JUDGMENT : Mir Alfaz Ali, J. Heard, Mr. HRA Choudhury, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. A Ahmed, learned Advocate appearing for the appellants. Also heard Mr. M. Phukan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Bilasipara in Sessions Case No.216/2011, whereby the learned Addl. Sessions Judge convicted the appellant under section 302 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.20,000/- with default stipulation. 3. Prosecution case is that on 09.09.2007 at about 8.00 am, the accused/appellant subjected his wife, the deceased to inhuman torture and caused her death by inflicting injuries. An FIR was lodged by the father of the appellant, Mohor Ali (since deceased), on the basis of which, police registered Bagribari P.S. Case No. 174/2007. In course of investigation, police recorded the statement of the witnesses u/s 161 CrPC, conducted inquest of the body and sent it for post mortem examination. 4. Pw-7, Dr. Soumitra Paul, who conducted the post mortem examination, found a ligature mark near the lower part of the neck of the deceased, which was prominent on the front and side of the neck. Bruises were seen above and below the ligature mark and on dissection of the neck, haemorrhage was seen in the tissue of the compressed area. In the opinion of the doctor, death was due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation which was ante mortem in nature. On conclusion of investigation, the charge sheet was laid against the present appellant u/s 302 IPC and eventually he stood trial. 5. In course of trial, the appellant denied the guilt and prosecution examined ten witnesses to prove the charge. On appreciation of evidence, learned Sessions Judge convicted the appellant u/s 302 IPC and awarded sentence as indicated above. 6. On our assessment of the evidence and materials on record and on perusal of the impugned judgment, we find that there was no direct evidence of the occurrence. Learned Sessions Judge basically relying on the circumstantial evidence recorded the conviction of the appellant. The vital circumstances relied by the learned Sessions Judge were (i) the death of the deceased was homicidal. Learned Sessions Judge basically relying on the circumstantial evidence recorded the conviction of the appellant. The vital circumstances relied by the learned Sessions Judge were (i) the death of the deceased was homicidal. (ii) At the time of occurrence, the appellant being the husband of the deceased, was with her in his house and (iii) failure of the appellant to explain, as to how the death was caused. 7. We have scrutinized the evidence meticulously. PW-3, Shariful Uddin, father of the deceased deposed that the deceased was married to the appellant 8/10 years back. He also stated, that he paid money to the appellant twice, but the appellant continued to demand money from the deceased. As she failed to meet the demand, the accused killed the deceased by using a chain. When he was asked during cross-examination as to the details of the demand, he failed to say specifically as to when or where such payment or demand was made and the evidence of this witness with regard to demand of property appears to be omnibus in nature. Although he stated in his evidence-in-chief that his daughter was subjected to torture, in cross-examination he stated that two days prior to the occurrence, when he visited his daughter (deceased), he was received very well by her. She also talked with him very nicely and also informed that the appellant was going to Guwahati within a day or two, for work. There was not even a whisper, regarding any torture or demand of dowry, when this witness met the victim immediately two days prior to the occurrence. PW-4, the wife of PW-3 stated in her evidence-in-chief, that the appellant subjected the deceased to torture for non-payment of dowry. In cross-examination, she also stated that she had no knowledge as to when the appellant demanded money from them. Evidently these two witnesses had no knowledge as to how the death of the deceased was caused. The other prosecution witnesses being PW-5, PW-6, PW-8, PW-9 and PW-10 pleaded ignorance about the occurrence. 8. Pw-1, Kazi Ahmed conducted the inquest and proved the inquest report, Ext.-1. The doctor, PW-7, in cross-examination stated categorically that he could not say whether the death of the deceased was homicidal or suicidal. The other prosecution witnesses being PW-5, PW-6, PW-8, PW-9 and PW-10 pleaded ignorance about the occurrence. 8. Pw-1, Kazi Ahmed conducted the inquest and proved the inquest report, Ext.-1. The doctor, PW-7, in cross-examination stated categorically that he could not say whether the death of the deceased was homicidal or suicidal. The post mortem examination report (Ext.-2) also demonstrates that it does not contain all the information which ought to have been there in a post mortem examination in case of death by asphyxia. When the doctor (PW-7), who conducted the post mortem examination was not sure, whether the death of the deceased was homicidal or suicidal, the very basic circumstance relied by learned trial court, that the death of the deceased was homicidal cannot not be held to have been established beyond reasonable doubt. 9. The appellant in his statement recorded u/s 313 CrPC stated that he was present in the house at the relevant time and on the basis of the said statement, the learned Sessions Judge held, that when the appellant was in the house with the deceased at the relevant time, he owed an explanation, as to under what circumstances death of the deceased was caused. Failure of the appellant to give any explanation, in the opinion of the learned Sessions Judge was a vital circumstance to inculpate the accused/appellant. One has to bear in mind, that in a criminal trial, the burden is always with the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond doubt and the accused has a right to remain silent. The burden to prove the guilt never shifts, unless the statute specifically provides. Section 106 of the Evidence Act provides that if a fact is within the special knowledge of a person, the burden to prove such fact within his special knowledge is on him. Therefore, Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not cast any burden on the accused to prove his innocence. However, if in a case, when prosecution proves certain fact discharging its burden towards the proof of guilt, which tend to inculpate the accused or the facts from which an inference of guilt of the accused can be drawn, in such circumstances, if the accused failed to explain such facts within his special knowledge to neutralise the inference of culpability, the court may draw an inference against the accused. In such situation, the provision of Section 106 of the Evidence Act puts a burden on the accused to explain the circumstances and the facts within his special knowledge. Therefore, unless the prosecution discharges its burden beyond doubt establishing all the incriminating circumstances, which raises an inference inculpating the accused, in absence of explanation, section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be pressed into service. 10. In the present case, the admission of the accused in his statement u/s 313 CrPC was that he was with the victim at the relevant time. Whereas, the medical evidence, as already indicated above, was inconclusive as to the nature of death, inasmuch as, the fact of death of the victim being homicidal has not been conclusively proved beyond doubt. Unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt, that the death of the victim was homicidal, because of mere presence at the place of occurrence, the accused shall not owe any explanation, as to the cause of homicidal death of the deceased. Therefore, when the prosecution has not been able to prove the necessary circumstances beyond reasonable doubt, so as to seek an explanation from the accused/appellant u/s 106 of the Evidence Act, accused/appellant cannot be convicted or held guilty for not giving such explanation. Therefore, having considered the evidence in its entirety, we are of the considered opinion, that the chain of circumstances was not complete in the instant case, for leading to an irresistible conclusion consistent only with the guilt of the accused or inconsistent with his innocence. 11. It is the trite law, that in a criminal case solely resting on the circumstantial evidence, prosecution needs to prove each and every circumstances conclusively and solidly beyond all reasonable doubt and the circumstances so proved, taken cumulatively must form a complete and unbroken chain of events leading to the inescapable conclusion, that it was none but the accused/appellant, who committed the offence. When the chain of events has not been completed, guilt of the accused cannot be held to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and as such, the appellant in the instant case is at least entitled to the benefit of doubt. When the chain of events has not been completed, guilt of the accused cannot be held to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and as such, the appellant in the instant case is at least entitled to the benefit of doubt. In Sharad Bridhichand Sarda-VS- State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , the Apex Court succinctly laid down the guidelines as to the standard of evidence required to prove a criminal case resting solely on the circumstantial evidence, which was later on followed by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions, held as under :- "152. A close analysis of the above authority would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. V. State of Maharastra the following observations were made: "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 153. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence." 12. 153. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence." 12. Thus, having scanned the evidence in its entirety as discussed hereinbefore, we are of the considered opinion that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was grossly inadequate to prove the charge u/s 302 IPC against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and as such, the impugned judgment is not sustainable. Accordingly, we set aside the conviction recorded and sentence awarded by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Bilasipara in Sessions Case No.216/2011 and allow the appeal. The appellant be released forthwith if not required in any other case. 13. Return the LCR.