JUDGMENT : Mir Alfaz Ali, J. This second appeal is by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge, Karimganj in Title Appeal No. 86/2003, whereby the learned Civil Judge dismissing the appeal filed by the plaintiff, upheld the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court in T.S. No. 139/2000. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit (T.S. No. 139/2000) for declaration of title, confirmation of possession and permanent injunction. Pleaded case of the plaintiff was that land measuring 2 powas 4 josties falling on the northern part of the suit land was originally owned by Makkadas Ali and Makkadas Ali sold the said land to Najafat Ali by registered sale deed on 05- 03-1952. Najafat Ali sold the said 2 powas 4 josties of land along with other land to one Umar Ali and delivered possession and Umar Ali had been possessing the said land since 1952. Later on said Umar Ali and his wife sold the suit land along with other land to Mubarak Ali and Partina Bibi by registered deed. After death of her husband, by family partition, Partina Bibi became the owner of the suit land. Thereafter, Partina Bibi by registered sale deed dated 19-05-1975 sold the suit land to Mohibur Rahman and delivered possession. Najafat Ali filed a suit in the year 1968 against Mahibur, Partina, Mubarak and others in respect of the suit land along with other land seeking declaration of title and other reliefs, which was dismissed. After dismissal of the suit, Najafat Ali executed a registered deed of relinquishment in favour of Habib, Mohibur and others. Plaintiff purchased the suit land from Mohibur and his legal heirs in 1983 and 2000 respectively. The defendants inspite of having no right, title and interest over the suit land started interfering with the possession of the plaintiff and hence, the plaintiff filed the suit. 3. Pleaded case of the defendant was that Nafajat Ali was the original owner of the suit land, who sold 2 powas 5 josties of land to Surman Ali and Makkadas Ali and handed over possession to them. Nafajat Ali also sold 11.5 josties of land to said Surman and Makaddas. After partition between Mukaddas and Surman, Surman Ali sold 11.5. josties of the land being part of the suit land to defendant No. 1 Abdur Rashid @ Haloo by registered deed in 1968. Nafajat Ali also sold 11.5 josties of land to said Surman and Makaddas. After partition between Mukaddas and Surman, Surman Ali sold 11.5. josties of the land being part of the suit land to defendant No. 1 Abdur Rashid @ Haloo by registered deed in 1968. Nafajat Ali also sold one powas of land to the father of defendant No. 1, Sarafat Ali on 26.05.1957. After death of Sarafat Ali, the land purchased by him, devolved upon his son, the defendant no. 1. During last settlement the suit land was included in dag no. 736 and 737. It was also stated that during the re-settlement, though the name of Najafat Ali was wrongly recorded in the Jamabandi in respect of dag no. 736 along with Basaral Ali, Najafat Ali had no interest or title over the said land, inasmuch as, he transferred the said land, as back as in the year 1968 by registered deed. It was also stated that Mohibur Rahman had no right, title and interest over the suit land, and therefore, plaintiff also did not acquire any title over the suit property. Though the sale deed no. 1070 was created by collusion, the plaintiff never possessed the suit land. It was also stated that the defendants were neither parties in the suit filed by Najafat Ali, nor the present suit land was involved in the suit filed by Najafat Ali in 1968. The specific case of the defendant was that the sale deed No. 1070 on the basis of which, the plaintiff claims title was collusive and they did not acquire any title over the suit land. On the basis of the above pleadings the learned trial court framed the following issues :- "1. Whether there is any cause of action for the suit ? 2. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and manner ? 3. Whether the plaintiff has any right, title, interest and possession over the suit land? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs claimed for?" 4. Both the parties adduced evidence and after hearing the parties, learned trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred the first appeal, which also stood dismissed. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate court, the plaintiff/appellant preferred the instant second appeal. 6. Both the parties adduced evidence and after hearing the parties, learned trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred the first appeal, which also stood dismissed. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate court, the plaintiff/appellant preferred the instant second appeal. 6. The appeal was admitted to be heard on the following substantial questions of law : "1. Whether in order to acquire title over the property purchased by executing the registered sale deed, actual physical delivery of possession of the land in question is a condition precedent of sale as described in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1982 ? 2. Whether the finding of the courts below that the appellant could not prove physical possession over the suit land was perverse ?" 7. I have heard Mr. P.P. Baruah, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. A. Sharif for the respondent. 8. During the course of argument, it was contended by Mr. P.P. Baruah that the substantial question No. 1 is not a substantial question of law in view of the clear provision of Section 54 of the T.P. Act as well as various decisions of this Court including Manmoth Ranjan Trivedi -Vs- Gopal Krishna, T.E. Co.(P) Ltd., (2006) 2 GauLJ 446, 2006 (2) GAULR 565 , 2006 Gau LT 718 (SUPP), where the question, as to whether actual delivery of possession of the land is a condition precedent of the sale of immovable property value of which is Rupees one hundred and above, has been succinctly answered a number of times by this court holding, that delivery of possession is not essential for effecting transfer by sale of an immovable property, value of which is rupees hundred and above. Because the 'sale' as defined in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, provides that transfer of immovable property, value of which is Rupees one hundred and above can be effected only by a registered instrument. Delivery of possession has not been made an essential condition for sale as defined in Section 54 of the T.P.Act. (Also see Sheo Prasad Chauhanitta-Vs.- Jaya Preta & Ors, (2015) 5 GauLT 347 ). 9. Delivery of possession has not been made an essential condition for sale as defined in Section 54 of the T.P.Act. (Also see Sheo Prasad Chauhanitta-Vs.- Jaya Preta & Ors, (2015) 5 GauLT 347 ). 9. Apex Court held in Santosh Hazari-Vs.- Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) by LRS, (2001) 3 SCC 179 observed, that " to be a 'substantial', question of law, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned". Since the substantial question formulated herein has already been answered and decided by various co-ordinate bench of this Court, those precedent binds this Court, unless overruled or set aside. Apparently either of the party has not been able to show any contrary view by the Apex Court on the substantial question of law No. 1 formulated herein. In view of the above, the substantial question No. 1 is not required to be answered afresh, as it no longer remains a substantial question of law. 10. The second substantial question of law formulated with regard to the findings of the courts below regarding the possession of the plaintiff, which is essentially a question of fact and both the courts below came to the concurrent finding, that plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land. Therefore, such concurrent finding of fact is not amenable to challenge in second appeal, unless suffers from the vice of perversity. The PW-1, though, stated in his evidence-in-chief that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land, during cross-examination he even failed to tell the boundary of the suit land. The PW-2 was admittedly not a person having any land on the boundary or in the proximity of the suit land. Though he stated that plaintiff possessed the suit land for 18/20 years, he could not tell since when plaintiff was possessing the land. On the other hand, evidence of DW-1 appears to be more reliable, as he has fair knowledge of the suit land and this witness supported the possession of the suit land by the defendant. DW-2 who also supported the possession of the defendant appears to be a man having his land in the proximity of the suit land. On the other hand, evidence of DW-1 appears to be more reliable, as he has fair knowledge of the suit land and this witness supported the possession of the suit land by the defendant. DW-2 who also supported the possession of the defendant appears to be a man having his land in the proximity of the suit land. When both the courts below, having appreciated the evidence of both sides in the touch stone of preponderance of probability, came to the concurrent finding, that plaintiff was not in possession, in my considered view, such finding of fact can by no stretch of imagination be held to have suffered from the vice of perversity. Accordingly, 2nd substantial question is answered in negative. 11. The plaintiff having been held to be out of possession, learned first appellate court dismissed the suit, in view of the bar under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, inasmuch as, no further relief of recovery of possession was sought in the suit. In the instant suit, plaintiff sought for declaration and confirmation of possession. When evidently the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit property and it was in possession of the defendant, the 'further relief' as contemplated in proviso to section 34 of the Specific Relief Act would have been the relief of recovery of possession and not confirmation of possession. Admittedly no such relief was sought in the suit. Therefore, once it was held that defendant was not in possession of the suit property, no decree could be passed for mere declaration in view of the bar under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. This being the position, the finding and decision of the learned first appellate court refusing to pass a decree for mere declaration in absence of prayer for further relief of recovery of possession, cannot be faulted. 12. In view of what has been stated above, and the answer to the substantial questions of law, this second appeal appears to be without merit and accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their cost. 13. Send back the LCR.