JUDGMENT : A.S. CHANDURKAR, J. 1. Since all these writ petitions raise challenge to identical orders passed by the trial Court they are heard together. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to the present writ petitions are that each petitioner is a defendant in the suits filed by the respondents herein under provisions of Section 16(1)(c) and (g) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (for short, the said Act). It is the case of the respondents - original plaintiffs that the plaintiff No.1 through its Trustees is a registered Public Trust. The plaintiffs are involved in maintaining the temple of Shri Gajanan Maharaj and are providing facilities to the devotees visiting the said temple. In front of the temple premises about 58 shop blocks were let out to various shopkeepers on leave and license basis. These licenses were granted for a period of eleven months. On the expiry of eleven months, on the request of each defendant, time was granted to hand over vacant possession. Out of 58 shop blocks, 46 allottees and shopkeepers had vacated their respective shops as per the undertaking given by them. The remaining shop keepers refused to vacate the said shop blocks and hence the plaintiffs filed separate suits for their eviction. Written statement was filed by each defendant denying the claim as made. During pendency of the suits the defendants moved an application for appointment of a Commissioner under provisions of Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, the Code) read with Section 29 of the said Act. In that application, it was stated that the defendants had sought removal of various obstructions caused by the plaintiffs which prevented the devotees from proceeding towards the temple from the front of their shops. In order to examine the existing position and especially the obstruction as caused, the appointment of the Commissioner was sought. The defendants also moved the separate application under Section 29 of the said Act praying therein that the plaintiffs be directed to remove all the obstructions caused by them in the form of barricades which would enable the devotees to pass from the shops of the defendant so as to facilitate purchase of various articles from their shops. The defendants also moved the separate application under Section 29 of the said Act praying therein that the plaintiffs be directed to remove all the obstructions caused by them in the form of barricades which would enable the devotees to pass from the shops of the defendant so as to facilitate purchase of various articles from their shops. These applications were opposed by the plaintiffs and by the impugned orders the trial Court rejected both the applications holding that the appointment of the Court Commissioner was not found necessary in the facts of the case and that no essential supplies or services had been withheld by the plaintiffs. Being aggrieved by these orders, the present writ petitions have been filed. 3. Shri J. B. Gandhi, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the learned Judge of the trial Court committed an error in rejecting both the applications. According to him, with a view to deprive the defendants of their business and livelihood, the plaintiffs had erected various barricades as well as scanning machines thereby creating obstructions on account of which the devotees were unable to approach the shops of the defendants. The object behind the same was to somehow harass and evict the defendants without following the due process of law. He referred to various sketch maps to indicate the obstruction as caused. Though it was urged by the plaintiffs that erection of the barricades were intended to facilitate the movement of devotees the object on the part of the plaintiffs was otherwise. Referring to the provisions of Section 29 of the said Act, it was submitted that the right of the devotees to have a smooth passage so as to approach the shops of the defendants was the right included in enjoying the suit premises. By causing obstruction to the devotees from approaching the said shops, the said act amounted to withholding essential services in a manner contrary to Section 29 of the said Act. It was urged that considering the object of Section 29 of the said Act, an obstruction caused of such nature would be covered by said provisions and the trial Court ought to have directed the plaintiffs to remove the obstruction as caused. It was urged that considering the object of Section 29 of the said Act, an obstruction caused of such nature would be covered by said provisions and the trial Court ought to have directed the plaintiffs to remove the obstruction as caused. Placing reliance on the decision in R. J. Mehta and another vs. Govind Ramchandra Nadkarni, (1989) MhLJ 809 and Balkisan Govindlal Purwar and another vs. Dnyandeo Totaram Gawande Patil, (1983) MhLJ 358, it was submitted that both the applications as filed deserve to be allowed and appropriate relief deserves to be granted to the defendants. 4. On the other hand, Shri A. R. Patil, learned Counsel for the respondents - plaintiffs opposed aforesaid submissions. He submitted that the defendants had initially moved an application for temporary injunction in the suits filed by them against the Trust in which it was prayed that the trustees be directed to open the main gate situated on the western north corner and also to remove the obstructions that were caused by them. The said application for temporary injunction was dismissed by the trial Court as well as by the first appellate Court. In the writ petition filed by the petitioners herein liberty was granted to them to move an appropriate application in view of certain subsequent events. He submitted that having failed in that attempt to obtain an order of temporary injunction, the present applications had been moved. It was submitted that an appointment of a court Commissioner was not permissible for the purposes of collecting evidence. It was open for the defendants to lead such evidence to substantiate their stand before the trial Court. It was then submitted that with the increase in the number of devotees visiting the temple various steps were taken by the trustees so as to ensure the safety of devotees and also to prevent the occurrence of any untoward incident on account of heavy rush. He referred to various directions issued by this Court in Writ Petition No.5856/2007 (Anandilal s/o Hajarimal Bhutada and another vs. The Shegaon Municipal Council, Shegaon, Distt. Buldhana and Ors.) on 5-4-2018. Merely because the manner in which the devotees were required to approach the temple was partly altered, the same would not give any cause for invoking the provisions of Section 29 of the said Act. Buldhana and Ors.) on 5-4-2018. Merely because the manner in which the devotees were required to approach the temple was partly altered, the same would not give any cause for invoking the provisions of Section 29 of the said Act. He submitted that there was no withholding of any essential supply or service as contemplated by Section 29 of the said Act. The devotees were not prevented from visiting the shops of the defendants and it was not open for the defendants to oppose the trustees from taking necessary steps for giving better facilities to the devotees. It was submitted that the trial Court rightly observed that the steps taken were in the larger interest of devotees and hence there was no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The learned Counsel referred to the judgment in Kalkaji Mandir Vikreta Sangathan-II vs. Piyush Joshi and others,2016 16 SCC 504 in support of his submissions. It was thus submitted that the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and with their assistance I have perused the documents filed on record. It is not in dispute that each defendant is occupying the respective shop blocks pursuant to the leave and license agreement entered into by the Trust. The eviction of the defendants has been sought on the termination of the said leave and license agreement. It is during pendency of these proceedings that the applications in question came to be moved. In the application filed under Section 29 of the said Act it is the case of the defendants that initially the devotees had free access to approach the shops of the defendants. Thereafter two new gates were erected on the northern wall and thereafter barricades were also erected in such a manner that the devotees would not be in a position to directly approach the shops of the defendants. Since the defendants were being deprived of their lawful right to run the business the applications in question came to be moved praying that all obstructions created by installing the barricades be directed to be moved. The appointment of the Commissioner has been sought to examine the existing position. 6. The question to be first considered is whether the provisions of Section 29 of the said Act would be attracted in such factual scenario. The appointment of the Commissioner has been sought to examine the existing position. 6. The question to be first considered is whether the provisions of Section 29 of the said Act would be attracted in such factual scenario. Under the provisions of Section 29 of the said Act, the landlord is restrained without just or sufficient cause from cutting off or withholding any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenants in respect of the premises let out to him. In the explanation to the said Section essential supply or services have been stated to include supply of water, electricity lines in passages and on staircases and conservancy or sanitary services. The explanation is inclusive in nature and the nature of essential supply or service would depend upon the facts of the case in question. The object behind restraining the landlord from cutting of or withholding essential supply or service is to ensure that the tenant is not prevented in any manner from enjoying the premises in question. When the facts of the present case are considered, it is alleged by the defendants that the plaintiffs have erected various barricades with a view to obstruct the free movement of devotees which prevents said devotees from directly approaching the shop blocks of the defendants. According to the plaintiffs, various safety measures have been taken so as to facilitate a systematic movement of the devotees towards the temple with a view to prevent occurrence of any stampede. The only alteration as can be gathered from the sketch maps placed on record are that the manner of entry into the temple premises has been regulated and there does not appear to be any complete blockage of entry to the shops of the defendants. The shops are accessible but by using a longer way. The aforesaid exercise of regulating the entry is pursuant to the directions issued in the Public Interest litigation by this Court. Moreover, the approach way in question has been approved by a joint Committee of various authorities who are responsible for maintenance of law and order in the light of the provisions of the Disaster Management Act, 2005. 7. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that regulating entry of devotees in the temple in an orderly manner amounts to withholding of any essential supply or service qua the defendants. 7. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that regulating entry of devotees in the temple in an orderly manner amounts to withholding of any essential supply or service qua the defendants. It has not been shown that every approach way to the shops of the defendants has been blocked. What has been done is the regulation of the manner in which the devotees can enter the temple premises. Though such regulation of entry may cause some inconvenience to the defendants, considering the larger object as stated by the plaintiffs which is the safety of devotees, it cannot be said that by regulating such entry of devotees any essential supply or service has either been cut off or withheld. In R. J. Mehta and another (supra) the suit as filed was for mandatory injunction restraining the defendants from keeping their dogs in any passage outside the suit premises. It is in that context that it has been observed that the plaintiffs had a right to enjoy the suit premises which was being affected by the act of the defendants. Similarly in Balkisan Govindlal and another (supra) the suit in question was filed by the tenants against the landlord for perpetual mandatory injunction. In that context it was observed that interim mandatory injunction for removing such obstruction as caused in the enjoyment of the suit premises could be granted. It is found that the facts of the aforesaid case are clearly distinguishable and ratio of the aforesaid decisions cannot apply to the case in hand. 8. As regards the prayer for appointment of the court Commissioner, the defendants are always free to lead such evidence to bring on record the aspect of obstruction as alleged to be caused by the plaintiffs. For that purpose, it is not necessary to appoint a court Commissioner as rightly held by the trial Court. Thus, in presence of any jurisdictional error, there is no reason to interfere with the impugned orders. By clarifying that the observations made in this judgment are only for deciding the applications as moved by the defendants the writ petitions are dismissed with no orders as to costs. The trial Court shall decide the suits on their own merits without being influenced by any observations made in this order.