JUDGMENT 1. This second appeal has been filed by the defendantappellant under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against judgment and decree dated 24.11.2017 passed in First Appeal No. 25/2017 by learned First Additional District Judge to the Court of First Additional District Judge, Datia, reversing the judgment and decree dated 29.4.2017 passed in Civil Suit No. 157/16 passed by learned Fourth Civil Judge Class-II, Datia. 2. It is submitted that a civil suit was filed by the daughters of the present appellant-defendant, i.e., respondents No. 1 and 2 (plaintiffs), claiming 2/3 rd share in the property and a declaration that they be declared as owner and possessor of such property and resultantly the defendant be restrained through an order of permanent injunction from selling such agricultural land in favour of any third person. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that firstly the plaintiffs could not prove the suit property to be ancestral property of the present appellant, i.e., their father and secondly they being daughters were not having any share in such property of the appellant during his life time and, therefore, the learned Civil Judge had rightly held that the plaintiffs could not prove that it is a coparcenary property and the plaintiffs are co-owner, co-possessor and coparceners alongwith defendant No. 1 and had dismissed the suit, but the learned first appellate Court has reversed such finding on incorrect appreciation of legal position. It is submitted that the analysis of para 212 of Mullas Hindu Law in regard to formation and genesis of coparcenary has been wrongly appreciated by the fist appellate Court to record a finding that the suit property is a coparcenary property. It is reiterated that the plaintiffs being daughters are not coparceners and, therefore, they being not coparceners in the suit property, they were not entitled to claim any share in the suit property. It is also submitted that the suit was barred by limitation. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, admits that there is no evidence on record to show that the suit property is a self-earned property of the appellant. 5. It is also submitted that the suit was barred by limitation. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, admits that there is no evidence on record to show that the suit property is a self-earned property of the appellant. 5. It is also true that prior to 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, females could not have been coparceners under Mitakshara Law as has been held in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mills as reported in AIR 1966 SC 240; whereas after Hindu Succession (Amendment Act) 2005 with the substitution of section 6 of that Act, which stipulates that a daughter of a coparcener would become a coparcener in her own right, the position prior to the amendment stands modified to the extent that daughters of a coparcener are now coparceners in their own right. 6. In the case of State Bank of India v. Ghamandiram as reported in AIR 1969 SC 1330 , the Court while interpreting and analyzing coparcenary and its incidents held thus - "According to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law all the property of a Hindu joint family is held in collective ownership by all the coparceners in a quasi-corporate capacity. The textual authority of the Mitakshasra lays down in express terms that the joint family property is held in trust for the joint family members then living and thereafter to be born (Sss Mitakshara, Chapter I. 1-27). The incidents of co-parcenership under the Mitakshara law are : first, the lineal male descendants of a person up to the third generation, acquire on birth ownership in the ancestral properties of such person; secondly that such descendants can at any time work out their rights by asking for partition; thirdly, that till partition each member has got ownership extending over the entire property conjointly with the rest; fourthly, that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common; fifthly, that no alienation of the property is possible unless it be for necessity, without the concurrence of the coparceners, and sixthly, that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors." 7. In the case of Ganduri Koteshwanamma v. Chakiri Yanadi as reported in AIR 2012 SC 169 , it has been held that the rights of daughters in coparcenary property as per amended section 6 are not lost merely because a preliminary decree has been passed in a partition suit. So far as partition suits are concerned, the partition becomes final only on passing of a final decree. Where such a situation arises, the preliminary decree would have to be amended taking into account the change in the law by the amendment of 2005. Admittedly, the suit was filed in the year 2016 by unmarried daughters of the appellant and, therefore, they will be governed by the Amendment Act of 2005 to the Hindu Succession Act, therefore, the first appellate Court has rightly held that the plaintiffs are coparceners in the suit property. 8. In the case of Prakash and others v. Phulavati and others as reported in (2016) 2 SCC 36 , in para 23, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : "23. Accordingly, we held that the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9.9.2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. Disposition or alienation including partitions which may have taken place before 20.12.2004 as per law applicable prior to the said date will remain unaffected. Any transaction of partition effected thereafter will be governed by the Explanation." 9. Thus, it is apparent that the issue of limitation has no relevance and living daughters of a living coparcener being entitled to claim a share in the ancestral property, the plaintiffs are entitled to the share in the ancestral property as has been held by the first appellate Court and, therefore, this Court is of the opinion that no substantial question of law emerges in the present second appeal. Accordingly, this second appeal is hereby dismissed.