JUDGMENT : 1. Both the writ petitions have been heard together as because the first writ petition i.e. W.P.(C). No.2133 of 2018 pertains to the continuation of tenure of the petitioner/society for a period of five years in pursuance to the 97th Amendment of the Constitution while the Second writ petition being W.P.C. No.1569 of 2019 the order has been passed on 09.04.2018 by which the order of stay in operation of Bank account has been vacated, therefore, the legality and propriety of the order dated 12.03.2019 which is subject matter of the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.1569 of 2019 will depend upon the outcome of the issue raised in the W.P.(C).No.2133 of 2018. 2. Ms. Shruti Shrestha, learned counsel appearing for the intervener applicant has submitted that she is resident of the cooperative society, the petitioner herein, but the writ petition has been filed by the Secretary of the society which is contrary to the bye laws formulated by the petitioner society and by misleading various facts, the writ petition has been filed, therefore, the intervener applicant is necessary party for proper adjudication of the issues agitated in the writ petition. 3. Mr. MrinalKanti Roy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as also Mr. Krishna Murari, learned counsel appearing for the Bank and the learned State counsel have not objected to such stand and submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, intervener applicant which is pleaded in the intervention application. 4. After hearing learned counsel for the parties on the application and taking into consideration the fact that the intervener applicant is the president of the society while the writ petition has been filed by the Society through the Secretary, therefore, the intervener applicant is necessary party for proper adjudication of the issue and therefore, the prayer made in the interlocutory application deserves to be allowed, accordingly, allowed. 5. The intervener applicant is directed to be impleaded the party to the proceeding. W.P.(C). No.2133 of 2018 6. The instant writ petition has been filed against the order passed by the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Society-cum- Conducting Officer, Dhanbad Circle, Dhanbad, who in exercise of power conferred under Rule 21 (b) (III), Rule 21 (c) and Rule 21 (d) has fixed the time schedule for conducting special general meeting to conduct the election of the Dhanbad Coal Board Employees Cooperative Credit Society Limited, Dhanbad. 7. 7. The legal issues have been raised in assailing the order for conducting election by taking the plea of applicability of the 97th Amendment Act of the Constitution of India whereby and whereunder a provision has been inserted in the constitution i.e. Article 243-ZT. 8. According to the petitioner the rules and regulations governing the continuation of society was based upon the provision of Jharkhand Co-operative Society Act, 1935 wherein a provision has been made under sub-section (9) to Section 14 of the Act, 6 of 1935, whereby and whereunder, the terms of office of elected members of the office board and its office bearers shall be three years from the date of election but after 97thAmendment Act of the Constitution of India the sub-section (9) of Section 14 of the Act, 6 of 1935 has been amended by substituting the previous provision as contained under the Jharkhand Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 by substituting the period of three years as five years pertaining to the term of office of the elected members. 9. The Article 243-ZT has been inserted in pursuance to the 97th Amendment Act of the Constitution wherein it has been provided that any provision of any law relating to cooperative societies in force in State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution 97thAmendment Act, 2011 which is inconsistent with the provision of the part shall continue to be enforced until amended or repealed by a competent legislature or other competent authority or until the expiration of one year from such commencement whichever is less and therefore, by 12.01.2013 all laws on Cooperative Societies were bound to be restructured in consonance with the 97th Amendment to the Constitution of India and, in any case, provision in the Act or Rules or by laws otherwise in consistent with the Constitution will be inoperative thereafter. 10. 10. As such submission has been made that the Jharkhand Cooperative Society Amendment Act has come into effect by virtue of its notification in the Gazette on 01st December, 2015 which is after the lapse of period of one year as provided under Article 243-ZT of the Constitution of India and as such before enactment of the Amended Act of the Jharkhand Act 21 of 2015 the effect of the 97th Amendment in pursuance to Article 243-ZT would operate after 12.01.2013 and therefore, the term of the office bearers since has been enhanced from 03 years to 05 years would be effective on or after 12.01.2013 and the election which is in question in this writ petition, was conducted on 01.11.2015 therefore, in view of amended (substituted) provision of sub-section (9) of Section 14 of the Jharkhand Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 by virtue of 97th Amendment Act the tenure would be 5 years which will run from 01st November, 2015 to 31st October, 2020 but the assistant Registrar has come out with the impugned order declaring to conduct an election which is in between the period of 05 years and therefore, the said order is in the teeth of 97th Amendment Act of the Constitution read with Article 243-ZT thereof. 11. It is further case of the petitioner that since the Amendment is by way of substitution therefore, the said substitution would relate back to the date of enactment and as such the term of the office bearers would be said to be five years from the date of enactment of the Act, 1935. 12. 11. It is further case of the petitioner that since the Amendment is by way of substitution therefore, the said substitution would relate back to the date of enactment and as such the term of the office bearers would be said to be five years from the date of enactment of the Act, 1935. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the newly impleaded respondent has submitted that the ground which has been agitated by the petitioner regarding applicability of the amended provision by way of 97th Amendment Act is not properly being construed by the petitioner the reason being that, if that be so, after the 97th Amendment and before enactment of the Jharkhand Cooperative Societies (Amended) Act, 2015 by way of Jharkhand Act 21 of 2015, election was conducted on 12.01.2013 term of which was for three years and after expiry of the period of three years the election was conducted and the term of the body constituted by way of election conducted in the year 2014 but for one reason or the other, the committee has been dissolved in the midst of the term thereafter the election was conducted on 01.11.2015, therefore, when no plea has been agitated by the petitioner in the earlier election regarding applicability of substituted provision of term of five years of an election conducted on 12.01.2013 or 12.01.2014, therefore, the petitioner will be precluded from taking such plea in the election conducted on 01.11.2015. 13. Further ground has been agitated regarding locus of the petitioner by submitting that the petitioner society has approached to this Court through the Secretary but as per the bye laws of the society, the President is empowered to sue before any court of law on behalf of any managing committee, therefore, the writ petition filed by the society through Secretary is contrary to the condition stipulated in the bye laws and hence, the writ petition is fit to be dismissed on the ground of locus of the petitioner. 14. 14. It has further been submitted that the constitution of the society by way of election dated 01.11.2015 cannot be said to be in consonance with the 97th Amendment since the constitution provides by way of said amendment that there would be member of schedule caste, schedule tribe and women to represent the said section of society but that requirement is not being fulfilled and therefore, it cannot be said to be in terms of the 97th Amendment of the Constitution. 15. Mr. Krishna Murari, learned counsel representing for the respondent No.8, the Branch Manager Dhanbad Central Cooperative Bank Limited to the W.P.(C) No.1569 of 2019, has submitted that the implication of the 97th Amendment of the Constitution since it is by way of substitution of the statute it relates back to the original date of enactment of the Act and therefore, the contention as has been raised by the petitioner in this writ petition so far as it relates to the legal position is concerned, the same cannot be disputed, therefore, he has adopted the argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioner of W.P.(C) No.2133 of 2018. 16. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after appreciating their arguments and after going across the pleadings made in the writ petition, this Court before entering into the issue, deem it fit and proper to deal with the statutory provisions which is relevant for the purpose herein. 17. The Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 has been enacted with an object to promote those self-help, non-profit and democratic working society to place cooperative society financially on sound footing and to have better financial management and control over society existing in the stage. 18. The Act of 1935 has been adopted by the State of Jharkhand and now it is known as Jharkhand Cooperative Societies Act, 1935. 19. The Section 14 needs discussion since the issue revolved found therein. 20. Section 14 provides with respect to registered society to have a managing committee etc. 21. Sub-section 1 thereof, provides that every registered society shall have an address, registered in accordance with the rules, to which all notices and communications may be send, and shall send notice, in writing to registrar and to the financing bank of any change in the said address within 15 days. 22. 21. Sub-section 1 thereof, provides that every registered society shall have an address, registered in accordance with the rules, to which all notices and communications may be send, and shall send notice, in writing to registrar and to the financing bank of any change in the said address within 15 days. 22. Sub-section 2 provides that the management of cooperative societies shall be vested in a managing committee constituted in accordance with rules. 23. Sub-Section 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 provides provision of appointment of a managing director, executive officer or chief executive, as the case may be, the Chairman or the Administrator would be appointed. The Chairman will hold to the office during the pleasure of the State Government and sub-section (8) deals with the eligibility to context the election or nomination as an office bearer of the managing committee. 24. Sub-section (9) of Section 14 of the Act, 1935 which is the subject matter of the instant writ petition and therefore, the same is referred hereinbelow:- “Notwithstanding anything contained in the rules or by-laws of a registered society, the term of the members and the office-bearers of the Managing Committee of a registered society shall be three co-operative years, and they shall continue to hold office after expiry of their term till the elections are held or for [nine months] from the close of the co-operative year, whichever is earlier.” 25. It is evident from the provision of sub-section (9) therein it has been provided that notwithstanding anything contained in the rules or bye-laws of a registered society, the term of the members and the office bearers of the managing committee of the registered society shall be three cooperative years and they shall continue to hold office after expiry of their term till the elections are held or for nine months from the close of the cooperative year, whichever earlier. 26. The parliamentarian has sought for an amendment in the Cooperative Societies Act, taking into consideration that the cooperative society is a subject enumerated in entry 32 of the State List of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution and the State Legislatures have accordingly enacted legislation on cooperative societies. 27. 26. The parliamentarian has sought for an amendment in the Cooperative Societies Act, taking into consideration that the cooperative society is a subject enumerated in entry 32 of the State List of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution and the State Legislatures have accordingly enacted legislation on cooperative societies. 27. The Central Government in order to ensure that the cooperative societies in the country may function in democratic, autonomous and economically sound manner and with a view to bring the necessary reforms, a proposal to incorporate a new part in the Constitution so was as to provide for certain provisions covering the vital aspects of working of cooperative societies like democratic, autonomous and professional functioning. 28. A new Article has also been proposed to be inserted in part-IV of the Constitution (Directive Principles of State Policy) for the States to endeavor to promote voluntary formation, autonomous functioning, democratic control and professional management of cooperative societies. 29. The new part in the constitution seek to empower parliament in respect of multi state cooperative societies and the state legislature and in case of other cooperative societies to make appropriate law, laying down the following matrix namely:- (a) provisions for incorporation, regulation and winding up of cooperative societies based on the principles of democratic member-control, member-economic participation and autonomous functioning; (b) specifying the maximum number of Directors of a cooperative society to be not exceeding twenty-one members; (c) providing for a fixed term of five years from the date of election in respect of the elected members of the Board and its office-bearers; (d) providing for a maximum time-limit of six months during which a Board of Directors of cooperative society could be kept under supersession or suspension; (e) providing for independent professional audit; (f) providing for right of information to the members of the cooperative societies; (g) empowering the State Governments to obtain periodic reports of activities and accounts of cooperative societies; (h) providing for the reservation of one seat for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes and two seats for women on the Board of every cooperative society, which have individuals as members from such categories; (i) providing for offences relating to cooperative societies and penalties in respect of such offences. 30. The said amendment has also considered for continuation of the existing laws and as such Article 243-ZT has been inserted which speaks as under:- “243-ZT. 30. The said amendment has also considered for continuation of the existing laws and as such Article 243-ZT has been inserted which speaks as under:- “243-ZT. Continuance of existing laws.—Notwithstanding anything in this Part, any provision of any law relating to cooperative societies in force in a State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Ninety-seventh Amendment) Act, 2011, which is inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall continue to be in force until amended or repealed by a competent legislature or other competent authority or until the expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is less.” 11. Thus, by 12-1-2013, all laws on cooperative societies were bound to be restructured in consonance with the Ninety-seventh Amendment to the Constitution of India and, in any case, any provision in the Act or Rules or Bye-laws otherwise inconsistent with the Constitution will be inoperative thereafter. Articles 43-B and 243-ZT are mandates to all the States and the competent authorities to structure cooperative societies as conceived in the Constitution of India, if not already there. Therefore, we have to see whether the Act, Rules or bye-laws contain any provision for democratic functioning. 12. The first legislation on cooperative movement in India was the Cooperative Credit Societies Act, 1904 and, thereafter, the cooperative societies emerged in India as State sponsored/promoted institutions. The main objective was only credit intended to relieve the poor agriculturists from the clutches of moneylenders. The first urban cooperative credit society under the 1904 Act was registered in Kanjivaram in erstwhile Madras province. The traits of democracy were present in the very first legislation through the principle “one man, one vote”. Since the first legislation was limited to the credit societies, a new legislation was introduced 8 years later as “the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912”. The restriction regarding registration limited to credit societies was taken away and any society established with the object of promoting the economic interests of its members in accordance with the cooperative principles, or a society established with the object of facilitating the operations of such a society, could be registered. 13. Under the Government of India Act, 1919 (Montague-Chelmsford Reforms), cooperation became a provincial subject which gave a further impetus to the movement. This gave birth to several cooperative land mortgage banks. The first of its kind was registered in Punjab. 13. Under the Government of India Act, 1919 (Montague-Chelmsford Reforms), cooperation became a provincial subject which gave a further impetus to the movement. This gave birth to several cooperative land mortgage banks. The first of its kind was registered in Punjab. Close to Independence and thereafter, we see a radical change and increased growth in the cooperative movement. Activities were spread to all spheres of human endeavour, and thus in 2002, National Policy on Cooperatives was announced. 14. The cooperative societies having been conferred a constitutional status by the Ninety-seventh Amendment, the whole concept of cooperatives has undergone a major change. In 1993, the local self-governments viz. panchayats and municipalities were also given constitutional status under Parts IX and IX-A of the Constitution of India by the 73rd and 74th Amendments. The Statement of Objects and Reasons would show that the Constitution wanted the local bodies to function as vibrant democratic units of self-government. After two decades, cooperative societies were given the constitutional status by including them under Part IX-B. The main object for the said Amendment was also to ensure “their autonomy, democratic functioning and professional management”. 31. Therefore, the 97th Amendment has conferred the Cooperative Societies a constitutional status. 32. It is evident from the provision of Article 243-ZT that the provision of any law relating to Cooperative Societies enforce in a State immediately before the commencement of the constitution (97th Amendment) Act, 2011 which is inconsistent with the provision of this part, shall continue to be enforced until amended or repealed by a competent legislature or other competent authority or until the expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is less. 33. Thus by 12.01.2013 all laws on Cooperative Societies were found to be restructured in consonance with the 97th amendment to the Constitution of India and, in any case, any provision of the Act or Rules or bye laws otherwise inconsistent with the Constitution will be inoperative thereafter. 34. 33. Thus by 12.01.2013 all laws on Cooperative Societies were found to be restructured in consonance with the 97th amendment to the Constitution of India and, in any case, any provision of the Act or Rules or bye laws otherwise inconsistent with the Constitution will be inoperative thereafter. 34. The State of Jharkhand has come out with an amendment by way of Jharkhand Act, 21 of 2015 known as the Jharkhand Cooperative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2015 came into effect from the date when it was gazetted i.e. on 01.12.2015 wherein the provision of sub-section (9) of Section 14 has been substituted which reads hereunder as:- “Amendment in Sub-section (9) of Section (14) of the Act of 1935—Sub-section (9) of Section (14) of the Jharkhand Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 shall be substituted by the following namely:- Notwithstanding anything contained in any provision of rules or the bye-laws of any Co-operative Society, the election of a board shall be conducted before the expiry of the term of the board so as to ensure that the newly elected members of the board assume office immediately on the expiry of the office of members of the outgoing board. The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of all elections to a co-operative society shall vest in such an authority or body, as may be provided by the act or as per the rules or the bye-laws of the co-operative society. Notwithstanding anything contained in any provision of rules or the bye-laws of any Co-operative Society the term of office of elected members of the board and its office bearers shall be five years from the date of election and the term of office bearers shall be conterminous with the term of the board. Provided that the board may fill a casual vacancy on the board by nomination out of the same class of members in respect of which the casual vacancy has arisen, if the term of office of the board is less than half of its original term. Provided further that if the term of the Board remains for more than half of its original term and if any vacancy arises for elected members of office bearers for any reason whatsoever, the Co-operative society shall fill the vacancy by special general meeting." 35. Provided further that if the term of the Board remains for more than half of its original term and if any vacancy arises for elected members of office bearers for any reason whatsoever, the Co-operative society shall fill the vacancy by special general meeting." 35. It is in the background of the 97th Amendment Act, 2011 read with Article 243-ZT and the Amendment incorporated by way of Jharkhand Act, 14 of 2015 in sub-section (9) of Section 14 the question which is to be answered by this Court: 36. Whether the period of three years would be five years if yes from which date in view of the effect of Article 243-ZT of the Constitution of India read with Amendment in sub-section (9) to Section 14 by virtue of Jharkhand Act, 21 of 2015? 37. But before answering the issue the factual aspect in hand needs to be stated. 38. The election of the Dhanbad Coal Board Employees Cooperative credit Society Limited, has been ordered to be conducted by an order passed by the Assistant Registrar-cum-Conducting Officer vide order dated 05.04.2018 the same has been alleged to be in the teeth of the 97th Constitutional Amendment since by virtue of the said amendment the original provision as contained under sub-section (9) of Section 14 of the Act, 6 of 1935, has been substituted whereby and whereunder the term of office of elected members of the board and its office bearers shall be five years from the date. 39. The original provision provides the term of office of elected members of the board shall be three years. 40. The petitioner’s contention is that since the election was conducted on 01.11.2015, therefore, the tenure in pursuance to the amended provision of sub-section (9) of Section 14 pertaining to the period of term of office would continue for five years and as such in the midst of the five years the order impugned is not proper. 41. While on the other hand the learned counsel appearing for the newly impleaded respondent, has raised the contention by not disputing the Amendment incorporated in the statute by way of 97th Amendment but she has emphatically argued regarding the previous election tenure of it was three years and the other irregularity as also the question of locus of the petitioner. 42. 42. The effectiveness of the Article 243-ZT and after going through the said amendment as quoted hereinabove before on or after 12.01.2013 all the inconsistent provision containing in the respective act prevailing in the respective states would be redundant, meaning thereby, the provision of sub-section (9) of Section 14 wherein the terms of the society in the principal act will be substituted from three years to five years. Affect of Repealment of Statute/Circular or Notifications. 43. This Court deem it fit and proper to discuss about the scope of repealment of an Act taking into consideration that the effect of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act before entering into the applicability of the amended rule which has been amended by way of substitution. 44. Section 6 and 6A of the General Clauses Act Deals with the effect of repeal of an Act. It reads as follows. “6. Effect of repeal.—Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not— (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) xxx xxx xxx (e) xxx xxx xxx Section 6A: Repeal of Act making textual amendment in Act or Regulation. Where any [Central Government] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any [Central Government] or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution or any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal.] 45. The repeal, therefore, does not affect any obligation or liability under repealed Act and the liability continues. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act further clarifies it. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act reads as under:- "24. The repeal, therefore, does not affect any obligation or liability under repealed Act and the liability continues. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act further clarifies it. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act reads as under:- "24. Continuation of orders, etc., issued under enactments re-enacted and re-enacted.—Where any [Central Act] or Regulation, is, after the commencement of this Act, repealed and re- enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided any [appointment notification,] order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, [made or] issued under the repealed Act or Regulation, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been [made or] issued under the provisions so re- enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any (appointment notification,) order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, [made or] issued under the provisions so re-enacted (and when any [Central Act] or Regulation, which, by a notification under section 5 or 5A of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, (14 of 1874) or any like law, has been extended to any local area, has, by a subsequent notification, been withdrawn from the re-extended to such area or any part thereof, the provisions of such Act or Regulation shall be deemed to have been repealed and re-enacted in such area or part within the meaning of this section]. 46. On conjoint reading of both the Sections, it is apparent that any order passed/notification issued under the repealed Act, if not inconsistent with the provisions of re-enacted Act, shall be deemed to have been passed or issued under the provisions so re-enacted unless and until it is superseded. This has been done in order to avoid a vacuum which could be created by repeal of an Act by an Amended Act, reference needs to be made of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neel alias Niranjan Majumdar vs. State of West Bengal (1972) 2 SCC 668 . The relevant paragraphs read as under:- "8. Section 6(b) of General Clauses Act, however, provides that where any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of the Act repeals any earlier enactment, then, unless a different intention appears, such repeal shall not "affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder". The relevant paragraphs read as under:- "8. Section 6(b) of General Clauses Act, however, provides that where any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of the Act repeals any earlier enactment, then, unless a different intention appears, such repeal shall not "affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder". Section 24 next provides that where any Central Act is repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any notification issued under such repealed Act shall, so far as it is inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force and be deemed to have been made under the provisions so re-enacted unless it is superseded by any notification or order issued under the provisions so re-enacted. The new Act nowhere contains an intention to the contrary signifying that the operation of the repealed Act or of a notification issued thereunder was not to continue. Further, the new Act re-enacts the provisions of the earlier Act, and Section 4 in particular, as already stated, has provisions practically identical to those of Section 15 of the earlier Act. The combined effect of Sections 6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act is that the said notification of 1923 issued under Section 15 of the Act of 1878 not only continued to operate but has to be deemed to have been enacted under the new Act. 47. In the decision reported as AIR 1961 Mysore 7 Issa Yacub Bichara Vs. State of Mysore, a notification issued under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 empowered certain officers to lodge complaint under the said Act. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act was however amended. No new notification conferring such powers on any officer was issued under the amended Act. It was thus contended that since no notification has been issued under the amended Act, and the pre-amended Act having been repealed by amendment, the notification issued under the un-amended Act would be deemed to be repealed with the then Act. The Court relying upon Section 24 of the General Clauses Act held that the notification issued under the repealed Act in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the re-enacted Act shall continue to remain in force and will deem to have been made or issued under the provisions of the amended Act. 48. The Court relying upon Section 24 of the General Clauses Act held that the notification issued under the repealed Act in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the re-enacted Act shall continue to remain in force and will deem to have been made or issued under the provisions of the amended Act. 48. In the decision reported as 2002 (3) SCC 481 , State of Punjab Vs. Harnek Singh, the Government of Punjab had issued notification under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, authorizing Inspector of Police for the time being serving in the State Vigilance Department or who may be posted in future to serve with the said agency, to investigate the offences under the said Act within the State of Punjab so long as they remain posted in the said agency. In supersession of this notification, the Government of Punjab issued another notification under Section 5A of the 1947 Act authorizing such Inspectors of police to investigate offences under the 1947 Act even beyond the State of Punjab and the restriction of investigation within the State of Punjab was removed. The 1947 Act was repealed on September 09, 1988 by re-enacting the 1988 Act. Investigation in the offences registered under the 1988 Act, were investigated by the Inspectors of Police who had been authorized to investigate by the notifications issued under the repealed 1947 Act. The accused-respondent filed petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. questioning the proceeding on the ground that in the absence of a notification issued afresh under the 1988 Act, the Inspectors were not authorized to investigate the cases under Section 17 of the 1988 Act. The High Court of Punjab & Haryana quashed the FIR and the subsequent proceedings. The questions before Hon’ble Supreme Court thus, were (a) whether the notifications issued by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred upon it under Section 5-A(1) of the 1947 Act (since repealed) empowering and authorizing the Inspector of Police to investigate the cases registered under the said Act, are not saved under the saving provisions of the re-enacted Act; and (b) whether the aforesaid notification being not inconsistent with the provisions of the re-enacted Act, continues to be in force and be deemed to have been issued under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 till the aforesaid notifications are superseded or specifically withdrawn. The Supreme Court while allowing the appeals answered the second question as under:- “…….We are further of the opinion that the High Court committed a mistake of law by holding that as notifications have not expressly been saved by S. 30 of the Act, those would not enure or survive to govern any investigation done or legal proceeding instituted in respect of the cases registered under the 1988 Act. There is no dispute that 1988 Act is both repealing and re-enacting the law relating to prevention of corruption to which the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act are specifically applicable. It appears that as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to repealed enactments, the Legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to make the same specifically applicable in 1988 Act also which is a replealed and re-enacted statute. Reference to Section 6 of General Clauses Act in sub-section (1) of Section 30 has been made to avoid any confusion or mis-understanding regarding the effect of repeal with regard to actions taken under the repealed Act. If the Legislature had intended not to apply the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act to the 1988 Act, it would have specifically so provided under the enacted law. In the light of the fact that Section 24 of the General Clauses Act is specifically applicable to repealing and re- enacting statute, its exclusion has to be specific and cannot be inferred by twisting the language of the enactments. Accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents would render the provisions of 1988 Act redundant inasmuch as appointments, notifications, order, scheme, rules, bye-laws, made or issued under the repealed Act would be deemed to be non-existent making impossible the working of the re-enacted law impossible. The provisions of the 1988 Act are required to be understood and interpreted in the light of the provisions of the General Clauses Act including Sections 6 and 24 thereof." 49. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a decision passed in Civil Appeal No.5526 of 2005 in the case of Fibre Boards Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore Vs. Commissioner Income Tax, Bangalore dealing with the scope of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 held: "Unlike Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which saves certain rights, Section 24 merely continues notifications, orders, schemes, rules etc. Commissioner Income Tax, Bangalore dealing with the scope of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 held: "Unlike Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which saves certain rights, Section 24 merely continues notifications, orders, schemes, rules etc. that are made under a Central Act which is repealed and re-enacted with or without modification. The idea of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act is, as its marginal note shows, to continue uninterrupted subordinate legislation that may be made under a Central Act that is repealed and re-enacted with or without modification. It being clear in the present case that Section 280ZA which was repealed by omission and re- enacted with modification in section 54G, the notification declaring Thane to be an urban area dated 22.9.1967 would continue under and for the purposes of Section-54G. It is clear, therefore, that the impugned judgment in not referring to Section 24 of the General Clauses Act at all has thus fallen into error.” Affect of Amendment by substitution- 50. It is admitted that within a period of one year the State of Jharkhand has not come out with the amendment rather the amendment has been incorporated by virtue of Jharkhand Act, 21 of 2015 by way of notification dated 01.12.2015 wherefrom it is evident that the amendment has been made out by way of substitution now it is to be seen that if the amendment is by way of substitution what would be its effect whether it will relate back to the date of principal act or from the prospective date. The issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Zile Singh Vrs. State of Haryana& Ors. reported in AIR 2004 SC 5100 , wherein at Paragraph Nos.13, 15 and 16 which is relevant reads as under:- “13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only 'nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis' - a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past. (See: Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, Ninth Edition, 2004 at p.438). It is not necessary that an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the presumption against retrospectivity may be rebutted by necessary implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole (ibid, p.440). 15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute Law, Seventh Edition), it is open for the legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the Courts will give it such an operation. In the absence of a retrospective operation having been expressly given, the Courts may be called upon to construe the provisions and answer the question whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention giving the Statute retrospectivity. Four factors are suggested as relevant: (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated (p.388). The rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal a privilege which did not amount to accrued right (p.392). 16. Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute or to 'explain' a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed. 16. Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute or to 'explain' a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed. The rule against retrospectivity is inapplicable to such legislations as are explanatory and declaratory in nature. The classic illustration is the case of Att. Gen. v. Pougett ([1816] 2 Price 381, 392). By a Customs Act of 1873 (53 Geo. 3, c.33) a duty was imposed upon hides of 9s. 4d., but the Act omitted to state that it was to be 9s. 4d. per cwt., and to remedy this omission another Customs Act (53 Geo. 3, c. 105) was passed later in the same year. Between the passing of these two Acts some hides were exported, and it was contended that they were not liable to pay the duty of 9s. 4d. per cwt., but Thomson C.B., in giving judgment for the Attorney General, said" "The duty in this instance was in fact imposed by the first Act, but the gross mistake of the omission of the weight for which the sum expressed was to have been payable occasioned the amendment made by the subsequent Act, but that had reference to the former statute as soon as it passed, and they must be taken together as if they were one and the same Act." (p.395).” 51. Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Government of India & Ors. Vrs. Indian Tobacco Association reported in (2005) 7 SCC 396 wherein the question fell for consideration was as to what would be the effect of subsequent notification substituting the list of places specified in the original notification. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment has observed at Paragraph-15 and 16 which reads hereunder as:- “15. The word “substitute” ordinarily would mean “to put (one) in place of another”; or “to replace”. In Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., at p.1281, the word “substitute” has been defined to mean “to put in the place of another person or thing”, to “to exchange”. The word “substitute” ordinarily would mean “to put (one) in place of another”; or “to replace”. In Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., at p.1281, the word “substitute” has been defined to mean “to put in the place of another person or thing”, to “to exchange”. In Collins English Dictionary, the word “substitute” has been defined to mean “to serve or cause to serve in place of another person or thing”; “to replace (an atom or ground in a molecule) with (another atom or group)”; or “a person or thing that serves in place of another, such as a player in a game who takes the place of an injured colleague”. 16. By reason of the aforementioned amendment no substantive right has been taken away nor has any penal consequence has been imposed. Only an obvious mistake was sought to be removed thereby.” 52. Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shamro V. Parulekar & Ors. Vrs. District Magistrate Thana, Bombay & Ors. reported in AIR 1952 SC 324 , wherein at Paragraph-7 which reads as under:- “7. The construction of an Act which has been amended is now governed by technical rules and we must first be clear regarding the proper canons of construction. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed (except where that would lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all. This is the rule in England : see Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, page 207; it is the law in America: see Crawford on Statutory Construction, page 110; and it is the law which the Privy Council applied to India in 'KESHORAM PODDAR v. NUNDO LAL MALLICK' 54 Ind App 152 (PC) at p. 155. Bearing this in mind, it will be seen that the Act of 1950 remains the Act of 1950 all the way through even with its subsequent amendments. Bearing this in mind, it will be seen that the Act of 1950 remains the Act of 1950 all the way through even with its subsequent amendments. Therefore, the moment the Act of 1952 was passed and section 2 came into operation, the Act of 1950 meant the Act of 1950 as amended by section 2, that is to say, the Act of 1950 now due to expire on the 1stof October 1952.” 53. Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shyam Sundar & Anr. Vrs. Ram Kumar & Anr. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 24 , wherein the question fell for consideration was the effect of substituted Section 15 introduced by Haryana Amendment Act, 1995, in the Parent Act, i.e. the Punjab Pre-emption Act, as applicable to the State of Haryana whereby, the right of the co-sharer to pre-empt a sale had been taken away during the pendency of an appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court affirming the decree passed by the Trial Court in a pre-emption suit. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case considered the effect of substituted Section 15 introduced by Amendment Act, 1955 on the substantive rights of the parties and after considering the judgments rendered in the cases of Hitendra Vishno Thakur& Ors. Vrs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602 , Garikapati Veeraya Vrs. N. Subbiah Choudhary & Ors. reported in AIR 1957 SC 540 , Dayawati & Anr. Vrs. Inderjit & Ors. reported in AIR 1966 SC 1423 , K.S. Paripoornan Vrs. State of Kerala & Ors. reported in (1994) 5 SCC 593 . Judgment rendered in the case of Shyam Sundar & Anr. Vrs. Ram Kumar & Anr. (supra) wherein at Paragraph-28 observed reads as hereunder:- “28. From the aforesaid decisions the legal position that emerges is that when a repeal of an enactment is followed by a fresh legislation, such legislation does not affect the substantive rights of the parties on the date of the suit or adjudication of the suit unless such a legislation is retrospective and a court of appeal cannot take into consideration a new law brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered because the rights of the parties in an appeal are determined under the law in force on the date of the suit. However, the position in law would be different in the matters which relate to procedural law but so far as substantive rights of parties are concerned, they remain unaffected by the amendment in the enactment. We are, therefore, of the view that where a repeal of provisions of an enactment is followed by fresh legislation by an amending Act, such legislation is prospective in operation and does not affect substantive or vested rights of the parties unless made retrospective either expressly or by necessary intendment. We are further of the view that there is a presumption against the retrospective operation of a statute and further a statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary, but an amending Act which affects the procedure is presumed to be retrospective, unless the amending Act provides otherwise. We have carefully looked into the new substituted Section 15 brought in the parent Act by the Amendment Act, 1995 but do not find it either expressly or by necessary implication retrospective in operation which may affect the rights of the parties on the date of adjudication of the suit and the same is required to be taken into consideration by the appellate court. In Shanti Devi v. Hukum Chand this Court had occasion to interpret the substituted Section 15 with which we are concerned and held that on a plain reading of Section 15, it is clear that it has been introduced prospectively and there is no question of such section affecting in any manner the judgment and decree passed in the suit for pre-emption affirmed by the High Court in the second appeal. We are respectfully in agreement with the view expressed in the said decision and hold that the substituted Section 15 in the absence of anything in it to show that it is retrospective, does not affect the right of the parties which accrued to them on the date of the suit or on the date of passing of the decree by the court of first instance. We are also of the view that the present appeals are unaffected by change in law insofar it related to determination of the substantive rights of the parties and the same are required to be decided in the light of the law of pre-emption as it existed on the date of passing of the decree.” 54. We are also of the view that the present appeals are unaffected by change in law insofar it related to determination of the substantive rights of the parties and the same are required to be decided in the light of the law of pre-emption as it existed on the date of passing of the decree.” 54. It is in this backdrop, this Court has proceeded to examine the issue thus there is clear cut distinction in an amendment by way of repealment of the act and amendment by way of substitution while in a case of repealment, the earlier act will said to be superseded from the new amended act subject to saving clause while on the other hand the amendment by way of substitution will not be said to be repealment of an act rather it would be replacement of the particular amendment which relates back from the date of the enactment of the principal Act. 55. The facts in hand is that the sub-section (9) to Section 14 of the principal Act of the year 1935, the term of society is three years but by virtue of 97th Amendment by which the Article 243-ZT has been inserted in the constitution which makes the terms of three years to five years and the same has mandated that all the concerning law in this regard is to be amended by the respective States within a period of one year i.e. by 12.01.2013 and if not amended, the act prevailing under the State will become inconsistent/redundant, meaning thereby, after 12.01.2013 the effect of the terms of the society of three years as provided in the principal act under sub-section (9) to Section 14 would automatically will be five years in place of three years. 56. 56. However, the State of Jharkhand subsequent to the said amendment has come out with the Amendment Act, 21 of 2015 whereby and whereunder the sub-section (9) to Section 14 has been amended by way of “substitution”, therefore, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered hereinabove the meaning of word “substitution” would be that the original provision contained under the statute would be replaced in view of the ordinary meaning of substitute which mean to put in place of another, or to replace, therefore even on account of the Act, 21 of 2001 of the State of Jharkhand the term of the society would be substituted from the period of three years to five years. 57. The impugned order has been considered in the light of the aforesaid factual aspect based upon the legal position wherefrom it is evident that the election has been directed to be conducted immediately after expiry of the term of three years but in view of the mandate of Article 243-ZT of the Constitution of India read with Amended Act of Jharkhand21 of 2015 the direction for conducting the election after expiry of term of three years would be held to be contrary to the constitutional mandate as also the Co-operative Societies Act, 1935, therefore, this Court is of the view that the direction passed by the authority in conducting the election after three years will be held to be illegal and as such not sustainable in the eye of law rather in view of the act that the period of three years will automatically be substituted to that the period of five years. 58. The second question which has also needs to be considered as per the argument advanced on behalf of the newly added respondent that the Article 243-ZJ speaks about number and term of members of the boards and office bearers which stipulates that there should be adequate representation of female, members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes since in the society which has been elected in the year 2014 is having no proper representation said to have in terms of the constitutional provision incorporated by virtue of inserting Article 243-ZJ. 59. 59. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in response, has submitted that the question of adequate representation is internal matter of the society and as such the same can be raised by the newly impleaded respondents before the appropriate authority. 60. This Court, after appreciating their arguments advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties, is of the view that if the petitioner is relying upon an instrument the same is to be relied upon in its entirety. It is not permissible to the parties to approbate and reprobate, meaning thereby, so far as the instrument is in favour of the person it will be accepted and the other part which is adverse to the interest of the said parties will not be followed. 61. The said aspect of the matter fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of R.N. Gosain Vrs. Yashpal Dhirreported in (1992) 4 SCC 683 , wherein it has been laid down which reads hereunder as:- “By furnishing the said undertaking the petitioner elected to avail the protection from election from the premises and he enjoyed the said protection till the pass of the order by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on March 26, 1992, staying dispossession of the petitioner, having done so, the petitioner cannot permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and assail the said judgment of the High Court. Learned judges found support to the said view from the three conditions of this Court rendered by two members Bench in the cases of Vidhi Shanker Vrs. Heera Lal reported in (1987) Supp1 SCC 200, Ramchandra Jai Ram Randive Vrs. Chandanmal Rupchand reported in (1987) Supp1 SCC 254 and Thacker Hariram Motiram Vrs. Learned judges found support to the said view from the three conditions of this Court rendered by two members Bench in the cases of Vidhi Shanker Vrs. Heera Lal reported in (1987) Supp1 SCC 200, Ramchandra Jai Ram Randive Vrs. Chandanmal Rupchand reported in (1987) Supp1 SCC 254 and Thacker Hariram Motiram Vrs. Balkrishan Chatrabhu Thacker reported in (1989) Supp2 SCC 655, in all decisions it has been held that it would not be proper after such an undertaking was given in the High Court and time was taken on the basis of such undertaking with the finding made by the High Court and relying on those decisions it has been held by the two judges Bench in the case of R.N. Gosain (supra), has observed thus, “law does not permit a person to file both approbate and reprobate this principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtained some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn around and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage.” 62. This Court keeping the aforesaid position of law and considering the constitutional mandate as mandated and inserted by way of the constitutional amendment as contained under Article 243-ZJ and taking the same into consideration alongwith amendment made by way of substitution in sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, 6 of 1935 is of the view that the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, 1935 being reproduced hereunder as:- Amendment in Sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act 6 of 1935—Sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Jharkhand Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 shall be substituted by the following, namely:- “The management of registered society shall be vested in a managing committee constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act and rules/Bye laws of the society made under this Act. Provided that the maximum number of directors of a cooperative society shall not exceed twenty-one; Provided that at least 50 per cent of managing board shall be reserved for the women members. Provided that the maximum number of directors of a cooperative society shall not exceed twenty-one; Provided that at least 50 per cent of managing board shall be reserved for the women members. Out of which two seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes Women in the board of every Co-operative Society consisting of individuals as members and having members from such class or category of persons. The seats so reserved shall be filed up from amongst the members of scheduled castes or scheduled tribes women members either by election or/and by co-option. This provision shall apply to all societies from the primary society and up to the Apex society. Provided further that such reservation is primary society and up to the Apex society shall be governed by the rules made under this Act for this purpose.” 63. That the meaning of amendment by way of substitution as has been discussed while answering the issue pertaining to the term of the society that the provision of reservation made for members will be said to have its effect from the date when the principal Act of 1935 was enacted, meaning thereby, if there would be a society, the 50 per cent of the managing board are to be reserved for the women members out of which two seats would be reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Women in the light of the said constitutional mandated read with the amendment made under sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Principal Act, 1935 incorporated by virtue of the Jharkhand Act, 21 of 2015 the same is to be complied with otherwise if the society will be allowed to run, contrary to the constitutional mandate under Article 243-ZJ read with the amended provision of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, 1935 by way of substitution the society will be said to not in consonance with the constitutional mandate and the statutory provision. 64. 64. As such, this Court is of the view that while answering the issue pertaining to term of the society which deem to have been extended three to five years but simultaneously it is to be seen by the competent authority under the Society Registration Act, to look into the representation of the reserved category as per the provision of Article 243-ZJ read with amended provision of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, 1935. 65. Therefore, the Registrar Co-operative Society being the competent authority under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 is directed to look into this aspect of the matter and ensure compliance of the aforesaid constitutional mandate as contained under Article 234-ZJ vis-a-vis the statutory provision as referred hereinabove. 66. It is made clear that if the society in question is not in terms of the provision of Article 243-ZJ read with amended provision of sub-section (2) to Section 14 of the Act, 1935, appropriate steps shall be taken by the Registrar, Co-operative Society, respondent No.3 within period of four months from the date of receipt of the order by taking appropriate decision/action in this regard in accordance with law and ensure that the Co-operative Society may run in accordance with the constitutional mandate. W.P.(C). No.1569 of 2019 67. In this writ petitioner, the petitioner who is the newly impleaded respondent in W.P.(C). No.2133 of 2018 has questioned the propriety of the order dated 12.03.2019 issued by the Registrar, Cooperative Society, Jharkhand Ranchi, by which, the order of stay in operation of the bank account passed by Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Society vide letter No.176 dated 18.04.2018 has been vacated. 68. This Court while dealing with the issues in W.P.(C) No.2133 of 2018 as above, since has declined to interfere with the order passed by the authority for conducting an election and when it was questioned by the writ petitioner of W.P.(C). No.2133 of 2018 this Court has passed an interim order on 08.05.2018 by staying the impugned order as contained in Memo No.149 dated 05.04.2018 issued by the Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Society, Dhanbad which was the subject matter of W.P.(C). No.2133 of 2018 as has been quashed, since this Court, has passed an order by quashing the impugned order in W.P.(C). No.2133 of 2018 this Court has passed an interim order on 08.05.2018 by staying the impugned order as contained in Memo No.149 dated 05.04.2018 issued by the Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Society, Dhanbad which was the subject matter of W.P.(C). No.2133 of 2018 as has been quashed, since this Court, has passed an order by quashing the impugned order in W.P.(C). No. 2133 of 2018, meaning thereby, the term of the society would be operative period for the Co-operative five years from 01.11.2015 and therefore, if the financial power will be allowed to be kept in abeyance the administration of the society will ultimately suffer but simultaneously it also needs to be seen herein that at the garb of operating the bank account of the society, nobody would be allowed to commit irregularity, more particularly financial in nature 69. As such this Court without interfering with the impugned order dated 12.03.2019 hereby leaving it open for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.1569 of 2019 that in case of any financial irregularity the same would be complained before the Registrar, Cooperative Society, Jharkhand Ranchi, in such exigency the Registrar would conduct an enquiry and take appropriate decision/action in accordance with law. 70. It goes without saying that the exercise of financial power would ultimately depend upon the decision to be taken by the Registrar, Co-operative Society while assessing the question of reservation of the members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes category as directed above. 71. Both the writ petitions are accordingly, disposed of. 72. Interim order, if any, shall stand vacated. 73. Pending Interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand dispose of.