JUDGMENT : Prasanta Kumar Deka, J. 1. Heard Mr. N.N. Jha, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. M.K. Choudhury, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. N. Ahmed, learned counsel for the legal heirs of deceased respondent No. 2. 2. Order dated 20.05.2009 passed in Misc. (J) Case No. 90/2008 arising out of T.S. No. 157/2007 in the court of learned Civil Judge No. 2, Kamrup (M) is under challenge. The petitioners filed T.S. No. 157/2007 against the predecessor in interest of the respondent No. 1 and other respondents as defendants seeking for the following reliefs: "(a) a decree may be passed declaring that the plaintiff has right, title, interest over the suit land described in the Schedule-A herein-below. (b) a decree may be passed declaring that the sale deed described in the schedule B herein-below executed by the defendant Nos. 2 to 5 in favour of the defendant No. 1 being deed No. 1301/64 dated 27.02.64 cannot effect the right, title, interest and possession of the plaintiff and other heirs of Late Tahiran Nessa in the suit and the same is fraudulent and not binding upon the plaintiff. (c) a decree may be passed declaring that the judgment and decree dated 14.5.86 passed by the Asst. District Judge, No. 1 at Guwahati in Title Suit No. 21/74 and the judgment and decree dated 23.12.97 passed in Title Suit No. 312/96 by the Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.) No. 1 at Guwahati are void and not binding upon the plaintiff. (d) a decree may be passed for permanent injunction restraining the defendant No. 1 from executing the decree dated 23.12.97 passed in T.S. No. 312/96 by the Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.) No. 1 at Guwahati and from entering into the suit land evicting he plaintiff from the same. (e) a decree may be passed for issuance of decree/ order to the Sub-Registrar, Guwahati for cancellation of the sale deed described in Schedule-B herein-below executed by the defendant Nos. 2 to 5 in favour of the defendant No. 1. (f) a decree may be passed for all costs and incidentals of the suit. (g) a decree may be passed for any other relief or reliefs which are entitled to the plaintiff under the law and equity. And for this act of your kindness, the plaintiff as in duty bound shall ever pray." 3. The suit was filed on 21.06.2007. (f) a decree may be passed for all costs and incidentals of the suit. (g) a decree may be passed for any other relief or reliefs which are entitled to the plaintiff under the law and equity. And for this act of your kindness, the plaintiff as in duty bound shall ever pray." 3. The suit was filed on 21.06.2007. In the plaint the relevant paragraphs in order to decide this application is reproduced herein-below: "15. That the plaintiff states that on the basis of the judgment and decree dated 23.12.97 passed in Title Suit No. 312/96 by the Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.) No. 1 at Guwahati, the defendant No. 1 has filed a Title Execution being Title Execution Case No. 5/98 and the eviction process of the plaintiff from the suit land is going on and as such during the pendency of the suit the defendant No. 1 may be restrained from evicting the plaintiff from the suit land removing the houses standing thereon by staying the execution proceeding of Title Execution No. 5/98 pending in the court of Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.) No. 1 at Guwahati till disposal of the suit for which the plaintiff has filed a separate application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure with the plaint." 4. The respondent No. 1 filed the written statement during his lifetime. Therein the written statement the said deceased respondent No. 1 as the defendant No. 1 took the defence and pleaded the actual facts which are reproduced herein-below: "11. That the allegations in paragraph 5 of the plaint are wholly true and correct. It is true and correct that on 15-06 the bailiff of the court went to execute the decree in Title Execution No. 5 of 1998 for giving khas possession of the suit land defendant in Title Suit No. 312 of 1996 constructed the houses the pendency of appeal and the bailiff was entitled to demolish constructions while executing the decree for possession by incidental, ancillary and consequential power and there was wrong in it. In fact, the decree for khas possession was exe 04.07.2007 by demolishing the houses constructed during pendency of the appeal. In fact, the decree for khas possession was exe 04.07.2007 by demolishing the houses constructed during pendency of the appeal. If the plaintiff felt aggrieved by such acts of the officer of the court, his remedy is by an application under Order 21 Rules 99, 100 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 etc. and a separate suit is barred. 12. That there is no question of astonishment as alleged in paragraph 6 of the plaint as he was all along aware of filing Title Suit No. 21 of 1974 which was declared ex-parte on 14.05.1986 and the defendants there in filing application for setting aside the same and the consequent dismissal of the same. He also knew the filing Title Suit No. 108 of 1987 which was subsequently re-numbered as Title Suit 312/96 and all these allegations in this paragraph are nothing but a figment of imagination of the fertile brain of the plaintiff." 5. The petitioners filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC before the learned court below which was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 90/2008. Amongst various other amendments sought to be introduced, the petitioners through the said amendment application sought to introduce as follows: "15.That the plaintiff states that the decree dated 23.12.97 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.) No. 1 at Guwahati in Title Suit No. 312/96 is executed and the defendant No. 1 is put in possession of the suit land and the defendant No. 1 taking over possession of the suit land has been preparing to construct permanent structure over the suit land and if during the pendency of the suit the defendant No. 1 constructs permanent structure over the suit land, there will be multiplicity of the suits between the parties and the nature and character of the suit will be changed for which the defendant No. 1 is required to be injuncted restraining him from construction permanent structure over the suit land till disposal of the suit for which the plaintiff has filed a separate petition under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil procedure with the plaint. 11. 11. That the petitioner states that as the suit will be for recovery of khas possession and as such a prayer for a decree for recovery of khas possession evicting the opposite party No. 1 from the suit land demolishing the structure over the suit land may be added in the plaint and hence the following prayer may be inserted as prayer d(1) after the prayer (d) as follows: "d(1) A decree for recovery of khas possession may be passed evicting the defendant no. 1, his men, workers, agents, servants, employees, etc. from the suit land and demolishing the structure over the suit land and the vacant possession may be handed over to the plaintiff." 6. The deceased respondent No. 1 filed written objection raising the plea that the amendment sought for was not bona-fide rather it was mala-fide. Earlier T.S. No. 108/1987 subsequently renumbered as T.S. No. 312/1996 was pending for a period of 20 years between the defendant respondent No. 1 and the rest of the defendants in T.S. No. 157/2007. The petitioners who are in relation of the defendants in T.S. No. 312/1996 cannot be said to be unaware of the decree which is put under challenge in the said T.S. No. 157/2007. However, it is raised that the relief for recovery of possession as sought to be introduced cannot be granted against defendant respondent No. 1 because he is not a trespasser of the suit land but holding the possession under valid decree. If the amendment is allowed the nature of the suit will change. Accordingly, he sought for dismissal of the said amendment application. The learned court below vide impugned order dated 20.05.2009 dismissed the said amendment application. The learned court below came to the finding that if the petition is allowed it would change the nature of the suit. 7. The petitioners on 14.09.2014 filed the present revision petition thereby challenging the impugned order dated 20.05.2009 whereby the said amendment application of the petitioners was rejected. 8. Mr. Jha submits that the suit was for declaration of the decree passed in T.S. No. 312/1996 and for permanent injunction restraining execution of the said decree. 7. The petitioners on 14.09.2014 filed the present revision petition thereby challenging the impugned order dated 20.05.2009 whereby the said amendment application of the petitioners was rejected. 8. Mr. Jha submits that the suit was for declaration of the decree passed in T.S. No. 312/1996 and for permanent injunction restraining execution of the said decree. Accordingly after the execution of the said decree the petitioners were dispossessed and as such the amendment is very vital otherwise the suit will be hit U/s 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 inasmuch as even if the declaration is granted to the petitioners there will no consequential decree and as such said declaration would become infructuous. He submits that the suit is pending at the stage of framing of issues. There were changes of the conducting counsel on behalf of the petitioners in the suit and as such there was delay in filing the revision petition challenging the order dated 20.05.2009 in the year 2014. Mr. Jha submits that in an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India there is no time bar in preferring the said application and it is for satisfaction of this Hon'ble High Court that in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India must be satisfied whether there is any illegality or some jurisdictional error apparent on the face of the order and for that purpose this Court can invoke the said jurisdiction at any stage. In support of his contention Mr. Jha relies on Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and Others, (2003) 6 SCC 675 and Varun Pahwa vs. Mrs. Renu Choudhury, (2019) AIR SC 1186. 9. Mr. Choudhury on the other hand objected vehemently to the submissions of Mr. Jha. He raised the issue that there is apparent laches on the part of the petitioners in filing the revision petition. It cannot be accepted from the petitioners that the order passed in the year 2009 came to be challenged in the revision application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the year 2014 and that too without any explanation as to why there was delay in preferring the said revision petition. It is also argued that under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the High Court does not issue a writ of certiorari. It is also argued that under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the High Court does not issue a writ of certiorari. Article 227 of Constitution of India vest the High Court with a power of superintendence and to be exercised sparingly to keep the Tribunal and Court within the bounds of their jurisdiction. Such power is not exercised to correct mistake of fact and of law. In support of the said contention Mr. Choudhury relies on Radhey Shyam and Another vs. Chhabi Nath and Others, (2009) 5 SCC 616 . It is further submitted that the cause of action accrued to the petitioners in order to seek for the amendment is totally a separate cause of action which arose only after filing the suit. The said cause of action if allowed to be introduced by way of amendment wherein the relief is also sought to be changed would materially affect the nature of the suit which is one of the prime consideration while deciding the application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC. Supporting the finding of the court below while dismissing the application, Mr. Choudhury submits that even if there is a case for interference of this Court the same had to be restrained keeping in view the conduct of the petitioners inasmuch as there is no explanation as to the delay in preferring the revision petition. 10. I have given due consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel. I have perused the plaint of the petitioners wherein as referred hereinabove the plaintiff is aware of the fact about the pendency of the Title Execution Case No. 05/1998. It is also pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiff petitioner is not bound by the decree passed in T.S. No. 312/1996 as he was not made party to the aforesaid suit. The amendment petition was dismissed on 20.05.2009 and as mentioned hereinabove the revision petition was filed in the month of September, 2014 i.e. after about 5 years from the date of passing the impugned order. There is no explanation even a single line in the revision petition stating the reasons for the said delay in preferring the revision petition. The amendment petition was dismissed on 20.05.2009 and as mentioned hereinabove the revision petition was filed in the month of September, 2014 i.e. after about 5 years from the date of passing the impugned order. There is no explanation even a single line in the revision petition stating the reasons for the said delay in preferring the revision petition. It is true there is no specific time period for preferring an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India but even then a duty is cast upon the petitioners to explain as to why there was delay in filing the revision petition. This is in view of the doctrine of prejudice to the respondents which must be considered in the present factual matrix for which in my considered opinion the nature of the pleadings of the parties to the suit are also relevant. In Smt. Sudama Devi vs. Commissioner and Others, (1983) AIR SC 653 the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with the writ petition and question of limitation held as follows: "We are of the view that so far as writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is concerned, there can be no hard and fast rule of 90 days by way of period of limitation but the general rule of laches alone can be applied and this must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court has said in its order that "the writ petition was beyond time by 136 days. Neither the explanation of 136 days nor the explanation for filing it today, was given." This view does not appear to be correct because the High Court has proceeded on the assumption that there is a period of limitation of 90 days and unless sufficient cause is shown as contemplated U/s 5 of the Limitation Act, a writ petition filed after the expiration of 90 days is liable to be rejected. This assumption is wholly unjustified. There is no period of limitation prescribed by any law for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is in fact doubtful whether any such period of limitation can be prescribed by law. In any event, one thing is clear and beyond doubt, that no such period of limitation can be laid down either under rules made by the High Court or by practice. It is in fact doubtful whether any such period of limitation can be prescribed by law. In any event, one thing is clear and beyond doubt, that no such period of limitation can be laid down either under rules made by the High Court or by practice. In every case it would have to be decided on the facts and circumstances, whether the petitioner is guilty of laches and that would have to be done without taking into account any specific period as a period of limitation. There may be cases where even short delay may be fatal while there may be cases where even a long delay may not be evidence of laches on the part of the petitioner." 11. Though there is no prescribed time limit for challenging an order under Article 227 of the Constitution but there must be some explanation in that respect in order to overcome the laches when there is a delay of more than 4 (four) years. If there is no explanation then the court is bound to consider the submission of the respondent the issue of laches as projected and to be decided by the court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in a revision petition. In order to decide the issue it would be proper in my considered opinion to look into the pleadings of the parties. Because mala-fide against a party is also a ground in retarding the act of promptness by a party to get the relief in an appropriate court. 12. In the written objection against the amendment petition filed by the respondent No. 1 there was a specific plea that the amendments sought for were not bona-fide but mala-fide. The said amendment application was rejected. Had the petitioners were sincere and had bona-fide ground in seeking the amendment they ought to have filed the said revision petition instantly after the dismissal. There is no explanation to that effect why there was delay in preferring the revision petition. 13. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court the issue of laches must be decided on the fact and circumstance where the petitioner is guilty of laches and that would have to be done without taking into account any specific period as a period of limitation. 13. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court the issue of laches must be decided on the fact and circumstance where the petitioner is guilty of laches and that would have to be done without taking into account any specific period as a period of limitation. Applying the said principle and keeping in view the objection raised against the amendment application by the respondent No. 1 this Court while exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution has a duty cast on it to consider the issue of laches when the respondent raises such plea. The said plea must have its basis on the pleading before the learned trial court. The fact of laches must be examined on the basis of individual cases and in the present case in hand I found that the petitioners were not sincere in conducting the revision application and if this revision petition is entertained and allowed the same would cause prejudice to the respondents as there is a specific pleading in the written objection against the petition under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC before the court below that the intent was mala-fide in filing the same. The act of mala-fide is an action which emanates from the conduct of the party against whom the said plea is raised. It requires examination of the conduct of the party against whom the said allegation is levelled. Filing of the revision petition after long 5 (five) years from the date of passing the impugned order suggests about the mala-fide against the respondents and that too without any explanation as to causes thereof. This conduct restrains my conscience from entertaining this revision petition at this admission stage. Accordingly, I am constrained to dismiss this revision petition on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioners, however without entering into the merit of the findings of the court below.