JUDGMENT S J Kathawalla, J. -By the present Suit, the Plaintiff has sought to challenge an order dated 23rd April 2018 passed by the Board of Appeal of Defendant No.1 ("Impugned Order"). By the Impugned Order, the Plaintiff, a jockey, was inter alia prohibited for a period of 6 months from participating in races held by Defendant No.1. 2. The Plaintiff is a professional jockey with experience of over 20 years. Defendant No.1 is a private members club that holds horse races in Mumbai and Pune. Defendant No.2 is a trainer, who, along with his family is a co-owner of a race horse by the name of "Lord Commander". Defendant No.3 is the Board of Appeal of Defendant No.1. 3. Prior to dealing with the facts of the matter, a brief background to the functioning of Defendant No.1 is required. BACKGROUND TO DEFENDANT NO.1 CLUB: 4. Defendant No.1 holds horse races in Mumbai and Pune under a license granted by the Government of Maharashtra. This license inter alia permits Defendant No.1 to license betting on horse races. Defendant No.1 employs "Stipendiary Stewards" possessing knowledge and experience in horse racing. The Stipendiary Stewards are present at every race held by Defendant No.1 and are charged with identifying any issue in respect of the conduct of a race. The recommendations of the Stipendiary Stewards are forwarded to the "Stewards of the Club" being a body comprising of the club members of Defendant No.1. Before recommending any issue to the Stewards of the Club, the Stipendiary Stewards conduct an initial inquiry into the matter, during the course of which inquiry, they may interview a jockey, the trainer and any other relevant person. The Stewards of the Club, upon receiving the notes of the preliminary enquiry from the Stipendiary Stewards, hold an enquiry into the allegations of wrongdoing and after hearing the person under enquiry, pass an order either disposing, exonerating, issuing a warning or an order of suspension. A person aggrieved by such order may file an appeal to the "Board of Appeal" of Defendant No.1 being Defendant No.3 herein. FACTS: 5. The facts leading to the filing of the present Notice of Motion are as under: 5.1 On 15th March, 2018, the last race for the day was one titled "Race No.230". Lord Commander was the favourite to win this race. However, at the conclusion of the race, Lord Commander finished 4th. FACTS: 5. The facts leading to the filing of the present Notice of Motion are as under: 5.1 On 15th March, 2018, the last race for the day was one titled "Race No.230". Lord Commander was the favourite to win this race. However, at the conclusion of the race, Lord Commander finished 4th. The race was won by another horse named "Fine Tune". Incidentally, Fine Tune is owned by one Mr. Jaydev Mody who is also the co-owner of Lord Commander. 5.2 At the conclusion of Race No.230, the Stipendiary Stewards called the Plaintiff for questioning in respect of his riding of Lord Commander in Race No.230. In response to the questions raised, the Plaintiff answered that he was instructed by Defendant No.2 (Lord Commander''s trainer) to sit well up, come into the straight, and do his best. To a specific question, he said that the pace of the race was too fast for Lord Commander and as such, he could not sit well up as instructed. It is common ground that post the race, the Plaintiff and Defendant No.2 did not meet. 5.3 Pursuant to a request made by the Plaintiff, on 18th March, 2018, the Plaintiff was furnished with medical reports of Lord Commander. The Plaintiff claims to have discovered from the medical reports that Lord Commander was suffering from Exercise Induced Pulmonary Hemorrhage Syndrome ("EIPHS")-Grade II and that he had been scoped on 27th November, 2017 and once again on 11th March, 2018 and advised rest on both occasions. The Plaintiff also claims that contrary to the instructions of the veterinarian of Defendant No.1, the Plaintiff was requested by Defendant No.2 to spurt Lord Commander on 12th March, 2018 and participate Lord Commander in Race No.230 on 15th March, 2018. 5.4 On 3rd April, 2018, a hearing was given to the Plaintiff. Defendant No.2 was also present at this hearing as also the Stipendiary Stewards. Post the hearing, the following minutes came to be recorded : "all statements/documents made/presented by the veterinary officers and stipendiary stewards and having viewed the video recordings of the race in question, as also the horse''s two previous runs...." and having deliberated the matter at length, the Stewards did not accept the explanation tendered by him and held him liable for not permitting his mount Lord Commander to run on its own merits in Race 230. In that, ; a. He did not follow the trainers instructions; b. His riding efforts in the straight on a favourite were found wanting as compared to his known riding ability, as one of the senior most jockeys in India. c. There was a drift in odds (both in win and place) on Lord Commander, while the winner, FINE TUNE, owned by the same part-owner was backed down." 5.5 The Plaintiff''s license was thus suspended with effect from 21st April, 2018 until 20th April, 2019 ("Stewards" Order"). 5.6 Being aggrieved by the Steward''s Order, the Plaintiff preferred an appeal before Defendant No.3 being the Board of Appeal of Defendant No.1. 5.7 A hearing was held before Defendant No.3 on 23rd April, 2018, at which hearing, the following order came to be passed : "The Board of Appeal deliberated the matter and applied their minds to the entire facts and circumstances. Whilst the Board concurred with the findings of the Stewards of the Club, keeping in mind that this was his first offence of this nature, the Board of Appeal unanimously decided to modify his punishment as under:- a. To modify the punishment imposed on him by the Stewards of the Club to the effect that his Jockey''s license will now stand suspended w.e.f. 28th April, 2018 till the end of the Mumbai Meeting 2017/18. Thereafter, should he apply for a Jockey''s license for the Season 2018/19, the same will not be granted to him up to and inclusive of the 27th October 2018; b. However, the balance period of six months punishment has been kept as suspended sentence and if he was again found guilty of a similar offence in the next three years commencing from 28th October, 2018 then the afore-said suspended sentence of six months would immediately come into force and effect and which aforesaid punishment would be in addition to any other punishment which the Stewards may impose on him. c. His deposit was ordered to be forfeited." As can be seen from the Impugned Order, Defendant No.3 upheld the findings in the Stewards'' Order. However, in light of this being the Plaintiff''s first offence of this nature, Defendant No.3 reduced his punishment to a ban of 6 months as opposed to the 1 year under the Steward''s Order. 5.8 Being aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Plaintiff has filed the present Suit assailing the Impugned Order. However, in light of this being the Plaintiff''s first offence of this nature, Defendant No.3 reduced his punishment to a ban of 6 months as opposed to the 1 year under the Steward''s Order. 5.8 Being aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Plaintiff has filed the present Suit assailing the Impugned Order. 6. Appearing for the Petitioner, senior Advocate Mr. Mustafa Doctor, submitted that the Steward''s Order as also the Impugned Order have been passed without giving reasons for the findings arrived at therein ; that both orders do not even record the deliberations, if any, for rejecting the Plaintiff''s contentions and submissions ; an unreasoned order cannot be the basis of suspension of the Plaintiff''s license nor can it be the basis of denying him a fresh license ; . purely on account of the Impugned Order being unreasoned, the Impugned Order ought to be set aside; that prior to Race No.230 on 15th March, 2018, the Plaintiff was working Lord Commander on 11th March, 2018 ; On this day, the Plaintiff noticed that Lord Commander was stopping in the last furlong and he informed Defendant No.2 about the same; at this time, the Plaintiff was unaware about the fact that Lord Commander had been previously diagnosed with EIPHS-Grade II on 27th November, 2017 and that it was advised rest till 3rd January, 2018; the fact that Defendant No.2 had an endoscopy performed on Lord Commander pursuant to 11th March, 2018 evidences that Defendant No.2 felt that the horse might have been stopping in the last furlong due to it being diagnosed with EIPHS; Defendant No.2 did not disclose the occurrence of the endoscopy to anyone including the Plaintiff and asked the veterinary doctor not to give him a report on the endoscopy; Defendant No.2 has been constantly changing his stance; the practice that is followed by veterinary doctors is to mention "normal" in the hospital log book in the case of EIPHS-Grades I and II ; the mention of the word "normal" does not mean that doctors have not prescribed a specific line of treatment ; Contrary to the advice of the veterinary doctor viz. to rest Lord Commander, Defendant No.2 instructed the Plaintiff to spurt the horse on 12th March, 2018. 7. to rest Lord Commander, Defendant No.2 instructed the Plaintiff to spurt the horse on 12th March, 2018. 7. Mr.Doctor, the learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner thereafter submitted that the law in India with respect to powers of domestic tribunals is well settled ; though courts may not normally readily interfere with orders passed by domestic tribunals, it is well settled that in certain cases, courts will interfere with such orders ; a domestic tribunal is not exempt from recording reasons for its finding ; it would be contrary to law to give domestic tribunals the benefit of not having to give reasons for their findings and permitting them the benefit of passing one lined unreasoned orders. Mr.Doctor placed reliance on the decision of the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates Private Limited & Anr. v. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors, (2010) 9 SCC 496 . According to Mr. Doctor, neither the Plaintiff, nor this Court, has any manner of knowing what factors weighed with the Stewards and Defendant No.3 and what did not whilst passing the orders. In the present case, there are a number of disputed facts, which required both the Stewards and well as Defendant No.3 to give reasons for their findings. The orders do not make it clear if factors pertaining to the health of Lord Commander and the riding instructions were considered relevant or not and if considered relevant, why they were disregarded. It is also not clear as to why the explanation tendered by the Plaintiff in respect of the manner in which he rode Lord Commander, was not acceptable to the Stewards and Defendant No.3. Anybody reading the Impugned Order is left guessing as to the reason that Defendant No.3 arrived at for the conclusion that it did. There is absolutely no manner of knowing what evidence the Impugned Order in based on. In this context, Mr.Doctor placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the matter of Royal Western India Turf Club Limited & Ors. v. Vinayak J. Gaekwad & Ors, (2006) 5 BCR 481 . 8. Mr.Doctor further submitted that the Impugned Order has serious consequences on the Plaintiff. Domestic tribunals do not have unbridled powers to pass orders affecting the livelihood of people without reasons. v. Vinayak J. Gaekwad & Ors, (2006) 5 BCR 481 . 8. Mr.Doctor further submitted that the Impugned Order has serious consequences on the Plaintiff. Domestic tribunals do not have unbridled powers to pass orders affecting the livelihood of people without reasons. In this context, Mr.Doctor placed reliance on the decision of the single Judge of this Court in the case of The National Sports Club of India v. Jaisingh Choraria,2013 SCCOnlineBom 932 and the Oral Judgment of the Division Bench dated 8th may, 2014 in Apeal No.547 of 2013 and the decision of the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney & Ors, (2009) 4 SCC 240 . Mr.Doctor therefore concluded that the Impugned Order be stayed. 9. As opposed to the aforesaid arguments of Mr. Doctor, Mr. Dinyar Madon, Ld. Senior Advocate appearing for Defendant Nos.1 and 3 submitted that the Plaintiff has made various false and inconsistent statements. Lord Commander was diagnosed with EIPHS Grade II on one occasion in November, 2017 and had never been diagnosed with EIPHS Grades III or IV, therefore, it could not have had a history of "chronic bleeding" as contended by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has made no allegations of mala fides, lack of good faith or unfair treatment. The Impugned Order is a decision with reasons and has been passed in consonance with the principles of natural justice as applicable to domestic tribunals. Defendant Nos.1 and 3 are not concerned with the inter se disputes between the owners, trainer and jockey of Lord Commander in the present case. Defendant Nos.1 and 3 are only concerned with ascertaining as to whether or not the Plaintiff prevented Lord Commander from running on its own merit in Race No.230. Further, the health of the horse was not relevant while undertaking the inquiry which was limited to the action of the Plaintiff in failing to allow the horse to run on its own merits. The Chief Stipendiary Stewards noticed that there had been a large swing in the odds for Race No.230 immediately prior thereto. The morning odds on Lord Commander were 7/4, the odds opened at 16/10 and drifted to 5/2. Whereas, the morning odds on the winner, Fine Tune were 6/1, the odds opened at 9/2 and was backed down to 13/4. The Chief Stipendiary Stewards noticed that there had been a large swing in the odds for Race No.230 immediately prior thereto. The morning odds on Lord Commander were 7/4, the odds opened at 16/10 and drifted to 5/2. Whereas, the morning odds on the winner, Fine Tune were 6/1, the odds opened at 9/2 and was backed down to 13/4. On going through the place betting, it was also observed that Lord Commander drifted from 35 paisa to 50 paisa and the winner Fine Tune was backed down from even money to 75 in "place" i.e. amongst the first 3. Lord Commander finished 4th in the race and as a result, did not even finish in place. As per the videographic evidence, while the Plaintiff was whipping the horse with his right hand in a show of encouraging the horse to run, he is in fact restraining the horse from running with his left hand. On law, Mr. Madon argued that the scope of inquiry by a civil court into the decisions of a domestic tribunal is limited. In this context, reliance was placed on MacLean v. Workers Union, (1929) 1 Ch 602 , T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria, (1963) AIR SC 1144 and Lennox Arthur Patrick O Reilly v. Cyril Cuthbert Gittens, (1949) AIR PC 313 ; Kulwant Rai Goyal v. Disciplinary Authority, (2010) 1 CLR 630 ; Madhya Pradesh Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors, (1966) AIR SC 671 ; Jaisingh Chorasia v. The National Sports Club of India,2013 SCCOnLineBom 932 ; The National Sports Club of India v. Jaisingh Chorasia [Appeal No.547 of 2013]. 10. Appearing for Defendant No.2, Mr. Naushad Engineer argued that there is no dispute in so far as the instructions given by Defendant No.2 to the Plaintiff are concerned. The instructions were to sit well up, come into the straight and do his best. He argued that the Plaintiff is dishonestly trying to create a controversy when in fact there exists none in so far as the instructions given by Defendant No.2 to the Plaintiff are concerned. The Plaintiff''s contention that Lord Commander did not perform well in Race No.230 because it was suffering from EIPHS is a smoke screen of a defence. EIPHS is a common occurrence/condition which affects upto 90% of all horses after they have been race/spurted or after a strenuous workout. The Plaintiff''s contention that Lord Commander did not perform well in Race No.230 because it was suffering from EIPHS is a smoke screen of a defence. EIPHS is a common occurrence/condition which affects upto 90% of all horses after they have been race/spurted or after a strenuous workout. In fact, the Plaintiff himself rode Lord Commander on 12th March, 2018 and stated that Lord Commander showed no problem. In any event, EIPHS is not an answer to the riding style of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff in effect restrained the progress of Lord Commander with his left hand and was giving an impression of pushing the horse by whipping him with his right hand which is something like pressing an accelerator and brake of a car at the same time. That in the present case, the Stipendiary Stewards on their own suspected that the Plaintiff''s riding style was suspect without any complaint made to them. Defendant No.2 did not want to create a scene after the race and had hence left at the conclusion of Race No.230. However, on being telephonically questioned by the Stipendiary Stewards, he immediately complained about the riding style of the Plaintiff. Merely because Defendant No.2 did not immediately complain and/or have an altercation with the Plaintiff does not justify and/or vindicate the Plaintiff''s riding style. The Plaintiff has wrongly compared the medical report of the horse Lorraine with that of Lord Commander. The reports are not identical. It was vehemently denied that Defendant No.2 was told to rest the horse after the endoscopy on 11th March, 2018. 11. I have considered the aforesaid arguments canvassed by the Plaintiff and Defendants. I have also considered the various decisions of the Apex Court and this Court as cited by them. I have also seen the videos of the subject race during and after the hearing of the present matter. However, prior to dealing with their respective arguments, it would be necessary to ascertain and recognize the extent of judicial scrutiny permitted in a matter such as the present one viz. enquiries/proceedings before domestic tribunals. In this context, it is necessary to set out the following observations from the various decisions cited by the Advocates. 12. However, prior to dealing with their respective arguments, it would be necessary to ascertain and recognize the extent of judicial scrutiny permitted in a matter such as the present one viz. enquiries/proceedings before domestic tribunals. In this context, it is necessary to set out the following observations from the various decisions cited by the Advocates. 12. In the decision of the Apex Court in T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria, (1963) AIR SC 1144 , the Apex Court held: "6.The scope of the jurisdiction of a civil court vis-a-vis the decisions of tribunals is also well settled. In Maclean v. Workers Union, (1929) 1 Ch 602 Maugham, J., observed: "It appears to me that we have no power to review the evidence any more than have a power to say whether the tribunal came to a right conclusion." Much to the same effect the Judicial Committee observed in L.A.P.O. Beilly v. C.C. Gittens, (1949) AIR PC 313 at p. 316: ..... It is important to bear in mind that neither the learned Judge nor Their Lordships'' Board is entitled to sit as a court of appeal from the decisions of a domestic tribunal such as the Stewards of the Trinidad Turf Club." Later on the Privy Council stated at p. 317: "All these matters, however, are essentially matters for the domestic tribunal to decide as it thinks right. Provided that the tribunal does not exceed its jurisdiction and acts honestly and in good faith, the court cannot intervene, even if it thinks that the penalty is severe or that a very strict standard has been applied." 13. Similarly, in Maclean v. The Workers Union,1927 M 3534 . it has been held: "It is certain, therefore, that a domestic tribunal is bound to act strictly according to its rules and is under an obligation to act honestly and in good faith. It is not suggested in the present case that the rules as they stand have not been complied with, and on the evidence before me I am quite unable to hold that the committee acted otherwise than honestly and in good faith. Indeed I was not invited to do so. It is not suggested in the present case that the rules as they stand have not been complied with, and on the evidence before me I am quite unable to hold that the committee acted otherwise than honestly and in good faith. Indeed I was not invited to do so. It is, however, contended that there are other implied rules or implied obligations, sometimes described as obligations of natural justice, which the plaintiff may invoke; for example, a rule that no person or persons should sit on the tribunal or be present at the hearing if he or they are in effect prosecutors or if he or they may fairly be suspected of a bias against the accused. It is, therefore, desirable to consider the principle on which these contentions must ultimately rest." 14. Further, in the decision rendered in Kulwant Rai Goyal v. Disciplinary Authority, Punjab and Sind Bank,2009 SCCOnLineBom 2130 , it has been held: "12. It is well settled that in matters pertaining to the departmental enquiry interference of the Court in its writ jurisdiction is very limited. This Court will not lightly upset findings of the enquiry officer upheld by disciplinary authority unless they are perverse or not borne out by evidence." 15. In Jaisingh Choraria v. The National Sports Club of India,2013 SCCOnlineBom 932 , this Court held as under: "48. Despite the aforestated happenings in Clubs during elections and thereafter, the Court is also conscious of the fact that the Court is required to follow the principles applicable to the review of decisions of the Executive Committee of a Club as laid down in a number of decisions including T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria (supra) viz. that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is rather limited; it cannot sit as a Court of appeal from decisions of such a body; it can set aside the order of such a body, if it is shown that the said body has acted without jurisdiction or has not acted in good faith or its acts are in violation of the principles of natural justice." 16. Lastly, in Royal Western India Turf Club Ltd. & Ors v. Vinayak J. Gaekwad & Ors, (2006) 5 BCR 481 , this Court held: "29. In any case, it is a determination of domestic Tribunal. Lastly, in Royal Western India Turf Club Ltd. & Ors v. Vinayak J. Gaekwad & Ors, (2006) 5 BCR 481 , this Court held: "29. In any case, it is a determination of domestic Tribunal. Undoubtedly the domestic Tribunal is entitled to take a view which a reasonable person can arrive at on the facts before him. In the present case, the allegation was that of tampering by mixing water with urine sample. Jamadar was seen doing it. The Trainer had taken specific responsibility for any misconduct on the part of his Jamadar. This has to be noted in the context of a responsibility of a Trainer whose horse is going for a race and he knows that at the end of it urine sample is to be taken. Surely, some limited consequence is bound to follow on him. In the present case, in view of the facts as stated above, the 1st appellant-Club has held respondent No. 1 to be vicariously liable for the misconduct of the Jamadar which is admittedly established. Where on the facts of a case the domestic Tribunal takes a particular decision a Civil Court is not expected to substitute its view for that of the domestic Tribunal unless it is based on no evidence or is something which a reasonable man cannot arrive at. In that case alone, a Civil Court can have a jurisdiction to disturb the decision of the domestic Tribunal by calling it as a perverse one. In the facts of the present case, no such perversity can be alleged. Similarly, what action is taken in the case of the owner of the horse or whether the result of the race is cancelled or not is not something which can deviate one from the expectation from the Trainer which he had clearly accepted in writing. The action taken by the 1st appellant-Club cannot, therefore, be interfered on any such count." 17. As can be seen from the aforesaid findings, there can be little quarrel with the proposition that a domestic tribunal is bound to act honestly and in good faith. This Court would not interfere lightly with the decision of a domestic tribunal even if it thinks that the penalty is severe provided the domestic tribunal has acted honestly and in good faith. This Court would not interfere lightly with the decision of a domestic tribunal even if it thinks that the penalty is severe provided the domestic tribunal has acted honestly and in good faith. Moreover, where a decision is patently absurd and totally unsustainable, the affected party may be justified in inviting this Court to hold that the decision was not arrived at in good faith. Even as a matter of law, it would be undesirable to hold that a civil court has no jurisdiction to interfere where the decision is demonstrably absurd and unsustainable. The aforesaid reproduced case law makes it clear that this Court is not expected to substitute its view for that of a domestic tribunal unless the domestic tribunal''s view is based on no evidence or is a view that a reasonable man could not have arrived at. In the present case, I would be required to ascertain whether or not the Impugned Order was based on sufficient and cogent evidence and whether a due inquiry was conducted viz. whether or not the Plaintiff had notice of what he is accused of, whether or not the Plaintiff was provided with an opportunity to be heard etc. In this context, it would be apposite to quote the following from Maclean v. The Workers Union,1927 M 3534: "Speaking generally, it is useful to bear in mind the very wide differences between the principles applicable to Courts of justice and those applicable to domestic tribunals. In the former the accused is entitled to be tried by the judge according to the evidence legally adduced and has a right to be represented by a skilled legal advocate. All the procedure of a modern trial, including the examination and cross-examination of the witnesses and the summing-up, if any, is based on these two circumstances. A domestic tribunal is in general a tribunal composed of laymen. It has no power to administer an oath and, a circumstance which is perhaps of greater importance, no party has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. It is not bound by the rules of evidence; it is indeed probably ignorant of them. It may act, and it sometimes must act, on mere hearsay, and in many cases the members present or some of them (like an English jury in ancient days) are themselves both the witnesses and the judges. It is not bound by the rules of evidence; it is indeed probably ignorant of them. It may act, and it sometimes must act, on mere hearsay, and in many cases the members present or some of them (like an English jury in ancient days) are themselves both the witnesses and the judges. Before such a tribunal counsel have no right of audience and there are no effective means for testing by cross-examination the truth of the statements that may be made. The members of the tribunal may have been discussing the matter for weeks with persons not present at the hearing, and there is no one even to warn them of the danger of acting on preconceived views." And the following observations from Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration, (1943) Ch 366 "There must be due inquiry. The accused person must have notice of what he is accused. He must have an opportunity of being heard, and the decision must be honestly arrived at after he has had a full opportunity of being heard." 18. Lastly, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Apex Court, in T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria, (1963) AIR SC 1144 , has laid down that "The jurisdiction of a civil court is rather limited; it cannot obviously sit as a court of appeal from decisions of such a body; it can set aside the order of such a body, if the said body acts without jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or acts in violation of the principles of natural justice" 19. In view of the aforesaid, I am limiting my judicial scrutiny to ascertain whether or not the proceedings before the Stipendiary Stewards and Defendant No.3 were conducted honestly and in good faith. In order to aid such assessment, it would be necessary to set out in detail the events that transpired at the hearings leading to the Steward''s Order and Impugned Order. 20. At the hearing before the Stewards'', they claim to have viewed the video recordings from all angles and perspectives of the 3 races Lord Commander ran during the Mumbai Meeting 2017/2018 viz. Race Nos. 104, 177 and 230. They also claim to have viewed the video recording of Race No.196 (ADMO) to reconfirm the Plaintiff''s riding style. 20. At the hearing before the Stewards'', they claim to have viewed the video recordings from all angles and perspectives of the 3 races Lord Commander ran during the Mumbai Meeting 2017/2018 viz. Race Nos. 104, 177 and 230. They also claim to have viewed the video recording of Race No.196 (ADMO) to reconfirm the Plaintiff''s riding style. According to them, the Plaintiff apprised them that he was not aware that Lord Commander was scoped after work on 11th March, 2018 and diagnosed with EIPHS Grade-II before Race No.230. Further, the chairman of the Stewards questioned the Plaintiff on the training held on 12th March, 2018. At the questioning, the Plaintiff admitted that Lord Commander did not show any problem on 12th March, 2018 and neither did Lord Commander cough or show any signs of bleeding. At the hearing, the Plaintiff contended that despite Lord Commander being diagnosed with EIPHS Grade-II before Race No.230 and having been advised rest, Defendant No.2 decided to spurt Lord Commander on 12th March, 2018 and subsequently trotted him the next day and cantered him a day before the race. This, according to the Plaintiff, was contrary to the advice of the vet. He further contended, in his defence, that the treatment of a horse is mentioned in the race cards. However, in the present case, this was not done. In response to these arguments, the Chief Stipendiary Steward responded that that they only receive reports in respect of EIPHS Grades-III and IV. It is in the case of Grades-III and IV, that horses are subjected to statutory bans. Further, Grades I and II are not published on the race card contrary to the Plaintiff''s case. This practice was further corroborated by consulting the Senior Veterinary Officer of Defendant No.1 who concurred that in cases of EIPHS Grades-III and IV, the horse is subjected to a statutory ban and hence, this information is printed on the race card. The senior Veterinary Officer of Defendant No.1 further elaborated that EIPHS Grades-I and II are considered normal. At this stage, the records reflect that the video recording of Race No.230 was played once again. Lastly, the Plaintiff and Defendant No.2 were asked if they intend to add any further submissions. This was answered in the negative. The senior Veterinary Officer of Defendant No.1 further elaborated that EIPHS Grades-I and II are considered normal. At this stage, the records reflect that the video recording of Race No.230 was played once again. Lastly, the Plaintiff and Defendant No.2 were asked if they intend to add any further submissions. This was answered in the negative. Insofar as the riding style of the Plaintiff in Race No.230 was concerned, the Stipendiary Stewards have come to a conclusion that the Plaintiff''s riding style was not commensurate to his reputation as India''s leading jockey. They noted that the Plaintiff''s left hand was not moving in the way that it should have and that the whipping of Lord Commander was not as per his known riding style. In their considered view, the EIPHS issue was irrelevant to the present proceedings considering that it was a Grade II case and that Lord Commander had not bled. Therefore, after a thoughtful consideration and deliberations over the submissions of the Plaintiff, Defendant No.2 and the Senior Veterinary Officer of Defendant No.1 as also after perusing the video recordings of the subject Race No.230 and Race Nos. 104 and 177, the Stipendiary Stewards did not agree with the Plaintiff. They therefore passed the Steward''s Order on the basis that the Plaintiff is liable for not permitting Lord Commander to run on its own merits. 21. At the hearing before Defendant No.3, Defendant No.3 claim to have viewed the video recording of Race No.230 in regular as well as slow motion at the beginning of the hearing. At this hearing, the Plaintiff''s spokesperson requested Defendant No.3 to view the video recording. He stated that the Plaintiff jumped out and pushed and had gone towards the rails, however, the horse did not show speed in the early part probably as this was a 1,000 mtr. race as opposed to Race No.177 which was a 1,200 mtr. race. He further stated that coming into the straight, the Plaintiff kept pushing and took every possible opportunity to get into position and did everything under his control to ride Lord Commander to the best of his ability. Heavy reliance was placed on the Endoscopy Report dated 27th November, 2017. race. He further stated that coming into the straight, the Plaintiff kept pushing and took every possible opportunity to get into position and did everything under his control to ride Lord Commander to the best of his ability. Heavy reliance was placed on the Endoscopy Report dated 27th November, 2017. It was stressed that Vitamin K is prescribed to stem excessive bleeding and the fact that it was prescribed for Lord Commander, was evidence of the fact that Lord Commander was suffering from bleeding. It was once again confirmed that the Plaintiff was not aware of any medical ailment affecting Lord Commander when the Plaintiff rode Lord Commander on 15th March, 2018. Upon hearing these arguments, the Chairman of Defendant No.3 board sought the view of the Senior Veterinary Officer of Defendant No.1 as also the Equine Hospital on the Endoscopy Report dated 27th November, 2017. In response, one of the Senior Veterinary Officers of Defendant No.1 stated that on 27th November, 2017, when Lord Commander was scoped, it was found to have "thick blood spots and thin blood streaks throughout the tracheal length." Going by a "Calendar Notification", he qualified this to be EIPHS-Grade II. He substantiated his findings by explaining the difference between tracheal length and tracheal width. Post this, the Chairman of Defendant No.3 board questioned Defendant No.2 as to why he chose to scope Lord Commander on 27th November, 2017. In response to this question, Defendant No.2 responded that due to smoggy weather, Lord Commander had nasal discharge but never bled. Therefore, he chose to scope Lord Commander out of abundant caution. He further stated that Lord Commander was recommended rest along with Vitamins C and K, steam inhalation and mild antibiotics so as to avoid a secondary bacterial infection. During the course of these discussions and deliberations, one of the Senior Veterinary Officers of Defendant No.1 stated that 80% to 90% of horses are normally diagnosed with EIPHS-Grade I and II after a spurt, race or strenuous workout. In any event, he clarified that the vets merely advice and do not dictate their recommendations. A board member of Defendant No.3 thereafter asked Defendant No.2 why he followed the veterinary advice on 27th November, 2017 and not on 11th March, 2018. In any event, he clarified that the vets merely advice and do not dictate their recommendations. A board member of Defendant No.3 thereafter asked Defendant No.2 why he followed the veterinary advice on 27th November, 2017 and not on 11th March, 2018. In response, Defendant No.2 informed the member that on 11th March, 2018 he scoped Lord Commander one hour after the spurt and in any event, EIPHS-Grade II is normal as most horses, if scoped immediately after work out, would show some signs of EIPH. Defendant No.2 further volunteered that he spurted Lord Commander again on 12th March, 2018 to get an idea if there was any problem. However, at the training session on 12th March, 2018, the Plaintiff informed Defendant No.2 that the horse worked well. At this stage, the Plaintiff interjected and stated that if this were the case, Defendant No.2 ought to have gotten the horse scoped again after the spurt on 12th March, 2018 to clarify his doubts. The record further reveals that a diagram was drawn by a Doctor from Equine Hospital demonstrating how EIPHS is determined. The Plaintiff and Defendant No.2 confirmed that Lord Commander had not bled or coughed during or after the subject race on 15th March, 2018. The video recording of the race was played once again. The chairman of Defendant No.3 pointed out to the Plaintiff that the video recording reflects that he was whipping Lord Commander with one hand and restraining the horse''s progress with the other, so much so that Lord Commander had is mouth open and is trying to fight the restrain. In light of all that transpired at the hearing, the Impugned Order came to be passed concurring with the findings in the Steward''s Order. However, as this was the Plaintiff''s first offence, his punishment was reduced to a ban of 6 months. 22. In my view, the events as have transpired at the hearings leading to the Stewards'' Order and Impugned Order cannot be said to be mechanical. Further, the orders also cannot be said to have been passed with non-application of mind and/or de hors consideration of facts and/or in a mala fide manner. 22. In my view, the events as have transpired at the hearings leading to the Stewards'' Order and Impugned Order cannot be said to be mechanical. Further, the orders also cannot be said to have been passed with non-application of mind and/or de hors consideration of facts and/or in a mala fide manner. Illustratively, in the Impugned Order, Defendant No3 held "as seen in the video recording, he was whipping the horse with one hand and restraining the horse''s progress with the other hand, so much so that the horse has its mouth open and is trying to fight the restrain." 23. Having expressly held that I am only limiting myself to whether or not the Stewards'' Order and the Impugned Order were passed in good faith, I do not agree with Mr. Doctor''s reliance on the decision in Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney & Ors, (2009) 4 SCC 240 for in my view, the Impugned Order does, in fact, contain reasons. For the same reasons, his reliance on Kranti Associates Private Limited & Anr. v. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors, (2010) 9 SCC 496 and on RWITC v. Vinayak Gaikwad, (2006) 5 BCR 481 would also not further his case. In any event, the Apex Court''s decision in Kranti Associates Private Limited & Anr. v. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors, (2010) 9 SCC 496 was in respect of orders passed by a quasi-judicial body-the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. Whilst the Plaintiff has raised various contentions assailing the manner in which the proceedings were conducted by the Stipendiary Stewards and Defendant No.3, it is to be noted that these are domestic proceedings conducted by lay persons. Strict principles of judicial determination cannot and do not apply to these enquires. In this context, I draw support from the following observations of the Division Bench of this Court in their decision rendered in Royal Western India Turf Club Ltd. v. Vinayak J. Gaekwad,2006 SCCOnLineBom 881 . "28. As far as the enquiry conducted by the Committee of Stewards and the appellate proceedings are concerned, it has got to be noted that they are domestic proceedings by lay persons. Strict principles of judicial determination cannot apply to these enquiries. "28. As far as the enquiry conducted by the Committee of Stewards and the appellate proceedings are concerned, it has got to be noted that they are domestic proceedings by lay persons. Strict principles of judicial determination cannot apply to these enquiries. Although much defects are sought to be pointed in the notices and the proceedings of the enquiry, the 1st respondent has not stated any where that he did not understand as to for what purpose the enquiry was being conducted or what was the charge against him. The submissions sought to be made on the basis of the tape-recorded conversation are to point out that the decisions were premeditated and that one of the members of the Appellate Board was pressurized to act in a particular manner. These allegations are denied on an Affidavit by one Dr. Cyrus Poonawalla whom the conversation is attributed. Thus, it is a matter of word against word. Merely on the strength of the Affidavit or typed copy of the alleged conversation or the denial thereof, one cannot reach any particular conclusion. The fact remains that on the date of the incident, a preliminary enquiry was held. It was followed by a detailed enquiry wherein the 1st respondent participated and the fact also remains that there was an internal appeal made available. All the pleas, which are sought to be raised by the 1st respondent, are technical pleas to submit now in Court that he should not be connected with the act of his Jamadar." 24. As stated above, the Defendants appear to have taken an honest and bona fide view of the matter. In any event, no mala fides have been attributed against the Defendants by the Plaintiff. Further, it is not the Plaintiff''s case that he was denied his right to be heard and/or was not given a hearing at the time of the Impugned Order and/or the Steward''s Order. 25. In my view, I cannot in the facts of the present matter, interfere with the decision of a body of experts much less ascertain whether or not a race horse suffered from EIPHS of a particular grade. Whilst I have closely observed the video recordings of the subject race, I am of the considered opinion that I am not equipped to ascertain whether or not the Plaintiff prevented Lord Commander from running on its own merits. Whilst I have closely observed the video recordings of the subject race, I am of the considered opinion that I am not equipped to ascertain whether or not the Plaintiff prevented Lord Commander from running on its own merits. These are matters to be determined by experts in that field. The experts appear to have considered the evidence placed before them, they appear to have applied their mind and after a thoughtful consideration of all, have rendered their findings/punishment against the Plaintiff. At the hearing, the Stipendiary Stewards as well as Defendant No.3 have repeatedly consulted Senior Veterinary Officers of Defendant No.1. It is not as though the health of Lord Commander was completely ignored by the Stipendiary Stewards and Defendant No.3. The material placed before me reflects that during the subject race, there were officials throughout tracking the horses in an open jeep, there were video recordings of the race, there was a Stipendiary Steward observing the race on a "crows nest" viz. an elevated platform in line with the winning post and situated in plain sight of all. All these precautions are taken by the Defendant No.1 club to inter alia prevent foul play in a race. The video recording commences prior to the commencement of the race and concludes shortly after the race. The Plaintiff and Lord Commander are clearly visible during the entire tenure of the race in the video recording. These video recordings being the best and cogent evidence were admittedly considered and deliberated upon by both Defendant No.1 and Defendant No.3. In this scenario, I do not deem it necessary to substitute the findings of the experts by staying the Impugned Order. 26. In any event, the Plaintiff''s prayer for damages amounting to Rs.1,05,00,000/-is matter of trial and in the event the Plaintiff is to succeed in the trial of this Suit, he may be awarded his share of damages which would be an adequate relief. The balance of convenience therefore, does not rest with the Plaintiff in the present matter. 27. In my view, the Plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case justifying the grant of an injunction. The present Notice of Motion is therefore dismissed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 28. The balance of convenience therefore, does not rest with the Plaintiff in the present matter. 27. In my view, the Plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case justifying the grant of an injunction. The present Notice of Motion is therefore dismissed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 28. I make it clear that the observations made herein are on the basis of the arguments canvassed before me and the material currently placed before me. Needless to add, the trial of this Suit ought to be proceeded with on the basis of such and further evidence as the parties may produce and the Judge who shall finally hear and dispose of the present suit shall do so uninfluenced in any manner with the observations that may have been expressed herein at this interlocutory stage. 29. At the request of the Advocate appearing for the Plaintiff, this order will come into force on and from 12th June, 2019. Order accordingly.