JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India whereby and whereunder the order passed in Execution Case No.70 of 1984 by the Civil Judge (Senior Division)-II Ranchi is under challenge by which the petition dated 20.02.2018 filed on behalf of the decree-holder for enhancement of cost of deputation of the Magistrate and Police Force has been allowed. 2. The brief facts of the case of petitioners as per pleading made in the writ petition, petitioners who are judgment debtors. The respondent/plaintiff has filed a suit for specific performance of contract being Title Suit No.220 of 1982 against the common ancestors of the petitioners namely Triloky Vishwakarma @ Triloky Mistry praying for the following reliefs:- “(a) That a decree for specific performance on the agreement dated 08.05.1979 be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant and the defendant be directed to execute and get registered the Deed of Sale with respect to the properties described in the Schedule ‘A’ below within the time to be fixed by the Court, failing which the same may be executed and get registered through the Court. (b) In the alternative if the Court holds that the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for specific performance of the agreement, a decree for Rs.21,500/- on account of damages as per details given in the account below be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant. (c) That a decree for the costs of the suit interest pendentilite and future be passed. (d) That a decree for such other relief or reliefs to which the plaintiff is entitled, be passed.” The said title suit was allowed vide judgment dated 10.02.1984 (decree dated 18.02.1984) with a direction that the defendant to execute and registered the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in terms of the Exibit-3 for an area of 486 sq.ft. covering shop portion in occupation of the plaintiff within three months after receiving the balance consideration, filing which the plaintiff will be entitled to get the same executed and registered through process of court. The petitioners/judgment debtors have challenged the same before the first appellate court in First Appeal No.42 of 1984(R) which was allowed vide judgment dated 13.02.1990, in part by modification of the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in Title Suit No.220 of 1982. The petitioners/judgment debtors have challenged the same before the first appellate court in First Appeal No.42 of 1984(R) which was allowed vide judgment dated 13.02.1990, in part by modification of the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in Title Suit No.220 of 1982. The respondent thereafter, has challenged the order passed by the first appellate court under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of this Court, at that time L.P.A. was maintainable against the order passed by the first appellate court which was disposed of vide judgment dated 07.08.1997 restoring the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in consequence thereof, the execution case has been filed in the year 1984 being Execution Case No.70 of 1984 and the sale deed through process of court was executed in favour of the decree holder/respondent on 05.07.1985 and as such once the sale deed was executed, the judgment and decree has passed in Title Suit No.220 of 1982 and confirmed by the High Court in L.P.A. No.42 of 1990, have been complied with and therefore, the executing court ought to have dropped the execution proceeding but the same is still pending and continuing by passing an order for deputation of Police force for recovery of possession. The decree holder has filed petition on 20.02.2018 for deputation of Magistrate and Police force in Execution Case No.70 of 1984 which was objected to by the judgment debtor on the ground that the sale deed has already executed and symbolic possession was handed over on 24.11.2011, therefore, there cannot be any order of delivery of possession beyond the terms of the judgment and decree. The executing court has passed order on 11.09.2018 by allowing the petition dated 20.02.2018 with a direction upon the decree holder to take steps for furnishing the cost for deputation of Magistrate and Police Force. The executing court has passed order on 11.09.2018 by allowing the petition dated 20.02.2018 with a direction upon the decree holder to take steps for furnishing the cost for deputation of Magistrate and Police Force. The petitioner is questioning the jurisdiction of the executing court in proceeding with the execution proceeding even though the decree and judgment passed in the title suit has been complied with and therefore, the execution proceeding ought to have been closed but instead the same still is continued with by passing an order of deputing Magistrate and Police Force in order to provide delivery of possession and therefore, the same cannot be held to be sustainable in view of the following reasons as under: (I) The executing court cannot travel the decree and judgment and once the decree and judgment has been complied with by executing the registered deed in favour of the decree holder, the executing court cannot proceed for delivery of possession and thereby, the executing court has exceeded its jurisdiction acting contrary to the decree and judgment. (II) The plaint does not contain any prayer for delivery of possession and as such there is no decree for delivery of possession passed by the trial court. (III) Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 specifically bars under sub-section (2) thereof that if there is no prayer for delivery of possession, the same cannot be granted by the court in absence of specific claim and as such the proceeding at the moment of the executing court is contrary to the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 3. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and after going across the record, deem it fit and proper to refer certain fats which is on record. As has been referred hereinabove that the decree and judgment has been passed and execution case has been filed the petitioners/judgment debtors have approached to this Court in W.P.(C) No.6547 of 2005 wherein an order passed by the executing court under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure dated 22.09.2005, has been dismissed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 03.08.2010, has declined to interfere with the order passed by the executing court dated 22.09.2005 in Misc. Case No.77 of 1985 wherein the objection has been filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the respondent since was in part performance of the contract the petitioner cannot resist recovery of possession in execution of decree through the process of law and while dismissing the writ petition, this Court has specifically directed to get the decree executed expeditiously. The petitioners/judgment debtors thereafter filed another petition under Order XXII Rule 101 and 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was also rejected vide order dated 25.09.2010 by the executing court wherein the same plea has been taken by raising an objection in executing the decree but the executing court has rejected the same on the ground that when the proceeding was at the stage of taking the possession of the suit premises through the process of court but at that juncture, the judgment debtors have filed the petition to decide the right, title and interest over the suit property and the executing court by relying upon the judgment passed by this Court in L.P.A. No.42 of 1990, has declined to pass any positive order in favour of the judgment debtors, thereafter, the executing court has passed order on 24.11.2011 by directing the decree holder to make reference of the boundary by filing afresh petition. The judgment debtors thereafter again filed another writ petition being W.P.(C) No.128 of 2012, questioning the order dated 24.11.2011 passed by the executing court on the ground that the executing court is travelling beyond its jurisdiction since the executing court is bent upon to execute the decree and judgment i.e. the delivery of possession, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court while disposing of the writ petition vide order dated 11.09.2012, declining to interfere with the said order with an observation to proceed further with the execution case in accordance with the law and also in accordance with the judgment and decree passed by this Court with a further direction to proceed with the execution proceeding expeditiously preferably with a period of three months from the date of production of the order. The decree-holder has filed a petition on 20.02.2018 for passing an appropriate order to allow him to deposit the enhanced amount on account of enhancement in the salary of the police personnel and the Magistrate, the same having been allowed by the impugned order, hence, this writ petition has been filed. 4. This Court in the light of the factual aspect of the matter the court has proceeded to examine the ground which has been agitated by the petitioner before proceeding, it would be relevant to make reference of the provision of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which reads hereunder as: “22. Power to grant relief for possession, partition, refund of earnest money, etc.—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (5 of 1908), any person suing for the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property may, in an appropriate case, ask for— (a) possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property in addition to such performance; or (b) any other relief to which he may be entitled, including the refund of any earnest money or deposit paid or 1 [made by] him, in case his claim for specific performance is refused. (2) No relief under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be granted by the court unless it has been specifically claimed: Provident that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief. (3) The power of the court to grant relief under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be without prejudice to its powers to award compensation under section 21.” It is evident from the provision of Section 22 by which it has been enacted as a rule of pleading which is in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and therefore, the provision has been made that in an appropriate case any suit for specific performance for possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property, in addition to such performance, or (b) any other relief to which he may be entitled, including the refund of any earnest money or deposit paid or [made by] him, in case his claim for specific performance is refused. Sub-section (2) of Section 22 provides that no relief under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be granted by the court unless it has been specifically claimed. Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the Court shall, at any state of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for just relief. It is evident after going across the said provision that under sub-section (1) to Section 22 the word inserted therein as “in an appropriate case” thus denotes that the applicability of Section 22 is not in each and every case rather it depends upon an appropriate case meaning thereby it has got no mandatory effect rather it can be said to be enabling provision depending upon the case. Further under proviso to Section 22 it has been stipulated that if the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, to allow him to amend the plaint on sub terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief, meaning thereby, the provision has been made under the said proviso to amend the plaint at any stage of the proceeding which also signifies that the provision of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is not mandatory rather it is an enabling provision. In the proviso the word ‘proceeding’ denotes that the amendment in the plaint can be allowed at any stage of the proceeding, therefore, the definition of proceeding is to be appreciated and it is not in doubt that under the Code of Civil Procedure, the ‘proceeding’ has not been defined. The issues of applicability of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court judgment rendered in the case of Babu Lal Vs. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. reported in (1982) 1 SCC 525 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the applicability of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, has observed that in absence of a relief of delivery of possession even though such relief can be claimed in the suit. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. reported in (1982) 1 SCC 525 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the applicability of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, has observed that in absence of a relief of delivery of possession even though such relief can be claimed in the suit. The Hon’ble Apex Court by making reference of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court to the effect that the executing court was competent to deliver the possession and further held therein that it was not necessary in a suit for specific performance either to separately claim possession nor was it necessary for the court to pass a decree for possession. With the context of the provision of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, reference needs to be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Babu Lal Vs. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. reported in (1982) 1 SCC 525 , wherein at Paragraph 12 and 13 which reads hereunder as: “12. The section enacts that a person in a suit for specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property, may ask for appropriate reliefs, namely, he may ask for possession, or for partition or for separate possession including the relief for specific performance. These reliefs he can claim, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the contrary. Sub-section (2) of this section, however, specifically provides that these reliefs cannot be granted by the court, unless they have been expressly claimed by the plaintiff in the suit. Sub-section (2) of the section recognised in clear terms the well-established rule of procedure that the court should not entertain a claim of the plaintiff unless it has been specifically pleaded by the plaintiff and proved by him to be legally entitled to. The proviso to this sub-section (2), however, says that where the plaintiff has not specifically claimed these reliefs in his plaint, in the initial stages of the suit, the court shall permit the plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings, to include one or more of the reliefs, mentioned above by means of an amendment of the plaint on such terms as it may deem proper. The only purpose of this newly enacted provision is to avoid multiplicity of suits and that the plaintiff may get appropriate relief without being hampered by procedural complications. 13. The expression in sub-section (1) of Section 22 “in an appropriate case” is very significant. The plaintiff may ask for the relief of possession or partition or separate possession “in an appropriate case”. As pointed out earlier, in view of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, some doubt was entertained whether the relief for specific performance and partition and possession could be combined in one suit; one view being that the cause of action for claiming relief for partition and possession could accrue to the plaintiff only after he acquired title to the property on the execution of a sale deed in his favour and since the relief for specific performance of the contract for sale was not based on the same cause of action as the relief for partition and possession, the two reliefs could not be combined in one suit. Similarly, a case may be visualised where after the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant the property passed in possession of a third person. A mere relief for specific performance of the contract of sale may not entitle the plaintiff to obtain possession as against the party in actual possession of the property. As against him, a decree for possession must be specifically claimed or such a person is not bound by the contract sought to be enforced. In a case where exclusive possession is with the contracting party, a decree for specific performance of the contract of sale simpliciter, without specifically providing for delivery of possession, may give complete relief to the decree-holder. In order to satisfy the decree against him completely he is bound not only to execute the sale deed but also to put the property in possession of the decree-holder. This is in consonance with the provisions of Section 55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that the seller is bound to give, on being so required, the buyer or such person as he directs, such possession of the property as its nature admits.” Judgment rendered in the case of Balmukund Vs. This is in consonance with the provisions of Section 55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that the seller is bound to give, on being so required, the buyer or such person as he directs, such possession of the property as its nature admits.” Judgment rendered in the case of Balmukund Vs. Veer Chand reported in AIR 1954 All 643 , a decree for specific performance of a contract includes everything incidental to be done by one party or another to complete the sale transaction, the rights and obligations of the parties in such a matter being governed by Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. Reference need to be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Janardan Kishore Vs. Girdhari Lal reported in AIR 1957 Pat 701 , has also referred, the Patna High Court taken the view that the relief of possession is inherent in a relief for specific performance of contract for lease, and the court executing a decree for specific performance of such a contract can grant possession of the property to the decree-holder even though the decree did not provide for delivery of possession. The reference of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Subodh Kumar Banerjee Vs. Hiramoni Dasi reported in AIR 1955 Cal 267 , has also taken similar view that the right to recover possession springs out of the contract which was being specifically enforced and not as a result of the execution and completion of the conveyance, and as such the judgment-debtor was bound to deliver possession to the decree-holder. It is evident from the aforesaid stipulation made under the Paragraph as quoted hereinabove that the reference of Section 55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, has also been made which provides that the seller is bound to give, as being so required, the buyer or such person as he directs, such possession of the property. It further transpires from the aforesaid judgment as has been made at Paragraph-16 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court by discarding the contention made on behalf of the petitioner to that the relief for possession must be claimed in a suit for specific performance of a contract in all cases but the said argument ignores the significance of the words ‘in an appropriate case’. The expression only indicates that it is not always incumbent on the plaintiff to claim possession or partition or separate possession in a suit for specific performance of a contract for the transfer of the immovable property. That has to be done where the circumstances demanding the relief for specific performance of the contract of sale embraced within its ambit not only the execution of the sale deed but also possession over the property conveyed under the sale deed. It may not always be necessary for the plaintiff to specifically claimed possession over the property, the relief of possession being inherent in the relief for specific performance of the contract of sale. Besides, the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 22 provides for amendment of the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief ‘at any stage of the proceeding’. Further it has been held at Paragraph-17 by discussing about the word ‘proceeding’ as to what does it mean which reads hereunder as: “17. The word “proceeding” is not defined in the Act. Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines it as “carrying on of an action at law, a legal action or process, any act done by authority of a court of law; any step taken in a cause by either party”. The term “proceeding” is a very comprehensive term and generally speaking means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right. It is not a technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning will be governed by the statute. It indicates a prescribed mode in which judicial business is conducted. The word ‘proceeding’ in Section 22 includes execution proceedings also. In Rameshwar Nath v. U.P. Union Bank Ltd. such a view was taken. It is a term giving the widest freedom to a court of law so that it may do justice to the parties in the case. Execution is a stage in the legal proceedings. It is a step in the judicial process. It marks a stage in litigation. It is a step in the ladder. In the journey of litigation there are various stages. One of them is execution. 18. Execution is a stage in the legal proceedings. It is a step in the judicial process. It marks a stage in litigation. It is a step in the ladder. In the journey of litigation there are various stages. One of them is execution. 18. In Mahender Nath Gupta v. Moti Ram Rattan Chand the Delhi High Court endorsed the view taken in Balmukand v. Veer Chand that where in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale relief for possession is not claimed and consequently the decree passed in the suit contains no relief for delivery of possession, the court executing the decree is competent to deliver possession, an order directing delivery of possession being merely incidental to the execution of the deed of sale. The court, however, observed that on March 1, 1964 Specific Relief Act of 1963 came into force and this Act altered the law by enacting Section 22. It made it necessary for the plaintiffs to ask specifically the relief of possession in suits for specific performance. The court, however, held that Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act of 1963 had no application to that case as the decree was passed when the old Act was in force. 19. The same High Court, however, in Ex-Servicemen Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Sumey Singh considered the effect of Section 22(2) with its proviso. In that case the decree did not give the plaintiff the relief of possession. The question arose: Was the court powerless to put him in possession of the property though he had a decree for specific performance in his favour? The Delhi High Court observed: “Section 22 enacts a rule of pleading. The legislature thought it will be useful to introduce a rule that in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings the plaintiff may claim a decree for possession in a suit for specific performance even though, strictly speaking, the right to possession accrues only when specific performance is decreed. The legislature has now made a statutory provision enabling the plaintiff to ask for possession in the suit for specific performance and empowering the court to provide in the decree itself that upon payment by the plaintiff of the consideration money within the given time, the defendant should execute the deed and put the plaintiff in possession. The legislature has now made a statutory provision enabling the plaintiff to ask for possession in the suit for specific performance and empowering the court to provide in the decree itself that upon payment by the plaintiff of the consideration money within the given time, the defendant should execute the deed and put the plaintiff in possession. In my opinion the proviso gives ample power to a court to allow the amendment of the plaint even at this stage. The proviso says that the amendment of the plaint can be allowed ‘at any stage of the proceedings’ on such terms as may be just for including a claim for possession where the plaintiff has not claimed such relief in his original plaint. * * * The term ‘proceeding’ is a very comprehensive term and generally speaking means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right. It is not a technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it, but one the ambit of whose meaning will be governed by the statute. It indicates a prescribed mode in which judicial business is conducted. The word ‘proceeding’ in Section 22 in my opinion includes execution proceedings also....” The High Court had relied upon Rameshwar Nath v. U.P. Union Bank Ltd. for its decision in this case. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Delhi High Court in this case. 22. The only amendment to be made in the plaint was to add a relief for possession necessitated because of the provisions of Section 22, which is only an enabling provision. 23. There has been a protracted litigation and it has dragged on practically for about 13 years and it will be really a travesty of justice to ask the decree-holders to file a separate suit for possession. The objection of the petitioner is hyper-technical. The executing court has every jurisdiction to allow the amendment. The only difficulty is that instead of granting a relief of possession the High Court should have allowed an amendment in the plaint. The mere omission of the High Court to allow an amendment in the plaint is not so fatal as to deprive the decree-holders of the benefits of the decree when Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act authorises the transferee to get possession in pursuance of a sale deed. 25. The mere omission of the High Court to allow an amendment in the plaint is not so fatal as to deprive the decree-holders of the benefits of the decree when Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act authorises the transferee to get possession in pursuance of a sale deed. 25. Before closing discussion on this point we cannot lose sight of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which reads: “28. (1) Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require. (2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1), the court— (a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the contract, to restore such possession to the vendor or lessor, and (b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and profits which have accrued in respect of the property from the date on which possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee until restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and, if the justice of the case so requires, the refund of any sum paid by the vendee or lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection with the contract. (3) If the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period referred to in sub-section (1), the court may, on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely: (a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor; (b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease. (4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be. * * *” 26. Sub-section (3) of Section 28 clearly contemplates that if the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree, the court may on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to. Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 28 contemplates the delivery of possession or partition and separate possession of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease. Sub-section (4) of Section 28 bars the filing of a separate suit for any relief which may be claimed under this section. 27. In Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. v. Haridas Mundhra dealing with Section 28(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 this Court observed: [SCR headnote p. 694, para (3)] “The Specific Relief Act, 1963, is not an exhaustive enactment and under the law relating to specific relief a Court which passes a decree for specific performance retains control over the decree even after the decree had been passed. Therefore, the Court, in the present case, retained control over the matter despite the decree and it was open to the Court, when it was alleged that the party moved against had positively refused to complete the contract, to entertain the application and order rescission of the decree if the allegation was proved.” The reasoning given by this Court with regard to the applicability of subsection (1) of Section 28 will equally apply to the applicability of sub-section (3) of Section 28.” Reference is also being made of the similar view, judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Aibunnisha Vs. Masrur Ala, reported in AIR 2005 Pat 133 , in which the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Babu Lal Vs. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. (supra), has been considered and it has been held therein that in absence of specific prayer of delivery of possession also the executing court proceed for delivery of possession. In the case of Smt. Sunita Devi Vs. Dinbandhu Shah & Ors. reported in AIR 2010 Jhar 151 at paragraph 12 thereof, it has been laid down that the judgment-debtor is bound not only to execute the sale deed but also to deliver the suit property in possession of the decree-holder in consonance with the provisions of Section 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act even if delivery of possession was not one of the relief’s specifically sought in the plaint. Delivery of possession is implicit in an agreement for sale and also in a decree for specific performance of contract and hence after execution of the deed of transfer in terms of the decree, possession has to be delivered in accordance thereof. This would only ensure substantial justice to the decree holder. The Hon’ble Madras High Court also rendered in the case of Krishnamurthy Gounder Vs. Venkatakrishan & Ors. reported in AIR 2012 Madras 105, by allowing the judgment in the case of Babu Lal Vs. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. (Supra) has taken the same view. This would only ensure substantial justice to the decree holder. The Hon’ble Madras High Court also rendered in the case of Krishnamurthy Gounder Vs. Venkatakrishan & Ors. reported in AIR 2012 Madras 105, by allowing the judgment in the case of Babu Lal Vs. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. (Supra) has taken the same view. In the light of the aforesaid legal position the factual aspects has already been dealt with in detail and as such the same is not being repeated for the shake of brevity but the argument which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner by referring to Paragraph-3 of the plaint wherein it has been pleaded that the defendant has put the plaintiff in possession over a portion of the properties agreed to be sold being the front portion of the holding and the plaintiff is coming in peaceful possession thereof in part performance of the aforesaid agreement and therefore, it is admitted case of the plaintiff that he was in possession of the property and as such if there is incorrect pleading, then he need to suffer. He in order to substantiate his argument, has relied upon judgment rendered in the case of Radhalal Vs. Chabilchand & Ors. reported in AIR 1955 Nagpur 79 , wherein the effect of symbolic possession, has been dealt with by holding therein that where the decree-holder having obtained ‘symbolical’ delivery of possession could still maintain another application for execution of the same decree by asking for actual possession of a house said to have been included in the property sold. If the decree holder have been kept out of any property comprised within his occasion purchased his remedy is by way of regular suit and not by a fresh application in execution proceeding. This Court in order to appreciate the aforesaid argument, has gone across the aforesaid judgment wherefrom it is evident that the question which fell for consideration before the court where the decree-holder having obtained ‘symbolical’ delivery of possession could still maintain another application for execution of the same decree by asking for actual possession of a house said to have been included in the property sold. The factual aspect involved therein was that in execution of final decree for a sole, a certain property which was sold. The factual aspect involved therein was that in execution of final decree for a sole, a certain property which was sold. After confirmation of sale on 05.04.1940 the decree-holder applied for and obtained delivery of possession of the village on 17.02.1941. The application for execution by way of actual delivery of possession was made on 03.04.1943, and the prayer of the decree-holder-auction-purchaser was that the judgment-debtors should be ejected from the house in their possession in that village called mouza Budhwada. The said application was resisted by the judgment-debtors on the ground that the decree-holder had obtained possession of the mortgaged property which he had purchased at the auction sale through Court and that the fresh application for possession was not maintainable. In that circumstances the Court has come to the finding that the decree-holder having exhausted his right of taking delivery of possession of the mortgaged property by accepting such possession as the officer of the Court could give him there was no right left in the decree-holder to move the Court again for another writ of delivery of possession. It has to be noted that after the confirmation of sale the decree-holder applied for and obtained delivery of possession through Court. At that time there was no question raised, either by the decree-holder or by the judgment-debtors, as to whether or not the decree had been fully and properly executed. If subsequently the decree holder finds that he has not been able to take effective possession of any portion of the mortgaged property his remedy would be by a suit for recovery of possession and not by a second application for the same relief which he had obtained previously in execution proceeding. The fact in hand is that it is a case of not symbolical possession rather it is the case of handing over the actual physical possession by issuing writ of delivery of possession. The judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Nagpur High Court in the case of Radhalal Vs. Chabilchand & Ors. The fact in hand is that it is a case of not symbolical possession rather it is the case of handing over the actual physical possession by issuing writ of delivery of possession. The judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Nagpur High Court in the case of Radhalal Vs. Chabilchand & Ors. (supra), the fact involved therein is quite different to that effect in hand since the same pertains to the symbolical possession, the petitioner accepted but herein the instant case there is no acceptance on the part of the petitioner rather since the year 1985 that day when the execution case has been filed, he is in pursuance to the execution proceeding for getting the actual suit of the decree but time and again the petitioners have been filed either under Order XXI Rule 97 or by filing writ petition before this Court the execution proceeding has been protracted for one reason or the other. Therefore, the fact involved in this case the judgment rendered in the case of Radhalal Vs. Chabilchand & Ors. (supra), is not applicable. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff has pleaded in the plaint i.e. possession over the portion of the property agreed to be sold being the front portion of the property and the plaintiff is coming in physical possession and therefore, the petitioner cannot come after accepting the possession in his favour by making an application before the executing court for delivery of physical possession but this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable to this Court for the reason that the pleading made at Paragraph-3 to the plaint is in order to substantiate the agreement and to apprise the Court the wish of the agreement which is the subject matter of the suit. The petitioner although has not made prayer for delivery of possession but in the light of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Babu Lal Vs. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. (supra), there is no dispute about the fact that for delivery of physical possession, the specific prayed to that effect is not required to be there. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. (supra), there is no dispute about the fact that for delivery of physical possession, the specific prayed to that effect is not required to be there. It is further intent that the order impugned is not fresh one rather the order has been passed for issuance of writ for delivery of possession as on 24.11.2011 which was assailed before this Court in W.P.(C) No.128 of 2012 wherein, this Court has directed to expedite the execution proceeding in accordance with the judgment and decree passed by this Court. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that since this Court has directed while passing the order in W.P.(C) No.128 of 2012 to execute the decree in accordance with law and also in accordance with the judgment and decree, therefore, the law would be that the executing court cannot be allowed to travel beyond the decree, if that argument would be accepted that would be against the intent of the provision of Section 22 read with Section 22 and 28(3) of the Specific Relief Act read with Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act and as has been decided in the case of Babu Lal Vs. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. (supra), the settled law is if there is decree for executing sale deed the implied meaning would be to deliver the possession, therefore, if the executing court is proceeding, it cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity, further on 24.11.2011 the executing court has rejected the objection, made by the judgment-debtors wherein the reference of not handing over the possession of the property in question has been considered by considering that there is only symbolical possession but in order to give delivery of possession the executing court, vide the said order, has directed to file fresh petition by making reference of the boundary and the said order having not been interfered with by this Court in W.P.(C) No.128 of 2012 rather directed for executing the decree within specific period by proceeding with it in accordance with law and as has been referred in preceding paragraph the law would be as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Babu Lal Vs. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. (supra), the delivery of possession also. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal & Ors. (supra), the delivery of possession also. The petition was filed before the executing court on 20.02.2018 seeking for a direction to allow to deposit enhanced cost which is to be incurred in deputing the Magistrate and Police Force for handing over the delivery of possession and therefore, when this Court has declined to interfere with the order dated 24.11.2011 and in pursuance to the said order the petitioner filed by the decree-holder dated 20.02.2018, has been disposed of vide order dated 11.09.2019 it could not be proper for this Court to set aside the said order otherwise the same will amount to review the order passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No.128 of 2012. 5. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances as narrated hereinabove and according to the considered view of this Court, this is not a case in the nature warranting any interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India taking into consideration the fact in Title Suit No.220 of 1982 dated 10.02.1984, 18.02.1984, and as yet the decree has not been executed since it is continuing since the year 1984 which is nothing but miscarriage of justice, therefore, while dismissing the writ petition the executing court is directed to execute the decree within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of the order. 6. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.