JUDGMENT : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J. 1. The petitioner establishment is aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 31/08/2001 delivered by the Industrial Court Jalgaon, vide which, complaint (ULP) No. 856/99 (Old No. 28/93) filed on 08/01/1993, has been partly allowed. The operative order reads as under :- "(i) Complaint ULP No. 856/99 (Original Complt. ULP No. 28/93) is hereby partly allowed. (ii) It is hereby declared that the respondent has committed unfair labour practice under Item No. 9 of Sch. IV of the Act and directed to desist from continuing the same. (iii) The respondent is further directed to pay the wages to the complainant for the period December, 91 to 5-3-92 for which he was entitled to, as per circular dated 16/10/91, within a period of one month from the date of this order. (iv) In the facts & circumstances of the case, respondent is saddled with cost of Rs. 500/-." 2. By an order dated 27/11/2001 passed by this Court, this petition was admitted and by way of an interim relief, the impugned judgment of the Industrial Court was stayed. 3. I have considered the strenuous submissions of the learned Advocates for the respective sides. 4. The issue involved in this case is as regards the interpretation of a circular issued by the Petitioner on 16/10/1991 on the basis of a policy decision taken by the establishment, to raise the age of retirement of seasonal clerks, seasonal watchmen and daily wage labourers, from 58 years to 60 years. 4. The issue involved in this case is as regards the interpretation of a circular issued by the Petitioner on 16/10/1991 on the basis of a policy decision taken by the establishment, to raise the age of retirement of seasonal clerks, seasonal watchmen and daily wage labourers, from 58 years to 60 years. The relevant portion of the said circular which is in Marathi, is reproduced as under :- ^^¼fo"k; & gaxkeh fyihd] gaxkeh igkjsdkjh o jkstankjkojhy etwjkaps lsok fuo`Rrh;s o;kckcr] lanHkZ & lsod lfefr lHkk fn- 25-9-1991 Bjko Ø-7 fnuakd 25-9-91 losd lfefr lesr ijhr dsysY;k Bjko Ø-7 uqlkj gaxkeh fyfid] gaxkeh igkjsdkjh o jkstankjkojhy etwj ;kaps lsokfuo`Rrh;s o; 60 o"ksZ dj.ksckcrps /kksj.k Bjfo.;kr vkysys vkgs- lnj ifj=d ikjhr gks.;kiwohZ ts lsod 58 o"kkZaurj lsokeqDr >kysys vkgsr v'kk lsodkauk R;kauh vtZ dsY;kl ojhy fu;ekizek.ks eqnrok<+ R;kaps o;kps 60 o"kkZi;Zr n;koh] lnj lsodkauk dkekoj ?ksrkuk ekaxhy Fkdckdh ckcr dks.krkgh fopkj dsyk tkÅ u;s- lacf/kr lsod 'kkjhfjd n`"V;k vik= vlY;kl r'kk izdkjs lacf/kr lsodkl ys[kh dyfo.;kr ;kos o R;kapk [kqyklk izkIr d:u uarjps vafre fu.kZ; /;kok- ¼osy izalaxh vko';drk HkklY;kl i.ku egkla?kkus lacf/ke lsodkaph oS|dh; rikl.kh 'kkldh; :X.kky;knzokjs d:u /;koh½ dks.kR;kgh ifjfLFkhrhr vik= vkf.k 'kkjhfjdn`"V;k dk;Z dj.;kl vleFkZ vlysY;k lsodkuk dkekoj BsÅ u;as-^^ 5. It is undisputed that the respondent attained the age of retirement at 58 years as per the existing service conditions, on 05/03/1990. It is equally undisputed that on attaining the age of 58 years, such seasonal clerks, watchmen and daily wage labourers would be deemed to have attained the age of superannuation. 6. After the petitioner introduced the circular on 16/10/1991, the original complainant moved an application on 01/11/1991 praying to the petitioner that since he had not completed the age of 60 years, he may be considered for reemployment as he would complete 60 years of age on 05/03/1992. The petitioner called upon the complainant by its communication dated 6-9/12/1991 to produce a medical fitness certificate. The complainant produced his medical certificate with another application dated 19/12/1991. As the petitioner did not induct the complainant in employment, he preferred his ULP complaint on 08/01/1993 under Section 28(1) of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 alleging that the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice and he should be granted wages for the said period of two years with all consequential benefits. 7. As the petitioner did not induct the complainant in employment, he preferred his ULP complaint on 08/01/1993 under Section 28(1) of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 alleging that the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice and he should be granted wages for the said period of two years with all consequential benefits. 7. The learned Advocate for the petitioner strenuously submits that though the circular does not specifically prescribe a cut off date, it is to be presumed that as the Management took a policy decision of increasing the age of retirement to 60 years, such a policy decision has to be made applicable prospectively. He further submits that a person who has hardly two months or three months for attaining the age of 60 years and who has already been retired at the age of 58 years, before the circular was issued, cannot be held to be eligible for re-employment. 8. I find from the circular reproduced above that the Management has not made the said circular applicable with prospective effect. It passed a resolution on 15/09/1991 concluding that the age of retirement of the seasonal clerks, watchmen and daily wage workers should be increased from 58 to 60 years. It was a policy decision taken by virtue of the resolution No.7 dated 15/09/1991. 9. Two factors emerge from the said circular. (a) Firstly, as regards the eligibility of the already superannuated employees is concerned, such employees would get the benefit of the circular till they complete the age of 60 years. It would mean that those persons who have already superannuated, but have not completed 60 years of age, would be eligible for re-employment till they complete 60 years of age. The circular does not mention as regards whether a superannuated employee, who may have only a month or two left for attaining the age of 60 years, would not be eligible. As such, the circular will have to be read as it is without attempting to read something that does not meet the eye. (b) Secondly, that those workers, who are physically unfit to be reinstated, would be ineligible. If necessary, they could be medically examined to assess whether they are physically fit to be re-inducted in service. Any candidate who is physically unfit, was specifically disqualified for such re-employment. 10. (b) Secondly, that those workers, who are physically unfit to be reinstated, would be ineligible. If necessary, they could be medically examined to assess whether they are physically fit to be re-inducted in service. Any candidate who is physically unfit, was specifically disqualified for such re-employment. 10. In view of the above, I do not find that the circular makes a distinction as regards the length of service available after superannuation at the age of 58 years and therefore, there could be no comparison between, an employee who may have a little less than two years for reinstatement, with an employee who may have just a month or two left for attaining the age of 60 years. 11. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has however, canvassed the issue of delay by which the complainant approached the Industrial Court. It cannot be ignored that the petitioner had actually decided to consider the case of the complainant by directing him to produce a medical certificate which he has so done on 19/12/1991. He approached the Industrial Court on 08/01/1993 when he had already attained the age of 60 years on 05/03/1992. The limitation period prescribed for filing the ULP complaint under Section 28(1) of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 is 90 days and if there is a delay of any nature whatsoever, an application for seeking condonation of delay was necessary under Regulation 101 of the Industrial Court Regulations, 1975. 12. The learned Advocate for the complainant submits that since a recurring cause of action is involved, the law of limitation would not be applicable. 13. I find from the record that after the complainant tendered the medical fitness certificate, he became eligible from 20/12/1991 for re-employment till 04/03/1992. The cause of action can be said to be recurring in between 20/12/1991 and 04/03/1992, after which the complainant could not have been reinstated on any day. From 05/03/1992, the complainant was rendered disqualified for reinstatement as he had completed 60 years of age. Even if 05/03/1992 was the date for reference as regards the cause of action, the complainant should have filed his ULP complaint within 90 days from 05/03/1992 and after 05/06/1992, his complaint was barred by limitation. Unless an application for seeking condonation of delay was filed, the complaint would not have been tenable. 14. Even if 05/03/1992 was the date for reference as regards the cause of action, the complainant should have filed his ULP complaint within 90 days from 05/03/1992 and after 05/06/1992, his complaint was barred by limitation. Unless an application for seeking condonation of delay was filed, the complaint would not have been tenable. 14. It is obvious that the complainant did not file an application for condonation of delay even after the petitioner filed its written statement pointing out that the complainant suffers from delay and there is no application for condonation. 15. The learned Advocate for the complainant points out that he had specifically stated in paragraph 11 of the complaint that the complaint was filed within limitation and the cause of action arises on day to day basis. 16. The Industrial Court has framed an issue as regards limitation and has concluded that as the complainant was praying only for unpaid wages upto 04/03/1992, the non payment of such wages would be a recurring cause of action. I am, however, not inclined to entertain this objection after a passage of about 18 years and when this Court has admitted this petition. 17. It is crystalized law that when it comes to condonation of delay, a Court must adopt a pragmatic approach rather than taking a pedantic view. The Honourable Apex Court has observed in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v/s. Katiji, (1987) AIR SC 1353 in paragraph No. 3 which reads as under :- 3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that :- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that :- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the 'State' the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology, imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology, imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The Courts therefore have to informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do evenhanded justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides." 18. The learned Single Judge of this Court, in the matter of Maharashtra State Co-operative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation Ltd.& Ors. Vs. Maharashtra State Co-operative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation Employees Union and others, (1992) 1 CurLR 350, has held that the type of Unfair Labour Practices covered under Items 6 and 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 are continuing or recurring unfair labour practices and therefore the complaint cannot be said to be barred by limitation. The learned Division Bench of this Court, in the matter of Kamani Tubes Ltd. Vs. Kamani Employees Union and another, (1987) MhLJ 861, has held that when an employer fails to implement an award, settlement or agreement, such failure would fall within the mischief of unfair labour practices under item 9 and would amount to a recurring cause of action. The learned Division Bench of this Court, in the matter of Warden and Company (India) Limited Bombay Vs. Akhil Maharashtra Kamgar Union, Thane, (2001) 2 CurLR 359, concluded that non payment of wages would amount to a continuous cause of action. The learned Division Bench of this Court, in the matter of Warden and Company (India) Limited Bombay Vs. Akhil Maharashtra Kamgar Union, Thane, (2001) 2 CurLR 359, concluded that non payment of wages would amount to a continuous cause of action. 19. In view of the above, I do not find that the condonation of delay ordered by the Industrial Court could be interfered with, in the interest of justice. Nevertheless, I find it appropriate to record that in any matter wherein the cause of action may be crystalized on a particular date or may be of recurring nature or continuous nature, an application for seeking condonation of delay before the Labour Court or the Industrial Court, as the case may be, shall be necessary in order to enable the concerned Court to pass a formal judicial order of condonation of delay pursuant to which such a ULP complaint could be registered. 20. Insofar as the refusal by the petitioner to grant reemployment to the complainant with effect from 20/12/91, after he was declared medically fit to resume duties, is concerned, I find that the circular which does not exclude employees like the complainant herein, would be applicable to his case. He was entitled for only 74 days wages payable to a seasonal clerk, keeping in view that he was eligible to be appointed from 20/12/91. Since the complainant had approached the Industrial Court with a delay of about 8 months, the Industrial Court deprived him of the interest component, though cost of Rs. 500/- were saddled upon the petitioner. 21. In view of the above, after considering the delay aspect, I find that the Industrial Court has rightly deprived the complainant of any interest on unpaid wages. At the same time, the Industrial Court should not have imposed cost of Rs. 500/- upon the Manager, after noting that the complaint was belatedly filed. 22. As such, this petition is partly allowed only to the extent of setting aside the direction of imposition of costs. 23. The respondent complainant would be entitled for 74 days wages for the period 20/12/1991 till 04/03/1992 (both days inclusive) at the rate of those wages which were payable to seasonal clerks at the relevant time. 22. As such, this petition is partly allowed only to the extent of setting aside the direction of imposition of costs. 23. The respondent complainant would be entitled for 74 days wages for the period 20/12/1991 till 04/03/1992 (both days inclusive) at the rate of those wages which were payable to seasonal clerks at the relevant time. The petitioner shall, therefore, make the payment to the respondent, either directly or by depositing the amount in this Court with notice to the learned Advocate for the respondent, within 60 days. If deposited in this Court, the complainant would withdraw the said amount, unconditionally. 24. Rule is made partly absolute in the above terms.