JUDGMENT 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. 2. Petitioner was taken into custody while being caught red handed allegedly on 16 th December 2016 accepting a bribe of Rs.1 lakh by the Anti-Corruption Bureau during the period of his posting as Executive Engineer, Water Ways Division-I, Chakradharpur. Pursuant to the order of bail dated 28 th April 2017 passed in B.A. No.2957 of 2017 by a Coordinate Bench of this Court he was released from custody on 15 th July 2017. Sanction for prosecution was issued vide order bearing memo no.22 dated 9 th June 2017 (Annexure-4) by the Department of Law, Government of Jharkhand. He submitted his joining on being released through application dated 17 th July 2017 before the Joint Secretary of the Department (Annexure-5). Petitioner was placed under suspension under Rule 100 of the Jharkhand Service Code by the impugned order bearing memo no. 4703 dated 6 th November 2017 issued by the respondent Department (Annexure-6) with retrospective effect from 17 th July 2017. This aggrieved the petitioner to approach this Court in the present writ petition. Apart from the above he sought increase of subsistence allowance to 75% in terms of Rule 96 of the Jharkhand Service Code and Rule 10(1) of the Jharkhand Government Servant (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rule, 2016 as also Circular No.737 dated 27 th March 2018 issued by the Planning cum Finance Department, Government of Jharkhand. Petitioner asked for posting on a suitable post as per the seniority and also for a direction upon the respondent no.7 Accountant General, Jharkhand for issuance of correct pay slip after inclusion of transport allowance and house rent allowance w.e.f. 1 st April 2018. Now the order of suspension has been revoked as per letter no.4469 dated 23 rd October 2018 issued by the respondent Department with immediate effect (Annexure-F to the counter affidavit of the State). 3. Three prayers of the petitioner have been admittedly redressed during pendency of the writ petition. Petitioner has been given a suitable posting on deputation in the Urban Department on revocation of his suspension. Pay slip has also been issued by the Accountant General office. The only question which survives for determination is whether part of the impugned order placing the petitioner on suspension with retrospective date after his release is proper in the eye of law. Pay slip has also been issued by the Accountant General office. The only question which survives for determination is whether part of the impugned order placing the petitioner on suspension with retrospective date after his release is proper in the eye of law. This issue is no longer res- integra in view of the ratio rendered by the learned Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Bachcho Lal Das Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1983 PLJR 561 , paragraph-9 whereof the question has been answered. The learned Division Bench took note of the judgment passed in C.W.J.C. No.1861/1980 therein and observed that such a power must be derived through a statutory rule. Rule 100 reads as under :- "A Government servant against whom a criminal charge or a proceeding for arrest for debt is pending should also be placed under suspension by the issue of specific orders to this effect during periods when he is not actually detained in custody or imprisoned (e.g. while released on bail) if the charge made or proceedings taken against him is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as such or involves moral turpitude. In regard to his pay and allowances, the provisions of rule 99 shall apply." 4. In a given situation if such an order is passed, it would mean that during that period though the concerned government servant might have actually worked, but it would be deemed that he has not worked at all. [See Satya Narayan Pd. Shrivastava Vs. State of Bihar, 1978 BBCJ 208 ]. The deemed suspension of the petitioner under Rule 99 on being taken in judicial custody, would cease to have effect once he is released. A specific order under Rule 100 has to be passed to put a government servant under suspension against whom a criminal charge or a proceeding for arrest for debt is pending during the period when he is not actually detained in custody or imprisoned if the charge made or proceeding taken against him is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as such or involves moral turpitude. 5. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents State has endeavoured to defend the impugned order inter-alia on the ground that after its revocation the order impugned does not survive. Secondly petitioner was continuing in deemed suspension on being taken in judicial custody as he was never permitted to join after his release. It was well within the jurisdiction of the respondents to pass a fresh order of suspension treating him to be in suspension from the date of his release i.e. 17 th July 2017. 6. Both the arguments are fallacious. Even though order of suspension has been revoked on 23 rd October 2018 but the revocation takes place with immediate effect and not from any anterior date. The legal ground to assail the retrospectivity of the order impugned does not lose its sting on its revocation. On the other hand, pursuant to the release from judicial custody, the effect of deemed suspension ceases to operate. In this regard reliance is placed upon another judgment of the learned Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Satya Narayan Pd. Shrivastava Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1978 BBCJ 208 . The opinion of the Court contained at paragraph-6 on this point is quoted hereunder :- "If it is held that the order under rule 99 can remain in force till the proceeding which has been taken on a criminal charge is terminated, then there was no necessity of making a specific provision to cover that very situation under rule 100 when such person is not actually detained in custody. If rule 99 is interpreted to cover even that period, then, in my view, rule 100 will be redundant. It is well settled principle of construction that different sections or different rules should not be interpreted in a manner which may result in any of the sections or the rules being held to be redundant, and in such a situation Courts have also construed such sections and rules in a harmonious manner so as to give justification for their existence. In my opinion, applying the aforesaid principle the two rules have to be interpreted to mean that under rule 99 a Government servant is to be considered as under suspension only for the period during which he is detained in custody or is undergoing imprisonment. In my opinion, applying the aforesaid principle the two rules have to be interpreted to mean that under rule 99 a Government servant is to be considered as under suspension only for the period during which he is detained in custody or is undergoing imprisonment. After he is released from custody, then in order to put him under suspension, a specific order under rule 100 has to be passed." 7. Therefore, that part of the order impugned which makes it retrospectively applicable w.e.f. 17 th July 2017 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Moreover petitioner was released from judicial custody on 15 th July 2017 and not 17 th July 2017. Even if that part of the order goes, petitioner would be treated as under suspension from the date of the order i.e. 6 th November 2017 till it was revoked on 23 rd October 2018. Thus, the order of suspension would not have continued for more than 12 months to enable the petitioner to seek enhancement of subsistence allowance in terms of Rule 10(1) of the CCA Rule 2016. As such, the second prayer of the petitioner is not tenable in law. In view of the quashing of the impugned order so far as it operates retrospectively, respondents are required to take a fresh decision in the matter in accordance with law so far as the salary for the said period is concerned. Writ petition is partly allowed to the extent and in the manner indicated above.