JUDGMENT : TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN, J. 1. The appellants are the defendants, who have suffered a decree at the hands of the learned trial Court and the same stands affirmed by the learned first Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 6.8.2014, constraining them to file the instant appeal. The parties shall be referred to as the ‘plaintiffs’ and the ‘defendants’. 2. Brief facts of the case as enumerated in the plaint are that Smt. Janki, who died during the pendency of the suit, entered into agreements with the plaintiffs for sale of land comprised in Khasra No. 41 (2-1 bighas) and 43 (4-2 bighas), Khata/Khatauni Nos. 5 min/5 min, situated in village Banehra, Pargana Dharampur, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. (for short ‘Suit Land’) vide agreements dated 14.6.2007 Ex.P-1 and dated 29.6.2007, Ex.P-2, with the plaintiffs. As per agreement Ex. P-1, she agreed to sell land measuring 4 bighas 2 biswas to the plaintiffs for total sale consideration of Rs.1,64,000/- as well as vide agreement Ex.P-2, dated 29.6.2007, land measuring 2 bighas 1 biswa was agreed to be sold for sale consideration of Rs.82,000/-. It was averred by the plaintiffs that they paid Rs.1,40,000/- and Rs.12,000/- to said Janki at the time of execution of agreements Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2, respectively. At the time of execution of agreements, Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2, the remaining sale consideration was agreed to be paid on 20.8.2007 and 30.9.2007, respectively. The plaintiffs paid an amount of Rs.24,000/- on 20.8.2017 as per Ex.P-1 and with the consent of parties, date of execution of sale deed was extended upto 5.3.2008 and qua this endorsement was made in the presence of witnesses. The plaintiffs paid Rs.60,000/- as per Ex.P-2 and with consent of the parties, the date of execution of sale was extended upto 5.3.2008 and endorsement qua this was made in the presence of the witnesses on 30.9.2007. The remaining sale consideration of the amount of Rs.10,000/- was agreed to be paid at the time of execution of sale deed on 5.3.2008. It was specifically pleaded by the plaintiffs that they remained present in the office of Sub Registrar, Nalagarh on 5.3.2008 alongwith remaining sale consideration in order to perform their part of agreement, but said Smt. Janki did not come to perform her part of contract. It was specifically pleaded by the plaintiffs that they remained present in the office of Sub Registrar, Nalagarh on 5.3.2008 alongwith remaining sale consideration in order to perform their part of agreement, but said Smt. Janki did not come to perform her part of contract. Thereafter, the plaintiffs personally approached her with the request to perform her part of contract but she tried to linger on the matter on one pretext or the other. The plaintiffs then issued a legal notice to defendant No.1 through counsel on 7.3.2008 and asked her to come to the office of Sub Registrar on 20.3.2008 to perform her part of contract. Notice was duly served upon her but she did not file any reply nor did she come to the office of Sub Registrar to execute the sale deed. The plaintiffs marked their presence by swearing on an affidavit on 20.3.2008 before the Notary Public. It was further averred that the plaintiffs came to know on 29.4.2008 that said Janki, defendant No.1, gifted the land in favour of defendant No.2, who is son of her husband from second wife by executing a false and frivolous transaction, vide gift deed No.1075/2008, dated 23.4.2008, registered with Sub Registrar, Nalagarh. It was averred by the plaintiffs that the said gift deed was executed by defendant No.1 in connivance with defendant No.2 to frustrate the legal rights of the plaintiffs and defendant No.2 was having complete knowledge of the agreements as they were members of one family. It was pleaded that the plaintiffs always remained ready and willing to perform and are still ready to perform their part of contract and sought grant of decree for possession by way of specific performance of the contracts and also sought declaration to the effect that gift deed No.1075, dated 23.4.2008 was wrong and void and in alternative, prayed for recovery of damages to the tune of Rs.3,40,000/- alongwith interest. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants by filing written statement wherein preliminary objections qua maintainability, cause of action, locus standi, valuation and plaintiffs having suppressed the material facts, were raised. On merits, it was admitted that defendant No.1 was owner in possession of the suit land. They denied the execution of agreements dated 14.6.2007 and 29.6.2007. The suit of the plaintiffs was stated to be baseless and liable to be dismissed. On merits, it was admitted that defendant No.1 was owner in possession of the suit land. They denied the execution of agreements dated 14.6.2007 and 29.6.2007. The suit of the plaintiffs was stated to be baseless and liable to be dismissed. They further pleaded that defendant No.1 had no male issue from her husband and her husband contracted second marriage with Smt. Chinto as per customary rights prevailing in the area and her husband gave the suit land to her in lieu of maintenance and to adjust both the wives. Out of the said wedlock, three sons and four daughters were born. Both wives and children were residing in a joint family and she adopted defendant No.2 as her son and they were living together for the last 16 years. She gifted the land to defendant No.2 vide gift deed dated 23.4.2008 out of her free will and without consideration and defendant No.2 became absolute owner in possession of the suit land. It was pleaded that in June, 2007, one Babu Ram resident of Banehra with two other persons came to the house of defendant No.1 in absence of defendant No.2 and said Babu Ram misled her that he would provide her widow pension from the office of SDM, Nalagarh and for this purpose he needed her thumb impression. Thereafter, Babu Ram took her thumb impressions on some papers and later on, the plaintiffs in connivance with said Babu Ram, Gur Piara, Ram Lal, son of Sh. Labha Ram, who were property dealers, converted those papers on which her thumb impressions were taken into false and frivolous agreements. The defendants came to know about false and frivolous agreements when they were summoned by the Court. There was no occasion or necessity to enter into the alleged agreements and the agreements were alleged to be wrong and not binding upon them. 4. On the basis of the pleadings, the leaned trial Court on 17.4.2006, framed the following issues: 1. Whether gift deed No. 1075, dated 23.4.2008 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 is wrong, illegal, null and void, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the agreements dated 14.6.2007 and 29.6.2007 executed by the defendants with the plaintiffs, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the decree of possession by way of specific performance of contracts dated 14.6.2007 and 29.6.2007, as alleged? OPP 4. OPP 2. Whether the agreements dated 14.6.2007 and 29.6.2007 executed by the defendants with the plaintiffs, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the decree of possession by way of specific performance of contracts dated 14.6.2007 and 29.6.2007, as alleged? OPP 4. Whether in the alternative, the plaintiffs are entitled for the recovery of Rs.3,40,000/- as alleged? OPP 5. Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi and cause of action to file the present suit? OPD 7. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fees as alleged? OPD 8. Whether the plaintiffs have suppressed the material facts from the Court? OPD 9. Relief. 5. After recording the evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 31.3.2012 decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court, the defendants assailed the same before the learned first Appellate Court, who vide judgment and decree dated 6.8.2014 affirmed the same, constraining the appellant/defendant to file the instant appeal. 6. It is vehemently argued by Mr. Rajeev Sood, learned counsel for the appellant that the learned courts below erred in not framing a proper issues especially with regard to the plaintiffs being ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. It is further averred that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below, which otherwise are perverse as it has failed to appreciate the testimonies of the witnesses. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs would argue that the findings rendered by learned courts below are based on evidence and the same cannot be interfered with by this Court. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record carefully. 7. Framing of issues is an important stage, at which the scope of the trial is determined. It is the issues that determine the scope of the trial. The real dispute between the parties is determined, the area of conflict is narrowed and the concave mirror held by the Court reflecting the pleadings of the parties pinpoints into issues the disputes, on which the two sides differ. It is the issues that determine the scope of the trial. The real dispute between the parties is determined, the area of conflict is narrowed and the concave mirror held by the Court reflecting the pleadings of the parties pinpoints into issues the disputes, on which the two sides differ. The correct decision of civil lis largely depends on correct framing of issues and correctly determining the real points in controversy, which need to be decided. 8. Order XIV Rule 1 CPC reads as under: 1. Framing of issues.- (1) Issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other. (2)Material propositions arc those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence. (3) Each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by the other shall form the subject of distinct issue. (4) Issues are of two kinds: (a) Issues of fact, (b) Issues of law. (5) At the first hearing of the suit the Court shall, after reading the plaint and the written statements if any, and 1 [after examination under rule 2 of Order X and after hearing the parties or their pleaders], as certain upon what material propositions of fact or of law the parties are at variance, and shall thereupon proceed to frame and record the issues on which the right decision of the case appears to depend. (6) Nothing is this rule requires the Court to frame and record issued where the defendant at the first hearing of the suit makes no defence. 9. The scheme of Order XIV CPC dealing with settlement of issues shows that an issue arises, when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other. Therefore, each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by other should form the subject of a distinct issue. 10. Now, what would be the result of omission to frame issues or omission to frame proper issues would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 11. Therefore, each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by other should form the subject of a distinct issue. 10. Now, what would be the result of omission to frame issues or omission to frame proper issues would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 11. The true scope of Order XIV Rule 1 CPC is that evidence led in, on an issue, on which the parties actually went to trial, should not be made the foundation for decision of another and different issue, which was not present to the minds of the parties and on which, they had no opportunity of adducing evidence, however, it may be clarified that the Rule would have no application to a case, where the parties go to a trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue, though no specific issue has been framed thereon and adduce evidence relating thereto. 12. Adverting to the facts of the case, it would be noticed that issue No.3 framed by learned trial Court is very wide and encompasses therein the requirement of the plaintiffs being ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and reads thus: “3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the decree of possession by way of specific performance of contracts dated 14.6.2007 and 29.6.2007, as alleged? OPP” 13. As regards the non-consideration of the evidence on record, it needs to be noticed that the judgment passed by learned first appellate Court is one of affirmance where it is only generally required to agree with the findings of the learned trial Court and is not required to re-state the evidence. Yet in the present case, the first appellate Court has taken pains to discuss in detail the pleadings as also the evidence of the parties to which no exception can be taken. 14. It would be noticed that the case of the plaintiffs is based on agreements Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2, which the defendants claims to have not been executed by her. Plaintiffs have examined PW-1 Anuradha Sharma, Notary Public, who attested the document Ex.P-1 and in examination stated that agreement had been presented by Janki for attestation. It was read over to her and other parties, who after admitting the same to be correct, Janki thereafter put her thumb impression on the agreement at serial No. 296 of the Register. 15. Plaintiffs have examined PW-1 Anuradha Sharma, Notary Public, who attested the document Ex.P-1 and in examination stated that agreement had been presented by Janki for attestation. It was read over to her and other parties, who after admitting the same to be correct, Janki thereafter put her thumb impression on the agreement at serial No. 296 of the Register. 15. Pw-3 Gurpiara is the witness to the agreements Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 and is also witness to the endorsements Ex. P-3 and P-4. He has categorically stated that agreement Ex.P-1 was prepared in his presence and endorsement Ex.P-3 was with respect to receiving the entire payment. He states that a sum of Rs.60,000/- was paid to Janki by Gurdev Singh in his presence and remaining amount of Rs.10,000/- was to be paid on 5.3.2008 qua which endorsement Ex.P-4 was made. 16. Pw-2 Gurpal Singh is the witness to the agreement to sell land measuring 2 bighas 1 biswa to Gurdev Singh and Hari Om for sale consideration of Rs.82,000/-. As per this witness, agreement was read over to both the parties and Janki put her thumb impression over it. Plaintiff Gurdev Singh also appended his signatures and a sum of Rs.12,000/- was paid at the time of execution of the agreement and the remaining amount was agreed to be paid on 30.9.2007. 17. Plaintiff Gurdev Singh appeared as PW-4 and stated and proved on record the agreements executed by Janki in his favour on 14.6.2007 and 29.6.2007, respectively. He also deposed about the payments that were made to the defendants on different dates. He further deposed that despite legal notice, the defendants had not turned up in the office of Sub Registrar to execute the sale deed on 5.3.2008 and he was ready and willing to pay the remaining amount of Rs.10,000/-. 18. On the other hand, defendants examined Pritam Chand as DW-1, who stated that Janki on 23.4.2008 had executed a gift deed qua land measuring 12 bigha 1 biswa in favour of Ram Pal. The gift deed was prepared by Karam Chand, Advocate and he was present at the time of its execution. The same was read over to Janki, who appended her thumb impression after admitting it to be correct. In cross-examination, he admitted that Janki used to reside with Ram Pal and was physically and mentally fit. He further stated that stamp papers were purchased by Janki. The same was read over to Janki, who appended her thumb impression after admitting it to be correct. In cross-examination, he admitted that Janki used to reside with Ram Pal and was physically and mentally fit. He further stated that stamp papers were purchased by Janki. 19. Dw-2 Prem Chand has stated that on 23.4.2008 Janki executed a gift deed in favour of Ram Pal, upon which thumb impression was appended by Janki. In cross-examination, he stated that Janki used to live with defendant No.2 and used to consult defendant No.2 before doing anything. He admitted that Janki was worldly wise lady and well aware of everything. DW-3 K.C. Gautam, attested the gift deed Ex.D-1 and stated that gift deed was executed by Janki in favour of Ram Pal. In cross-examination, he admitted that Janki was worldly wise woman. 20. Defendant No.2 Ram Pal has stepped into the witness box as DW-4 and stated that his father had given 12 bighas 12 biswas of land to Janki in lieu of maintenance. He further stated that Janki was owner in possession of the land who executed gift deed in his favour on 23.4.2008. He accepted the gift and became owner in possession of the suit land. He also stated that Janki was a wise lady and he stated that Janki disclosed to him that Babu obtained her thumb impression on blank papers to get sanctioned widow pension, but till date widow pension has not been sanctioned in her favour. In cross-examination, the witness admitted that Janki was in fit mental state of mind. Further stated that he has no enmity with Ram Pal and Gurpiara and of course for that matter with the plaintiff and also for Babu Ram. He admitted that Janki was owner in possession of the suit land. This in entirety is the documentary and oral evidence led by the parties. 21. It is not in dispute that the gift deed was executed by defendant Janki in favour of defendant No.2 Ram Pal only after she had entered into an agreement of sale with the plaintiffs and after she had received the legal notice from the plaintiffs to this effect and it is with the sole purpose of defeating the claim of the plaintiffs that defendant No.1 executed a gift deed in favour of defendant No.2. 22. 22. Defendant No.1 Janki was worldly wise woman and capable of watching her interest as has been candidly admitted by her witnesses, therefore, it does not lie in her mouth to claim that she was innocent and was duped or misled to execute the agreements in question. It is nothing but an after thought coupled with the dishonest intention on her part. 23. Once the agreements Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 stand duly proved on record and are prior in point of time, then Janki was left with no residuary power to deal with the property that was subject matter of these agreements, therefore, the gift as executed by her in favour of defendant No.2 is null and void. 24. It is otherwise more than settled that the appellate Court continues to be a final court of fact and law and second appeal to the High Court lies only where there is a substantial question of law. Meaning thereby, the pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before this Court in second appeal. It shall be apt to refer to three Judge Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs, (2001) 3 SCC 179 wherein it was observed as follows: “15...... The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final Court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate Court is also a final Court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate Court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one.” 25. What would be the substantial question of law was thereafter considered in para 12 of the judgment, which reads thus: “12. The phrase ‘substantial question of law’, as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with- technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. The phrase ‘substantial question of law’, as occurring in the amended Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with- technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta & Anr. Vs. T. Ram Ditta, AIR (1928) PC 172, the phrase “‘substantial question of law” as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 of the C.P.C. (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. The Century Spinning and Manufacuring Co., Ltd., (1962) Supp3 SCR 549, the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao Vs. Noony Veeraju, (1952) ILR(Mad) 264:- “When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative view, then the question would be a substantial question of law. Noony Veeraju, (1952) ILR(Mad) 264:- “When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative view, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.” and laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial:- “The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law.” 26. Finally, in paragraph 14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the guidelines on the test of as to what is the substantial question of law, which reads thus: “14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.” 27. The findings recorded by the learned Courts below are based on the correct appreciation of the pleadings and evidence and, therefore, cannot be held to be perverse. Moreover, the findings rendered by both the learned Courts below are pure findings of fact, which are immune from challenge in second appeal. 28. No question of law much less substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. 29. Accordingly, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.