JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. Since common questions of law and facts arise for consideration in these petitions, the same were taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner, Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) in C.R. No.75/2008 had acquired the land of the petitioners (landlords) in C.R. No. 60/2008 comprised in Khasra Nos. 126/2, 126/3, 126/4, 126/5, 126/6, 126/7, 126/11, 126/12, 126/16, situated at Station Ward Boileauganj, Shimla and Khasra No. 104, situated at Village Penjari, Tehsil and District Shimla, total measuring 6852.1 sq. yards for setting up Regional Station. 3. After completion of all codal formalities, award was passed by the Land Acquisition Collector on 27.4.1984. Aggrieved by the said award, the landowners preferred land reference before the learned District Judge, which was decided on 28.6.1989 by awarding compensation for the total land measuring 6852.1 sq. yards @ Rs. 110/- per sq. yard. Thereafter, both the parties, i.e. landlords and ICAR preferred appeals before this Court being RFA Nos. 103/1989 and 104/1989 respectively, which were decided by a common judgment, dated 12.11.1997. The appeal filed by the ICAR was dismissed, whereas the appeal filed by the landlords was allowed and the compensation was enhanced from Rs.110/- per sq. yard to Rs. 165/- sq. yard. 4. The ICAR deposited a sum of Rs. 11,60,120/- before the learned District Judge, Shimla on 27.10.1999 on account of enhanced amount of compensation, however the landowners did not admit the correctness of the amount so deposited and preferred the execution petition for the shortfall of the decretal amount before the said Court. 5. The learned District Judge vide impugned order dated 19.1.2008 held the land owners to be entitled to Rs.7,82,554/- from the ICAR drawing support from law laid down by the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunder Vs. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 211 and Gurpreet Singh vs. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 457. 6. Both the parties aggrieved by the said order have filed the instant petitions on the various grounds as taken in these petitions. However, the parties are ad idem that the moot question in this case is regarding date of applicability of the judgment in Sunder's case(supra). 7. Mr. 6. Both the parties aggrieved by the said order have filed the instant petitions on the various grounds as taken in these petitions. However, the parties are ad idem that the moot question in this case is regarding date of applicability of the judgment in Sunder's case(supra). 7. Mr. Raman Sethi, learned counsel for the landowners, would claim that the courts do not legislate and while laying down the law only reiterate what the law is, whereas Mr. Satyen Vaidya, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Vivek Sharma, Advocate, for the ICAR, would contend that it is from the date of judgment that the ratio laid down in Sunder's case would be applicable. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case carefully. 9. At the outset, it needs to be noticed that a reference on the same question regarding the date of applicability of the ratio laid down in Sunder's case was made to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No(s). 7034-7037/2015, titled as M/s Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. vs. The State of Kerala, decided on 14.11.2018, however the Three Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court did not answer the question and rather allowed the appeals in terms of law laid down in Sunder's case by holding the appellants therein to be entitled to interest on solatium as awarded by the reference court. It was further held that questions raised/referred to the larger Bench would be answered, if required, in an appropriate case. 10. Thus, what essentially follows is that the judgment in Sunder's case has to be applied in letter and spirit while determining the compensation. 11. It is more than settled that prospective declaration of law is a device innovated to avoid reopening of settled issues. However, there has to be no prospective over ruling unless it is so indicated in a particular judgment. 12. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax versus Smt. Aruna Luthra, (2001) 252 ITR 76 opined that a declaration by the Court is This was the law, this is the law. This is how the provisions have to be construed. The Court merely declares the law and earlier decision by the Court is "simply no law". This is how the provisions have to be construed. The Court merely declares the law and earlier decision by the Court is "simply no law". It shall be apposite to extract the relevant observations which read thus:- "A Court decides a dispute between the parties. The cause can involve decision on facts. It can also involve a decision on a point of law. Both may have bearing on the ultimate result of the case. When a court interprets a provision, it decides as to what is the meaning and effect of the words used by the Legislature. It is a declaration regarding the statute. In other words, the judgment declares as to what the Legislature had said at the time of the promulgation of the law. The declaration is-This was the law. This is the law. This is how the provision shall be construed. Julius Stone in Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (First Indian Reprint 1999) (Chapter XIV), while dealing with the subject of Judge and Administrator in Legal Ordering, observes as under: "If, then, a main impulse underlying the stare decisis doctrine is that justice should respect reasonable reliance of affected parties based on the law as it seemed when they acted, this impulse still has force when reliance is frustrated by an overruling. Despite this, it has long been assumed that a newly emergent rule is to be applied not only to future facts, and to the necessarily past facts of the very case in which it emerges, but to all cases thereafter litigated, even if these involved conduct, which occurred before the establishment of the new rule. This has proceeded ostensibly on the conceptual basis, clearly formulated since Blackstone, that the new holding does not create, but merely declares, law. So that any prior putative law under which the parties acted is to be regarded as simply not law". (emphasis supplied) The above observations clearly support the principle that the court merely declares law. An earlier decision as declared by the court is "simply no law". 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court could have directed the implementation of the judgment in Sunder's case (supra) prospectively and not retrospectively. However, I do not find any such direction contained in the said judgment. Even the reference that was made now stands rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd.'s case supra. 14. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court could have directed the implementation of the judgment in Sunder's case (supra) prospectively and not retrospectively. However, I do not find any such direction contained in the said judgment. Even the reference that was made now stands rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd.'s case supra. 14. In this view of the matter, C.R. No. 60/2008 filed by the landlords, which seeks strict implementation qua deposit of compensation amount in terms of Sunder and Gurpreet Singh cases, more particularly the interest on solatium w.e.f. 27.4.1985 till its payment is allowed and the ICAR is directed to deposit the amount in question strictly in accordance with Sunder's case before this Court within a period of 12 weeks from today, whereas C.R. No. 75/2008 filed by the ICAR taking exception to the applicability of Sunder and Gurpreet Singh cases to the instant case is hereby dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of. No order as to costs.