payment of DA also. 24. The directions issued by the Supreme Court, in Putti Lal (supra), is only for the Government of Uttarakhand to pay daily wage workers the “minimum of the pay-scale”. The pay-scale of an employee represents only the basic pay, and it is on this basic pay that DA is computed and paid. The direction of the Supreme Court, in Putti Lal (supra), is only for payment of the minimum of the pay-scale, and not any other allowance. The words “Dearness Allowance”, by itself and without anything more, indicate that it is also an allowance albeit its payment being made, as a percentage of the basic pay to which an employee is entitled to, in order to protect him against the adverse effects of inflation. We must, therefore, respectfully disagree with the opinion of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in Ram kishore (supra), that DA should be paid to a daily rated worker, notwithstanding the law declared by the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra). The submission, that pay would include DA, needs only to be noted to be rejected. 25. The judgment of the Supreme Court, in Putti Lal (supra), necessitates compliance both in its letter and spirit, notwithstanding that payment of DA to the daily rated workers would help protect them from the adverse effect of inflation. Yielding to instinct tends to ignore the cold logic of law. Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be. (Asha Ramchandra Ambedkar, (1994) 2 SCC 718 ). Yielding to instinct tends to ignore the cold logic of law. Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be. (Asha Ramchandra Ambedkar, (1994) 2 SCC 718 ). There may be pitiable situations but, on that score, the law cannot be ignored. (Martin Bum Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 529 ). 26. The plea of discrimination does not also merit acceptance. Members of the Kumaon Ban Shramik Sangh, which filed Writ Petition No.15627 of 1988, were, in view of the order of the Allahabad High Court dated 25.02.1993 (which attained finality on SLP No.25422 of 1994 preferred thereagainst being dismissed on 01.12.1994), entitled for payment of DA. The law declared by the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra), is that, on application of the doctrine of “equal pay for equal work”, daily rated workers, discharging functions similar to regular Class-IV employees of the Government, would be entitled to be paid the minimum of the scale of pay applicable to regular Class-IV posts in the Government; and they shall not be entitled for any other allowances. In the light of the law declared by the Supreme Court, in Putti Lal (supra), the earlier Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1998 dated 25.02.1993 is no longer good law. 27. Notwithstanding the change in the law, consequent upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra), the earlier judgment of the Allahabad High Court, in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 dated 25.02.1993, would continue to bind the parties thereto, as the said judgment has attained finality. The petitioners, in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 dated 25.02.1993, would therefore be entitled for payment of dearness allowance even after the declaration of law, to the contrary, in the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra). 28. The daily-rated workers, who were not parties to the judgment in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 dated 25.02.1993, however stand on a different footing. The declaration of law by the Allahabad High Court, in its judgment in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 dated 25.02.1993, ceased to apply on a different view being taken by the Supreme Court in its judgment in Putti Lal (supra). The declaration of law by the Allahabad High Court, in its judgment in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 dated 25.02.1993, ceased to apply on a different view being taken by the Supreme Court in its judgment in Putti Lal (supra). As a result, all such daily-rated workers, who were not parties to Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988, are bound by the law declared by the Supreme Court in Putti Lal (supra), and not by the earlier decision of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 dated 25.02.1993. They cannot claim parity with the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988, nor can they claim to have been discriminated against merely because, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 15627 of 1988 continue to be paid dearness allowance by the Government. The respondents-writ petitioners would only be entitled to be extended the minimum scale of pay of regular Class-IV posts in the Government, and not for dearness allowance. 29. Reliance placed, on behalf of the respondent-writ petitioners on certain internal correspondence, between officers of the Government, to contend that DA is payable, is also of no avail. It is the law declared by the Supreme Court, in Putti Lal (supra), which is binding on the State Government, notwithstanding any understanding to the contrary of some of the officers of the State of Uttarakhand. 30. Viewed from any angle, we are satisfied that the learned Single Judge erred in directing payment of DA to the respondent-writ petitioners as it fell foul of the directions of the Supreme court in Putti Lal (supra). As the directions to pay D.A. is itself illegal, the directions to pay the said amount from 21.03.2002, that too with interest at 12%/18% per annum, are also illegal and must be declared as such. The orders under appeals are, therefore, set-aside, and the Special Appeals are allowed. However, in the circumstances, without costs.