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2019 DIGILAW 1235 (HP)

Roop Ram v. Tara Devi

2019-08-28

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

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JUDGMENT : TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN, J. 1. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court whereby he reversed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the plaintiff has filed the instant regular second appeal. 2. The parties shall be referred to as the 'plaintiff' and the 'defendants'. 3. Brief facts giving rise to filing of the present appeal are that one Kanshia, a resident of village Hiun Jajah, Tehsil Rajgarh, District Sirmaur, H.P. co-owned a parcel of land comprised in Khata/Khatauni No. 14/51, Khasra Nos. 335/206 and 337/211, measuring 5 bighas 17 biswas and Khata Khatauni No. 6min/32/31, Khasra No. 209, measuring 1 bigha 9 biswas, situated in mauza Hiun Jajah, Tehsil Rajgarh, District Sirmaur and bequeathed his share therein along with other property in favour of his sister's son Megha, who was living with him at Hiun Jajah. It was averred that in the same village, Megha had his self acquired property comprised in Khata Khatauni No. 1min/4, Khasra No.354/212, measuring 3 bighas 17 biswas. Besides this, he has some landed property in village Sahroj which was about 7-8 kilometres away from village Hiun Jajah. Megha willed away his entire property movable and immovable in favour of his youngest brother Roop Ram, the plaintiff, vide Will dated January 11, 1983, Ex. PW5/A. He died on January 25, 1983 and the ownership of his property in village Sahroj was mutated in favour of the plaintiff vide mutation No. 85 dated December 21, 1983, Ex.PW1/A. However, ownership of the property bequeathed by Kanshia in favour of Megha was not mutated in favour of the plaintiff and the same had been mutated in favour of Janki, who claimed to be the wife of Kanshia on the latter's demise in July 1982. The plaintiff challenged the mutation which was ultimately cancelled and a mutation in respect of Kanshia's property bequeathed in favour of Megha came to be sanctioned in favour of Mathi, even though, she was in no way related to Megha. It was further averred that on the basis of this mutation, Mathi sold part of the suit land comprised in Khasra No. 354/212, measuring 3 bighas 17 biswas in favour of Shyam Dutt, predecessor-in-interest of defendants No. 2 to 6 vide sale deed dated July 8, 1990, Ex.DW1/B and gifted the remaining suit land comprised in Khasra Nos. It was further averred that on the basis of this mutation, Mathi sold part of the suit land comprised in Khasra No. 354/212, measuring 3 bighas 17 biswas in favour of Shyam Dutt, predecessor-in-interest of defendants No. 2 to 6 vide sale deed dated July 8, 1990, Ex.DW1/B and gifted the remaining suit land comprised in Khasra Nos. 335/206, 337/211 and 209, measuring 7 bighas 6 biswas in favour of Shyam Dutt's brother Hem Raj (defendant No.1) vide gift deed dated November 23, 1992. The plaintiff, therefore, had filed the suit for declaration that he is owner and in possession of the suit land and that the sale deed dated July 8, 1990 and the gift deed dated November 23, 1992, executed by Mathi, are illegal, null and void, fraudulent and not binding on him and further the mutations effected on the basis of deeds were also be declared null and void. Lastly, it was prayed that the defendants be restrained from alienating or encumbering the suit land. 4. The defendants contested the suit filed by the plaintiff by filing written statement. It was denied that Megha had willed away his property movable and immovable in favour of the plaintiff. According to the defendants, the bequest in favour of the plaintiff was the result of fraud and misrepresentation as there was no occasion for Megha to bequeath his property in favour of the plaintiff, who lived in a different village Sahroj and never looked after him. It was averred that Megha in fact lived with his wife Mathi at village Hiun Jajah till his death and there was no reason for him to disinherit her wife by bequeathing his property in favour of the plaintiff. As per defendants, the Will dated 11th January, 1983 allegedly executed in favour of the plaintiff was shrouded in suspicious circumstances. As far as the plaintiff's claim as to mutation of ownership of Megha's property at village Sahroj on the basis of the Will in his favour is concerned, it was averred that the same was passed behind the back of the interested parties and without proper inquiry by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade. It was further averred that on the demise of her husband, Mathi had become absolute owner of the suit land and the deeds of gift and sale executed by her were valid. It was further averred that on the demise of her husband, Mathi had become absolute owner of the suit land and the deeds of gift and sale executed by her were valid. It was also averred that the mutation attested in favour of the plaintiff in respect of property at village Sahroj was wrong. The defendants also raised contentions regarding maintainability of the suit, mis joinder of different cause of action, non-joinder of necessary parties, estoppel and valuation of the suit. 5. From the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court on 22.04.1997 framed the following issues: "1. Whether the suit land was self acquired property of Megha? OPP. 2. Whether the deceased Megha executed a valid will in favour of the plaintiff? OPP. 3. Whether the Gift Deed No. 172 dt. 28-11-92 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of the plaintiff is null and void, as alleged? OPP. 4. Whether the Gift Deed No. 119 executed by late Mathi on 8-7-90 is null and void? OPP. 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of injunction? OPP. 6. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable? OPD. 7. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable for misjoinder or cause of action? OPD. 8. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his acts, conduct to file the present suit? OPD. 9. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not properly valued, if so, what is the correct valuation? OPD. 10. Relief." 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the defendants filed an appeal before the learned first appellate Court, who allowed the same vide judgment and decree dated 25.11.2002, constraining the plaintiff to file the instant appeal. 7. On 01.04.2004, this appeal came to be admitted on the following substantial question of law: "Whether the learned first Appellate Court has misapplied the law pertaining to the existence of suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the Will?" I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case. 8. How the Will is required to be proved and what would constitute suspicious circumstance has been elaborately considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharpur Singh and others vs. Shamsher Singh, (2009) 3 SCC 687 wherein it was observed as under: "14. 8. How the Will is required to be proved and what would constitute suspicious circumstance has been elaborately considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharpur Singh and others vs. Shamsher Singh, (2009) 3 SCC 687 wherein it was observed as under: "14. The legal principles in regard to proof of a will are no longer res integra. A will must be proved having regard to the provisions contained in clause (c) of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in terms whereof the propounder of a will must prove its execution by examining one or more attesting witnesses. Where, however, the validity of the Will is challenged on the ground of fraud, coercion or undue influence, the burden of proof would be on the caveator. In a case where the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, it would not be treated as the last testamentary disposition of the testator. 15. This Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma, (1959) AIR SC 443] opined that the fact that the propounder took interest in execution of the Will is one of the factors which should be taken into consideration for determination of due execution of the Will. It was also held that: (AIR p. 451, para 19) one of the important features which distinguishes Will from other documents is that the Will speaks from the date of death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. 16. 16. In H. Venkatachala case1, It was also held that the propounder of will must prove: (i) that the Will was signed by the testator in a sound and disposing state of mind duly understanding the nature and effect of disposition and he put his signature on the document of his own free will, and (ii) when the evidence adduced in support of the Will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of testator's mind and his signature as required by law, Courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of propounder, and (iii) If a Will is challenged as surrounded by suspicious circumstances, all such legitimate doubts have to be removed by cogent, satisfactory and sufficient evidence to dispel suspicion. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts indicated therein. It was moreover held:(H. Venkatachala case1, AIR p. 452,para 20 "20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter." 17. This Court in Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi vs. Mrudula Jyoti Rao & ors, (2006) 13 SCC 433 : (2006) 14 SCALE 186 , held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 33-34) "33. The burden of proof that the Will has been validly executed and is a genuine document is on the propounder. The propounder is also required to prove that the testator has signed the Will and that he had put his signature out of his own free will having a sound disposition of mind and understood the nature and effect thereof. If sufficient evidence in this behalf is brought on record, the onus of the propounder may be held to have been discharged. But, the onus would be on the applicant to remove the suspicion by leading sufficient and cogent evidence if there exists any. In the case of proof of Will, a signature of a testator alone would not prove the execution thereof, if his mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated. However, if a defence of fraud, coercion or undue influence is raised, the burden would be on the caveator. [See Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Shedage, (2002) 2 SCC 85 and Sridevi and Ors. v. Jayaraja Shetty and Ors, 2005 8 SCC 784]. Subject to above, proof of a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document. 34. [See Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Shedage, (2002) 2 SCC 85 and Sridevi and Ors. v. Jayaraja Shetty and Ors, 2005 8 SCC 784]. Subject to above, proof of a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document. 34. There are several circumstances which would have been held to be described (sic) by this Court as suspicious circumstances: (i) When a doubt is created in regard to the condition of mind of the testator despite his signature on the Will; (ii) When the disposition appears to be unnatural or wholly unfair in the light of the relevant circumstances; (iii) Where propounder himself takes prominent part in the execution of Will which confers on him substantial benefit. [See H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Ors, (1959) AIR SC 443 and Management Committee T.K. Ghosh s Academy v. T.C. Palit and Ors, (1974) AIR SC 1495]" 18. Respondent was a mortgagee of the lands belonging to the testatrix. He is also said to be the tenant in respect of some of the properties of the testatrix. It has not been shown that she was an educated lady. She had put her left thumb impression. In the aforementioned situation, the question, which should have been posed, was as to whether she could have an independent advice in the matter. For the purpose of proof of will, it would be necessary to consider what was the fact situation prevailing in the year 1962. Even assuming the subsequent event, viz., the appellants had not been looking after their mother as has been inferred from the fact that they received the news of her death only six days after her death took place, is true, the same, in our opinion, would be of not much significance. 19.The provisions of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act keeping in view the nature of proof required for proving a Will have no application. A Will must be proved in terms of the provisions of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the event the provisions thereof cannot be complied with, the other provisions contained therein, namely, Sections 69 and 70 of the Indian Evidence Act providing for exceptions in relation thereto would be attracted. In the event the provisions thereof cannot be complied with, the other provisions contained therein, namely, Sections 69 and 70 of the Indian Evidence Act providing for exceptions in relation thereto would be attracted. Compliance with statutory requirements for proving an ordinary document is not sufficient, as Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act postulates that execution must be proved by at least one of the attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. {See B. Venkatamuni vs. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh & ors, (2006) 13 SCC 449, SCC p. 458, para 19]} 20. This Court in Anil Kak vs. Kumari Sharada Raje & ors, (2008) 7 SCC 695 opined that court is required to adopt a rational approach and is furthermore required to satisfy its conscience as existence of suspicious circumstances play an important role, holding: (SCC p. 714, paras 52-55) "52. Whereas execution of any other document can be proved by proving the writings of the document or the contents of it as also the execution thereof, in the event there exists suspicious circumstances the party seeking to obtain probate and/ or letters of administration with a copy of the Will annexed must also adduce evidence to the satisfaction of the court before it can be accepted as genuine. 53. As an order granting probate is a judgment in rem, the court must also satisfy its conscience before it passes an order. 54. It may be true that deprivation of a due share by (sic to) the natural heir by itself may not be held to be a suspicious circumstance but it is one of the factors which is taken into consideration by the courts before granting probate of a Will. 55. Unlike other documents, even animus attestandi is a necessary ingredient for proving the attestation." 21. Unfortunately, the first appellate court as also the High court did not advert to these aspects of the matter. 22. We may notice that in Jaswant Kaur vs. Amrit Kaur & ors, (1977) 1 SCC 369 this Court pointed out that when the Will is allegedly shrouded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and defendant. 22. We may notice that in Jaswant Kaur vs. Amrit Kaur & ors, (1977) 1 SCC 369 this Court pointed out that when the Will is allegedly shrouded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and defendant. An adversarial proceeding in such cases becomes a matter of Court's conscience and propounder of the Will has to remove all suspicious circumstances to satisfy that Will was duly executed by testator wherefor cogent and convincing explanation of suspicious circumstances shrouding the making of Will must be offered." 9. What would be suspicious circumstance was thereafter set out in para-23 of the judgment which reads as follows: "23. Suspicious circumstances like the following may be found to be surrounded in the execution of the Will: i. The signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful or not appear to be his usual signature. ii. The condition of the testator's mind may be very feeble and debilitated at the relevant time. iii. The disposition may be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances like exclusion of or absence of adequate provisions for the natural heirs without any reason. iv. The dispositions may not appear to be the result of the testator's free will and mind. v. The propounder takes a prominent part in the execution of the Will. vi. The testator used to sign blank papers. vii. The Will did not see the light of the day for long. viii. Incorrect recitals of essential facts." 10. It was further clarified that the circumstances narrated hereinabove are not exhaustive and were subject to offer of reasonable explanation, existence thereof, which were required to be considered before coming to the conclusion on the genuineness of the Will. It was also clarified that even though the Will may be registered one, but the same by itself would not mean that the statutory requirements of proving the Will need not be complied with. 11. It would be noticed that even though the learned trial Court held that Mathi was not wife of Megha, however, said finding was reversed by the learned first appellate Court and rightly so because the learned trial Court in coming to such conclusion had insisted upon mathematical precision and proof of marriage. 11. It would be noticed that even though the learned trial Court held that Mathi was not wife of Megha, however, said finding was reversed by the learned first appellate Court and rightly so because the learned trial Court in coming to such conclusion had insisted upon mathematical precision and proof of marriage. It has specifically come on record that Megha and Mathi lived as husband and wife for more than 25 years and, therefore, a strong presumption of wedlock arises in their favour. 12. The law on this issue is well settled and I may only refer to a fairly recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhannulal and others vs. Ganeshram and another, (2015) 12 SCC 301 wherein it was observed as under: "11. We are unable to accept the submissions made by Mr. Naveen Prakash, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-appellant. Indisputably, the first wife of Chhatrapati died in the very early age and immediately thereafter the original defendant No.1 Phoolbasa Bai started living with Chhatrapati as his second wife. Out of the wedlock of Phoolbasa Bai and Chhatrapati, one son was born, whose name was Mannu Lal. The said son of Chhatrapati and Phoolbasa Bai died unmarried. It is also not in dispute that the original owner Shiv Ram had only one son namely, Chhatrapati and one daughter Sumitrabai. Phoolbasa Bai died during the pendency of the suit in the year 1992. The relationship of Chhatrapati and Phoolbasa Bai has not been denied. It has also not been denied that they had been living together as husband and wife in a joint family. 12. In the fact of the case there is strong presumption in favour of the validity of a marriage and the legitimacy of its child for the reason that the relationship of Chhatrapati and Phoolbasa Bai are recognized by all persons concerned. 13. In Andrahennedige Dinohamy vs. W.L. Balahamy, (1928) 27 LW 678: AIR 1927 PC 185 , it was held that where a man and woman are proved to have lived together as husband and wife, the law will presume, unless the contrary is clearly proved, that they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage, and not in a state of concubinage. The Court observed as follows: (LW pp. 681-82) "The parties lived together for twenty years in the same house, and eight children were born to them. The Court observed as follows: (LW pp. 681-82) "The parties lived together for twenty years in the same house, and eight children were born to them. The husband during his life recognized, by affectionate provisions, his wife, and children, The evidence' of the Registrar of the District shows that for a long course of years the parties were recognized as married citizens, and even the family functions and ceremonies, such as, in particular, the reception of the relations and other guests in the family house by Don Andris and Balahamy as host and hostess--all such functions were conducted on the footing alone that they were man and wife. No evidence whatsoever is afforded of repudiation of this relation by husband or wife or anybody." 14. In the case of Gokal Chand vs. Parvin Kumari, (1952) AIR SC 231, this Court observed that continuous cohabitation of woman as husband and wife and their treatment as such for a number of years may raise the presumption of marriage, but the presumption which may be drawn from long co-habitation is rebuttable and if there are circumstances which weaken and destroy that presumption, the Court cannot ignore them. 15. It is well settled that the law presumes in favour of marriage and against concubinage, when a man and woman have cohabited continuously for a long time. However, the presumption can be rebutted by leading unimpeachable evidence. A heavy burden lies on a party, who seeks to deprive the relationship of legal origin. In the instant case, instead of adducing unimpeachable evidence by the plaintiff, a plea was taken that the defendant has failed to prove the fact that Phoolbasa Bai was the legally married wife of Chhatrapati. The High Court, therefore, came to a correct conclusion by recording a finding that Phoolbasa Bai was the legally married wife of Chhatrapati." 13. Apart from the above, Keshwa Ram, who claimed to be the priest of Megha and others, while appearing as DW-3 also testified that Mathi was Mehga's wife and was living at Kanshia's house for 30-40 years and that Mathi lived with Mehga. 14. In addition thereto, defendants have examined another witness Jati Ram, who is a resident of adjoining village contiguous to village Hiun Jajah and while appearing as DW-5, he testified that Megha lived in the house of Kanshia for 25-30 years and Mathi had lived there as Megha's wife. 14. In addition thereto, defendants have examined another witness Jati Ram, who is a resident of adjoining village contiguous to village Hiun Jajah and while appearing as DW-5, he testified that Megha lived in the house of Kanshia for 25-30 years and Mathi had lived there as Megha's wife. He further stated that "we all villagers considered Mathi to be the wife of Megha we were children when Mathi had been married. I do not recollect the marriage. I saw Mathi and Megha having lived together for 25-30 years. Mathi died in village Hiun in 1996-97". 15. Besides above, the other documentary evidence brought on record by way of abstract of 'Pariwar Register', wherein Mathi is shown Megha's wife, lends credence to the defendants' claim that Mathi was Megha's wife. 16. Even on the electoral roll pertaining to the Tehsil in which village Hiun Jajah is situated, Mitha Devi is shown to be the wife of Megha vide entires at serial Nos. 280 and 281. 17. It needs to be noted that the learned trial Court had rejected the entry in the 'Pariwar Register' Ex. DW6/C on the ground that there was discrepancy of age difference of Megha and Mathi. In the 'Pariwar Register' Ex. DW6/C, the age difference of the two was 15 years, whereas, in the electoral roll Ex. DW4/A, it was three years. Besides this, Megha's wife was shown to be Mitha Devi and not Mathi. 18. But, then the learned first appellate Court has rightly reversed the finding of the learned trial Court by concluding that it appeared to be oblivious of the fact that the information recorded by the officials engaged in the preparation of the data as to the voters, their names and age, which are reflected in the electoral roll, are not always absolutely correct. The age mentioned by certain illiterate village rustics to the officials is based on guesswork and is hardly correct. 19. The age mentioned by certain illiterate village rustics to the officials is based on guesswork and is hardly correct. 19. The learned first appellate Court is absolutely right in observing that whether it was wife Mathi or Mitha or there was a age difference between the two, the fact remains that Megha was not a bachelor and had a wife, who was none-else than Mathi, who lived with him for over 25 years till he breathed his last and it was for this reason that the mutation in respect of Kanshia's landed property bequeathed in favour of Megha came to be sanctioned in favour of Mathi after mutation in favour of Janki was rejected. 20. Yet, surprisingly, the Will dated January 11, 1983, Ex.PW5/A propounded by the plaintiff contains recital that Megha, the testator, was having no wife. Evidently, this recital is false and casts a serious shadow of doubt on the veracity, correctness and authenticity of the Will. The Will is shrouded by suspicious circumstances and, therefore, cannot be held to be genuine and reliance has correctly been placed by the learned first appellate Court on the following judgments: (i) Kishan Chand and another vs. Smt. Basanti Devi and others, (1996) 2 SLJ 872. (ii) Joga Singh (Major) and another vs. Samma Kaur and others, (1996) 2 SLJ 1481. (iii) Kalayan Singh vs. Smt. Chhoti and others, (1990) AIR SC 396. (iv) Milkhi Ram and others vs. Smt. Surmoo Devi, (1993) 1 ShimLC 118 . 21. In the instant case, the wife of the testator, Mathi, has been totally disinherited of the property and left to fend for herself without there being any reason which makes the Will highly suspicious. 22. In addition to the above, there are some other factors which also render the Will Ex.PW5/A to be highly suspicious. The plaintiff's claim of having looked after Megha is not borne out from the records as it has specifically come on record that Megha lived in village Hiun Jajah which is 7-8 kilometres away from village Sahroj where the plaintiff lived. 23. In addition thereto, there is no evidence worth-name to prove that the plaintiff used to render services to Megha or looked after him. On the contrary, the Will Ex. PW3/A executed by Kanshia in favour of Megha clearly mentions that Megha was serving and looking after Kanshia. 23. In addition thereto, there is no evidence worth-name to prove that the plaintiff used to render services to Megha or looked after him. On the contrary, the Will Ex. PW3/A executed by Kanshia in favour of Megha clearly mentions that Megha was serving and looking after Kanshia. In such circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the plaintiff was looking after Megha by going to his village, which as observed above, was 7-8 kilometres away. 24. That apart, there is discrepancy as to the point of time when the Will Ex. PW5/A was allegedly executed. The plaintiff while appearing as PW-1 in his cross examination maintained that the Will in his favour was executed 10-15 years after the death of Kanshia. Admittedly, Kanshia died in July, 1982, as is evident from certificate Ex.DW6/B. Secondly, computing 10-15 years from this year, the Will Ex. PW5/A was allegedly executed somewhere in the year 1992-93. However, the Will in question is stated to be executed on January 11, 1983, which casts a serious doubt on the plaintiff's claim. 25. It would also be noticed that as per the statement of PW-1, Megha remained sick in the last days of his life and admittedly died 12-13 days after the execution of the Will. Sukh Ram, who claims to have scribed the Will, testified in his cross examination that Megha was suffering from a breathing disease at that time and that day he also took rest. If Megha was sick during last days of his life and was unwell even on the date when the alleged Will was executed, then where was the occasion for him to go to different village Sarsu which was at a distance of 7-8 kilometres away to get the Will scribed and could have conveniently made the same in his own village. 26. Lastly, it would be noticed that defendant Hem Ram has clearly maintained that he had never seen Megha's sign and that he (Megha) used to append thumb impression. This claim of Hem Ram has not even been disputed during his cross examination by the plaintiff. Even when confronted with cross- examination, the plaintiff clearly claimed that he did not produce any document containing Megha's signatures, except the so called Will. This additionally casts a serious doubt regarding the execution of the Will. 27. The substantial question of law is accordingly answered against the appellant. 28. Even when confronted with cross- examination, the plaintiff clearly claimed that he did not produce any document containing Megha's signatures, except the so called Will. This additionally casts a serious doubt regarding the execution of the Will. 27. The substantial question of law is accordingly answered against the appellant. 28. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal and accordingly the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.