JUDGMENT : 1. Heard counsels for the parties. 2. Present writ petition has been filed challenging that part of the letter as contained in Letter No.515 dated 05.08.2014 issued by Deputy Labour Commissioner, Hazaribagh, whereby reference has been refused and advise has been given to move before the competent court of law. 3. It appears that during 1995 to 1996, 883 persons were employed in Class-III and Class-IV post under the Mechanical Division of the respondent-Road Construction Department, Govt. of Jharkhand. In the year, 1998, vide letter dated 29.08.1998, all such employees have been terminated from the service. Some of the terminated employees have been approached to this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.3769 of 2001 and analogous cases, which have been disposed of vide order dated 07.03.2003, directing the Management to take appropriate action after compliance of Section 25(F) of the Industrial Disputes Act and also it has been ordered for payment of the salary, they have worked. 4. Thereafter, notice has been issued to the terminated employees by the State Government which has been published in daily Newspaper “Prabhat Khabar” dated 05.08.2003 for filing show cause. Further thereafter, a High Power Committee was constituted on 18.05.2004 and the Committee after considering the show cause, came to the conclusion that the termination is valid and justified. 5. Against such stand of the State Government, industrial dispute has been raised by some of the employees, which has been referred vide Reference Case No.8 of 2006 before Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hazaribagh. After considering the materials and evidence available on record, vide order dated 01.12.2006, award has been decided in favour of the workmen. Against the said award, writ petition has been filed, which is still pending. Another set employees had also moved before this Court by filing W.P.(L) No.3919 of 2008 which has been allowed in favour of the workmen on 25.01.2012. Thus, there is some order by High Court as well as Labour Court in favour of the removed employees. 6. These petitioners have filed present writ petition against the order dated 05.08.2014 whereby their claim, for reference, neither rejected nor allowed, rather advisory jurisdiction has been exercised unknown to law and advise has been extended for moving to the court of law. 7. Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment passed in Civil Appeal No.5140 of 2019 (Sunil Vasudeva & Ors. 7. Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment passed in Civil Appeal No.5140 of 2019 (Sunil Vasudeva & Ors. Versus Sundar Gupta & Ors.) arising out of SLP(C)No.5449 of 2015 by Apex Court in 02.07.2018, especially para-31, which is quoted herein below: “31. In the given facts and circumstances, we are not inclined to dilate the issues on merits raised in the Writ Petition No. 18500(w) of 1985 filed at the instance of the respondents before the High Court of Calcutta, but if the civil suit was not maintainable as alleged in view of Section 293 of the Income Tax Act and this was the purported defence of the respondents and of the Income Tax Department and consequential effect to the order dated 8th September, 1965 of which a reference has been made by us. No party could be left remediless and whatever the grievance the party has raised before the Court of law, has to be examined on its own merits. In our considered view, there appears no error being committed by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment dated 24th September, 2014 in exercise of its review jurisdiction and that needs no interference by this Court.” 8. On the strength of the above decision, it has been submitted by the counsel for the petitioners that no person can be made remediless. 9. Counsel for the petitioners has also relied upon the judgment passed by Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava (2015) 1 SCC 347 , especially para-22, which is quoted hereinbelow : 22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under. 22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence. 10. 10. Referring above judgment, submission has been made by the counsel for the petitioners that since there was positive order in favour of similarly situated employees by the court of law, either same benefit should be extended to the petitioners or reference should have been made for deciding the claim on merit, especially when they all had been removed by common order. 11. On the other hand, counsel for the State has submitted that there is delay by the employees in raising industrial dispute and as such, it is a stale claim. 12. It is admitted position that altogether 883 persons were appointed and they have been terminated by single order and all stand on similar footing. Some have taken favourable order not only from the High Court but also from the Labour Court. It is mandate of our Constitution that similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. It is as per the State litigation policy also. Litigation policy reveals, that if citizen is entitled for the benefit and so declared by any court of law, similarly situated persons must be granted same relief to avoid further litigation. 13. Be that as it may, the impugned order is bad due to non-exercising of jurisdiction. The concerned government has been authorized to consider the dispute and to refer the same or not to refer. 14. In the present case, the jurisdiction has not been exercised rather advise has been extended, which is not permissible in law. 15. In view of the above discussion, part of the letter, as contained in Letter No.515 dated 05.08.2014, passed by Deputy Labour Commissioner, Hazaribagh is, hereby, quashed and the matter is remanded to the Secretary, Department of Labour, Employment & Training, Govt. of Jharkhand, Ranchi, for passing appropriate order under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 16. It is expected that the order will be passed within two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 17. With the above observation and direction, this writ petition is allowed and disposed of.