Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 1263 (ALL)

Brijesh Singh v. State of U. P.

2019-05-09

AJAI LAMBA, ANANT KUMAR

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. This is second application under Section 389, Cr.P.C. for suspension of sentence of the applicant-appellant. 2. Applicant-appellant was convicted and sentenced vide judgment and orders dated 6th May, 2011 for committing offence under Section 302/34, IPC to undergo R.I. for life and under Section 3(1) of Gangsters Act to undergo three years' R.I. Fine was also imposed vide order of sentence. 3. It has been pointed out by learned counsel for the applicant-appellant Mr. Sushil Kumar Singh, Advocate, that applicant-appellant Brijesh Singh alias Babloo Singh is facing prosecution since February, 2007. The applicant-appellant has been in custody since 8th March, 2007. It has also been pointed out before the Court that long undergone period of 12 years itself entitles the applicant/appellant to bail. It has been asserted on behalf of the applicant-appellant that right to speedy trial is vested in the appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Trial would include disposal of the appeal against conviction. It has been pointed out by learned counsel for the applicant-appellant that presently criminal appeals of 1982 are being listed in the Court. The present case is not likely to come up for hearing for decades. Manifest injustice would be caused to the applicant-appellant if the applicant-appellant is not released on bail. It has also been argued that in case the applicant-appellant is acquitted, the acquittal would be meaningless in view of long period of incarceration. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to dispute that the applicant-appellant has been in custody since 8th March, 2007. It has also not been disputed that appeals of 1980's are being listed for adjudication, presently. 5. We have considered the custody period of the applicant-appellant in context of his prayer for his suspension of sentence under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Before we proceed further, we would like to refer to the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in context of right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Before we proceed further, we would like to refer to the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in context of right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In this regard we would like to refer to (2001) 4 SCC 355 : ( AIR 2001 SC 1528 ), Akhtari Bi (Smt.) v. State of M.P. (2JJ.); (2005) SCC (Cri) 1674 : ( AIR 2005 SC 3669 ), Surinder Singh alias Shingara Singh v. State of Punjab (2 JJ.); (2002) (4) SCC 578 : ( AIR 2002 SC 1856 ), P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (5 JJ.); (1978) 1 SCC 579 : ( AIR 1978 SC 527 ), Babu Singh and others v. State of U.P. (2JJ.); (2001) 10 SCC 463 , Takht Singh and others v. State of M.P. (2JJ.); Special Leave to Appeal (Cri.) No. 2356 of 2010, Kushal Singh v. State of U.P. (2JJ.) and (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 270 : (2012) 5 SCC 752 , Fazal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2JJ.). 6. In Akhtari Bi's case AIR 2001 SC 1528 ) (supra) the following has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India:- "5. To have speedy justice is a fundamental right which flows from Article 21 of the Constitution. Prolonged delay in disposal of the trials and thereafter appeals in criminal cases, for no fault of the accused, confers a right upon him to apply for bail. This Court has, time and again, reminded the executive of their obligation to appoint requisite number of Judges to cope with the ever-increasing pressure on the existing judicial apparatus. Appeal being a statutory right, the trial court's verdict does not attain finality during pendency of the appeal and for that purpose his trial is deemed to be continuing despite conviction. It is unfortunate that even from the existing strength of the High Courts huge vacancies are not being filled up with the result that the accused in criminal cases are languishing in the jails for no fault of theirs. It is unfortunate that even from the existing strength of the High Courts huge vacancies are not being filled up with the result that the accused in criminal cases are languishing in the jails for no fault of theirs. In the absence of prompt action under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies, it is incumbent upon the high courts to find ways and means by taking steps to ensure the disposal of criminal appeals, particularly such appeals where the accused are in jails, that the matters are disposed of within the specified period not exceeding 5 years in any case. Regular benches to deal with the criminal cases can be set up where such appeals be listed for final disposal. We feel that if an appeal is not disposed of within the aforesaid period of 5 years, for no fault of the convicts, such convicts may be released on bail on such conditions as may be deemed fit and proper by the Court. In computing the period of 5 years, the delay for any period, which is requisite in preparation of the record and the delay attributable to the convict or his counsel can be deducted. There may be cases where even after the lapse of 5 years the convicts may, under the special circumstances of the case, be held not entitled to bail pending the disposal of the appeals filed by them. We request the Chief Justices of the High Courts, where the criminal cases are pending for more than 5 years to take immediate effective steps for their disposal by constituting regular and special benches for that purpose." (Emphasized by us) 7. In Surinder Singh alias Shingara Singh's case AIR 2005 SC 3669 ) (supra) the following has been held in paras (8, 9, 10, 11, 12):- "8. It is no doubt true that this Court has repeatedly emphasized the fact that speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 of the Constitution. The aforesaid Article confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair, or just, such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair, or just, such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. It has also been emphasized by this Court that the procedure so prescribed must ensure a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. It is conceded that some amount of deprivation of personal liberty cannot be avoided, but if the period of deprivation pending trial becomes unduly long, the fairness assured by Article 21 would receive a jolt. These are observations made in several decisions of this Court dealing with the subject of speedy trial. In this case, we are concerned with the case where a person has been found guilty of an offence punishable under Section 302. IPC and who has been sentenced to imprisonment for life. The Code of Criminal Procedure affords a right of appeal to such a convict. The difficulty arises when the appeal preferred by such a convict cannot be disposed of within a reasonable time. In Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 2147 ) this Court dealt with such a case. It is observed: SCC pp. 292-93, para 2 (at pp. 2148-2149 para 2 of AIR) "The practice not to release on bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment was evolved in the High Courts and in this Court on the basis that once a person has been found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, he should not be let loose, so long as his conviction and sentence are not set aside, but the underlying postulate of this practice was that the appeal of such person would be disposed of within a measurable distance of time, so that if he is ultimately found to be innocent, he would not have to remain in jail for an unduly long period. The rationale of this practice can have no application where the Court is not in a position to dispose of the appeal for five or six years. It would indeed be a travesty of justice to keep a person in jail for a period of five or six years for an offence which is ultimately found not to have been committed by him. Can the Court ever compensate him for his incarceration which is found to be unjustified? It would indeed be a travesty of justice to keep a person in jail for a period of five or six years for an offence which is ultimately found not to have been committed by him. Can the Court ever compensate him for his incarceration which is found to be unjustified? Would it be just at all for the Court to tell a person: "We have admitted your appeal because we think you have a prima facie case, but unfortunately we have no time to hear your appeal for quite a few years and, therefore, until we hear your appeal, you must remain in jail, even though you may be innocent?" What confidence would such administration of justice inspire in the mind of the public? It may quite conceivably happen, and it has in fact happened in a few cases in this Court, that a person may serve out his full term of imprisonment before his appeal is taken up for hearing. Would a Judge not be overwhelmed with a feeling of contrition while acquitting such a person after hearing the appeal? Would it not be an affront to his sense of justice? Of what avail would the acquittal be to such a person who has already served out his term of imprisonment or at any rate a major part of it? It is therefore, absolutely essential that the practice which this Court has been following in the past must be reconsidered and so long as this Court is not in a position to hear the appeal of an accused within a reasonable period of time, the Court should ordinarily, unless there are cogent grounds for acting otherwise, release the accused on bail in cases where special leave has been granted to the accused to appeal against his conviction and sentence". 9. Similar observations are found in some of the other decisions of this Court which have been brought to our notice. But, however, it is significant to note that all these decisions only lay down broad guidelines which the Courts must bear in mind while dealing with an application for grant of bail to an appellant before the Court. None of the decisions lay down any invariable rule for grant of bail on completion of a specified period of detention in custody. None of the decisions lay down any invariable rule for grant of bail on completion of a specified period of detention in custody. Indeed in a discretionary matter, like grant or refusal of bail, it would be impossible to lay down any invariable rule or evolve a strait jacket formula. The Court must exercise its discretion having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances. What the relevant facts and circumstances are, which the Court must keep in mind, has been laid down over the years by the Courts in this country in large number of decisions which are well known. It is, therefore, futile to attempt to lay down any invariable rule or formula in such matters. 10. The counsel for the parties submitted before us that though it has been so understood by the Courts in Punjab, the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dharampal case (2000 (1) CLR 74) only lays down guidelines and not any invariable rule. Unfortunately, the decision has been misunderstood by the Court in view of the manner in which the principles have been couched in the aforesaid judgment. After considering the various decisions of this Court and the difficulties faced by the Courts, the High Court in Dharampal case observed: (Chan LR p. 87 para 18) "We therefore, direct that life convicts, who have undergone at least five years of imprisonment of which at least three years should be after conviction, should be released on bail pending the hearing of their appeals should they make an application for this purpose. We are also of the opinion that the same principles ought to apply to those convicted by the Courts Martial and such prisoners should also be entitled to release after seeking a suspension of their sentences. We further direct that the period of five years would be reduced to four for females and minors, with at least two years imprisonment after conviction. We however, clarify that these directions shall not be applicable in cases where the very grant of bail is forbidden by law". 11. We agree with the submission urged before us that the directions contained in the aforesaid judgment of the High Court are only in the nature of guidelines and the High Court should not be understood to have laid down an invariable rule to be observed with mathematical precision. 11. We agree with the submission urged before us that the directions contained in the aforesaid judgment of the High Court are only in the nature of guidelines and the High Court should not be understood to have laid down an invariable rule to be observed with mathematical precision. In fact in the very first paragraph of the judgment the learned Judges observed that they were making "an attempt to frame certain guidelines" for the grant of bail. Difficulties may arise if such a direction is treated as an invariable rule in the matter of grant of discretionary relief. The rule laid down in Dharampal case may be inferentially understood to mean that unless a convict has undergone five years imprisonment, he should not be released on bail. This would again lead to travesty of justice, because in a given case having regard to the evidence on record and the reasoning of the Court convicting the accused, the High Court in an appeal may well be persuaded and justified in granting bail to the appellant even while admitting his appeal. 12. We therefore, hold that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Dharampal case laid down guidelines which ought to be kept in mind by Courts dealing with applications for grant of bail in a pending appeal. It does not lay down any hard-and-fast rule of universal application. As we have observed earlier, it would be futile to lay down any strait jacket formula in such matters." (Emphasized by us) 8. In P. Ramachandra Rao's case AIR 2002 SC 1856 ) (supra) the following (relevant) has been held:- "No person shall be deprived of his life or his personal liberty except according to procedure established by law - declares Article 21 of the Constitution. Life and liberty, the words employed in shaping Article 21, by the founding fathers of the Constitution, are not to be read narrowly in the sense drearily dictated by dictionaries; they are organic terms to be construed meaningfully. Embarking upon the interpretation thereof, feeling the heart-throb of the preamble, deriving strength from the directive principles of State policy and alive to their constitutional obligation, the courts have allowed Article 21 to stretch its arms as wide as it legitimately can. Embarking upon the interpretation thereof, feeling the heart-throb of the preamble, deriving strength from the directive principles of State policy and alive to their constitutional obligation, the courts have allowed Article 21 to stretch its arms as wide as it legitimately can. The mental agony, expense and strain which a person proceeded against in criminal law has to undergo and which, coupled with delay, may result in impairing the capability or ability of the accused to defend himself have persuaded the constitutional courts of the country in holding the right to speedy trial a manifestation of fair, just and reasonable procedure enshrined in Article 21. Speedy trial, again, would encompass within its sweep all its stages including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial - in short everything commencing with an accusation and expiring with the final verdict - the two being respectively the terminus a quo and terminus ad quern - of the journey which an accused must necessarily undertake once faced with an implication." (Emphasized by us) 9. We have also taken into account the judgment rendered in Babu Singh's case: AIR 1978 SC 527 ) (supra) by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in which the following has been held:- "15. Another relevant factor is as to whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. 16. Thus the legal principle and practice validate the court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is a lying for bail to find whether he has a bad record-particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance. 17. In regard to habituals it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance. 17. The significance and sweep of Art. 21 make the deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern and permissible only when the law authorising it is reasonable, even-handed and geared to the goals of community good and State necessity spelt out in Art. 19. Indeed, the considerations I have set out as criteria are germane to the constitutional proposition I have deduced. Reasonableness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose, but for the bi-focal interests of justice-to the individual involved and society affected. 18. We must weigh the contrary factors to answer the test of reasonableness, subject to the need for securing the presence of the bail applicant. It makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare or present his case than one remanded in custody. And if public justice is to be promoted. Mechanical detention should be demoted. In the United States, which has a constitutional perspective close to ours, the function of bail is limited, 'community roots' of the applicant are stressed and, after the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project, monetary suretyship is losing ground. The considerable public expense in keeping in custody where no danger of disappearance or disturbance can arise, is not a negligible consideration. Equally important is the deplorable condition, verging on the inhuman, of our sub-jails, that the unrewarding cruelty and expensive custody of avoidable incarceration makes refusal of bail unreasonable and a policy favouring release justly sensible. 19. A few other weighty factors deserve reference. All deprivation of liberty is validated by social defense and individual correction along an anti-criminal direction. Public justice is central to the whole scheme of bail law. Fleeing justice must be forbidden but punitive harshness should be minimised. Restorative devices to redeem the man, even through community service, meditative drill, study classes or other resources should be innovated, and playing foul with public peace by tampering with evidence, intimidating witnesses or committing offences while on judicially sanctioned 'free enterprise?, should be provided against. Fleeing justice must be forbidden but punitive harshness should be minimised. Restorative devices to redeem the man, even through community service, meditative drill, study classes or other resources should be innovated, and playing foul with public peace by tampering with evidence, intimidating witnesses or committing offences while on judicially sanctioned 'free enterprise?, should be provided against. No seeker of justice shall play confidence tricks on the court or community. Thus, conditions may be hung around bail orders, not to cripple but to protect. Such is the holistic jurisdiction and humanistic orientation invoked by the judicial discretion correlated to the values of our Constitution. 20. Viewed from this perspective, we gain a better insight into the rules of the game. When a person, charged with a grave offence, has been acquitted at a stage, has the intermediate acquittal pertinence to a bail plea when the appeal before; This Court pends? Yes, it has. The panic which might prompt the accused to jump the gauntlet of justice is less, having enjoyed the confidence of the court's verdict once. Concurrent holdings of guilt have the opposite effect. Again, the ground for denial of provisional release becomes weaker where the fact stares us in the fact that a fair finding-if that be so innocence has been recorded by one court. It may be conclusive, for the judgment of acquittal may be ex facie wrong, the likelihood of desperate reprisal, if enlarged, may be a deterrent and his own safety may be more in prison than in the vengeful village where feuds have provoked the violent offence. It depends. Antecedents of the man and socio-geographical circumstances have a bearing only from this angle. Police exaggerations of prospective misconduct of the accused, if enlarged, must be soberly sized up lest danger of excesses and injustice creep subtly into the discretionary curial technique. Bad record and police prediction of criminal prospects to invalidate the bail plea are admissible in principle but shall not stampede the court into a complacent refusal. 21. Realism is a component of humanism which is the heart of the legal system. We come across cases where parties have already suffered 3.4 and in one case ("the other day it was unearthed') over 10 years in prison. These persons may perhaps be acquitted-difficult to guess. 21. Realism is a component of humanism which is the heart of the legal system. We come across cases where parties have already suffered 3.4 and in one case ("the other day it was unearthed') over 10 years in prison. These persons may perhaps be acquitted-difficult to guess. If they are, the injustice of innocence long in rigorous incarceration inflicted by the protraction of curial processes is an irrevocable injury. And, taking a pragmatic view, while life imprisonment may, in law, last a whole life, in practice it hardily survives ten years, thanks to rules of remission. Thus, at the worst, the prisoner may have to serve some more years, and, at the best, law is vicariously guilty of dilatory deprivation of citizen's liberty, a consummation vigilantly to be vetoed. So, a circumstance of some consequence, when considering a motion for bail, is the period in prison already spent and the prospect of the appeal being delayed for hearing, having regard to the suffocating crowd of dockets pressing before the few Benches." (Emphasized by us) 10. In the case of Takht Singh's case (supra) the following has been held:- "1. Leave granted. 2. The appellants have been convicted under Section 302/149, I.P.C. by the learned Sessions Judge and have been sentenced to imprisonment for life. Against the said conviction and sentence their appeal to the High Court is pending. Before the High Court application for suspension of sentence and bail was filed but the High Court rejected that prayer indicating therein that the applicants can renew their prayer for bail after one year. After the expiry of one year the second application was filed but the same has been rejected by the impugned order. It is submitted that the appellants are already in jail for over 3 years and 3 months. There is no possibility of early hearing of the appeal in the High Court. In the aforesaid circumstances the applicants be released on bail to the satisfaction of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Sehore. The appeal is disposed of accordingly." (Emphasized by us) 11. In the case of Kushal Singh's case (supra) the following has been held:- "Heard Mr. V.K. Shukla, counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Ratnakar Dash, senior advocate appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh. Sehore. The appeal is disposed of accordingly." (Emphasized by us) 11. In the case of Kushal Singh's case (supra) the following has been held:- "Heard Mr. V.K. Shukla, counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Ratnakar Dash, senior advocate appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh. The petitioner is serving out a life sentence having been convicted by the trial court under Section 302, apart from some other ancillary Sections of the Indian Penal Code. Against the judgment of the trial court, he preferred an appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 6243/2003) before the Allahabad High Court. The appeal was preferred in the year 2003 and it remains pending till date. The petitioner was arrested on July 15, 2002, two or three days after the commission of the offence. Since then, he remains continuously in jail and has, thus, completed slightly over eight years of imprisonment. It appears that he made a prayer for bail before the Allahabad High Court, which was dismissed on January 13, 2010. While dismissing the bail application, the Court observed that the lower court records were received and directed the office to list the case for final hearing after preparing the paper book within a period of four weeks from the date of the order. The appeal, however, was not listed for hearing, as directed by the Bench, presumably on account of the heavy pendency of such matters before the High Court-As noted above, the petitioner has remained in jail now for over eight years and there is no likelihood of an early hearing of the appeal by the High Court. In these facts and circumstances, the petitioner deserves to be released on bail so that his appeal before the High Court may not completely lose its purpose and meaningfulness. The petitioner is. accordingly, directed to be released on bail on his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 30,000/- with two sureties each of the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of." (Emphasized by us) 12. In the case of Fazal's case (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has been held as under:- "Application for exemption from filing Official Translation is allowed. Leave granted. Delay condoned. As the appellant has already served a period of more than 5 years of sentence, in our opinion, the appellant deserves to be released on bail. In the case of Fazal's case (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has been held as under:- "Application for exemption from filing Official Translation is allowed. Leave granted. Delay condoned. As the appellant has already served a period of more than 5 years of sentence, in our opinion, the appellant deserves to be released on bail. Accordingly, we direct that, during the pendency of the appeal, the appellant be released on bail, subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court." (Emphasized by us) 13. The law on the issue of suspension of sentence in view of long custody period, wherein the appeal is not likely to be heard in near future appears to be clear from the above noted judgments. 14. From the above noted judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India it becomes evident that right to speedy trial is enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Speedy trial would include investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial etc. i.e. everything commencing with the accusation against the accused, and expiring with the final verdict of the last court. It has further been held in law that if a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair, or just, such deprivation would be violative of bis fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The procedure so prescribed must ensure speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. Some amount of deprivation of personal liberty cannot be avoided, but if the period of deprivation pending trial becomes unduly long, the fairness assured by Article 21 of the Constitution of India would receive a jolt. The practice not to release on bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment so long as his conviction and sentence are not set aside is on the premise that the appeal of such person would be disposed of within a measurable distance of time, so that if he is ultimately found to be innocent, he would not have to remain in jail for an unduly long period. The rationale of this practice can have no application where the court is not in a position to dispose of the appeal for 5 or 6 years for an offence which is ultimately found not to have been committed by him. The court, in such circumstances can never compensate him for his incarceration. The rationale of this practice can have no application where the court is not in a position to dispose of the appeal for 5 or 6 years for an offence which is ultimately found not to have been committed by him. The court, in such circumstances can never compensate him for his incarceration. In case of such long incarceration the acquittal would to some extent be meaningless. It has been held that in the matter of suspending the sentence pending appeal the court should consider the following guidelines vis. unless a life convict has undergone 5 years imprisonment, he should not be released on bail. In a given case, however, having regard to the evidence on record and reasoning of the court convicting the accused, the High Court in an appeal may be persuaded and justified in granting bail to the appellant even while admitting his appeal. Period of 5 years would be reduced to four years for females and minors. These guidelines shall not be applicable in cases where the very grant of bail is forbidden in law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has clarified that the above noted periods be considered as guidelines and should not be understood to have laid down an invariable rule to be observed with mathematical precision. There may be cases where even after lapse of 5 years the convicts may, under the special circumstances of the case, be held not entitled to bail pending the disposal of the appeals filed by them. Above extracted portions from judgments also indicate that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a number of cases without adverting to the facts of the case, or reasons for conviction, suspended the sentence solely on the ground that appellant had already been in jail for three years and three months, varying up to 8 years. In these orders the only reason assigned for grant of bail and suspension of sentence under Section 389 Criminal Procedure Code is the period under gone by the life convict. 15. From the above it is evident that it has been consistently held that while considering a motion for bail, the period already spent in prison and the prospect of the appeal being delayed for hearing, in view of large pendency, is a relevant criteria. 15. From the above it is evident that it has been consistently held that while considering a motion for bail, the period already spent in prison and the prospect of the appeal being delayed for hearing, in view of large pendency, is a relevant criteria. It is in these circumstances we are required to consider the delay that is likely to be caused in hearing and disposal of the appeal. 16. Considering the long period of incarceration and the fact that the present appeal is not likely to be disposed of for decades, we hereby allow the application. 17. Applicant-appellant Brijesh Singh alias Babloo Singh s/o. Sri Kailash Nath Singh is directed to be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Court concerned. 18. Heavy surety. 19. It is made clear that in case applicant-appellant indulges in committing any other offence, the prosecution would be at liberty to seek cancellation of bail granted by virtue of this Court's order.