JUDGMENT : TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN, J. 1. The appellants are the successor-in-interest of the defendants, who aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court whereby it reversed the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, have filed the instant Second Appeal. The parties shall be referred to as the plaintiff and the defendants. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that the Will alleged to have been executed in favour of the defendants by deceased Panjku is forged and not genuine Will and the plaintiff is owner of 1/3rd share in the land and house comprised in Khewat No. 68, Khatauni No. 75, Khasra Nos. 432, 453, Kita 2, measuring 13-17-5 bighas, situated in Mauja Barto/89, land comprised in Khewat Khatauni No. 34/34, Khasra Nos. 226, 228, 236, 252, 255, 258, 260, 263, 267, 283, 321, Kita 11, measuring 8-5-18 bighas, situated in Muhal Behl/90, Tehsil Sundernagar, District Mandi, and to the extent of 1/4th share in land comprised in Khewat Khatauni No. 40/40, Khasra No. 284, measuring 0-9-12 bighas situated in Mauza Behl/90, Tehsil Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the suit property) with the consequential relief of restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit land. 3. It was averred by the plaintiff that the plaintiff and the defendants are members of Joint Hindu Family and constitute a coparcenary and the suit property was previously owned by Panjku, father of the parties, who had died on 20.5.1997 leaving behind the parties as his legal heirs. The defendants have produced a forged and fictitious Will which was never executed by Panjku and thus the plaintiff is entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property. The suit property was ancestral property in the hands of Panjku in which the plaintiff was having share. 4. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement wherein preliminary objections qua maintainability, cause of action and valuation were taken. On merits, it was denied that the plaintiff is the member of joint Hindu Family but stated that the plaintiff had separated himself from the joint family since long and he is not the coparcenar of a Hindu Family and as such he has no right, title or interest over the suit property which is self acquired property of the deceased Panjku. It was averred that deceased Panjku died on 20.5.1997 but stated that the deceased had executed valid Will prior to his death in favour of the defendants in his free and disposing mind on the basis of which the defendants inherited the suit property from deceased Panjku. 5. No replication was filed by the plaintiff. 6. From the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court on 7.8.2001 framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of injunction as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the suit property is the coparcenary property and the plaintiff has 1/3rd share in it? OPP 3. Whether the Will executed by Panjku in favour of the defendants is the result of fraud, as alleged? OPP 4. Whether Panjku executed a valid Will in favour of the defendants, as alleged? OPD 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 6. Relief. 7. After recording the evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff constraining him to file an appeal before the learned first Appellate Court, who vide its judgment and decree dated 03.03.2006 allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court and consequently, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed. 8. It is against the judgment and decree dated 03.03.2006 passed by the learned first Appellate Court that the defendants have filed the present appeal. 9. During the pendency of the appeal, appellant No. 1 Saju died and accordingly, his legal representatives were ordered to be brought on record. 10. On 18.4.2007, the appeal came to be admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the Appellate Court was right in rejecting the Will in favour of the appellants-defendants Ext.DW-1/A holding that it had not been executed in accordance with the provisions of Section 63 (c) of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act when it was established that the Will was a registered document? 2. Whether the decree of the learned Appellate Court can be sustained in holding that the property was a coparcenary property. Such findings being against the documentary and oral evidence on record? 11. 2. Whether the decree of the learned Appellate Court can be sustained in holding that the property was a coparcenary property. Such findings being against the documentary and oral evidence on record? 11. During the course of hearing, it was fairly conceded by learned counsel for the appellants that as regards the substantial question of law No. 2, the same does not arise for consideration and, therefore, he does not press this question. 12. Now adverting to substantial question of law No. 1, it would be necessary to refer to the statutory provisions as contained in Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, which read thus: Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act “68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested - If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being a will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied.” Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act “63. Execution of unprivileged wills - Every testator, not being a soldier employed in an expedition or engaged in actual warfare, or an airman so employed or engaged, or a mariner at sea, shall execute his will according to the following rules: (a) The testator shall sign or shall affix his marks to the will, or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction. (b) the signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will. (b) the signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will. (c) The will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has been some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person; and each of the witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary.” 13. From a conjoint reading of the provisions extracted above, it is evidently clear that a Will is required to be attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has seen the testator signing or affixing his mark on the Will or has seen some other person signing the will in the presence and by the direction of the testator or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of the signature or mark or his signature or the signature of such other person and that each of the witnesses has signed the Will in the presence of the testator. Section 68 of the Evidence Act is against the use of a Will in evidence unless one attesting witness has been examined to prove the execution. 14. The correct legal position in matters of Will was laid down by the three Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and Others, AIR 1959 SC 443 and thereafter approved by the Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee and Others vs. Subodh Kumar Banerjee and Others, AIR 1964 SC 529 and thereafter reiterated in a number of cases including three Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Smt. Jaswant Kaur vs. Smt. Amrit Kaur and Others, (1977) 1 SCC 369 , wherein the legal position was succinctly summed up in the following manner: “10. “There is a long line of decisions bearing on the nature and standard of evidence required to prove a will. Those decisions have been reviewed in an elaborate judgment of this Court in R. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thirnmajamma and Others, AIR 1959 SC 443 . The Court, speaking through Gajendragadkar J. laid down in that case the following propositions: 1. Stated generally, a will has to be proved like any other document, the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. As in the ease of proof of other documents, so in the case of proof of wills, one cannot insist on proof with mathematical certainty. 2. Since section 63 of the Succession Act requires a will to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by section 63 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has .been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. 3. Unlike other documents, the will speaks from the death o[ the testator and therefore the maker of the will is never available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the will came to be executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the will. 4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the will. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the will. That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the will bears the signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at the time when the will was made, or that those like the wife and children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the will excite the suspicion of the court, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator. 5. It is in connection with wills, the execution of which is surrounded by suspicious circumstance that the test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasises that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is called upon to decide a solemn question and by reason of suspicious circumstances the court has to be satisfied fully that the will has been validly executed by the testator. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter.” 15. Bearing in mind the aforesaid provisions of law, it would be necessary to have a glance of the evidence led by the respective parties. 16. The Will in question has been placed on record as Ex.DW-1/A and a perusal thereof shows that the two attesting witnesses are Bishanu Ram and Sant Ram. Bearing in mind the aforesaid provisions of law, it would be necessary to have a glance of the evidence led by the respective parties. 16. The Will in question has been placed on record as Ex.DW-1/A and a perusal thereof shows that the two attesting witnesses are Bishanu Ram and Sant Ram. The defendants have examined one of the attesting witnesses Bishanu Ram as DW-3, so as to comply with the requirement of Section 68 of the Evidence Act. 17. Now, adverting to the statement of DW-3, he has simply stated that Panjku was the father of the parties and was known to him and the defendants used to look after the deceased, who had executed the Will Ex.DW-1/A in his presence which bears his signatures. The Will was executed out of free volition and at that time Sant Ram and Ganga Ram were also present. 18. This is only the statement with respect to the Will which has come on record. When the statement is analyzed, it would be noticed that there is nothing in the statement to suggest that the deceased testator even signed or affixed the thumb impression upon the Will in presence of DW-3 and he alongwith another witness Sant Ram had signed the Will in the presence of the testator. Therefore, the mandate of Section 63 (c) of the Indian Succession Act is clearly not complied with by the defendants. 19. As observed above, the mere fact that the signature of DW-3 appears at the foot of the Will Ex.DW-1/A again by itself does not lead to presumption that DW-3 had appended his signatures on the Will Ex.DW-1/A as an attesting witness and in drawing support for such conclusion, I am fortified by the law expounded by the three Hon’ble Judges Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yumnam Ongbi Tampha Ibema Devi vs. Yumnam Joykumar Singh and Others, (2009) 4 SCC 780 wherein the earlier decision of the three Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Girja Datt Singh vs. Gangotri Datt Singh, AIR 1955 SC 346 was also considered and it was observed as under: “11. As per provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act, for the due execution of a Will: (1) the testator should sign or affix his mark to the Will. As per provisions of Section 63 of the Succession Act, for the due execution of a Will: (1) the testator should sign or affix his mark to the Will. (2) the signature or the mark of the testator should be so placed that it should appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a Will. (3) the Will should be attested by two or more witnesses. (4) each of the said witnesses must have seen the testator signing or affixing his mark to the Will and each of them should sign the Will in presence of the testator. 12. The attestation of the Will in the manner stated above is not an empty formality. It means signing a document for the purpose of testifying of the signatures of the executant. The attested witness should put his signature on the Will animo attestandi. It is not necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time and no particular form of attestation is necessary. Since a Will is required by law to be attested, execution has to be proved in the manner laid down in section and the Evidence Act which requires that at least one attesting witness has to be examined for the purpose of proving the execution of such a document. 13. Therefore, having regards to the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act and Section 63 of the Succession Act, a Will to be valid should be attested by two or more witnesses in the manner provided therein and the propounder thereof should examine one attesting witness to prove the will. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator's signature or affixing his mark to the will but also that each of the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator. 14. In Girja Datt Singh vs. Gangotri Datt Singh, AIR 1955 SC 346 , this court observed as follows: (AIR p.351, Para 15) “15. When this position was realised the learned counsel for Gangotri fell back on an alternative argument and it was that the deceased admitted execution and completion of the will Ex.A-36 and acknowledged his signature thereto before the Sub-Registrar at Tarabganj and this acknowledgment of his signature was in the presence of the two persons who identified him before the Sub-Registrar viz. Mahadeo Pershad and Nageshur who had in their turn appended their signatures at the foot of the endorsement by the Sub- Registrar. These signatures it was contended were enough to prove the due attestation of the will Ex.A-36. This argument would have availed Gangotri if Mahadeo Pershad and Nageshur had appended their signatures at the foot of the endorsement of registration animo attestandi. But even apart from this circumstance it is significant that neither Mahadeo Pershad nor Nageshur was called as a witness to depose to the fact of such attestation if any. One could not presume from the mere signatures of Mahadeo Pershad and Nageshur appearing at the foot of the endorsement of registration that they had appended their signatures to the document as attesting witnesses or can be construed to have done so in their capacity as attesting witnesses. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act requires an attesting witness to be called as a witness to prove the due execution and attestation of the will. This provision should have been complied with in order that Mahadeo Pershad and Nageshur be treated as attesting witnesses. This line of argument therefore cannot help Gangotri.” 15. In B. Venkatamuni vs. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh, 2006 (13) SCC 449, it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 456-460, Paras 15-24) “15. It is, however, well settled that compliance with statutory requirements itself is not sufficient as would appear from the discussions hereinafter made. 16. The approach of the Division Bench of the High Court did not address itself the right question. It took an erroneous approach to the issue as would appear from the decision of this Court in Surendra Pal vs. Dr. Saraswati Arora, 1974 (2) SCC 600 , where-upon again Mr. V. Balachandran himself placed reliance, wherein the law was stated in the following terms: (SCC p. 605, Para 7) “7. The propounder has to show that the will was signed by the testator; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions, that he put his signature to the testament of his own free will and that he has signed it in the presence of the two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But there may be cases in which the execution of the will itself is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, such as, where the signature is doubtful, the testator is of feeble mind or is overawed by powerful minds interested in getting his property, or where in the light of the relevant circumstances the dispositions appear to be unnatural, improbable and unfair, or where there are other reasons for doubting that the dispositions of the will are not the result of the testator's free will and mind. In all such cases where there may be legitimate suspicious circumstances those must be reviewed and satisfactorily explained before the will is accepted. Again in cases where the propounder has himself taken a prominent part in the execution of the will which confers on him substantial benefit that is itself one of the suspicious circumstances which he must remove by clear and satisfactory evidence. After all, ultimately it is the conscience of the court that has to be satisfied, as such the nature and quality of proof must be commensurate with the need to satisfy that conscience and remove any suspicion which a reasonable man may, in the relevant circumstances of the case, entertain.” 17. In H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma, AIR 1959 SC 443 , it was opined: (AIR pp. 451-452, Paras 19-20) “19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. 20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter.” 18. In Guro vs. Atma Singh, 1992 (2) SCC 507 , this Court has opined: (SCC p. 511, Para 3) “3. With regard to proof of a will the law is well settled that the mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement prescribed in the case of a will by Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where, however there were suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the will could be accepted as genuine. Such suspicious circumstances may be a shaky signature, a feeble mind and unfair and unjust disposal of property or the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicion before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator.” 19. Yet again Section 68 of the Evidence Act postulates the mode and manner of proof of execution of document which is required by law to be attested stating that the execution must be proved by at least one attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. 20. Yet again Section 68 of the Evidence Act postulates the mode and manner of proof of execution of document which is required by law to be attested stating that the execution must be proved by at least one attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. 20. This Court in Daulat Ram vs. Sodha, 2005 (1) SCC 40 stated the law thus: (SCC p. 43, Para 10) “10. Will being a document has to be proved by primary evidence except where the court permits a document to be proved by leading secondary evidence. Since it is required to be attested, as provided in Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872, it cannot be used as evidence until one of the attesting witnesses at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. In addition, it has to satisfy the requirements of Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925. In order to assess as to whether the will has been validly executed and is a genuine document, the propounder has to show that the will was signed by the testator and that he had put his signatures to the testament of his own free will; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind and understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and that the testator had signed it in the presence of two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to remove the suspicion by leading appropriate evidence. The burden to prove that the will was forged or that it was obtained under undue influence or coercion or by playing a fraud is on the person who alleges it to be so.” 21. Yet again in Meenakshiammal vs. Chandrasekaran, 2005 (1) SCC 280 , it was stated: (SCC p. 287, Para 19) “19. In Chinmoyee Saha vs. Debendra Lal Saha, AIR 1985 Cal. Yet again in Meenakshiammal vs. Chandrasekaran, 2005 (1) SCC 280 , it was stated: (SCC p. 287, Para 19) “19. In Chinmoyee Saha vs. Debendra Lal Saha, AIR 1985 Cal. 349 it has been held that if the propounder takes a prominent part in the execution of the will, which confers a substantial benefit on him, the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. Once the propounder proves that the will was signed by the testator, that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the disposition and put his signature out of his own free will, and that he signed it in presence of the witnesses who attested it in his presence, the onus, which rests on the propounder, is discharged and when allegation of undue influence, fraud or coercion is made by the caveator, the onus is on the caveator to prove the same.” [See also Sridevi vs. Jayaraja Shetty, 2005 (2) SCC 784 ] 22. The principle was reiterated in Pentakota Satyanarayana vs. Pentakota Seetharatnam, 2005 (8) SCC 67, wherein it was stated: (SCC pp. 81-82, Para 24) “24. In the instant case, the propounders were called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts indicated above.” However, having regard to the fact that the will was a registered one and the propounder had discharged the onus, it was held that in such circumstances, the onus shifts to the contestant opposing the will to bring material on record meeting such prima facie case in which event the onus shifts back on the propounder to satisfy the court affirmatively that the testator did not (sic) know well the contents of the will and in sound disposing capacity executed the same. 23. Each case, however, must be determined in the fact situation obtaining therein. 24. 23. Each case, however, must be determined in the fact situation obtaining therein. 24. The Division Bench of the High Court was, with respect, thus, entirely wrong in proceeding on the premise that compliance with legal formalities as regard proof of the will would sub-serve the purpose and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution thereof is not of much significance.” 16. In Benga Behera vs. Braja Kishora Nanda, 2007 (9) SCC 728 in paragraphs 40 and 41 to 46 it was inter-alia observed as follows: (SCC pp. 739-740) “40. It is now well settled that requirement of the proof of execution of a will is the same as in case of certain other documents, for example gift or mortgage. The law requires that the proof of execution of a will has to be attested at least by two witnesses. At least one attesting witness has to be examined to prove execution and attestation of the will. Further, it is to be proved that the executant had signed and/or given his thumb impression in presence of at least two attesting witnesses and the attesting witnesses had put their signatures in presence of the executant. [See: Madhukar D. Shende vs. Tarabai Aba Shedage, 2002 (2) SCC 85 , Janki Narayan Bhoir vs. Narayan Namdeo Kadam, 2003 (2) SCC 91 and Bhagat Ram vs. Suresh, 2003 (12) SCC 35 ] 41. The Court granting letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed or probate must satisfy itself not only about the genuineness of the will but also satisfy itself that it is not fraught with any suspicious circumstances. 42. No independent witness has been examined to show how the testatrix came close to Respondent-1. Why valuable agricultural land measuring Ac. 4.187 and homestead land along with a house standing thereon had been gifted in favour of the first respondent, has not been explained. The original will has not been produced. Why both the will and the sale deed should have been executed on the same day, has not been explained. 43. The burden on the first respondent was heavy, he being a stranger to the family. He failed to discharge the said burden. Variance, inconsistencies and contradictions have been brought on record, particularly in the statements of PW-4 and PW-9 and other witnesses vis-a-vis the contents of the document, which we have noticed hereinbefore. 44. 43. The burden on the first respondent was heavy, he being a stranger to the family. He failed to discharge the said burden. Variance, inconsistencies and contradictions have been brought on record, particularly in the statements of PW-4 and PW-9 and other witnesses vis-a-vis the contents of the document, which we have noticed hereinbefore. 44. Learned trial Judge as also the High Court did not take into consideration the effect of such contradictions and inconsistencies, particularly the interpolation/variance in the xerox copy of the will vis-a-vis certified copy thereof. Serious consideration was required to be bestowed on the contention of the appellants that thumb impressions of the testatrix on different pages of the xerox copy did not tally. No effort was made to compare the thumb impression appearing on the xerox copy with the thumb impression appearing on other admitted documents. Non-production of the original will stating that the will got lost, gives rise to an inference that it might have been that the will did not contain the thumb impression of the testatrix. The testatrix was an old and ill lady. She had no independent adviser in the matter of the execution of the will. On the other hand, the plaintiff-Respondent 1 and his father being disciple of her guru were in a position to dominate her mental process. 45. Respondent 1 was a student at the relevant time. His father had taken an active part in the entire process in registering and culmination of the will in favour of his son. There are materials on record to show that although sufficient time had been granted for examination of the other attesting witnesses, Chandramani Das Mohapatra was not summoned. No summon could be issued only because his correct address had not been furnished. 46. Existence of suspicious circumstances itself may be held to be sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that execution of the will has not been duly proved.” The position was reiterated in Anil Kak vs. Sharada Raje, 2008 (7) SCC 695 .” 20. Reverting back to the facts, it needs to be reiterated that the defendants have examined no other witness to prove the execution of the Will. Reverting back to the facts, it needs to be reiterated that the defendants have examined no other witness to prove the execution of the Will. Even though, the defendants have examined certain witnesses like DW-1 Puran Chand, Senior Assistant in the office of Tehsildar, Sundernagar to prove that Ex.DW-1/A was the true and correct according to the record maintained in the office of Sub Registrar, but admittedly DW-1 is not a witness to the execution of the Will and his statement is of no assistance to the defendants to prove the execution of the Will. 21. Likewise, Sauju Ram while appearing as DW-2 could not state anything with regard to the Will as he was not present at the time of execution thereof. 22. Even DW-3 and DW-4 have not stated about the presence of DW-2 at the time of execution of the Will. Therefore, the statement of DW-2 does not carry forward the case of the defendants. 23. In such circumstances, the learned first Appellate Court was absolutely right and committed no error by reversing the judgment of the learned trial Court thereby decreeing the suit of the plaintiff on the basis of succession and holding him entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property. The substantial question of law No. 1 is accordingly answered. 24. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending applications if any, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.