ORDER : Sunita Agarwal, J. 1. The present petition is directed against an order dated 2.8.2016 passed by the Civil Judge, (Senior Division)/Fast Track Court Ghaziabad in Original Suit No. 1006 of 1995 (M/S Karchop Oversiez v. Noida and others). The said suit had been filed by the petitioner seeking permanent injunction against the defendants restraining them from evicting the petitioner/plaintiff from disputed plot no. 33, Block-A situated in Sector 58, Noida, Pargana and Tehsil Dadri, District Ghaziabad (in an area of 800 square meter). 2. In the original plaint, the petitioner claimed to be valid allottee of the aforesaid plot being in possession thereof as on date. As per the plaint assertion the said plot was allotted to the petitioner/plaintiff vide allotment letter dated 16.10.1990. The allotment or the lease was made for a period of 90 years vide registered lease deed executed on 14.1.1991 and the possession of plot was handed over to the petitioner/plaintiff on 16.1.1991. As per the lease deed, the plaintiff was required to pay the entire consideration in installment. It is contended in the original plaint that there had been no default on the part of the plaintiff and as per conditions in the lease deed, constructions were required to be raised by the plaintiff within the period of 24 months from the date of obtaining possession. In case of any default on the part of the plaintiff/allottee, the Noida authority would be authorised to realise enhanced fee to extend the time for raising construction. It is contended that the plaintiff had paid installment up till December, 1994 with interest and had always been willing to pay extension fee as per the condition of the lease deed. 3. It is admitted that the plaintiff could not raise construction within the time given in the lease deed on 14.12.1994. A letter was issued to the petitioner asking him to surrender the plot as he did not raise construction. Reply to the said letter was given by the petitioner on 31.1.1995 asking Noida Authority to give some more time, explaining the reasons for his inability to raise construction. However, vide letter dated 18.3.1995, the Noida Authority had cancelled the allotment made in favour of the plaintiff, information of which was received by the plaintiff vide letter dated 12.5.1995. Reply to the said letter was given by the petitioner on 31.1.1995 asking Noida Authority to give some more time, explaining the reasons for his inability to raise construction. However, vide letter dated 18.3.1995, the Noida Authority had cancelled the allotment made in favour of the plaintiff, information of which was received by the plaintiff vide letter dated 12.5.1995. It is asserted that when the officer and employees started interfering in the possession of the plaintiff over the suit property, cause of action for filing the suit arose. The simpliciter relief of permanent injunction has, thus, been sought with the assertion in the original plaint that the Noida Authority had no right to cancel the lease granted in favour of the plaintiff and to transfer the possession of the plot to any third party. 4. It is not indicated in the entire petition as to whether any interim injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff on the presentation of the aforesaid suit on 10.9.1995 or thereafter. During the pendency of the suit, an amendment application was filed to seek addition of three private parties as defendant nos. 3, 4 and 5. Addition of paragraphs and 20 was sought wherein it was asserted that the defendant no. 4 in collusion with the defendant nos. 1 and 2 had transferred the suit property vide lease deed dated 9.6.2011 in favour of the defendant no. 5 and had put him in possession of the suit. The lease deed dated 9.6.2011 executed by defendant no. 4 in favour of the defendant no. 5 was liable to be declared void ab initio. The relief of declaration has been added by adding Clause to the relief clause of the plaint that a decree of declaration be passed in favour of the plaintiff to the effect of declaration of lease deed dated 9.6.2011 being null and void. 5. After amendment of the plaint vide order dated 11.3.2014, preliminary issue nos. The relief of declaration has been added by adding Clause to the relief clause of the plaint that a decree of declaration be passed in favour of the plaintiff to the effect of declaration of lease deed dated 9.6.2011 being null and void. 5. After amendment of the plaint vide order dated 11.3.2014, preliminary issue nos. 3 and 4 with regard to valuation of the suit and court fee had been decided by Civil Judge, (Senior Division) vide order dated 2.8.2016 holding therein that in view of amendment of relief, the plaintiff was required to pay ad-Valorem court fee i.e. court fee on the market value of the suit property which was subject matter of the lease deed dated 9.6.2011, as per Section 7 (iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as applicable in the State of U.P., read with Section 4 of The Suits Valuation Act, 1887 as amended in its application to the State of U.P. This order was challenged in revision namely Civil Revision No. 60 of 2016 which had been rejected vide order dated 5.7.2017. Both the orders are subject matter of challenge in the present petition. 6. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the registered lease deed dated 14.1.1991 executed by Noida Authority in favour of the plaintiff is still in existence and it has neither been cancelled by a court of law nor any such cancellation can be perceived on the part of the Noida Authority. The amended relief is simply to seek declaration of the right of the plaintiff being owner in possession of the suit property. The relief of cancellation of the lease deed dated 9.8.2011 in view of the subsisting lease in favour of the plaintiff is consequential. In case of declaration of the plaintiff being owner in possession of the suit property by virtue of the registered lease deed dated 14.1.1991, the lease deed dated 9.6.2011 would automatically fall i.e. has to be declared a null and void document. The said declaration cannot be termed as relief of cancellation or lease deed for securing the suit property in terms of Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The said declaration cannot be termed as relief of cancellation or lease deed for securing the suit property in terms of Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The said provision is not attracted in the instant case rather the Court fee has to be paid in terms of Section 7(iv) read with Article 17(iii) as contained in Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, 1870, amended in its application to the State of U.P. Reliance is placed on the judgments of this Court in Smt. Shefali Roy, vs. Hero Jaswant Dass and others reported in AIR 1992 Allahabad 254 and in Suresh and others vs. Shree Chand and others reported in 2007 (102) RD 516. 7. Having considered the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the aforesaid judgments relied upon by him relevant is to note that when there is a dispute for determination of Court fee, entirety of the averments made in the plaint and the relief claim has to be seen. The averments made in the written statement is not required to be examined. Where more than one reliefs are claimed based on the same cause of action in the alternative, the court fee shall be paid according to the value of the relief in respect of which the largest fee is payable. However, where two or more separate and distinct cause of action are joined, the plaint shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of fees with which the plaints would be chargeable under the Court Fees Act 1870, as it separate suits were instituted in respect of each such cause of action. 8. For any relief of cancellation of a deed or document by adjudging the said document as void or voidable which would result in securing a decree for money or other property having a market value, the Court fee has to be paid in accordance with the provisions of Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act. The Court fee to obtain a declaratory decree or an order where consequential relief other than relief specified in sub-Section (iv-A) is prayed, can be computed in terms of Section 7(iv) read with Article 17(iii), Scheduled II of the Court Fees Act. 9. The Court fee to obtain a declaratory decree or an order where consequential relief other than relief specified in sub-Section (iv-A) is prayed, can be computed in terms of Section 7(iv) read with Article 17(iii), Scheduled II of the Court Fees Act. 9. The assertion of the petitioner that the amended relief is simply a relief of declaration without any consequential relief of cancellation of lease deed dated 9.8.2011 in favour of defendant no. 5 is not correct. Reason being that the plaintiff cannot simply seek mere declaration of his right of being owner in possession of the suit property. The cause of action for institution of Original Suit No. 1006 of 1995, as per own case of the plaintiff arose on 8.9.1995 when after cancellation of the lease dated 14.1.1991 vide letter dated 18.3.1995, officers and employees of Noida made an effort to evict the petitioner. 10. It is also admitted in amended paragraph 2' A of the plaint that the possession of the suit property had been handed over to the defendant no. 5 vide lease deed dated 9.6.2011. In the said circumstance, the plaintiff would get right in the suit property not by mere relief of declaration or injunction. For securing the suit property, the Court has to necessarily grant relief of cancellation of lease deed by adjudging it void or voidable instrument. The said view taken by this Court is fortified by the decision of the Division Bench in Smt. Shefali Roy (supra) relied by learned counsel for the petitioner. The Division Bench considering the provisions of Section (iv-A) of the Court Fees Act as applicable in the State of U.P has observed in paragraphs 20'-'22' as under:- "20. No doubt the aforesaid provision is emphatic dealing with the point in issue. However, words used therein "other document securing money or other property having such value" require interpretation so as to find out pith and substance to this provision, that is what is the intention of legislature in putting the word "securing". This word "securing" is not only related to the money part of the decree but other property as well as used in this provision, and therefore word "securing" relates to recovery or possession of the other property, otherwise putting this word "securing" in this provision becomes meaningless. This word "securing" is not only related to the money part of the decree but other property as well as used in this provision, and therefore word "securing" relates to recovery or possession of the other property, otherwise putting this word "securing" in this provision becomes meaningless. As such where money part or any other property is claimed by way of securing it, the plaintiff is certainly required to pay ad valorem Court-fee i.e. 1/5th of the value of subject-matter of the property. But where no relief is claimed in terms of the above referred provision, then certainly payment of Court-fee shall be governed under Art. 17, Schedule II of the Court-fees Act. "21. In the instance case no relief is claimed in terms of the above referred provision by the plaintiff, but simply a declaration is sought that the alleged sale deed be declared null and void. 22. The payment of Court-fee depends upon the averments of the plaint and the relief claimed and not on the averments of the written statement. A suit for mere declaration that the plaintiff is owner of the property in suit as claimed by the plaintiff in the instant case and incidentally claiming a declaration that the alleged sale deed be declared null and void, does not fall within the ambit of Section 7(iv-A) (State of U.P. Amendment). See State of U.P. v. Ramkrishan Burman, AIR 1971 SC 87 : (1971 All LJ 1), wherein considering this State of U.P. Amendment their Lordships of the Apex Court ruled that in a suit for mere declaration that the plaintiff is owner of certain properties, this U.P. Amendment is not attracted for the purposes of payment of Court-fee. According to their Lordships this U.P. Amendment relates to a decree for recovery of money or other property. It however, does not include a decree concerning title to money or other property, and, hence where mere declaration is involved, the payment of Court-fee is governed under Art. 17, Schedule II of the Court-fees Act. In view of the decision in Ramkrishan Burman's case (supra), we are of the opinion that the plaintiff has paid proper Court-fee." 11. It however, does not include a decree concerning title to money or other property, and, hence where mere declaration is involved, the payment of Court-fee is governed under Art. 17, Schedule II of the Court-fees Act. In view of the decision in Ramkrishan Burman's case (supra), we are of the opinion that the plaintiff has paid proper Court-fee." 11. A careful reading of the said paragraphs clearly indicates that this Court had held that in a case where no relief is claimed in terms of Section 7 (iv-A), the payment of Court fee shall be governed by Article 17 Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. In a suit for mere declaration that the plaintiff is owner of the property in suit and incidentally claiming a declaration that the sale deed be declared null and void, the relief does not fall within the ambit of Section 7(iv-A) of Court Fees Act. This is not so in the instant case. 12. There is one more aspect of the matter. Learned counsel for the petitioner though asserted that the lease deed dated 9.6.2011 was executed in favour of the defendant no. 5 during pendency of the suit for injunction, but has not stated that whether there was any interim order of the temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff restraining the defendants from transferring the suit property in favour of third party. The transfer, therefore, cannot be said to be hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the lease deed cannot be declared void ab-initio for the mere fact that the suit for simpliciter injunction filed by the petitioner was pending on the date of execution of the lease deed. 13. As in the facts of the instant case, this Court finds that the suit as framed, is not for mere declaration of the plaintiff being owner of the suit property rather the decree for recovery of the suit property would be required to be passed by adjudging the lease deed dated 9.6.2011 null and void, the provision of Section 7(iv-A) are, thus, attracted. The plaintiff is required to pay ad-Valorem Court fee as per the adjudication made by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) vide order dated 2.8.2016. 14. No infirmity is found in the decisions of the Courts below. 15. The plaintiff is required to pay ad-Valorem Court fee as per the adjudication made by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) vide order dated 2.8.2016. 14. No infirmity is found in the decisions of the Courts below. 15. Noticing the fact that the plaintiff had been required to provide proper valuation of the suit in the plaint and pay Court fee by order dated 2.8.2016, two months time is granted to the plaintiff from the date of delivery of this judgment to pay the requisite Court fee in compliance of the directions of the Court of first instance i.e. Civil Judge, (Senior Division)/Fast Track Court, Ghaziabad. 16. In the case of non-compliance on the part of the plaintiff to correct the suit valuation and non-payment of Court fee as directed hereinabove, it would be open for the court below to pass appropriate order, in accordance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. 17. In view of the above, the present petition is found devoid of merit and hence dismissed.