JUDGMENT : B. Veerappa, J. 1. By consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing. 2. The petitioner filed the present writ petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 21.12.2016 in No. 19785/14040/16-17 passed by the first respondent as per Annexure "F" resuming the Site No. 206-A situated at II Phase, Harohalli Industrial Area. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that he is engaging in manufacture of automobile components with an intention to setup an Industrial Unit for the manufacture of automobile components in Bengaluru. He applied for allotment of land to the first respondent on 23.04.2011, the first respondent after considering the application of the petitioner has allotted 4004 square meters of land in Plot No. 206-A, Phase-II, Harohalli Industrial Area on 29.07.2011. On 23.02.2012, the first respondent issued "Confirmatory Letter of Allotment" after receipt of Rs. 60 Lakhs from the petitioner as tentative costs. Thereafter, on 09.04.2012, the first respondent handed over the allotted land to the possession of the petitioner. Subsequently, on 18.07.2012, the first respondent executed a registered lease- cum-sale agreement in favour of the petitioner. 4. The things stood thus, the first respondent issued a notice dated 21.07.2016 under Section 34(B)(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (KIAD Act for short) to the petitioner. The petitioner replied to the said notice by his reply dated 20.08.2016 and requested to grant six months time to implement the project. The first respondent without considering the reply and without following the procedure as contemplated has cancelled the allotment of land by passing an impugned order dated 21.12.2016. Hence, the present writ petition is filed. 5. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 filed statement of objections denying the averments made in the writ petition and contended that after issuing a notice to the petitioner under Section 34B(1) of KIAD Act, the petitioner has attended the hearing fixed by the authorities on 2.12.2016 and requested time to implement the project. After considering the entire material on record, the first respondent passed orders strictly in accordance with law and therefore sought for dismissal of the writ petition. 6. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties to the lis. 7. After considering the entire material on record, the first respondent passed orders strictly in accordance with law and therefore sought for dismissal of the writ petition. 6. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties to the lis. 7. Sri K.S. Ganesh, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned order passed by the first respondent resuming the land allotted to the petitioner is erroneous and contrary to the material on record cannot be sustained. He would further contend that the impugned order passed by the first respondent is an utter violation of the principles of natural justice. No show cause notice has been issued before passing the impugned order or given an opportunity of being heard the petitioner. He further contended that, the first respondent has not followed the procedure as contemplated under the provisions of Section 34B(2) of KIAD Act. Therefore, the same cannot be sustained. He would further contended that in the order sheet produced by the learned counsel for the respondents as per Annexure "R5" clearly depicts that, the case was called on 21.10.2016 and recorded as final orders could not be made ready and post the matter for hearing on 11.11.2016. On 11.11.2016, the case was not at all called; instead, the case was called on 2.12.2016. Therefore, it clearly indicates that the order sheet procedure adopted by the respondents is against the provisions of KIAD Act and in utter violation of principles of natural justice and it cannot be sustained. There is no compliance of the provision as contemplated under Section 34B(2) of the KIAD Act. Therefore, he sought to allow the writ petition. 8. Per contra, Sri B.B. Patil, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 - KIADB, while reiterating the statement of objections sought to justify the impugned order and vehemently contended that the Board issued notice under Section 34B(1) on 21.07.2016. Petitioner attended the hearing on 2.12.2016 before the respondents on the subject matter and infact he has requested time. Once the petitioner appeared before the respondents, he cannot turned around and submit that there was no notice or resumption or violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, he sought to dismiss the writ petition. 9. Petitioner attended the hearing on 2.12.2016 before the respondents on the subject matter and infact he has requested time. Once the petitioner appeared before the respondents, he cannot turned around and submit that there was no notice or resumption or violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, he sought to dismiss the writ petition. 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it is not in dispute that on the application dated 23.4.2011 filed by the petitioner, the first respondent allotted 4004 square meters of land in Plot No. 206-A, Phase II, Harohalli Industrial Area on 29.7.2011. Subsequently, issued "Confirmatory Letter of Allotment" after receipt of Rs. 60 Lakhs from the petitioner on 23.2.2012 and possession was also handed over to the petitioner on 9.4.2012. It is also not in dispute that the first respondent executed a registered lease-cum-sale agreement in favour of the petitioner. Subsequently, the first respondent issued notice under Section 34B(1) of KIAD Act, the same was replied by the petitioner on 20.8.2016 and requested six months time to implement the project. 10. It is the specific case of the petitioner that, before resumption, the first respondent has not followed the procedure as contemplated under Section 34B(2) of the KIAD Act, which reads as under: "(2) If the allottee fails to remedy the breaches within the time so stipulated, the Board shall serve a notice upon the allottee under intimation to such Bank or Financial Institutions to show cause within thirty days from the date of service of notice, why the possession of the premises or part thereof or residential tenement should not be resumed." 11. A careful perusal of the impugned order on resumption passed by the first respondent dated 21.12.2016, there is no reference for the compliance of provisions under Section 34B(2) of the KIAD Act. The order sheet produced along with the statement of objections by the respondents-KIADB clearly depicts in Annexure "R5" that, the case was called on 3.10.2016 and posted the matter to 21.10.2016. On 21.10.2016, the case was called and recorded that final orders could not be made ready and posted the matter for hearing on 11.11.2016. Unfortunately, there was no hearing on 11.11.2016. Even the order sheet does not depicts, what has happened on that day. But, very strangely, the matter was taken on 2.12.2016. Subsequently, the final order came to be passed on 21.12.2016. Unfortunately, there was no hearing on 11.11.2016. Even the order sheet does not depicts, what has happened on that day. But, very strangely, the matter was taken on 2.12.2016. Subsequently, the final order came to be passed on 21.12.2016. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the first respondent before passing the impugned order clearly indicates that they have not followed the procedure as contemplated under the provisions of Section 34B(2) of the KIAD Act. Before resumption, even though the petitioner appeared before the authorities, they have not followed the procedure as contemplated under the provisions of Section 34B(2) of the KIAD Act. In support of the same, no material is produced the Court. 12. In the absence of the material produced and reference made about the notice on resumption in the impugned order, the impugned order cannot be sustained. Even though, Sri B.B. Patil, learned counsel for the respondents sought to justify the action by relying upon the detailed statement of objections filed by them, the impugned order cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. 13. This Court in the case of P.K. Appanna vs. The Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board, Bangalore, 1996 SCC Online Kar 412, at paragraph No. 9, held as under:- "9. There is however a distinction between a notice in terms of Clause 4 and that demanded by the principles of natural justice. A notice in terms of contractual stipulation may be generous beyond the requirements of the doctrine, and would not entitle the party concerned to enforce it in the writ jurisdiction of this Court. A grievance based upon the non-adherance to any such stipulation may however be permissible in a civil action. What this Court is concerned with is to see whether the bare minimal requirement of a hearing and notice has been complied with by the authority. The requirement of any such hearing and notice does not necessarily extend to a 4 months notice as contemplated by Clause 4 of the lease-cum-sale agreement. No such shorter notice was also ever issued to the petitioner at any time after 31st of December, 1990 till the date the issue of the resumption order. The resumption order is in the circumstances on the face of it in violation of the principles of natural justice and hence unsustainable." 14. No such shorter notice was also ever issued to the petitioner at any time after 31st of December, 1990 till the date the issue of the resumption order. The resumption order is in the circumstances on the face of it in violation of the principles of natural justice and hence unsustainable." 14. For the reasons stated supra, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court is liable to be quashed. The matter requires for re-consideration after following the procedure strictly in accordance with law. 15. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 21.12.2016 in No. 19785/14040/16-17 passed by the first respondent as per Annexure "F" is hereby quashed. The matter is remanded to respondent No. 1 for re-consideration after following the procedure and providing an opportunity of being heard the petitioner and pass appropriate orders strictly in accordance with the provisions of the KIAD Act and in accordance with law. 16. In view of disposal of the main writ petition, I.A. No. 1/2017 for vacating stay does not survive for consideration and the same stands disposed of.