JUDGMENT : Sandeep Mehta, J. 1. The instant special appeal (writ) has been preferred by the appellant Heem Singh being aggrieved of the judgment dated 01.02.2018 passed by learned Single Bench of this court, whereby, the Writ Petition No. 521/2009 preferred by the petitioner craving the following relief was rejected:- "(A) That, the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 11th Dec. 2003 and affirmed by Appellate and Reviewing Authority dated 17.06.2005 and 29th Aug., 2008 respectively (Annex. 8, 10, 12) whereby punishment of dismissal from service has been inflicted may kindly be quashed and set-aside." 2. Mr. R.S. Saluja, learned counsel representing the appellant writ petitioner, vehemently and fervently urged that the impugned judgment rendered by learned Single Bench is perverse on facts as well as in law because the impugned orders and material available on record were not considered by learned Single Bench in the correct perspective. The departmental enquiry instituted against the appellant was not carried out with strict adherence to the mandatory procedure prescribed in law. The contention of Mr. Saluja for assailing the impugned orders was that the disciplinary authority and so also the appellate authority have not passed speaking orders while imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal from service against the appellant. 3. In this regard he drew the court's attention to the order dated 11.12.2003 (Annex. 8) passed by the disciplinary authority and urged that the charge No. 3, which was the principal charge against the appellant, was based on the evidence of witnesses Jodh Singh (P.W. 1), Devi Singh (P.W. 2), Shankar Singh (P.W. 3) and Hamer Singh (P.W. 4). He referred to the statements of these witnesses and urged that even if the same are considered as being true on the face of the record, manifestly, no inference can be drawn therefrom that the accused appellant murdered the deceased Bhanwar Singh by running his tractor over him or that he conspired to have Bhanwar Singh murdered. He urged that while passing the impugned order dated 11.12.2003 (Annex. 8), the disciplinary authority not only misread the examination-in-chief of the witnesses, but also failed to even barely advert to the cross-examination conducted from them on behalf of the delinquent employee. He urged that while passing the impugned order dated 11.12.2003 (Annex. 8), the disciplinary authority not only misread the examination-in-chief of the witnesses, but also failed to even barely advert to the cross-examination conducted from them on behalf of the delinquent employee. He urged that the consideration of evidence as done by the disciplinary authority without adverting to the cross-examination conducted from the witnesses is absolutely perverse and is reflective of gross non-application of mind and amounts to a blatant violation of principles of natural justice and fairness as well as Rules 16(6), (7), (8), (9) and 11(A) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958. He further submitted that the appellate authority while passing the order dated 17.06.2005 (Annex. 10) and affirming the order of the disciplinary authority, fell into the same error and did not even barely advert to the evidence led by the department and more particularly, the cross-examination conducted on behalf of the delinquent employee and mechanically dismissed his appeal. As per him, the learned Single Bench too without considering these pertinent submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant, affirmed these grossly illegal orders and unjustly dismissed the writ petition by the impugned order dated 01.02.2018, which as per Mr. Saluja is totally laconic and perverse. He, thus, implored the court to accept the appeal and set aside the impugned orders/judgment. 4. Per contra, Mr. Manish Vyas, learned Additional Advocate General, representing the respondents, vehemently and fervently opposed the submissions advanced by Mr. Saluja and contended that the delinquent was charged for the murder of Bhanwar Singh and that the witness Jodh Singh has given positive evidence to bring home this charge. As per him, the standard of proof required in a disciplinary enquiry cannot be equated with the standard of proof required to bring home the charge in a criminal case. He further submitted that mere acquittal of the delinquent in the corresponding criminal case cannot entitle him to seek exoneration in the disciplinary enquiry, more particularly, where the acquittal is recorded by giving benefit of doubt. He, thus, urged that the impugned judgment is perfectly justifiable and implored the court to dismiss the appeal. 5. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at bar and gone through the material available on record. 6. He, thus, urged that the impugned judgment is perfectly justifiable and implored the court to dismiss the appeal. 5. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at bar and gone through the material available on record. 6. The language of the principal charge No. 3, which was imputed to the appellant herein in the disciplinary enquiry is reproduced herein for the sake of ready reference. ^^3- ;g fd vkius vius fuokl LFkku ij fnukad 15-8-2002 dks vodk'k ds nkSjku Jh Hkaojflag iq= pUnuflag jktiwr fuoklh jkoksa dh xqMyh tks fd ihŒMCY;wŒMhŒ foHkkx ukFk}kjk esa yksdj gh viuh M~;wVh ij tk jgk Fkk fd vkids o Hkaojflag ds chp tehu laca/kh fookn gksus ls vkius vius lkFkh yksds'k] bZdcky dh lgk;rk ls Hkaojflag dh gR;k djus dh n`f"V ls Hkhy cLrh dqaBok ds ogka thi dh VDdj ekjh] ftlls og fxj x;k vkSj gYyk djus ij ekj fn;k ftlls mldh ekSds ij gh e`R;q gks xbZA vki ,d vuq'kkflr foHkkx ds deZpkjh gks dkuwu dh tkudkjh j[krs gSa] vkius bl rjg dh xEHkhj vijk/k dkfjr fd;k gS] ftlls turk esa iqfyl dh Nfo /kwfey gqbZ gS] tks ÁkFkfed tkap ls Áekf.kr gSA** [Emphasis supplied] 7. The substratum of the charge is that the delinquent had collaborated with Lokesh and Iqbal and collided a jeep with Bhanwar Singh, due to which he fell down and thereby he was assaulted and killed at the spot. Admittedly, the sole eye witness, who was examined by the department to bring home this charge, was Jodh Singh (P.W. 1). We have minutely perused the statement of the said Jodh Singh. For the sake of ready reference, we think it proper to reproduce the same verbatim. Admittedly, the sole eye witness, who was examined by the department to bring home this charge, was Jodh Singh (P.W. 1). We have minutely perused the statement of the said Jodh Singh. For the sake of ready reference, we think it proper to reproduce the same verbatim. ^^fnukad 18-7-2003 Jh tks/kflag iq= :iflag th ifM;kj mez 58 lky is'kk bUtu feL=h fuoklh fe;kjke th dh Hkkxy xqMyk Fkkuk ukFk}kjk us tkap ij fy[kk;k fd eSa batu Bhd djus ds dke djrk gwaA batu Bhd djus ds fy;s dbZ ckj jkoksa dh xqMyh x;k gwaA gheflag nks"kh deZpkjh tks vkt mifLFkr gS] iqfyl esa dkfuŒ gS buds batu dks Hkh eSaus dbZ ckj Bhd fd;k gSA blfy, budks igpkurk gwaA nks rhu lky igys gheflag ljnkjx<+ ls ,d bUtu Øsu ysdj vk;k Fkk] ftldks eSaus jkoksa dh xqMyh tkdj jkeflag ds dq,a ij fQV dh Fkh ml oDr bZdcky [kka uke dk eqlyeku tks ljnkjx<+ dk gksuk crk jgk Fkk] oks Hkh ogha FkkA Øsu QhV djus ds nkSjku mlls ckrphr gqbZ blfy, mls igpkurk gwaA jkoksa dh xqMyh ds Hkaojflag dks Hkh eSa tkurk gwa tks gheflag ds dkdk yxrk FkkA Hkaojflag lkai dkVus ij >kMk Qqadk djrk Fkk o ihŒMCY;wŒMhŒ esa ukFkwflag }kjk esa ukSdjh djrk FkkA Hkaojflag ds ejus ds djhc 2 lky igys gheflag ds firk ukFkqflag dks Hkh lkai us dkV [kk;k FkkA Hkaojflag us ukFkqflag ds dksbZ >kM Qwad fd;k gks rks eq>s irk ugha gSA ukFkqflag dks lkai dkVus ds ckn 15&20 fnu mn;iqj HkrhZ j[kk FkkA vLirky ls NqV~Vh gksus ij ?kj ykus ds 23 fnu esa ukFkqflag dh e`R;q gks xbZA Hkaojflag dks ljnkjx<+ ds bZdcky uke ds eqlyeku us yksgs ds lfj;s ls esjs lkeus Hkhy cLrh uyk ds ikl Hkaojflag dks lkbZfdy ij tkrs gq, dks yksgs ds lfj;s ls flj esa pksV igqapk ekj fn;k FkkA ml jkst gheflag dks Hkh eSaus ml LFkku ls djhc 300 QhV ukFk}kjk dh rjQ tkrs gq, dks ns[kk Fkk oks eksVj lkbZfdy ij FkkA bZdcky us eq>s ns[k fy;k Fkk blfy, eq>s Hkh ekjus ds fy, lfj;k ysdj nkSM+k blfy, eSa Mj ds Hkkx x;kA ftl txg Hkaojflag dks ekjk Fkk ml txg ls djhc 300 QhV dh nwjh ij gheflag dk VªsDVj Hkh [kM+k Fkk] ml oDr dqaBok dh rjQ ls ,d thi rst xfr ls vkbZ Fkh exj eSaus mlds uacj ugha ns[ks oks ?kk;yksa dh rjQ tkus okys jkLrs dh rjQ fudy xbZ FkhA Hkaojflag dks bZdcky }kjk ekjrs gq, eSaus vka[kksa ls ns[kk gSA bZdcky o Hkaojflag ds dksbZ nq'euh gks rks eq>s irk ugha gSA eSaus ;g dHkh ugha lquk dh Hkaojflag dks bZdcky ds tfj;s gheflag us ejok;k gksA blds vykok eq>s vksj dqN ugha dguk gSA Øksl }kjk iSjksdkj gheflag dkfuŒ 642 1- Á'u%& bl ?kVuk ds 20 fnu ckn Hkh Árkiflag th ljiap lkŒ dks muds ?kj cqyk;k Fkk vkSj crk;k fd bZdcky ds lkFk gheflag o yksds'k dk uke Hkh xokg esa rqe fy[kk nsuk eSaus euk Hkh fd;k rks ljiap lkŒ us crk;k fd gheflag dk uke fy[kkuk gS blfy, iqfyl }kjk fy;s x;s c;kuksa esa eSaus muds uke crk;s FksA 2- ;g ckr lgh gS fd vkius bZdcky }kjk Hkaojflag dks ekjrs gq, ns[kk Fkk exj ml oDr ml ?kVuk esa gheflag ogka ekStwn ugha FkkA gka ;g lgh gSA 3- ;g ckr lgh gS fd Hkaojflag dks gheflag }kjk ekjus dh /kedh nsus dh ckr vki ugha tkurs gS \ gka ;g lgh gSA 4- ;g ckr lgh gS fd vki ml jkst ukFk}kjk ls ?kkVk Fkksfj;k tkus okys jksM ij dksVsyk ls xqMyk tk jgs Fks vkSj vkidks gheflag dqaBok ls ukFk}kjk dh rjQ eksVj lkbZfdy ls tkrk gqvk feyk FkkA ftl txg gheflag feyk mlls djhc 300 fQV vkxs tkus ij vkius Hkaojflag dks bZdcky }kjk ekjrs gq, ns[kk x;k Fkk \ gka ;g lgh gSA 5- ;g ckr lgh gS fd Øsu gheflag fdlls yk;k o fdlds fy;s yk;k bldh rqEgsa dksbZ tkudkjh ugha gS \ gka ;g lgh gS fd bldh eq>s tkudkjh ugha gSA 6- ;g ckr lgh gS fd xqMyh esa jkeflag uke dk dksbZ vkneh ugha jgrk gS \ gka ;g lgh gS exj eSaus c;kuksa esa ftl jkeflag dk ftØ fd;k gS og pq.Mkorksa dk xqM dqBok dk jgus okyk gS] ftldk dqvka ogha ij gS tgka eSus Øsu fQV dh FkhA 7- ;g ckr lgh gS fd bZdcky }kjk Hkaojflag dks ekjus ds ckn tks thi ogka ls fudyh Fkh oks lkbZfdy Hkaojflag dks dqpyrs gq, fudyh Fkh \ gka ;g lgh gS exj bZdcky mlh esa cSBdj x;k FkkA 8- ;g ckr lgh gS fd thi pykus okys dks vkius ugha igpkuk] u gh thi ds uacj ns[ks] u gh thi dks igpkuh dh oks fdldh Fkh \ gka ;g lgh gSA Øksl }kjk foHkkxh; iSjksdkj %& 1- ;g ckr lgh gS fd esjs iwoZ c;ku ,DlŒihŒ 1 esa , ls ch ikVZ esa fy[ks c;ku vkius i<+dj lquk;s gS oks esjs }kjk gh fy[kk;s x;s gS tks lgh gS exj bu c;kuksa esa Hkaojflag dks bZdcky }kjk ekjrs oDr gheflag }kjk /kDdk eqDdh djuk o ekSds ij gksus dh ckr xyr fy[kh gSA eSaus ,slk ugha fy[kk;k FkkA iqu% ftjg&uhy tks/kflag ifjgkjA** 8. It is clear from a perusal of the statement of this witness that even in his examination-in-chief, the witness categorically stated that Iqbal Musalman gave an iron rod blow to Bhanwar Singh near Bheel Basti while he was proceeding on a bicycle. He further alleged that on that day he saw Heem Singh travelling towards Nathdwara on a motorcycle and that he was at a distance of 300 feet from the place of incident. The tractor of Heem Singh was standing at a distance of 300 feet from where, Bhanwar Singh was assaulted. He later saw a Jeep speeding away, but could not identify its occupants. The witness was cross-examined on behalf of Heem Singh and in reply to the very first question, the witness answered that Pratap Singh, Sarpanch, called him to his house about 20 days after the incident and pressurized him to name Heem Singh and Lokesh as accused with Iqbal and thus, the witness named Heem Singh in his police statement. In answer to question No. 2, the witness admitted the emphatic suggestion of the delinquent that he saw only Iqbal assaulting Bhanwar Singh and that Heem Singh was not a participant in the incident. The third question which was put to the witness was that on the day of the incident, he saw Heem Singh going from Kunthwa to Nathdwara on his motorcycle and 300 feet ahead of this place, Heem Singh was seen killing Bhanwar Singh. The witness admitted this suggestion. 9. Apparently, even if the examination-in-chief of Jodh Singh is accepted to be true as such, while eschewing his cross-examination, not even the faintest of inference can be drawn therefrom that the appellant herein was in any manner or even remotely connected with the murder of Bhanwar Singh. Manifestly, the imputation made against the appellant in the charge was that he collaborated with Iqbal and Lokesh and murdered Bhanwar Singh by colliding a Jeep. Nonetheless, the department did not lead evidence of even a single witness so as to establish even by a preponderance of probability that the appellant conspired or collaborated with these two persons to murder Bhanwar Singh by collision with a Jeep. Rather, it is apparent that Jodh Singh was instigated by the Sarpanch of the village to falsely implicate the appellant herein for the alleged murder of Bhanwar Singh after more than 20 days. Rather, it is apparent that Jodh Singh was instigated by the Sarpanch of the village to falsely implicate the appellant herein for the alleged murder of Bhanwar Singh after more than 20 days. The remaining witnesses of the department, viz. P.W. 2 Devi Singh and P.W. 3 Shankar Singh did not utter even a single word against the appellant. P.W. 4 Hamer Singh stated in his evidence that Heem Singh's father was bitten by a snake. Bhanwar Singh performed some Jhada Phoonka for curing him, but he did not survive and passed away. At that time, Heem Singh hurled an insinuation in the presence of witness that he would kill Bhanwar Singh by crushing him under a tractor or a motorcycle. Apparently, the statement of this witness only gives rise to an inference that Heem Singh was annoyed with Bhanwar Singh and had threatened him at an earlier point of time. However, evidence of this witness cannot be considered relevant so as to implicate the appellant for the murder of Bhanwar Singh even by a preponderance of probability. The evidence of the remaining departmental witnesses, viz. Bhanwar Singh S/o. Kalu Singh (P.W. 5), Bhanwar Singh S/o. Amar Singh (P.W. 6), Rajesh Kumar (P.W. 7), Munishwar Mishra (P.W. 8), Nana Lal (P.W. 9) and Sudhir Joshi (P.W. 10), is totally formal in nature. Seen in light of the above findings, we are of the firm view that the conclusions drawn by the disciplinary authority in the impugned order that the department led evidence, which could be construed as establishing guilt of the appellant herein for the charge No. 3 by preponderance of probabilities is absolutely without foundation. As has been discussed above, Jodh Singh was instigated by the Sarpanch to name the appellant before the police in the incident involving murder of Bhanwar Singh. The evidence of Jodh Singh recorded during the disciplinary proceedings, even if accepted as such, is not sufficient to draw even a vague inference that the appellant was guilty of the charge No. 3. If his cross-examination is seen and considered, manifestly, a clear indication is elicited that the appellant herein was named falsely and upon the instigation of the Sarpanch. The evidence of the remaining witnesses, viz. Shankar Singh (P.W. 3), Hamer Singh (P.W. 4) and Nana Lal (P.W. 9) in no manner implicates the appellant for the murder of Bhanwar Singh. If his cross-examination is seen and considered, manifestly, a clear indication is elicited that the appellant herein was named falsely and upon the instigation of the Sarpanch. The evidence of the remaining witnesses, viz. Shankar Singh (P.W. 3), Hamer Singh (P.W. 4) and Nana Lal (P.W. 9) in no manner implicates the appellant for the murder of Bhanwar Singh. Thus, even if the factum of the acquittal of the appellant by the trial court by giving him the benefit of doubt is eschewed from consideration, we are of the firm view that the department failed to lead any worthwhile evidence whatsoever so as to bring home the charge of murder of Bhanwar Singh against the appellant by a preponderance of probability. The discussion of evidence made by the disciplinary authority in the impugned order dated 11.12.2003 (Annex. 8) is totally laconic and lackadaisical and fails to meet the standards of proof and appreciation of evidence required in disciplinary proceedings. Rule 16(6), (7), (8) and (9) of the Rules of 1958, which apply to enquiry at hand are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:- "(6)(a) Where the Government Servant has pleaded not guilty to the charges, at the commencement of the enquiry, the Inquiring Authority shall ask the Presenting Officer appearing on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority to submit the list of witnesses and documents within 10 days, who shall also simultaneously send a copy to the Government Servant. Delinquent Officer, within ten days of the receipt of the list of prosecution witness and documents, shall submit the list of documents required by him for his defence. The Inquiring Authority shall then summon the documents of both sides and ask the parties to admit or deny them. It shall then summon such evidence as is necessary, giving opportunity to the presenting officer for examination-in-chief and also to the Government Servant or his assisting officer, whosever may be present, for cross-examination. The Presenting Officer shall be entitled to re-examine the witness on any point on which they have been cross-examined but not on any new matter, without the leave of the Inquiring Authority, after the close of the prosecution evidence the Government Servant shall be called upon to submit the list of the witnesses within 10 days which he would like to produce in his defence. The Inquiring Authority after considering the relevancy of the witnesses and the documents shall summon only the relevant witnesses and the documents and record the evidence thereof, while giving opportunity of Examination-in-Chief and cross-examination/re-examination to the parties and then close the evidence. The Inquiring Authority shall consider the relevancy of the witnesses and the documents called for by both the parties and in case of his refusal to summon any witnesses or documents, he shall record the reason in writing. The Inquiring Authority may also put such questions to the witnesses of the parties, as it thinks fit, in the interest of justice. An opportunity for hearing the arguments shall be given to the parties. Note:-If the Government Servant applied orally or in writing for the supply of copies of the statement of witnesses mentioned in the list referred to in sub-rule (6)(a), the Inquiring Authority shall furnish him with such copies as early as possible and in any case not later than three days before the commencement of the examination of the witnesses on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority. (6)(a)(1). The evidence of any person which is of a formal character may be given by affidavit and may, subject to all just exception, be accepted in evidence in departmental proceedings. Where the enquiry officer thinks fir that the person should be summoned and examined personally, or if either party, namely the presenting officer or the delinquent officer insists on the personal attendance of the witness, arrangements should be made for the personal attendance of such witness. (6)(b) The enquiring Authority may, for good and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, recall witnesses for examination in part-heard cases being conducted by him. (6)(c) The Inquiring Authority shall give a notice within 10 days of the order or within such further time not exceeding 10 days as the Enquiring Authority may allow, for the discovery or production of any documents which are in the possession of Government but not mentioned in the list referred to in sub-rule (6)(a). Note:-The Government Servant shall indicate the relevance of the documents required by him to be discovered or produced by the Government. Note:-The Government Servant shall indicate the relevance of the documents required by him to be discovered or produced by the Government. The Inquiring Authority shall, on receipt of the notice for the discovery or production of documents, forward the same or copies thereof to the authority in whose custody or possession the documents are kept, with as requisition for the production of the document by such date as may be specified in such requisition: Provided that the Enquiring Authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, refuse to requisite such of the documents as are in its opinion, not relevant to the case. On receipt of the requisition, every authority having the custody or possession of the requisitioned documents shall produce the same before the Inquiry Authority: Provided that if the authority having the custody or possession of the requisitioned documents is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that the production of all or, any of such documents would be against the public interest or security of the State, it shall inform the Inquiring Authority accordingly and the Inquiring Authority shall, on being so informed, communicate the information to the Government Servant and withdraw the requisition made by it for the production or discovery of such documents. (6)(d) In case of joint departmental enquiry under rule 18 or in the case of enquiry under rule 16 of these rules, the Government Servant/s/fail/fails to appear without sufficient cause on the date fixed for the hearing of which he had the notice, the Inquiry Authority, may proceed with the enquiry in the absence of such Government Servant(s). (6)(A) If it shall appear necessary before the close of the case on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority, the Inquiring Authority may, in its discretion, allow the Presenting Officer to produce evidence not including in the list given to the Government Servant or may itself call for new evidence or re-call re-examine any witness and such case the Government Servant shall be entitled to have, if he demands it, a copy of the list of further evidence proposed to be produced and an adjournment of the Inquiry for three clear days before the production of such new evidence, exclusive of the days of adjournment and the day to which the inquiry is adjourned. The Inquiring Authority shall give the Government Servant an opportunity of inspecting such documents before they are taken on the record. The Inquiring Authority may also allow the Government Servant to produce new evidence, if it is of the opinion that production of such evidence is necessary in the interest of justice. Note:-New evidence shall not be permitted or called for or, any witness shall not be recalled to fill up any gap in the evidence. Such evidence may be called for only when there is an inherent lacuna or defect in the evidence which has been produces originally. (6)(B)(a) Where a Disciplinary Authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iii) of Rule 14, but not competent to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 14, has itself inquired into or caused to be inquired into the articles of any charge and that authority, having regarding to its own findings or having regard to its decision on any of the findings of any Inquiring Authority appointed by it, is of the opinion that the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 14 should be imposed on the Government Servant, that authority shall forward the records of the inquiry to such disciplinary authority as is competent to impose the last mentioned penalties. (b) The Disciplinary Authority to which the records are so forwarded may act on the evidence on the record or may, if it is of the opinion that further examination of any witnesses is necessary in the interest of justice, recall the witnesses and examine, cross-examine and re-examine the witness and may impose on the Government Servant such penalty as it may deem fit in accordance with rules. (7) At the conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiring Authority shall prepare a report of the inquiry, recording its findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefore. If in the opinion of such authority the proceedings of the inquiry establish charges different from those originally framed it may record findings on such charges provided that findings on such charges shall not be recorded unless the Government Servant has admitted the facts constituting them or has had an opportunity of defending himself against them. If in the opinion of such authority the proceedings of the inquiry establish charges different from those originally framed it may record findings on such charges provided that findings on such charges shall not be recorded unless the Government Servant has admitted the facts constituting them or has had an opportunity of defending himself against them. (8) The record of the inquiry shall include:- (i) the charges framed against the Government Servant and the statement of allegations furnished to him under sub-rule (2); (ii) his written statement of defence, if any; (iii) the oral evidence taken in the course of the enquiry; (iv) the documentary evidence considered in the course of the enquiry; (v) the orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and the Inquiring Authority in regard to inquiry; and (vi) a report setting out the findings on each charge and the reasons therefore. (9) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring Authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge. The Disciplinary Authority may while considering the report of the Enquiring Authority for just and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing remand the case for further/de-novo enquiry, in case it has reason to believe that the enquiry already conducted has been laconic in some respect or the other. 10. On a bare perusal of the above statutory provisions, it is clear that permitting cross-examination from the witnesses during the course of an enquiry for a proposed major penalty is a sacrosanct duty cast upon the disciplinary authority. While considering the proceedings of enquiry and before passing a final order, the disciplinary authority is under a mandate of law to consider the entire evidence led before it. Entire evidence, would unquestionably include the cross-examination conducted from the witnesses. However, while passing the impugned order (Annex. While considering the proceedings of enquiry and before passing a final order, the disciplinary authority is under a mandate of law to consider the entire evidence led before it. Entire evidence, would unquestionably include the cross-examination conducted from the witnesses. However, while passing the impugned order (Annex. 8) and considering the charge No. 3 against the appellant, the disciplinary authority held as below:- ^^mDr vkjksi ds ifjÁs{; esa iSjoh i{k dh vksj ls xokgku tks/kflag ihŒMCY;wŒ 1] nsohflag ihŒMCY;wŒ 2] 'kadjflag ihŒMCY;wŒ 3] gesjflag ihŒMCY;wŒ 4 ds dFku djk;s x;s gSa] ftuesa ls xokg Jh tks/kflag ihŒMCY;wŒ 1 us vius dFkuksa esa oDr ?kVuk vkjksfir dkfuŒ dh ?kVuk LFky ds ikl Lo;a o VªsDVj gksus dh iqf"V dh gSA blh Ádkj xokg 'kadjflag ihŒMCY;wŒ 3 us ?kVuk LFky ds vklikl ?kVuk ls vk/kk ikSu ?k.Vk igys vkjksfir dkfuŒ dk pDdj yxkuk o oDr ?kVuk VªsDVj iMk gksuk ns[kuk crk;kA blh rjg xokg Jh gesjflag ihŒMCY;wŒ 4 us vkjksfir dkfuŒ o e`rd Hkaojflag ds chp iqjkuh jaft'k gksuk o vkjksfir dkfuŒ ds firk dh e`R;q ls iwoZ xokg ds tfj;s Hkaojflag dks ;g dgyokuk dh eSa mls thi ;k eksVj lkbZfdy dh VªsDdj nsdj ekj Mkywaxk crk;k gS vkSj blh rjg dh ?kVuk dkfjr gqbZ gSA blh Ádkj xokg Jh ukukyky Fkkukf/kdkjh [keukSj ihŒMCY;wŒ 9 us Hkh vius dFkuksa esa vuqla/kku ls vkjksfir dkfuŒ ds fo:) tqeZ Áekf.kr gksus ij mls fxjrkj djuk o ?kVuk eas Á;ksx esa yk;s x;s yksgs dk lfj;k] thi] VªsDVj dks tCr djuk crk;k gSA bl Ádkj mijksDr leLr foospu ls vkjksfir dkfuŒ ds fo:) mDr vkjksi iw.kZr;k Áekf.kr gksrk gSA vkjksfir dkfuŒ us mDr vkjksi ds cpko esa ekuuh; vij ls'ku U;k;ky; ukFk}kjk ds mDr ?kVuksa ls lacaf/kr Ádj.k esa tkjh fu.kZ; vkns'k dh Áfr is'k dh gS] ftldk voyksdu djus ls ik;k tkrk gS fd ekuuh; U;k;ky; }kjk mDr dkfuŒ dks iw.kZ :i ls nks"keqDr ugha fd;k gS cfYd lansgksa dk ykHk nsrs gq, nks"keqDr fd;k gSA blls Li"V gS fd U;k;ky; }kjk Hkh vkjksfir dkfuŒ dks Lora= :i ls nks"keqDr ugha fd;k x;k gSA vr% eSa mDr vkjksi dks iw.kZr;k Áekf.kr ekurk gwa ftlds dkj.k iqfyl dh Nfo /kwfey gqbZ gSA** 11. Manifestly, this finding is on the face of the record perverse, arbitrary and was arrived at by gross misreading of the testimony of the witnesses concerned. Manifestly, this finding is on the face of the record perverse, arbitrary and was arrived at by gross misreading of the testimony of the witnesses concerned. The enquiry officer acted without any foundation and conjecturally concluded that the accused was seen near the place of the incident with his tractor coinciding with the time of the incident. However, this finding is perverse because the charge against the appellant is not to this effect. Furthermore, the witness simply stated that he saw the accused going on his motorcycle at a distance of about 300 feet from the place of the incident and his tractor was lying there. Merely by this aspersion, no inference whatsoever can be drawn that the accused was a collaborator in the assault made upon Bhanwar Singh. Even a layman would not be in a position to draw such an inference by sheer preponderance on the basis of such flimsy evidence. Furthermore, a perusal of the above portion of the findings in the enquiry report clearly reflects that the cross-examination conducted from Jodh Singh was totally ignored by the enquiry officer while drawing the inference of culpability against the accused appellant and rather, it is manifest that cross-examination conducted from the witness was not even referred to by the disciplinary authority while recording its findings. The finding recorded in this very paragraph that Nana Lal, Investigating Officer, stated that the offending tractor, jeep and the iron sariya used in the incident were recovered from/at the instance of the appellant herein, is also perverse because the exact words spoken by Nana Lal in this regard are to the contrary. The relevant portion of the statement is reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready reference:- ^^eqYtheku dh ikbZ lwpuk /kkjk 27 lk{; vf/kfu;e ds vuqlkj thi o VsªDVj e; Vªksyh rFkk yksgs dk lfj;k cjken fd;s x;sA eqYtheku dh fu'kkunsgh ls ?kVuk LFky dh rkjhQ dh xbZA** 12. Manifestly, Nana Lal just gave a vague statement that recovery of these offending articles/vehicles was made at the instance of the accused. There were 3 accused in this case and thus, by no stretch of imagination, can it be inferred that these recoveries were made from or at the instance of the delinquent Constable, i.e. the appellant herein. Manifestly, Nana Lal just gave a vague statement that recovery of these offending articles/vehicles was made at the instance of the accused. There were 3 accused in this case and thus, by no stretch of imagination, can it be inferred that these recoveries were made from or at the instance of the delinquent Constable, i.e. the appellant herein. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the disciplinary authority's order dated 11.12.2003 is absolutely illegal, laconic and lackadaisical and was passed with total non-application of mind to the relevant facts. The appellate authority too, erred while concurring with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority without independent application of mind to the facts of the case and passed the appellate order dated 17.06.2005 (Annex. 10) without any foundation in the eyes of law. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the standards of appreciation of evidence in a disciplinary enquiry vis-a-vis a criminal case. In the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr., (1999) 3 SCC 679 , Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "13. As we shall presently see, there is a consensus of judicial opinion amongst the High Courts whose decisions we do not intend to refer in this case, and the various pronouncements of this Court, which shall be copiously referred to, on the basic principle that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings can proceed simultaneously with a little exception. As we understand, the basis for this proposition is that proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the factors operating in the mind of the Disciplinary Authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in the those proceedings is also different than that required in a criminal case. While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubts. While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubts. The little exception may be where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common without there being a variance." 14. In the case of Anil Kumar Vs. Presiding Officer and Ors. : (1985) 3 SCC 378 ], Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- 5. We have extracted the charges framed against the appellant. We have also pointed out in clear terms the report of the Enquiry Officer. It is well-settled that a disciplinary enquiry has to be a quasi-judicial enquiry held according to the principles of natural justice and the Enquiry Officer has a duty to act judicially. The Enquiry Officer did not apply his mind to the evidence. Save setting out the names of the witnesses, he did not discuss the evidence. He merely recorded his ipse dixit that the charges are proved. He did not assign a single reason why the evidence produced by the appellant did not appeal to him or was considered not credit-worthy. He did not permit a peep into his mind as to why the evidence produced by the management appealed to him in preference to the evidence produced by the appellant. An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the Enquiry Officer. It has to be a speaking order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. This is too well-settled to be supported by a precedent. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India : [1966] 1 SCR 466, this Court observed that a speaking order will at best be a reasonable and at its worst be atleast a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. Similarly in Mahabir Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh: [1971] 1 SCR 201, this Court reiterated that satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that appealed to the authority. It should all the more be so where the quasi-judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of livelihood or attach a stigma to the character. It should all the more be so where the quasi-judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of livelihood or attach a stigma to the character. In this case the enquiry report is an order sheet which merely produces the stage through which the enquiry passed. It clearly disclosed a total non-application of mind and it is this report on which the General Manager acted in terminating the service of the appellant. There could not have been a gross case of non-application of mind and it is such an enquiry which has found favour with the Labour Court and the High Court." 15. In the case of Chhel Singh Vs. M.G.B. Gramin Bank, Pali & Ors. [ (2014) 13 SCC 166 ], Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- 7. The said orders of the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority were challenged by the Appellant before the High Court in Writ Petition No. 1702/1995. One of the grounds taken was that the entire inquiry stood vitiated having conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. The Inquiry Officer without having any justifiable reason disallowed the prayer of the Appellant to summon five important witnesses. The other ground was that the penalty imposed was disproportionate to the gravity of charges. 8. The learned Single Judge by judgment dated 31st March, 2009 allowed the writ petition, quashed the order of removal and directed the Respondent to reinstate the Appellant in service with all consequential benefits with following observation: In the instant case the reason given for not calling the witnesses named by the delinquent employee is absolutely vague and irrelevant. It does not and cannot appeal to the measures and standards of a quasi judicial inquiry that ultimately resulted into removal of the delinquent employee from service. The refusal to call defence witnesses in the manner existing in present case is apparent denial of reasonable opportunity to the charged employee for defending himself. A definite prejudice, therefore, is caused by not calling the witnesses named by the Petitioner without examining their relevance and ultimately holding him guilty for the charges in defence of which he indicated his desire to examine those witnesses. The Court also observed: In the instant matter the inquiry officer simply mentioned that the defence witnesses Kalyan Singh and Ganpat Singh are not trustworthy. No reason is given by the Inquiry Officer to disbelieve those persons. The Court also observed: In the instant matter the inquiry officer simply mentioned that the defence witnesses Kalyan Singh and Ganpat Singh are not trustworthy. No reason is given by the Inquiry Officer to disbelieve those persons. Pertinent to note here that Ganpat Singh as well as Kalyan Singh extensively narrated facts about serious ailment of the Petitioner. The Inquiry Officer while disbelieving those persons should have given definite reasons to justify his conclusion. Merely saying that the persons are not found trustworthy, is not at all sufficient. The basic principle is that every person coming forward as a witness in evidence states trust except proved otherwise, therefore, onus was upon the Inquiry Officer to establish by adequate discussion relating to conduct and character of Kalyan Singh and Ganpat Singh to disbelieve them or to say that they were not trustworthy. 16. In the case of Nand Kishore Prasad Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. [ (1978) 3 SCC 366 ], Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- 19. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, we may remind ourselves of the principles, in point, crystallised by judicial decisions. The first of these principles is that disciplinary proceedings before a domestic tribunal are of a quasi-judicial character; therefore, the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice is that the tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence, i.e. evidential material which with some degree of definiteness points to the guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him. Suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic inquiries. As pointed out by this Court in Union of India v. H.C. Goel : AIR 1964 SC 364 , "the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory rules." 17. As pointed out by this Court in Union of India v. H.C. Goel : AIR 1964 SC 364 , "the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory rules." 17. In view of the above discussion, we are of the firm opinion that the learned Single Bench of this court failed to appreciate the admitted facts and evidence available on record in the correct perspective while dismissing the writ petition of the appellant writ petitioner and the reasons assigned in the impugned order dated 01.02.2018 for affirming the findings of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority and for upholding the order of termination from service passed against the appellant are groundless and unsustainable. 18. As a result of the above discussion, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The impugned orders passed by the disciplinary authority dated 11.12.2003 (Annex. 8), the appellate authority dated 17.06.2005 (Annex. 10) and the learned Single Bench dated 01.02.2018 are hereby quashed and set aside. The appellant shall be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. However, he shall not be entitled to receive back-wages for the period he remained out of service. 19. The appeal is allowed in these terms. 20. No order as to costs.