JUDGMENT : 1. This petition is directed against an order dated 15th March, 2014; whereby petitioner has been compulsory retired on the basis of disciplinary action initiated against him. 2. Facts, in brief, giving rise to filing of this petition are that petitioner was initially appointed as a Clerk in the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh in 1978. He continued to work as such and was ultimately promoted to the post of Section Officer in the year 2012. Charge was assigned to the petitioner to handle LIC and Old Age Pension claims of Advocates within the State of Uttar Pradesh. It appears that certain complaints were made with regard to performance of duties assigned to the petitioner, which led to a preliminary enquiry report being called for in the matter. Such a preliminary enquiry report appears to have been submitted on 2.4.2013. This preliminary enquiry report was then made the basis for issuance of a charge-sheet upon the petitioner on 12th May, 2013. Disciplinary proceedings, accordingly, were initiated against the petitioner. 3. Petitioner submitted a reply to the charge-sheet denying the allegations made against him in the charge-sheet. Interestingly, the respondents, on the date of service of the charge-sheet upon the petitioner i.e. 12th May, 2013 also issued a show cause notice to the petitioner calling for his explanation after observing that petitioner is liable to be dismissed from service. Thereafter no enquiry apparently was conducted, inasmuch as, no date, time or place was fixed for holding of enquiry. Ultimately, an enquiry report has been submitted against the petitioner on 7.7.2013. The enquiry report appears to be based upon the preliminary enquiry report as well as the charges levelled against the petitioner and the reply submitted to it. These materials have ultimately found the basis for passing of the order impugned dated 15th March, 2014. The order records that petitioner is being compulsory retired in exercise of powers under Fundamental Rule 56. The order impugned is assailed on following grounds :- (i) Punishment of compulsory retirement is not one of the punishments provided for in Rule 57 of the Uttar Pradesh Bar Council Employees Service Rules, 2004 and, therefore, a punishment not specified in the rules, could not have been inflicted upon the petitioner. In support of such contention, learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Vijay Singh Vs. In support of such contention, learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Vijay Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2012) 5 SCC 242 . (ii) It is urged that no disciplinary enquiry in the eyes of law was actually conducted in the matter, inasmuch as, only a preliminary enquiry report was submitted behind the back of the petitioner, whereafter a charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner and without fixing any date for conduct of enquiry and by denying the opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses etc., the order of punishment has been passed, which is violative of principles of natural justice and is otherwise inconsistent with the Rules of 2004. (iii) It is also submitted that the provisions of Fundamental Rule 56, which have been invoked by the Chairman, U.P. Bar Council, was not even applicable and that the then Chairman lacked basis understanding of law, as would be clearly reflected from his action, which is the subject matter of challenge in this petition. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed in which the averments made in the order impugned has been reiterated. An attempt is made to justify the action taken against the petitioner. 5. I have heard Sri S.P. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Amit Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh. 6. Adverting to the first ground urged in support of the petition, this Court finds that specific rules have been framed known as 'Uttar Pradesh Bar Council Employees Service Rules, 2004', in exercise of powers under Section 15(2K) of the Advocates Act, 1961, to regulate the service conditions of the employees of the Bar Council. Chapter IX provides for penalties, disciplinary proceedings and appeal penalties. The penalties which can be imposed upon an employee have been segregated into two distinct categories i.e. Minor Penalties and Major Penalties. Penalties which are permissible in the Rule 57, are reproduced hereinafter:- “57. Penalties :- The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon the employees of the Bar Council. The penalties which can be imposed upon an employee have been segregated into two distinct categories i.e. Minor Penalties and Major Penalties. Penalties which are permissible in the Rule 57, are reproduced hereinafter:- “57. Penalties :- The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon the employees of the Bar Council. (a) Minor Penalties:- (i) Censure; (ii) Withholding of increments for a specified period; (iii) Stoppage at an efficiency bar; (iv) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Bar Council by negligence or breach of orders; (v) Fine in case of persons holding Group 'D' posts; Provided that the amount of such fine shall in no case exceed twenty five percent of the months pay in which the fine is imposed. (b) Major Penalties:- (i) Withholding of increments with cumulative effect; (ii) Reduction to a lower post or grade or time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale; (iii) Removal from the service which does not disqualify from future employment; (iv) Dismissal from the service which disqualify from future employment.” 7. It is absolutely clear that compulsory retirement is not a punishment contemplated to be inflicted upon an erring employee in the applicable service rules. Law is otherwise settled that the employer cannot impose punishment upon an employee which is not contemplated in the applicable rules that regulate the service conditions of the employee concerned. Law in that regard has already been settled by the Apex Court in Vijay Singh (supra). Paragraphs 14 & 15 of the judgment in Vijay Singh would be apposite and are reproduced hereinafter:- “14. The issue involved herein is required to be examined from another angle also. Holding departmental proceedings and recording a finding of guilt against any delinquent and imposing the punishment for the same is a quasi-judicial function and not administrative one. (Vide: Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., AIR 1963 SC 395 ; Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 ; Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 539 ; and Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. & Ors. v. Ananta Saha & Ors., (2011) 5 SCC 142 ). 15. Imposing the punishment for a proved delinquency is regulated and controlled by the statutory rules. Yunus Khan v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 539 ; and Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. & Ors. v. Ananta Saha & Ors., (2011) 5 SCC 142 ). 15. Imposing the punishment for a proved delinquency is regulated and controlled by the statutory rules. Therefore, while performing the quasi-judicial functions, the authority is not permitted to ignore the statutory rules under which punishment is to be imposed. The disciplinary authority is bound to give strict adherence to the said rules. Thus, the order of punishment being outside the purview of the statutory rules is a nullity and cannot be enforced against the appellant.” 8. Once the punishment of compulsory retirement is not made permissible under the rules, the Bar Council as employer of the petitioner cannot be permitted to impose such a punishment. The imposition of punishment being in derogation of the statutory rules cannot be sustained. The order impugned is liable to be quashed on this ground alone. 9. Coming to the second ground urged on behalf of the petitioner, regarding failure on part of the employer to afford adequate opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself, it is observed that though a charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner on 12.5.2013, but no date, place and time thereafter was fixed for holding of enquiry. None of the witnesses were examined. No right of cross-examination was otherwise given to the petitioner. The enquiry officer could not have relied upon the findings returned in the preliminary enquiry report unless such report was duly exhibited in the enquiry and was substantiated by adducing supporting witnesses. No such procedure was otherwise followed. The enquiry proceedings, therefore, are found to be conducted in a manner which is wholly inconsistent with the principles of natural justice. It would also be worth noticing that the procedure for holding of disciplinary action, in respect of employee of Bar Council has otherwise been specified in Rule 58, which is reproduced hereinafter:- “58. The enquiry proceedings, therefore, are found to be conducted in a manner which is wholly inconsistent with the principles of natural justice. It would also be worth noticing that the procedure for holding of disciplinary action, in respect of employee of Bar Council has otherwise been specified in Rule 58, which is reproduced hereinafter:- “58. (1) Disciplinary Proceedings:- (a) The disciplinary proceedings against a member shall be conducted by the Inquiring Officer with due observance of the principles of natural justice for which it shall be necessary that- (i) The member shall be served with a charge-sheet duly approved by the Secretary containing specific charges and mention of evidence in support of each charge and he shall be required to submit explanation in respect of the charge within reasonable time which shall not be less than fifteen days; (ii) Such a member shall also be given an opportunity to produce at his own cost or to cross-examine witnesses in his defence and shall also be given an opportunity of being heard in person, if he so desires; (iii) If no explanation in respect of charge sheet is received or the explanation submitted is unsatisfactory the competent authority may award appropriate punishment considered necessary. (b) …. (i) Where a member is dismissed or removed from service on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) Where the member refuses or fails without sufficient cause to appear before the inquiring officer when specifically called upon in writing to appear; or (iii) Where a member has absconded and his where about are not known to authority for more than three months; or (iv) Where it is otherwise (for reasons to be recorded) not possible to communicate with him, the competent authority may award appropriate punishment without taking or continuing disciplinary proceedings; (c) Disciplinary proceedings shall be taken by the appointing authority against the member either suo moto or on a report made to this effect by an Inspecting Authority or the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the State Bar Council under whose control the member is working or may have worked. (d) The Inquiring Officer shall be appointed by the Executive Committee/Chairman/Vice-Chairman. Provided that the Officer at whose instance disciplinary action was started shall not be appointed as an inquiry officer nor shall the inquiring officer be the appellate authority.” 10. (d) The Inquiring Officer shall be appointed by the Executive Committee/Chairman/Vice-Chairman. Provided that the Officer at whose instance disciplinary action was started shall not be appointed as an inquiry officer nor shall the inquiring officer be the appellate authority.” 10. The procedure as is clearly contemplated in Rule 58(1)(a)(i), (ii) & (iii) have not at all been followed while conducting the enquiry against the petitioner. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, would be that the procedure followed for conduct of disciplinary action is violative of principles of natural justice, apart from it being inconsistent with the specific provisions of the service rules. The grievance of the petitioner with regard to non-observance of fair procedure in conduct of enquiry is, therefore, made out on record. 11. The last limb of petitioner's submission also merits consideration. Once the statutory rules have been framed to regulate the service conditions of the petitioner, it was not open for the Chairman of the Bar Council to have relied upon the provisions of the Fundamental Rule 56 for passing the order of compulsory retirement. The provisions of the Fundamental Rule would not be applicable in case of an employee of the Bar Council. The explanation submitted in the counter affidavit that reference to Rule 56 was due to inadvertent error, even if it is accepted, would clearly reveal that there was complete non application of mind on the part of the authority concerned in passing the order impugned. It is unfortunate that even elementary principles of law have been given a go by, by an authority, which is otherwise expected to be aware of such principles. Viewed from such aspects, this Court finds that the order impugned dated 15th March, 2014, passed by the Chairman is wholly arbitrary, illegal and, therefore, cannot withstand the test of judicial scrutiny. It is, accordingly, quashed. 12. Liberty stands reserved to the respondents to conduct an appropriate enquiry from the stage the proceedings of enquiry have gone bad, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Managing Director ECIL Hyderabad and others Vs. B. Karunakar and others, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . However, the petitioner would be reinstated in service for the purposes of holding of the enquiry. It would be open for the respondents to place the petitioner under suspension and for such purposes the petitioner would be paid subsistence allowances. B. Karunakar and others, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . However, the petitioner would be reinstated in service for the purposes of holding of the enquiry. It would be open for the respondents to place the petitioner under suspension and for such purposes the petitioner would be paid subsistence allowances. The question of back-wages and other service benefits would abide by the outcome of the fresh enquiry report, which would be submitted within a period of three months. 13. Moreover, considering the nature of allegations which have been made and also the fact that none of the charges relates to financial embezzlement and the petitioner is otherwise due to retire within a period of one month, it is left open for the Bar Council to take an appropriate decision, whether to initiate disciplinary action afresh or to drop the proceedings.