JUDGMENT : Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned A.S.G.I representing the C.B.I on the prayer for suspension of sentence made through I.A. No. 5222 of 2019. 2. The appellant has been convicted in R.C. Case No. 64(A)/1996 Pat by the learned court of Additional Judicial Commissioner-I-cum Special Judge-VII, CBI (AHD Scam), Ranchi for the offences punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477(A) of the I.P.C and sentenced to undergo imprisonment of 3 ½ years and a fine of Rs. 5 Lakhs and in default thereof, to undergo imprisonment for ½ (half) year separately. He has further been convicted for the offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(i) (c) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to undergo imprisonment of 3 ½ years and a fine of Rs. 5 Lakhs and in default thereof, to undergo imprisonment for ½ (half) year separately. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant, in support of the prayer, has inter alia made the following submissions: (i) It is submitted that earlier by order dated 23rd February, 2018, the prayer for suspension of sentence of this appellant made through I.A. No. 528 of 2018 in connection with his conviction in the instant R.C. Case No. 64(A)/1996 Pat was rejected by this Court by a detailed order on merits, also taking into account that the appellant has remained in custody only for a period of 1 year during trial and 2 months since conviction i.e. less than half of the sentence awarded. (ii) Prayer for suspension of sentence was renewed by this appellant through I.A. No. 11057 of 2018. By order dated 10th January, 2019, again prayer for suspension of sentence was rejected also taking into account that the appellant had not undergone custody for half of the sentence out of 3 ½ years awarded to him, as on that date. (iii) Appellant is serving incarceration in connection with his conviction recorded in two other R.C. Cases, namely, R.C. Case No. 68(A)/1996, where he has been awarded Rigorous Imprisonment for 5 years under both the offences of I.P.C and P.C.Act respectively as well as in R.C. Case No. 38(A)/1996-Pat where he is undergoing custody on being sentenced to undergo R.I for 7 years under both the offences of I.P.C and P.C Act, which have been ordered to run consecutively and not run concurrently. (iv) Prayer for suspension of sentence made by this appellant through I.A. No. 1010 of 2018 in Cr. Appeal (S.J) No. 207 of 2018 arising out of his conviction in connection with R.C. Case No. 68(A)/1996, I.A. No. 11049 of 2018 in Cr. Appeal (S.J) No. 668 of 2018 arising out of his conviction in connection with R.C. Case No. 38(A)/1996-Pat and I.A. No. 11057 of 2018 in Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 138 of 2018 arising out of his conviction in connection with the instant R.C. Case No.64(A)/1996 Pat, had been rejected by separate orders dated 10th January, 2019. This Court while rejecting the prayer in the other two appeals, had also taken into account that the appellant has remained in custody for about eleven months only, much less than half of the sentence of five years awarded in connection with R.C. Case No. 68(A)/1996 and similarly in Cr. Appeal (S.J) No. 668 of 2018 observing that the appellant had also not undergone custody for more than half of the sentence awarded till date, even if the sentences were treated to run concurrently and not consecutively. All three orders of rejection of the same date i.e., 10th January, 2019 were challenged by the appellant before the Apex Court in Separate Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 2219 of 2019 (arising out of order dated 10th January, 2019 passed in Cr. Appeal (S.J.) No. 138 of 2018 in connection with his conviction under R.C. Case No. 64(A)/1996 Pat and Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 2451 of 2019 and Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 2447 of 2019 arising out of order of rejection dated 10th January, 2019 passed in other two R.C. Cases i.e. 38(A)/1996 Pat and 68(A)/1996. (v) Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has completed half of the custody in the instant R.C. Case i.e. approximately 26 months as on date, as per breakup chart at paragraph-8 enclosed to the I.A. which was filed on 13.06.2019. It is submitted that the Apex Court declined to interfere and Special Leave Petitions were accordingly dismissed vide order dated 10.04.2019 passed in all these Special Leave Petitions (Crl.) heard analogous. Though, notices were issued upon the CBI on 15.03.2019, however no leave was granted. The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed in limine without any reasons or speaking order. It is submitted that the Apex Court declined to interfere and Special Leave Petitions were accordingly dismissed vide order dated 10.04.2019 passed in all these Special Leave Petitions (Crl.) heard analogous. Though, notices were issued upon the CBI on 15.03.2019, however no leave was granted. The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed in limine without any reasons or speaking order. (vi) It is submitted by reference to the orders passed by this Court in a number of cases in the case of co-convicts in the instant R.C. Case No. 64(A)/1996 Pat such as, Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 229 of 2018 (Tripurari Mohan Prasad vs. The State through Central Bureau of Investigation) order dated 6th April, 2018; Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 196 of 2018 (Subir Kumar Bhattacharya vs. State of Jharkhand through CBI (AHD) order dated 20.07.2018; Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 146 of 2018 (Dr. Rabindra Kumar Rana @ Ravindra Kumar Rana Vs. State of Jharkhand through CBI) order dated 31.08.2018; Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 431 of 2018 (Sri Beck Julius versus State of Jharkhand through S.P., CBI, AHD Scam) order dated 30.11.2018 that these appellants have been enlarged on bail by granting the privilege of suspension of sentence on completion of half of custody in the instant R.C. Case No. 64(A)/1996. Similarly, this Court in the case of other co-convicts in R. C. Case No. 38(A)/1996 Pat, such as, Cr. Appeal (S.J) No. 737 of 2018 ( Naresh Prasad Vs. State of Jharkhand through CBI) order dated 27.7.2018; Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 811 of 2018 (Bimal Kant Das @ Dr. Bimal Kant Das Vs. State of Jharkhand through CBI) order dated 24.8.2018; Cr. Appeal (S.J) No. 177 of 2018 (Dr. Krishna Mohan Prasad Vs. State of Jharkhand through CBI) order dated 6.4.2018 and co-convicts in R.C. Case No. 68(A)/1996 such as, Cr. Appeal (S.J.) No. 215 of 2018 (Ram Nandan Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand through CBI) order dated 23.03.2018, Cr. Appeal (SJ) No. 179 of 2018 (Bijayaeshwari Prasad Sinha @ Dr. Bijayeshwari Prasad Sinha Vs. State of Jharkhand through Superintendent of Police, C.B.I (AHD Scam), Ranchi order dated 23.03.2018, has followed a uniform yardstick while granting suspension of sentence to such convicts on completion of half of the custody against the respective sentence awarded to them. Appeal (SJ) No. 179 of 2018 (Bijayaeshwari Prasad Sinha @ Dr. Bijayeshwari Prasad Sinha Vs. State of Jharkhand through Superintendent of Police, C.B.I (AHD Scam), Ranchi order dated 23.03.2018, has followed a uniform yardstick while granting suspension of sentence to such convicts on completion of half of the custody against the respective sentence awarded to them. (vii) Learned counsel for the appellant submits that considering the uniform yardstick applied by this Court in case of other co-appellants convicted in the instant R.C. case and other R.C. cases, the prayer for suspension of sentence of this appellant may be allowed as he has also undergone custody for more than half of the sentence i.e. approximately 26 months as against the sentence of three and half years awarded in the instant R.C. Case No. 64(A)/1996. It is further submitted that since no leave was granted and the SLP challenging the earlier orders of rejection dated 10th January, 2019 was dismissed in limine without any speaking order or reasons assigned, doctrine of ‘merger’ would not apply. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that it is true that the appellant has not completed half of the custody in connection with other two R.C. Cases i.e. R.C. Case No. 38(A)/1996-Pat and R.C. Case No. 68(A)/1996, he is not likely to come out of the jail for the present even if bail is granted to the appellant in the instant case. 4. Learned ASGI representing the CBI, has strongly opposed the prayer on inter alia the following grounds: i. The first plank of the argument on behalf of the CBI is that the Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) preferred by the appellant against the orders of rejection dated 10.01.2019 rejecting the prayer for suspension of sentence passed in connection with his conviction in all the three R.C cases i.e. R.C. Case No. 64(A)/1996 Pat, R.C. Case No. 38(A)/1996 Pat and R.C. Case No. 68(A)/1996 have been dismissed by the Apex Court vide order dated 10.04.2019 after notice to the CBI and taking into consideration the grounds urged in the Special Leave Petitions as also the reply of CBI. Therefore, this Court should not entertain the plea of suspension of sentence of this appellant on any grounds including completion of half of the custody. ii. Therefore, this Court should not entertain the plea of suspension of sentence of this appellant on any grounds including completion of half of the custody. ii. Learned ASGI has taken pains to point out that the appellant has taken specific plea of having completed more than half of the sentence i.e. 21 months and 09 days in the Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) arising out of the instant R.C. Case No. 64(A)/1996 Pat to seek suspension of sentence and grant of bail. CBI in its reply, had strongly opposed the prayer on merits as also on the period of custody. Since the Apex Court after perusal of the materials on record refused to grant relief to the appellant, it is implicit that the prayer for suspension of sentence on the ground of completion of half of the custody was also refused. iii. Learned ASGI has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (now known as Khoday India Limited) and others Vs. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal (under Liquidation) represented by the Liquidator reported in (2019) 4 SCC 376 on the principles applicable when the special leave petition is dismissed in limine or by a reasoned or speaking order refusing leave to appeal or after the leave is granted. It is submitted that the ratio rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Kunhayammed and others vs. State of Kerala and other reported in (2000) 6 SCC 359 have been reiterated and followed. Reliance has been placed upon the opinion of the Apex Court at paras-19, 20 and 23 of the report in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (Supra). Learned ASGI has referred to the legal position summed up at para-23 of the report where the opinion of the Apex Court at para-44 (v) in the case of Kunhayammed (Supra) has also been reproduced as under: “44. To sum up, our conclusions are: (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. To sum up, our conclusions are: (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties.” 5. Learned ASGI submits that though Leave to Appeal was not granted but since the Apex Court has applied its mind after perusing the materials brought on record and was not inclined to interfere in the matter, the plea of the appellant for suspension of sentence on the ground of completion of half of the custody should not be entertained by this Court. 6. I have considered the submission of learned counsel for the appellant and learned ASGI representing the CBI. I have taken note of the facts and circumstances above and the principles of law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kunhayammed (Supra) and followed in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (Supra), and reiterated in a latest judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 7574 of 2014 (M/S. S.E. Graphites Private Limited Vs. State of Telangana & Ors) vide judgment dated 10th July, 2019. 7. State of Telangana & Ors) vide judgment dated 10th July, 2019. 7. On perusal of the materials on record and on consideration of the submissions and the grounds urged on behalf of the parties, the following facts and legal position emerges: (i) Prayer for suspension of sentence of this appellant in connection with his conviction in the instant R.C. Case No. 64(A)/1996 Pat, from which the present appeal arises, was rejected both on merits and on the ground that the appellant had not completed half of the custody as against the sentence of three and half years awarded to him, by orders dated 23rd February, 2018 and 10th January, 2019 passed by this Court. (ii) Appellant had also made prayer for suspension of sentence in connection with his conviction in R.C. Case No. 38(A)/1996 (Cr. Appeal (S.J.) No. 668 of 2018) and in R.C. Case No. 68(A)/1996 (Cr. Appeal (S.J.) No. 207 of 2018) through I.A. Nos. 11049 of 2018 and 1010 of 2018 raising various grounds. By separate orders of the same date 10th January, 2019, prayer for suspension of sentence made by this appellant in other two criminal appeals were rejected, also taking into account that the appellant had not undergone half of the custody as against the sentence awarded. (iii) Orders of rejection dated 10th January, 2019 were made subject matter of challenge before the Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 2219 of 2019 (arising out of the order dated 10th January, 2019 in I.A. No. 11057 of 2018 in Cr. Appeal (S.J.) No. 138 of 2018 arising out of conviction in the instant R.C. Case No. 64(A)/1996) and two other Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) Nos. 2451 of 2019 and 2447 of 2019. (iv) A supplementary affidavit has been filed by the appellant on 10th July, 2019 enclosing the order dated 10th April, 2019. The order dated 15th March, 2019 has also been annexed, wherein notices were issued by the Apex Court in these S.L.Ps (Crl.) upon the CBI returnable in two weeks. By order dated 10th April, 2019 all the three Special Leave Petitions of this appellant along with one other analogous S.L.P. (Crl.) No.2298 of 2019 were dismissed. The order dated 10th April, 2019 is quoted hereunder for better appreciation: “Having heard learned counsel for the petitioners and upon perusing the relevant material, we are not inclined to interfere. By order dated 10th April, 2019 all the three Special Leave Petitions of this appellant along with one other analogous S.L.P. (Crl.) No.2298 of 2019 were dismissed. The order dated 10th April, 2019 is quoted hereunder for better appreciation: “Having heard learned counsel for the petitioners and upon perusing the relevant material, we are not inclined to interfere. The special leave petitions are accordingly dismissed. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.” (v) On behalf of the C.B.I. it has been urged that Hon’ble Supreme Court has refused to interfere in the matter and dismissed the Special Leave Petitions after issuing notice to the C.B.I and taking into account the grounds urged by the petitioner and the reply of the C.B.I. Appellant had also taken a plea of completion of half of the custody i.e. 21 months and 9 days in the memo of S.L.P. in connection with instant R.C. Case No. 64(A)/1996 Pat, but the Apex Court did not accede to his prayer. As such, considering the ratio rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Kunhayammed (Supra) specifically Para-44 (v) and followed in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (Supra), this Court should not allow relief to the appellant. This Court deems it proper to extract the opinion of the Apex Court at para-44 in the case of (Kunhayammed (Supra) as also reproduced at Para-23 of the report in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (Supra) hereunder: “44. To sum up, our conclusions are: (i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law. (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal. (iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. The first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal. (iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter. (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation. (vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 47 CPC.” (underline provided to add emphasis and not part of the original text) 8. The legal position in this regard has been settled by the Apex Court as quoted above. In the present case, Special Leave to Appeals (Crl.) preferred by the appellant against the orders of rejection of prayer for suspension of sentence dated 10th January 2019 were dismissed as the Apex Court was not inclined to interfere in the matter. As held in the case of Kunhayammed (Supra), if the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. The observation on this issue in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (Supra) by the Apex Court at para-20 of the report are also quoted hereunder: “20. The Court thereafter analysed number of cases where orders of different nature were passed and dealt with these judgments by classifying them in the following categories: (i) Dismissal at the stage of special leave petition---without reasons---no res judicata, no merger. (ii) Dismissal of the special leave petition by speaking or reasoned order—no merger, but rule of discipline and Article 141 attracted. (iii) Leave granted---dismissal without reasons---merger results.” 9. It is not the case of the CBI that the order refusing the Special Leave Petitions is a speaking order. Perusal of the orders of rejection quoted hereinabove also shows that the Apex Court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the relevant materials, was not inclined to interfere in the matter and Special Leave Petitions were dismissed. In such a case, the principle of law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of (Kunhayammed (Supra) as followed in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited (Supra) as well as in a latest judgment reported in the case of ( M/S. S.E. Graphites Private Limited (Supra) would apply to the facts of the present case. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, this Court does not find substance in the plea urged on behalf of the C.B.I. by learned A.S.G.I. 10. Proceeding further on the facts of the instant case, this Court finds that it is not in dispute that the appellant has completed more than half of custody i.e., approximately 26 months against the sentence of three and half years awarded in the instant R.C. Case no. 64(A)/1996 Pat. It is also true that this Court has been following uniformity in matters of suspension of sentence of appellants suffering conviction in R.C. Cases such as R.C. Case Nos. 64(A)/1996 Pat, 38(A)/1996 Pat and 68(A)/1996; some of the orders passed by this Court have been referred to on behalf of the appellant and taken note above. 64(A)/1996 Pat. It is also true that this Court has been following uniformity in matters of suspension of sentence of appellants suffering conviction in R.C. Cases such as R.C. Case Nos. 64(A)/1996 Pat, 38(A)/1996 Pat and 68(A)/1996; some of the orders passed by this Court have been referred to on behalf of the appellant and taken note above. It is also true that in a number of cases, though this Court following the same yardstick has allowed suspension of sentence to the appellants but they have not been released from custody on account of their conviction in connection with other R.C. Cases where they have not completed more than half of the custody. The case of the appellant stands on similar footing. In the instant R.C. Case No. 64(A)/1996 Pat, he has completed half of the custody, but is still short of the period of half custody in connection with his conviction in other R.C. Cases i.e., Nos. 38(A)/1996 Pat and 68(A)/1996. 11. As such, on consideration of the totality of facts and circumstances and the position in law discussed hereinabove, I am satisfied that since the appellant has completed half of the custody in connection with in the instant R.C Case, he should be allowed privilege of suspension of sentence. Accordingly, let the appellant Lalu Prasad @ Lalu Prasad Yadav be released on bail, during pendency of this appeal, on furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 50,000/- (fifty thousand) with two sureties of the like amount each, to the satisfaction of Additional Judicial Commissioner-I-cum Special Judge-VII, CBI (AHD Scam), Ranchi in R. C Case No. 64(A)/1996 Pat, subject to the condition that he will deposit fine of Rs. 5.00 Lakhs in the Court below and if not wanted in connection with any other case. Appellant would not leave the country without permission of the learned Trial Court. He would also submit his passport, if any, before the learned Trial Court. Accordingly, the instant I.A. No. 5222 of 2019 stands disposed of.